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This dissertation is dedicated to my family, 
who never once questioned the wisdom of a career in history. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
amedcî –    Receiver-general of the Grand Vezir’s provincial correspondence. 
 
 
anadolu muhâsebecisi –  Accounting officer for the province of Anatolia.  
 
 
baş muhâsebeci –   Chief accounting officer. 
 
 
beylikçi –  Chancery official responsible for promulgation of all edicts and 
regulations except those of a financial nature; a subordinate of the 
reis efendi.  
 
 
büyük rûznamçe/tezkireci –  Secretary and paymaster of the imperial council. 
 
 
defterdâr –    The empire’s chief treasury official. 
 
 
fetvâ emîni –    Head of the office dealing with religious opinions or fatwas. 
 
 
hacegân –  Bureau chiefs of the Ottoman administration; the highest level of 
the chancery.  
 
 
kethüdâ bey –  The Grand Vezir’s deputy, who acted as his secretary and managed 
his correspondence.  
 
 
kapıcıbaşı –    Head of the palace doorkeepers 
 
 
kapudan-ı deryâ –   The Grand Admiral of the Ottoman navy. 
 
 
 
 x 
 
kaymakam –  A proxy, here for the Grand Vezir when on campaign. During 
wartime the Ottoman government accompanied the army in the 
field and proxies were left in the capital to duplicate their normal 
functions.  
 
mektûbî –  Official who managed the correspondence bureau of the Grand 
Vezir. 
 
 
reisülküttâb –  Official in charge of the chancery scribes and secretaries in the 
financial administration. The reis was the head of the chancery and 
also, in the eighteenth century, assumed direction of foreign affairs.  
 
 
sefâretnâme –  The official report of an Ottoman ambassador, submitted after his 
return from abroad. 
 
 
serasker –    Military commander. 
 
 
şeyhülislâm –    The highest religious official in the empire; the chief jurisconsult.  
 
 
sırkâtibi –    Privy secretary to the sultan. 
 
 
tevkî‘î –  Chancellor; responsible for validating official documents and 
affixing the sultan’s seal thereto.  
 
 
vekâyi‘nüvis –   Official court chronicler. 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
 
This study uses a modified Modern Turkish script to render Ottoman Turkish names, titles, terms, 
and constructs. In general, I adhere to the original orthography and indicate long vowels with a 
circumflex (Â, â, Î, î, Û, û); I omit the glottal consonants ‘ayn (‘) and hamza (’), which are 
unvoiced in Turkish, except where absolutely necessary, as in the transliteration of extended 
passages and key technical terms. For non-specialists the following letters may be unfamiliar: 
 
C,c  –  pronounced “j” as in “jam.” 
Ç,ç – pronounced “ch” as in “cheese.” 
Ğ,ğ  – this “soft g” is mostly unvoiced and lengthens the preceding vowel.    
I,ı  – pronounced like the first syllable in “early.” 
Ö,ö  –  pronounced as in German “schön” or the French “seul.” 
Ş,ş  –  pronounced “sh” as in “shoe.” 
Ü,ü  –  pronounced as in German or the French “tu.” 
 
 For Arabic and Persian names, terms, and text, I have followed the transliteration system 
employed by the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES), which uses diacritics to 
more accurately reflect the script. In all cases I have preferred, where they exist, Anglicized 
versions of place names and titles like “sultan,” “sufi,” and “ulema.” Unless otherwise noted, all 
source translations are my own. 
1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In his work Ahlâk-ı Alâî, the Ottoman moralist Kınâlızâde Ali Çelebi (d. 1571) reckons two 
distinct types of ignorance: simple and compound. The first type means simply not knowing 
something, which alone is not blameworthy. The second is more pernicious. Compound 
ignorance is two-fold in that the individual does not know something and thinks they do; it is a 
vice because they are willfully ignorant of their own ignorance.
1
 
This dissertation, an investigation into the life and work of the eighteenth century 
historian and statesman Ahmed Ebülbekâ Hasan al-Harbûtî (d. 1806), called Vâsıf Efendi, might 
be described as a testament to both simple and compound ignorance. On one hand, it tries to 
evoke the intellectual effervescence of a little-known milieu. For all the attention devoted to 
eighteenth century Ottoman reform, particularly to the reigns of Mustafa III (1757-1774), 
Abdülhamid I (1774-1789), and Selim III (1789-1807), and for all the scholarship on these early 
attempts at European-style administrative and military modernization, very little research has 
explored the underlying moral and mental climate – a peculiar outpouring of energy in response 
to the shock of defeat and imperial collapse. Jane Hathaway has called intellectual history the 
biggest “lacuna” in the study of the Ottoman eighteenth century.2 Utilizing Vâsıf and his 
                                                 
1
  Kınâlızâde Ali, Ahlâk-ı Alâî, ed. Mustafa Koç (İstanbul, 2007), 170-174. Also Gottfried 
Hagen, “The Order of Knowledge, the Knowledge of Order: Intellectual Life,” in The 
Cambridge History of Turkey (Cambridge, 2013), 2: 407.  
2
  Jane Hathaway, “Rewriting Eighteenth Century Ottoman History,” Mediterranean Historical 
Review 19 (2004): 38-42. Some notable exceptions to this statement are Virginia H. Aksan, 
An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700-1783 (Leiden, 1995); 
Kemal Beydilli, “Küçük Kaynarca'dan Tanzimat'a Islâhât Düşünceleri,” İlmî Araştırmalar 8 
2 
 
voluminous body of writing, this study seeks to dispel some of our simple ignorance of late 
eighteenth century intellectual life.  
 On the other hand, I became dimly aware during my research that this work would 
inevitably suffer from a good deal of compound ignorance, my own. Probably this is common to 
all biography. Although my original intention had been a strictly historiographical study, 
evaluating Vâsıf’s historical output in view of his life and career, he seemed to recede in the 
same measure that I moved forward. The more personal detail I unearthed, the fuzzier he 
became; the more I learned about the man, the more I realized how little I knew or indeed could 
ever know. The once familiar historian grew less distinct. What is more, there seemed to be 
many missing pieces even where my knowledge about him was more certain, arguments without 
context, barbs without targets, and addresses without a clear audience. Gradually I shifted away 
from Vâsıf strictly as an individual to Vâsıf as a member of and an important contributor to a 
wider intellectual milieu, and it was there that the project crystallized in its present form. Rather 
than study Vâsıf as an isolated mind, I have tried connect his work to the larger controversies 
that occupied the empire’s late eighteenth century elites. I do not pretend that this treatment is 
comprehensive. But, at the least, I hope that it will provide the outlines for fuller, future study. 
 
Ahmed Vâsıf: His World and Corpus 
Before moving to the subject of this study, Vâsıf Efendi, it is necessary by way of introduction to 
say a few words about his world.  Norman Itzkowitz once wrote that “success spoiled the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1999): 25-64; Kahraman Şakul, “Nizâm-ı Cedîd Düşüncesinde Batılılaşma ve İslami 
Modernleşme,” İlmî Araştırmalar 19 (2005): 117-150; Fatih Yeşil’s detailed biography, 
Aydınlanma Çağında bir Osmanlı Kâtibi: Ebubekir Râtib Efendi (1750-1799) (İstanbul, 
2010); and Aysel Yıldız, “Vaka-yı Selimiyye or the Selimiyye Incident: A Study of the May 
1807 Rebellion.” (Ph.D. diss., Sabancı Üniversitesi, 2008).  
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Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century.”3 There is certain truth to this sentiment. While the 
century began inauspiciously in 1699 at Karlowitz, which ended the vitiating War of the Holy 
League (1683-1699), for the next seventy years the empire enjoyed enough success to breed a 
false sense of security. Abroad, they balanced losses at Karlowitz and Passarowitz (1718) with 
the capture of Azov (1711) and the Morea, regained in 1715 from Venice. The 1739 Treaty of 
Belgrade rewarded their three-year struggle against Russia and Austria with Belgrade, parts of 
Wallachia, and thirty years of peace. At home, meanwhile, Ottoman fiscalism triumphed. 
Alongside general economic expansion, contracted tax-farm yields grew tenfold between 1703 
and 1768 and accounted for upwards of fifty percent of total revenues,
4
 prosperity that was 
reflected in Istanbul, where the elite built waterfront villas and pleasure domes and followed the 
royal household up and down the Bosphorus on seasonal villegiaturas. They would look back on 
this time as an Edwardian summer of unending feasts, garden parties, and entertainments.
5
 
The Ottoman elite, of which Vâsıf was one, were the instruments of eighteenth century 
change. They belonged not just to the dynasty and imperial administration but represented a 
number of interest groups that identified as Ottoman, recognized the legitimacy of the dynasty, 
and, aligning their interests with Istanbul, “cemented” a consensus that held the regime together.6 
                                                 
3
 Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote, eds., Mubadele: An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of 
Ambassadors (Chicago, 1970), 1. 
4
 Ariel Salzmann, “An Ancien Régime Revisited: ‘Privatization’ and Political Economy in the 
Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” Politics and Society 21 (1993): 405. Cf. the remarks of 
Bruce McGowan in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, ed. 
Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge, 1994), 710-739.  
5
 Shirine Hamadeh evokes this zeitgeist well, though I am less convinced of the empirical basis 
of her other claims. The City's Pleasures: Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century (Seattle, 2007). 
6
 On a consensus at the heart of the Ottoman regime, see Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman, ix-x; 
Rifaat Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to 
Eighteenth Centuries (Albany, NY, 1991); Ariel Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman 
Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State (Leiden, 2004); Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman 
Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (Cambridge, 2010). 
4 
 
The empire’s success or failure in meeting its challenges depended in large measure on their 
reaction. The eighteenth century elite was moreover larger and more diffuse than in the sixteenth 
or early seventeenth centuries. The rise of great households and growth in tax-farming, 
especially with lifetime malikâne grants in 1695, meant that power no longer concentrated only 
at the center. Decentralization bound provincial “interlocutors” – tax-farmers, Janissaries, semi-
autonomous magnates called a‘yân, and others – to the regime, making for a flexible if 
precarious coalition. The eighteenth century, then, at least in part, is the story of holding this 
consensus: “a hundred-year struggle of the Ottoman dynasty and its affiliated households to 
preserve the old order.”7  
 Although scholars once regarded the eighteenth century as the era of decline par 
excellence, today most prefer to view it through a model of “crisis and change” whereby the 
empire responded dynamically to internal and external pressures.
8 
There is much to commend in 
this view. “Crisis and change” permits us to see Ottomans as active, rational agents working for 
their own and the realm’s preservation and interests. Accordingly, fiscal decentralization was a 
rational adaptation and, at least for a time, a very successful one. Yet it must be said that 
“change” is too vague a term to be very useful and far too nondescript to satisfy. It says little, for 
                                                                                                                                                             
Also Gottfried Hagen's remark that legitimacy of the governor “is founded upon a consensus 
between government and governed,” “Legitimacy and World Order,” in Legitimizing the 
Order: Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power, ed. Hakan Karateke and Marcus Reinkowski 
(Leiden, 2005), 56. 
7
 Virginia Aksan, “War and Peace,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey (Cambridge, 2006), 3: 
113-114. See also Carter Findley, “Political Culture and the Great Households,” in ibid, 3: 65-
66; Engin Akarlı, “Ottoman Historiography,” Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 30 
(1996): 34-36. 
8
 Aksan and Hathaway forcefully argue this model. An Ottoman Statesman; idem, “Locating 
the Ottomans Among Early Modern Empires,” in Ottomans and Europeans: Contacts and 
Conflicts (Istanbul, 2004), 81-110; Hathaway, “Problems of Periodization in Ottoman 
History: the Fifteenth through the Eighteenth Centuries,” Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 
20 (1996): 25-31; idem, “Rewriting Eighteenth Century Ottoman History,” 29-53.  
5 
 
example, about how these individuals specifically responded to their world. More to the point of 
this study, it says nothing about how, during the century’s turbulent end, Ottomans, especially 
the elites, understood and rationalized the empire’s reverses, or about how well they faced the 
frailty of their worldviews. “Change” as a model says nothing of this. In fact, to Vâsıf and his 
peers the world did not appear to be changing; it seemed to be sliding inexorably into chaos. 
In this regard, the 1768-1774 war with Russia can be considered the century's turning 
point. It is fair to say that many Ottomans had been overconfident and were shocked by the war's 
outcome. It is also accurate to date to 1774 a cascading series of crises in the empire, both 
political and ideological.
9
 The Ottoman military had not kept pace with new European 
technologies and tactics. Moreover, decentralized power proved dysfunctional in war and a 
hindrance to efficiently raising men and revenue, functions contracted to provincial notables. 
Preserving the old order required some modicum of reform. The problem, however, was that 
reform must shift the balance of power in the “loosely maintained federation” of Ottoman 
elites.
10
 Restructuring the military or provincial administration would impinge on Janissary, 
a‘yân, or other interests and provoke opposition. Rulers like Ahmed III (1703-1730), Mahmud I 
(1730-1754), Abdulhamid I, and even Selim III were only too aware of this fact. Eighteenth 
century reform was hence ad hoc and partial, sufficient to preserve the status quo and hold 
consensus, but rarely much more.   
 During the last quarter of the eighteenth century the Ottoman elite struggled mightily 
against itself. The turbulent political life of the period suggests a breakdown in consensus as well 
                                                 
9
 On the war as the turning point of the eighteenth century, I follow among others Aksan, “War 
and Peace,” 3: 81-117; Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri,” 25-64; McGowan, 639-645; and 
Christoph Neumann, “Political and Diplomatic Developments,” in The Cambridge History of 
Turkey, 3: 44-64. 
10 
The phrase belongs to Aksan, “War and Peace,” 3: 117. 
6 
 
as a deep moral and intellectual crisis. Wars with Russia, Austria, and France threatened to dispel 
the illusion of Ottoman military exceptionalism, the elite's ideological glue. And though frequent 
policy shifts in the 1770s and 1780s gave way to a measure of stability under Selim III, who 
oversaw ambitious reforms, the situation remained fragile. Selim's eventual deposition, murder, 
and the purging of his supporters suggest that the crisis went unresolved. By 1808 the regime 
was beset by paralysis and failing legitimacy, the old order unable to support itself.  
If this is a grim picture,
11
 it should nonetheless not obscure the fact that important 
changes were occuring in the eighteenth century. Ottomans of all stripes and characters – 
military commanders, propagandists, statesmen, shills, intellectuals, earnest objectors, and 
cynical opportunists – all responded creatively to preserve the old order, even if, ultimately, 
political action proved ineffectual. This study attempts to investigate how they did so and what 
their main concerns were, concentrating on the efforts of Vâsıf Efendi, perhaps the most 
towering of their number.  
Born in Baghdad in the 1730s, Vâsıf served the empire for nearly forty years as a 
chancery scribe, negotiator, ambassador, and court historian (vekâyi‘nüvis). As we shall shortly 
see, he was well-traveled and highly-placed, his duties bringing him into contact with a 
                                                 
11 
In light of recent treatments, I fully realize that this interpretation of the eighteenth century 
might be controversial. For this I make no apologies. Although I am no declinist, the attempts 
of revisionists to portray the eighteenth century as a period of Ottoman resurgence, or even 
one of renaissance, deserves push-back. It is true, for example, as Ariel Salzmann and others 
have pointed out, that decentralization does not make “decline.” Yet it is much less certain 
that there was, in her words, “rarely a net devolution of state power” in the arrangement 
(“Ancien Régime Revisited,” 405). If judged only on the state's ability to defend itself and 
project power over borders, the late eighteenth century empire was weaker than the late 
seventeenth century empire. Indeed, it was enfeebled. My own reading of the century neither 
attributes this weakness to intrinsic cultural factors nor discounts the empire’s adaptability, 
but it does see an Ottoman elite stumbling from one crisis to the next, enacting ad hoc reforms 
enough to allow them to preserve the status quo and hold consensus. By 1808 they were 
virtually paralyzed. Does the eighteenth century, then, bring us to the limits of “crisis and 
change”? I have yet to be convinced otherwise.  
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surprising number of Enlightenment-era personalities: Russian generals Piotr Rumiantsev and 
Nikolai Repnin, Carlos III of Spain, the English littérateur William Beckford, the Spanish 
admiral Don Federico Gravina, and Catherine the Great. As an intellectual Vâsıf was meanwhile 
one of the most formidable Ottomans of the eighteenth century. His corpus includes a divan of 
poetry, an embassy report (sefâretnâme), and short works of belles-lettres, geography, and 
printing in addition to a history covering the entire second half of the century (roughly, 1753-
1805). By all lights he was willful, opinionated, and highly involved in the political and 
intellectual controversies of his day.  
 Vâsıf's most important work, however, is his vast court chronicle Mehâsinü’l–Âsâr ve 
Hakâikü’l–Ahbâr (The Charms and Truths of Relics and Annals). Perhaps the most extensive 
Ottoman histories of the eighteenth century belong to the office of the court historian. The 
vekâyi‘nüvis recorded the dynasty's contemporary history as a salaried official, usually while 
serving simultaneously in other posts, and submitted his work to the sultan in regular 
installments. During the eighteenth century over thirteen men served as court historian. Their 
efforts, like Vâsıf's, number thousands of folios and remain mostly unpublished.12  
 Current literature on Ottoman court historians leaves much to be desired. For one, there 
have been very few attempts at all to study them individually or as a group. Only one monograph 
on an eighteenth century vekâyi‘nüvis exists, which, though brilliant, is now some seventy years 
old. To this we can add another admirable study of the nineteenth century historian Ahmed 
Cevdet.
13
 There is also a persistent misunderstanding surrounding how these men, as it were, 
                                                 
12
 Bekir Kütükoğlu's long article remains the most useful survey, “Vekayi‘nüvis,” in 
Vekayi‘nüvis Makaleler (İstanbul, 1994), 103-138.  
13
 Respectively, Lewis V. Thomas, A Study of Naima (New York, 1972); Christoph Neumann, 
Araç Tarih, Amaç Tanzimat: Tarih-i Cevdet'in Siyasi Anlamı, trans. Meltem Arun (İstanbul, 
1999). Itzkowitz lamented this lack of scholarship in his 1959 doctoral dissertation. Little has 
8 
 
“did history.” The view that vekâyi‘nüvises were colorless scribes, amanuenses who recorded the 
past in a neutral, Rankean light, can for instance be found in a number of studies. Rhoads 
Murphey claims that court historians gave “minutely-detailed, factually accurate description; in 
other words to attempt to portray the world wie es eigentlich gewesen.”14 Bernard Lewis remarks 
approvingly on their “frankness” in a tradition that, on the whole, “[told] it like it was.”15 Most 
recently, and most problematically, Baki Tezcan has asserted on multiple occasions that Ottoman 
court historians, anticipating von Ranke, provided “secular” and “positivist” accounts and were 
seen as “neutral...bearers of historical truth.”16  
Such conclusions appear to have been made without a sound understanding of Ottoman 
historiographical traditions or serious recourse to the histories themselves. This dissertation 
attempts quite the opposite – to evaluate Vâsıf’s work as the self-contained product of an 
individual operating within a distinct intellectual milieu. To Vâsıf, as to others, history was 
inherently didactic and useful above all for its political and moral examples. He was by no means 
                                                                                                                                                             
changed in the interim. “Mehmed Raghib Pasha: the Making of an Ottoman Grand Vezir” 
(Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1959), 180-181. During my final edits for this work, I 
came across a treatment by Robert Charles Bond, “The Office of the Ottoman Court Historian 
or Vak‘anüvis, 1714-1922: an Institutional and Prosopographic Study” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of California Los Angeles, 2004), but was unable to consult it. Nor, it seems, has 
Bond ever published on the topic.  
14
 Rhoads Murphey, “Ottoman Historical Writing in the Seventeenth-Century: A Survey of the 
General Development of the Genre after the Reign of Sultan Ahmed I (1603-1617),” in 
Essays on Ottoman Historians and Historiography (İstanbul, 2009), 93. 
15
 Bernard Lewis, “Reflections on Islamic Historiography,” Middle East Lectures 2 (1997): 77. 
16
 Tezcan, “The Politics of Early Modern Ottoman Historiography,” in The Early Modern 
Ottomans: Remapping the Empire, ed. Virginia Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge, 
2007), 180, 183, 196-197; idem, “Ottoman Historical Writing,” in The Oxford History of 
Historical Writing, ed. José Rabasa et al (Oxford, 2011), 3: 200-201; idem, The Second 
Empire, 196, 198. For dissenting views, Gottfried Hagen and Ethan L. Menchinger, “Ottoman 
Historical Thought,” in A Companion to Global Historical Thought (Oxford, 2014), 92-106; 
Ethan L. Menchinger, “‘Gems for Royal Profit’: Prefaces and the Practice of Eighteenth-
Century Ottoman Court History,” Uluslararası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi 2:2 (2010): 127-
151. 
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“neutral” but actively interpreted history. What is more, unlike earlier court historians Vâsıf, 
commissioned by Sultan Selim III, edited and rewrote the work of at least seven predecessors. 
He was, quite literally, rewriting the history of his empire. Seen in this way, his corpus expresses 
a set of values and concerns, a way of viewing the world, shared by his patron the sultan and a 
powerful part of Ottoman society.  
The biggest challenge of this study has been to establish these concerns, for Vâsıf and his 
peers drew on an immense cultural and intellectual heritage in philosophy, theology, law, and 
ethics, all with specialized vocabularies. Keeping well in mind, to quote an eloquent phrase, that 
“the critical mind must also be joined with the sympathetic heart to get the most out of an 
Ottoman chronicle,”17 I have tried to isolate some of these strands and at the same time present 
them comprehensibly both in their intellectual genealogy and in the author’s immediate context. 
The reader will therefore notice continuity as one recurring theme. Vâsıf and his fellows were 
not engaged in the radical re-making of their society but drew on tried and true conceptual 
frameworks, some of them very ancient, to understand and attempt to solve the empire’s plight. 
A work of this sort has to proceed on the assumption that these frameworks and their keywords 
were not deployed as clichés or empty rhetoric, but served a definite purpose in contemporary 
intellectual discourse. They are signposts that orient us in an otherwise forbidding wilderness.  
Another major theme, carried through all chapters, is a basic disagreement among 
eighteenth century Ottomans over the legitimate place of human reason and action across life’s 
many spheres. Whether in their discussions of fatalism and historical agency, in the conduct of 
war and peace, in personal ethics and responsibility, or in political reform, Vâsıf and his peers 
were deeply engrossed in a contest over human limitations, the place of man in the universe, and 
                                                 
17
 Itzkowitz, “Mehmed Raghib Pasha,” 182. 
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the boundaries of the earthly and heavenly, the secular and the divine. This is perhaps the most 
striking discovery of the study and, at least for the moment, one I cannot fully explain. 
Nonetheless, it is there, and leads us to the consideration of how the eighteenth century shaped 
Ottoman minds, how it undermined many of very same conceptual frameworks we will discuss, 
and how it ultimately contributed to the makings of a distinctly Ottoman modernity. These are 
not considerations I will fully try to answer; I thankfully leave them to other, less fortunate souls.  
In addition to Vâsıf’s work and secondary studies, I have relied heavily in my research on 
archival sources, contemporary histories, and works of Ottoman ethics, law, political thought, 
philosophy, and theology in both Turkish and Arabic. The archival sources come largely from 
the Prime Minister’s Archives (BOA) in Istanbul. I have also had to access many non-archival 
primary sources in manuscript, in Istanbul, Vienna, and elsewhere, although some of these have 
been published or are at least edited as theses and dissertations. Vâsıf’s corpus presents an 
especial challenge in that, as will be seen below, it is almost entirely unedited and unpublished 
and its pieces are scattered among different volumes throughout the world’s major manuscript 
libraries. I need to reiterate my thanks for the help I received in collecting these pieces.  
The dissertation consists of five chapters, each focused on a major element in Vâsıf’s 
work. Chapter One introduces his life and career, including a biographical section on his travels, 
posts, and publications, a discussion of his history’s overall structure and content, and an 
analysis of his epistemology and conceptualization of history as a field of knowledge. Chapter 
Two looks more closely at Vâsıf’s “philosophy of history,” proposing that the way in which he 
presents historical dynamics stresses human agency and the importance of action, or what we 
might call a “reformist philosophy of history.” Chapter Three treats war, peace, and 
peacemaking, and the way in which the historian justified peace throughout his career. Chapter 
11 
 
Four moves to Vâsıf’s view of the moral universe, how he joined history, knowledge, and 
morality in the Persianate tradition of “practical philosophy” or hikmet-i ‘ameliyye, and to his 
understanding of political thought, including the ideal ruler and order. Finally, in Chapter Five I 
examine Vâsıf’s views on political reform. In all instances, the historian proves to represent only 
one facet of a very diverse spectrum of Ottoman opinion.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
History as Magistra Vitae: Ahmed Vâsıf's Life and Work 
 
Writing over the course of twenty years, Ahmed Vâsıf Efendi left one of the largest Ottoman 
chronicles of the eighteenth century: over 1,800 folios in manuscript, of which most remains 
unpublished and, hence, under-utilized. Before exploring this immense work's themes more 
closely, it is necessary to describe its development within the author's life and career.  
 This chapter reconstructs Vâsıf's biography, intellectual formation, and approach to 
historical writing. Based on an array of archival and narrative sources, it places his chronicle 
firmly in a tradition of moralizing, didactic historiography. Vâsıf, like other Ottomans, held that 
history should impart lessons. Indeed, he considered his work valuable precisely for the guidance 
it offered to statesmen on a variety of subjects – ethical, practical, political – and made an 
explicit link between historical knowledge and morality. It is no surprise, then, that the chronicle 
engages with partisan questions and provides commentary on many of the pressing issues of the 
late eighteenth century. Far from a “neutral” record, this was history as magistra vitae – a 
“teacher of life.” 
 
A Portrait of an Eighteenth Century Historian 
Very little is known about Ahmed Vâsıf's birth, family, or youth.18 Rather uncharacteristically, 
the author says nothing whatsoever about his early life. One certainty is that he was born in 
                                                 
18 There is no need here for a full narrative of Vâsıf’s life. The following section relies heavily 
on İlgürel’s pioneering work in Mehâsinü’l–Âsâr ve Hakâikü’l–Ahbâr, ed. Mücteba İlgürel 
(İstanbul, 1978), xix-xlvii and İA, s.v. “Vâsıf,” but also on Kütükoğlu, “Vekayi‘nüvis,” 103-
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Baghdad in the early decades of the eighteenth century, but the exact date is not known. Judging 
from estimates of his age made by later European and Ottoman contemporaries, it is probably 
reasonable to place his birthdate around the year 1730.
19
 We also have precious few details about 
Vâsıf's family. According to some sources, Vâsıf's full name was Ahmed b. Ebülbekâ Hasan al-
Harbûtî. His father, one Ebülbekâ Hasan, was a religious scholar (‘âlim) who taught in Baghdad. 
The adjective al-Harbûtî or “the one from Harput” indicates that the family may have originally 
hailed from the city of Harput in eastern Anatolia, near present-day Elâzığ. On the whole they 
were of modest means.
20
  
 A bit more evidence exists concerning Vâsıf's education and early activities. For one, he 
seems to have excelled in language from a young age. Ahmed Âsım relates that he studied with 
local scholars and inclined naturally to literature and epistolography, cultivating the Arabic 
linguistic sciences (‘ulûm-ı ‘arabiyye). Later, forced upon his own resources, Vâsıf applied these 
skills as a scribe and copyist to a number of Baghdadi magnates, perhaps members of the local 
Mamluk elite, and soon became known for his skilled pen.
21
 
                                                                                                                                                             
138, and cited primary sources. I intend shortly to publish an updated bibliography and 
biography of Vâsıf. 
19 Spanish sources in 1787 put him between 45 and 54 years old, Antonio Jurado Aceituno, “18. 
Yüzyılda Bir Osmanlı Elçisinin İspanya'yı Ziyareti,” Tarih ve Toplum 36 (2001): 34; Mehmet 
Necati Kutlu, “İspanyol Belgelerine Göre İspanya Nezdinde Görevlendirilen (Eyüp'te 
Medfun) İlk Osmanlı Elçisi Ahmet Vâsıf Efendi,” in Tarihi, Kültürü ve Sanatıyla IV. 
Eyüpsultan Sempozyumu Tebliğler, 5-7 Mayıs 2000 (İstanbul, 2000), 109. Ottoman sources 
claim he exceeded 70 years of age at his death in 1806, Süleyman Fâik, Sefînetü’r-Rüesâ 
(İstanbul, 1853), 149.  
20 Ismâ‘îl Bâshâ al-Baghdâdî, Hadiyyat al-‘ârifîn: asmâ al-mu’allifîn wa âthâr al-muṣannifîn 
min kashf al-ẓunûn (Beirut, 2008), 1: 166; M. Nuri Çınarcı, ed., “Şeyhülislâm Ârif Hikmet 
Bey'in Tezkiretü'ş-Şu‘ârâsı ve Transkripsiyonlu Metni,” (master’s thesis, Gaziantep 
Üniversitesi, 2007), 108; Mehmed Nâil Tuman, Tuhfe-i Nâilî: Divân Şâirlerinin Muhtasar 
Biyografileri (İstanbul, 2001), 2: 1139. 
21 Ahmed Âsım, Târih-i Âsım (İstanbul, 1870), 1: 255. 
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 At some point as a young man Ahmed Vâsıf left his natal city of Baghdad. He himself 
gives no indication why this was. It may be that the city had little to offer him. Baghdad in the 
early eighteenth century was something of a provincial backwater, sitting in Persian marches that 
during the 1730s and 1740s, after the collapse of Safavid power, suffered from brigandage and 
periodic military incursions.
22
 In any event, biographical sources agree that the young man 
traveled west and north to Aleppo, Kars, and Van to continue his education. Almost certainly this 
means he was seeking out scholars in the storied Islamic tradition of “travel in search of 
knowledge (riḥla fî ṭalab al-‘ilm).” Although sources do not specify what or with whom Vâsıf 
studied, it is possible to speculate given the region’s intellectual life. Theology thrived in 
eighteenth century Syria and Anatolia in networks of pietistic Nakşbendî sufi scholars like 
Davûd-ı Karsî (d. 1755/6), Saçaklızâde Mehmed Maraşî (d. 1732/33), and Ebusaid Mehmed 
Hâdîmî (d. 1762), all of whom wrote extensively on will-power and human agency, subjects 
crucial to Vâsıf’s mature thought.23 Anatolia was also known for the high level of its logic, 
philosophy, semantics, and other rational sciences (‘ulûm-ı ‘akliyye), particularly among Kurdish 
teachers, and attracted students from Baghdad, Aleppo, and elsewhere abroad.
24
  
 This is one obstacle in sketching Vâsıf's formation as a thinker. It is hard to associate him 
with any one “type” of intellectual figure. He was not a religious scholar like his father, though 
                                                 
22 On Baghdad in the early to mid-eighteenth century, T. Niewenhuis, Politics and Society in 
Early Modern Iraq (The Hague, 1982); Robert Olson, The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-
Persian Relations, 1718-1743: a Study of Rebellion in the Capital and War in the Provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire (Bloomington, IN, 1975).  
23 Philipp Bruckmayr, “The Particular Will (al-irâdat al-juz'iyya): Excavations Regarding a 
Latecomer in Kalâm Terminology on Human Agency and its Position in Naqshbandi 
Discourse,” European Journal of Turkish Studies 13 (2011), 2-20. Hilmi Kemal Altun has 
cataloged a large number of such scholars and their works in “Osmanlı Müelliflerince Yazılan 
Kazâ ve Kader Risâleleri ve Taşköprüzâde'nin Risâle Fi'l-Kazâ ve'l-Kader Adlı Eseri” 
(master's thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 2010). 
24 Khaled El-Rouayheb, “The Myth of ‘the Triumph of Fanaticism’ in the Seventeenth-Century 
Ottoman Empire,” Die Welt des Islams 48 (2008): 210-216. 
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he was deeply familiar with the religious or “transmitted” sciences (‘ulûm-ı nakliyye). He was 
not a philosopher, despite, as will be seen, the space he devoted to philosophical concepts in his 
work. Neither did he have formal training as a scribe (kâtib), even though this was to become his 
eventual profession. Vâsıf's education was certainly wide-ranging, profound, but does not seem 
to have been directed to any of these specific ends. If anything he might best be considered a 
littérateur (edîb); at least, his interests in history, poetry, and ethics place him securely in this 
ambit.  
 Vâsıf's movements in Aleppo, Kars, and Van are chronologically obscure. We also do not 
know for sure in what order he resided in these cities. It seems most likely that he first followed 
the caravans west from Baghdad to Aleppo, called “the Grey,” an ancient city dominated by its 
huge medieval citadel. Vâsıf was there by 1761/62 at the latest.25 It is then likely that he traveled 
northeast into Anatolia. In April of 1767, for example, he claims that while studying near Kars 
and Van he witnessed riots in Kars which led to the murder of the local warden, Gürcü Mehmed 
Paşa.26 
 At this point Vâsıf entered the service of a provincial governor, a connection that began 
his career. This man was Kel (or Gül) Ahmedpaşazâde Ali Paşa. A powerful minister and former 
Grand Admiral (kapudan-ı deryâ), Ali Paşa had once nearly ousted and replaced Koca Ragıb 
Paşa as Grand Vezir on the death of Osman III in 1757, but the plot fell apart and Ali was 
dismissed, expropriated, and exiled to the island of Kos. On 6 March 1767 he was appointed to 
Aleppo, and then transferred to Kars on 27 April and İçel a month later.27 Vâsıf probably 
encountered him at this juncture in Aleppo or Kars. His services to Ali Paşa were of a scribal 
                                                 
25 MEHÂSİN 1, 268a; Mehâsin (İlgürel), 345. 
26 MEHÂSİN 5, 1: 289-290. Cf. Çeşmizâde Mustafa, Çeşmizâde Tarihi, ed. Bekir Kütükoğlu 
(İstanbul, 1993), 25-26.  
27 MEHÂSİN 5, 1: 96-97, 181, 290, 294. Cf. Çeşmizâde Tarihi, 19, 27, 37. 
16 
 
nature, described as either that of a librarian or accountant, but he also tutored the governor and 
helped him through works like the odes of the sixteenth century Persian poet ‘Urfî and the 
Makâmât of al-Ḥarîrî.28 It is important to note that even at this early age Vâsıf took an interest in 
surrounding events. When he recorded the history of these years as a much older man, he drew 
on his memories of Ali Paşa and others and hints that he sometimes took these down in writing. 
 In early 1767 Ahmed Vâsıf was approximately 35 years old and about to embark on a 
career in state service. He was already highly learned. He had traveled the Levant and eastern 
reaches of the empire, searching out scholars and knowledge. Vâsıf by this point must have 
mastered Turkish, Persian, and classical Arabic in addition to his native dialect; there is also 
evidence that, at least in later life, he knew some amount of Greek and Russian.
29
 Vâsıf was 
furthermore well-positioned in a major statesman's entourage. Little did he know that the 
following years would take him farther afield – to the Danube, Crimea, Russia, and the Gate of 
Felicity itself. 
 The Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia on 4 October 1768, initiating one of the 
most costly wars of the eighteenth century. As the government traditionally accompanied the 
Ottoman army on campaign, when Kel Ahmedpaşazâde Ali Paşa was summoned to the front as 
part of general mobilization, to muster with the imperial army, he took his scribes and household 
along with military forces. Ali, now the Sivas governor, met the Grand Vezir in mid-June 1769 
at Hantepesi, north of the Danube on the Pruth River. Vâsıf, too, was there.30 
                                                 
28 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 55. Âsım describes his duties as hazîne kitâbeti, 1: 255. Fâik calls them 
kitâbilik, 146. On Ḥarîrî (d. 1122) see Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen 
Litteratur (Weimar, 1898), 1: 325-326. On ‘Urfî (d. 1590/91), E.G. Browne, A Literary 
History of Persia (reprint, Bethesda MD, 1997) 4: 241-249. 
29 Aceituno, 35. 
30 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 12. 
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 Vâsıf accompanied Ali Paşa during the war's first campaign season and followed the 
Ottoman army to Bender. The conditions on the front were already poor. Provisions had been 
ineptly or corruptly organized and were scarce. Soldiers deserted, sometimes mutinied. Twice in 
Bender Vâsıf saw his patron openly defy orders to protest the army's condition.31 However, Ali 
Paşa eventually accepted command in Bender, though unwillingly, and his forces, Vâsıf 
included, spent an uneasy winter in 1769/70 on the frontier while the imperial army barracked 
south of the Danube at Babadağı. He later recalled that the garrison was buffeted by several 
Russian attacks and a mutiny. On top of this, in mid-October Ali Paşa took ill, died, and was 
buried in Bender's inner citadel. Without his protector of three years, Vâsıf faced an uncertain 
immediate future and, so he says, succumbed for a time to anxiety and deep depression.
32
  
 Vâsıf next appears in sources the following spring in the retinue of another commander, 
Abaza Mehmed Paşa. Although they served together at a major battle – the defeat at Kartal in 
July 1770 – the author makes no mention of their connection. İlgürel ventures this is because he 
disapproved of Mehmed Paşa’s leadership, which may well be true as the paşa was assigned to 
Yenikale in the Crimea that autumn but neglected his duties. When the Russians invaded the 
peninsula in 1771 Abaza Mehmed fled by ship to Sinope and Vâsıf, possibly along with the 
Crimea serasker İbrahim Paşa, fell into Russian hands.33 Vâsıf was sent to St. Petersburg in a 
                                                 
31 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 19, 25-26; Ahmed Resmî, A Summary of Admonitions: a Chronicle of the 
1768-1774 Russian-Ottoman War, ed. and trans. Ethan L. Menchinger (İstanbul, 2011), 16b 
both in translation and original text. 
32 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 50-51, 53-55. 
33 Şemdânîzâde Süleyman, Mür’i’t-Tevârih, ed. Münir Aktepe (İstanbul, 1976), 2b: 76; Âsım, 1: 
255; Muharrem Saffet Çalışkan, ed., “(Vekâyi‘nüvis) Enverî Sadullah Efendi ve Tarihinin I. 
Cildi’nin Metin ve Tahlili (1182-1188 / 1768-1774),” (Ph.D. diss., Marmara Üniversitesi, 
2000), 265-266. 
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captivity lasting some months. In his chronicle, he remarks tartly that the sultan, Mustafa III, 
attributed the situation to “fickle fate.”34 
 Towards the fall of 1771, Vâsıf, who had been freed by Catherine II, arrived at the 
imperial army in Babadağı bearing letters from the Russians. Summoned to Istanbul, he gave the 
sultan several depositions and was rewarded.
35
 During this time Vâsıf also cultivated new 
patrons. One attempt with reisülküttâb Râif İsmail Efendi seems to have gone awry. However, 
Vâsıf did successfully curry favor with the mektûbî and later reis Abdürrezzâk Bâhir Efendi and 
secured a position in the latter's bureau. This attachment lasted over a decade and in the near 
term aligned him with a political faction that included Ahmed Resmî Efendi and Grand Vezir 
Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa, who promoted him to the hacegân.36  
 Vâsıf spent the rest of the war closely involved in peacemaking. After the collapse of 
initial negotiations at Foksani in the summer of 1772, Muhsinzâde appointed him as a special 
courier to the Russian General Piotr Rumiantsev to renew the truce, a charge he adeptly 
discharged. That fall, Abdürrezzâk Efendi, acting as chief delegate, included him as secretary to 
negotiations (mükâleme kâtibi) at the second peace conference in Bucharest, which lasted six 
months. Vâsıf also witnessed the Ottoman rout at Kozluca and was evidently with the Grand 
Vezir and imperial army, heavily besieged at Şumnu, when peace was signed on 21 July 1774.37 
 The homecoming was not a joyful one for many Ottoman statesmen, least of all for 
Ahmed Vâsıf. For one, in the war's chaotic end he had lost all his patrons. Abdürrezzâk Efendi, 
                                                 
34 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 169. İlgürel’s claim that Vâsıf’s captivity lasted nine months is questionable, 
as he makes this judgment based on the date of the truce of 29 May 1772. In fact, Vâsıf had 
returned by September 1771, as he accompanied Abdürrezzâk Efendi to Istanbul on 19 
September. 
35 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 176-177, 279; Çalışkan, “Vekâyi‘nüvis Enverî,” 265-266.  
36 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 188; Fâik, 146-147.  
37 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 225-233, 241-245, 302-306. 
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attacked in a mutiny, was sent away for “protection” and then dismissed and exiled to Anatolia. 
Muhsinzâde Paşa died shortly after the peace.38 Mustafa III, moreover, who had shown Vâsıf 
kindness, was dead. Abdülhamid I's accession to the throne in 1774 shifted power alignments in 
the capital and cast most who had fought and ended the war into disfavor. Vâsıf expressed 
bitterness at his colleagues’ reception in Istanbul, where, he said, they were forced to swallow 
dismissal and slink home like so many criminals. While he was appointed in October 1774 to 
renegotiate some peace terms in Jassy with Rumianstev, Vâsıf received no reward or further 
posts.
39
 The late Muhsinzâde's wife Esma Sultan, who was Abdülhamid’s sister, also seized his 
landed income and accused him of acquiring it illegally. No one would intercede on his behalf.
40
 
 We have very little information on the next decade of Vâsıf's life. Like some of his peers, 
the best known being Ahmed Resmî Efendi, he apparently spent the time between 1774 and 1783 
in obscurity. There are indications that he suffered financial hardship, and it is not improbable he 
returned to his old work of copying for support. However, Vâsıf maintained contact with 
Abdürrezzâk Efendi and, when the latter again became reisülküttâb on 28 April 1779, his 
fortunes began to revive. He wrote a chronogram for that occasion and later gained some minor 
appointments.
41
 Furthermore, his earliest known work – a commentary on Jârullah 
Zamakhsharî's Nawâbigh al-kalim – dates to this period and strongly suggests the reis’ 
                                                 
38 Ibid, 2: 300-301, 309-313.  
39 MEHÂSİN 6, 5b-6a, 6a-12a. 
40 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 232-233. 
41 MEHÂSİN 6, 97b-98a; Erhan Afyoncu, “Osmanlı Müelliflerine Dair Tevcihat Kayıtları I,” 
Belgeler 20 (1999): 125. 
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patronage, as it is a Turkish translation of Abdürrezzâk's presumably Arabic original, 
commissioned by Grand Vezir Esseyyid Mehmed Paşa (1779-1781).42  
 The 1770s and 1780s were a time of rancorous, factional politics in the empire. The 
1768-1774 war opened questions that struck at Ottoman identity and survival; in its aftermath, 
statesmen struggled to find answers. One of the biggest points of contention was how the 
government should respond to the Treaty of Kaynarca, which laid heavy impositions on the 
empire and was felt particularly in the loss of the Crimean peninsula. Some, taking a hard line, 
supported an armed response. Vâsıf and others took a pragmatic view of the matter. By 1783, he 
had aligned himself with the faction of Grand Vezir Halil Hamid Paşa, who favored a cautious 
approach: to appease the Russians while strengthening the empire through a series of military 
reforms. Vâsıf held a number of positions under this Grand Vezir, and was appointed court 
chronicler (vekâyi‘nüvîs) for the first time on 2 November 1783. He held this post until his 
departure as ambassador to Spain on 1 July 1787.
43
 
 One of Ahmed Vâsıf's most significant but neglected intellectual undertakings took place 
during this time. In 1784 Vâsıf and the beylikçi Râşid Mehmed Efendi approached the Grand 
Vezir about purchasing İbrahim Müteferrika's printing press. The press had ceased operation 
decades before, and Râşid and Vâsıf argued that if reopened it would lower the prices and 
increase the circulation of books. After petitioning the sultan they gained control of the press.
44
 
In their partnership Râşid left everyday oversight to Vâsıf, who in turn shared the income, and 
together they published two court chronicles: those of Sâmî, Şâkir, and Subhî (1784) and İzzî 
                                                 
42 Tercüme-i Şerh-i Nevâbigü'l-Kelim li-Vâsıfi’l-Merhûm, Millet Kütüphanesi Pertev Paşa nr. 
387, 2b-3a. The manuscript’s colophon dates it to 6 April 1780. On Zamakhsharî, 
Brockelmann, 1: 293. 
43 MEHÂSİN 1, 40a, 292a-292b; Mehâsin (İlgürel), 46, 372-373. 
44 BOA.AE.I. Abdülhamid 1064; MEHÂSİN 1, 114a-116a.  
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(1785). But problems soon emerged. Vâsıf alienated the typesetter, the future mathematician 
Gelenbevî İsmail Efendi, and split with Râşid over allegations that he had embezzled money. 
Râşid secured his dismissal from the press. Cevdet further claims that he engineered Vâsıf's 
appointment as Spanish ambassador in order to remove him from Istanbul, as a sort of 
“honorable” exile.45 Whatever happened, the two were henceforth enemies. 
 Vâsıf's earliest historical writing dates to these same years, after he replaced Sadullah 
Enverî as vekâyi‘nüvîs. Submitted in yearly installments to Abdülhamid I, the work extends from 
1783 to 7 June 1787, or shortly before he left for Spain, and appears uneven and unfinished. 
Although Vâsıf's overriding concern is with Russian encroachment on the Crimea and Ottoman 
reform efforts, the work is cleft in two by the 1785 fall and murder of his patron, Grand Vezir 
Halil Hamid Paşa. Vâsıf's eulogistic praise of Halil Paşa, whom he introduces as the empire's 
savior, the “renewer of the age,” turns quickly to repudiation as the author, understandably if 
hypocritically, tries to distance himself from the disgraced minister.
46
 It seems improbable he 
would have left this imbalance in a finished work. As Vâsıf also reports, he fully expected to 
resume his duties as historian upon returning from Spain. However, the outbreak of war with 
Russia in 1787 altered the situation and Enverî regained the post. Although early on Vâsıf called 
this work the “first” volume of his history, he later indicated an intention to revise and include it 
in a larger history of Abdülhamid I's reign (1774-1789).
47
 
 Vâsıf spent nearly a full year abroad in Spain. Officially his aim was to strengthen 
relations between the two countries, but his basic mission may well have been to secure an 
alliance. Vâsıf toured Barcelona, Valencia, La Granja, and Madrid, and met with Carlos III. He 
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also encountered a young Englishman, the foppish littérateur and eccentric William Beckford, 
whom he appears to have befriended. He returned via Malta on the Santa Rosa, a Spanish frigate 
under Admiral Don Federico Gravina, reaching Istanbul on 11 May 1788, and hastily submitted 
his report or sefâretnâme.
48
 Circumstances had changed in the interim: the empire was now at 
war with Russia and Austria and Vâsıf was without a position. 
 In general, the war's first years passed quietly for Vâsıf in Istanbul. After coming to the 
throne in 1789, and for reasons not entirely clear, Selim III provided him a post in the financial 
bureaucracy (rikâb anadolu muhâsebecisi) and had him revise accounts of certain historical 
events from the imperial accession onward. However, in 1791 the historian's name appeared in a 
list of those to be sent to the army. Vâsıf alleged that this was a plot against him by envious 
“degenerates,” yet he could do naught to change Selim's mind and left for the front to serve as 
court historian and full anadolu muhâsebecisi, complaining of large debts for the journey.
49
 
 Ahmed Vâsıf remained with the army during that summer's disastrous campaign season, 
recording events at the imperial camp and discharging various duties. The latter included serving 
as a courier and composing an address for Grand Vezir Koca Yusuf Paşa before the major 
engagement at Maçin (9 July 1791). In spite of Vâsıf's stirring words, at Maçin the Ottoman 
army was outdone and effectively destroyed. Koca Yusuf then opened negotiations with the 
Russian commander, Nikolai Repnin.
50
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 Here we must note that the historian now witnessed, and probably actively abetted, a 
serious insubordination in the army. In early August 1791, Vâsıf parleyed for ten days with 
Repnin in the city of Galatz. While he was away Selim III, who now had word of Russia's 
specific demands, in particular that the Dniester River form the two empires’ new border, 
ordered the Grand Vezir to break off talks and fight for better terms. Yet Vâsıf had already 
yielded and signed an eight-month truce, while the other Ottoman commanders flatly refused to 
fight. When he returned to the army on 11 August 1791, these commanders had him draw up a 
memorandum justifying their refusal, in effect defying both the sultan and Grand Vezir.
51
 Vâsıf's 
involvement in this “Maçin Petition,” important as it was to his intellectual career, does not seem 
to have been widely known at the time. Actually, we know of it entirely through another work, 
the later Muhassenât-ı ‘Asker-i Cedîd (The Merits of the New Soldiery), to be discussed below.  
 Selim III did however blame Vâsıf for accepting the Dniester as the new border, for 
which he paid a price. We have it on the historian's testimony that after the Maçin boycott 
“certain malicious men” began to influence the sultan against him. Selim III had called Vâsıf a 
“blackguard (kızılbaş)” when he learned of the truce.52 Later, courtiers convinced him that 
promoting Vâsıf would create the impression he was being rewarded. The sultan thus gave him a 
choice of temporary appointments in the provinces: to delineate the new frontier in Bosnia or to 
oversee the surrender of fortresses and ordnance in Belgrade. Vâsıf opted for the latter, assuming 
that he would retain his original position in the financial bureau. However, he learned on 
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reaching the city of Niş that his immediate inferior, Sivasî Hasan Efendi, had taken his post “by 
fraud” with the help of an unnamed statesman; Enverî once again replaced him as court historian. 
Vâsıf says that he continued to Belgrade, in complete despair, where he finished his duties and 
awaited orders from the sultan. After six months Selim had him return to Istanbul, but again he 
had neither post nor other income.
53
  
 Vâsıf writes that he bided his time in the capital “in assiduous study” for a year. One task 
he undertook during the period was compiling a dictionary of obscure words from the Persian 
historian Vassâf, whom he greatly esteemed. The sole copy of Müşkilât-ı Lugat-ı Vassâf 
(Perplexities in Vassâf's Vocabulary) in the Topkapı Palace library, dated 6 March 1793, may 
suggest he was actively seeking patronage. To add insult to injury, at least in the historian’s 
mind, he shortly found that Enverî had presented Selim with a new chronicle – one that 
incorporated verbatim his own unfinished notes from the war front.
54
  
 Perhaps as the fruit of his labors, in April of 1793 Vâsıf regained his old position of 
anadolu muhâsebecisi and one or two months later that of court historian. Selim particularly 
wanted him to revise and update the work of Enverî and Mehmed Edîb Efendi, who had recorded 
events in the capital during the war, and this commission became the “second” volume of his 
chronicle. Covering the period from Selim's accession in 1789 to 1794, the work is more openly 
moralizing than his first and incorporates precepts from the Aristotelian tradition of “practical 
philosophy” or hikmet-i ‘ameliyye. Indeed, the late war gave Vâsıf much fodder for reflection. 
After accusing Enverî of plagiarism, he turned his attention above all to explaining the failure of 
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Ottoman arms – and to subsidiary discussions of historical agency, the causes of Ottoman 
weakness, and the need for the sultan's new reform program, the famous Nizâm-ı Cedîd.55  
 Vâsıf was soon in disfavor again, however, this time as a result of his long-standing 
quarrel with Râşid Mehmed Efendi. It seems that Râşid, who was now reisülküttâb, was feuding 
with the jurist and scholar Tatarcık Abdullah Mollâ, one of the historian’s friends. One night in 
1794 Abdullah went to Üsküdar to visit a colleague. Other callers came to pay their respects and 
the party, which included Vâsıf, spent several hours eating and conversing before it dispersed. 
Yet Râşid learned of the gathering and reported it to the sultan as subversive, and in late July or 
early August 1794, Selim had the men rounded up and sent into exile. As Vâsıf tells it, he was 
simply a victim of malicious slander.
56
 Yet İlgürel conjectures the meeting was not so 
completely innocent. Other sources relate that Vâsıf had written his friend Feyzî Süleyman Paşa 
an incriminating letter about Râşid, which came into the reis' possession after Feyzî’s death 
earlier that spring. Râşid therefore targeted Vâsıf along with Abdullah Mollâ and had them 
exiled to Midilli and Güzelhisar, respectively. Whatever the truth of the matter, the exiles did not 
last long. Selim III quickly relented and pardoned the men in early 1795.
57
 
 Vâsıf’s return from exile began a rather fallow period in his intellectual career. While he 
resumed work in the financial bureaucracy during the second half of the 1790s, auditing accounts 
as anadolu and baş muhâsebecisi, he had lost his grip on the post of court historian. On his exile 
the position passed to Enverî and, after his death, to Halil Nûrî Bey. Vâsıf would not regain it 
until after Nûrî’s death several years later.  
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 The historian’s sole written work from this period is the so-called Tesliyetnâme (Letter of 
Consolation), probably written in the summer of 1798. The French invasion of Egypt in July of 
that year caught Selim III by surprise and put him in such a violent mood as to concern his 
ministers. Vâsıf was asked to put together a short tract to calm the sultan, which, he says, he 
quickly composed and submitted to the Porte.
58
 The Tesliyetnâme is an example of a rare literary 
genre, the letter of consolation. Yet it is perhaps more important for Vâsıf’s analysis of the 
French invasion, which he presents in a historical, comparative framework. Likening the 
invasion to other setbacks in Muslim history, Vâsıf offers a sweeping vindication of God’s 
benevolence and of the Ottoman Empire’s regenerative ability. It is, in a word, history as 
theodicy (a defense of God’s power and goodness in view of the existence of evil), and a vision 
that Vâsıf increasingly applied to his historical output in later years.  
 Halil Nûrî Bey’s death in 1798 left the post of vekâyi‘nüvîs vacant and Vâsıf’s 
subsequent appointment, his fourth, initiated a period of intense production that would last 
practically until his death. The historian’s immediate task was to revise and rewrite Nûrî’s six-
volume chronicle (1794-1798), which he then supplemented into the spring of 1800. This 
became Vâsıf’s “third” volume.59 The concerns of this work closely resemble those of the second 
volume. Namely, it seeks to explain the underlying weakness of the empire in relation to Europe 
while articulating the need for moral renewal and political reform. It also offers for the first time 
                                                 
58 Tesliyetnâme, TOP Hazine nr. 1625; Süleymaniye Serez Kısmı nr. 1890. An edited text has 
been published by Yüksel Çelik as “Siyaset-Nasihat Literatürümüzde Nadir bir Tür: Mısır'ın 
İşgali Üzerine III. Selim'e Sunulan Tesliyet-Nâme,” Türk Kültürü İncelemeler Dergisi 22 
(2010): 85-126. 
59 MEHÂSİN 3, 2b, 227b. On Nûrî see Karslızâde, 63; Otocar von Schlechta-Wssehrd, “Die 
osmanischen Geschichtschreiber der neueren Zeit,” Denkschriften der phil. hist. Klasse der 
Kaiserl. Ak. der Wissenschaften 8 (1856): 9. 
27 
 
an interpretation of the French Revolution, which Vâsıf saw as pernicious and responsible for 
much of the world’s turmoil.  
 After revising Nûrî, Vâsıf continued to record the empire’s contemporary events in his 
“fourth” volume, a compilation left unfinished and extending from May, 1800 to January, 1805, 
while serving in senior chancery posts like tevkî‘î and büyük rûznâmçe, gained through the 
intercession of Selim’s privy secretary (sırkâtibi) Ahmed Fâiz Efendi.60 He also composed 
several minor works. These included a short treatise translated from Arabic, entitled Râhibnâme 
(Book of the Monk), on the ethical virtue of patience; the introduction to a modern geography 
written by his colleague Mahmud Râif Efendi, Atlas-ı Cedîd Tercümesi (New Atlas Translation); 
and an essay on the campaign in Egypt against the French, culled from his chronicle and 
dedicated to Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Paşa.61  
 From this period Vâsıf also left a large volume on the invasion of Egypt.62 This work, 
probably incomplete, is almost entirely derivative and a pastiche of events from his third and 
fourth volumes prefaced with an adapted version of the Tesliyetnâme. Yet it carries no small 
importance for Vâsıf’s development as a historian, for here for the first time he experimented 
with an interpretive framework, applying the Tesliyetnâme’s germ – its insistence on God’s 
benevolence and the dynasty’s divine favor – to a large sequence of Ottoman history. At the turn 
of the nineteenth century, then, Vâsıf was clearly seeking to reconcile the empire’s situation with 
what he knew and believed of its exceptionalism. His effort here was another instance of history 
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as theodicy, in which the Ottoman victory in Egypt was, and could be nothing less than, a 
vindication.  
 Selim III planned further revisions of the dynastic chronicle in the early years of the 
nineteenth century. Probably in 1800, he ordered Vâsıf to revisit the vekâyi‘nüvîses who had 
served in the decades before his reign and overhaul their work, including Mehmed Hâkim 
Efendi, Çeşmizâde, and Musazâde. The historian pushed himself to exhaustion to complete this 
task, finishing Hâkim within four months and the whole sometime between the winters of 1801 
and 1802. Vâsıf held these chroniclers in low regard, purging them heavily, and described the 
results as a “digest (fihrist).” However, Selim was evidently pleased and had him proceed to 
Sadullah Enverî’s chronicle of the 1768-1774 war, which he completed between 8 February 1802 
and 29 January 1803. The whole was printed in November or December of 1804 and can be 
considered his “fifth” volume.63  
 The quality of this volume is especially uneven. Although Vâsıf’s revision of Hâkim is 
hasty and uninspired – he in fact detested Hâkim, complaining the work made him physically 
ill
64
 – the second half may well be his finest overall effort. This is because the war years 
furnished a venue in which he could explore a number of major intellectual concerns like 
historical agency, peacemaking, and reform. Vâsıf framed the whole with a preface on causality, 
intimating that humans are responsible agents, and presents the war and its disastrous issue as a 
series of moral examples. Bolstered by his own eyewitness accounts, Vâsıf’s war chronicle is an 
admirable work of interpretive history no less than it is a powerful argument for continued 
political reform.  
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 Late in life Ahmed Vâsıf most likely produced another short but influential work. This 
was the virulent, propagandistic defense of Selim III's reforms entitled Muhassenât-ı ‘Asker-i 
Cedîd, but better known as Hulâsatü’l-Kelâm fî Reddi’l-Avâmm (A Final Word to Refute the 
Rabble) or more simply Koca Sekbanbaşı Risâlesi. This essay takes the form of a combative 
dialogue between an anonymous narrator, the so-called Koca Sekbanbaşı, and Janissary 
opponents, the former trying to expose the latter's gross ignorance and convince them of the 
necessity of military reform. 
 Muhassenât presents us with a number of difficulties. For one, its author is anonymous 
and adopts the guise, surely fictional, of a seasoned Janissary officer, and there has been no small 
debate over his true identity. Most scholars agree that the author must have been a member of 
Selim's entourage who was familiar with the workings of the bureaucracy, and that the work 
dates to approximately 1803/4. The second difficulty is that the narrator also identifies himself as 
the author of the 1791 Maçin petition to Selim, which justified the army boycott. The author of 
one is therefore the author of both.
65
 These clues point to a partisan of reform in Selim's 
bureaucracy, who was present with the imperial army at Maçin on 10 August 1791 and still 
active in 1803/4.
66
  
 Vâsıf, as we have seen, fits all of these prerequisites. Furthermore, similarities in 
phrasing and political orientation aside, the work’s only direct attribution comes from a later 
source, Esad Efendi's Üss-i Zafer on the 1826 destruction of the Janissary corps, in which Vâsıf 
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is repeatedly identified as the author of the essay as well as of the Maçin petition.
67
 Hakan Erdem 
has alternately argued for the authorship of Mustafa Reşid Çelebi, based on what he believes to 
be a fragmentary author's copy. If the latter claim is true – if the copy is annotated by the author 
– it would discount Vâsıf, as it is not in his hand and two dates in marginal notes postdate his 
death. However, these annotations appear to be glosses on the text rather than additions, and 
there is no other compelling evidence that the fragment is an author's copy.
68
 Under the 
circumstances, and barring new information, Esad Efendi's testimony carries great weight and 
we can cautiously accept Vâsıf as “Koca Sekbanbaşı.”  
 There is one final work as well, a “sixth” volume incomplete and surviving in one 
manuscript that begins in the year 1774 and ends abruptly in 1779. According to the preface, 
Selim III commissioned this work after Vâsıf's fifth volume was printed in late 1804, an event 
the historian describes as a triumph. Selim saw the work's popular demand, he says, and ordered 
him to revise and ready for print the next sequence of dynastic history written by Enverî and 
himself between 1774 and Selim's accession in 1789 – that is to say, the whole of Abdülhamid I's 
reign.
69
 It is therefore likely that this chronicle was composed in 1805 and is one of the author's 
last written works. It also shows that Vâsıf intended to revisit his first volume and incorporate it 
into the larger work, but was perhaps forced to abandon the project when he became reisülküttâb 
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later that year. These additions would have ensured his bold claim, made elsewhere, to have 
composed the empire's history for fifty years between 1753 and 1803.
70
  
 In August, 1805 poets like Surûrî celebrated Vâsıf’s replacement of Mahmud Râif Efendi 
as reisülküttâb, a post that, if we believe his biographers, he had coveted for decades.
71
 During 
this period the Ottoman Empire was swept up in the perilous currents of Napoleonic Europe, and 
Vâsıf’s term yielded quite mixed results. In September he renewed with the ambassador Italinski 
the empire’s defensive alliance with Russia against France, originally signed in 1799. According 
to İlgürel, however, the very next day news of Napoleon’s victory at Austerlitz reached Istanbul. 
The empire then changed tack, conducting secret negotiations with the French and confirming 
Napoleon as emperor in order to break with Russia. Vâsıf inadvertently leaked details of these 
arrangements, causing a diplomatic row. Tension meanwhile increased with Russia as Vâsıf fell 
under the spell of the French ambassador Sébastiani, and oversaw the closure of the Bosphorus 
and dismissal of the governors of Wallachia and Moldavia, which angered both the Russian and 
English governments. Aside from these mixed achievements, some biographers claim that Vâsıf 
also indulged in peculation while reis, “cutting himself garments of whole cloth from the fabric 
of state.”72 
 Vâsıf did not live to see the looming war with Russia, which began in December of 1806, 
nor the fall of his patron Selim III the following year. Now more than seventy years old, he fell 
ill in the autumn from an abdominal ailment and was dismissed from office. His physicians’ 
treatments were unsuccessful and he died and was buried in Eyyüp.
73
 Vâsıf’s precise death date 
nonetheless forms a small point of contention, as it is not related in any biographical sources. 
                                                 
70 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 315. 
71 Fâik, 148; Târih-i Cevdet, 8: 78; Karslızâde, 65. On his appointment, BOA.HAT 12474. 
72 Fâik, 148; Târih-i Cevdet, 8: 78. Also Âsım, 1: 257-258. 
73 Fâik, 148-149; Âsım, 1: 255; Karslızâde, 65. 
32 
 
The date on his tombstone, 20 October 1806, has hence gained general acceptance. However, a 
recently published source, the diary of a contemporary imam, records in two separate entries that 
Vâsıf died on 17 October, which may mean that the tombstone’s date is incorrect.74 
 Vâsıf’s biography, of course, does not end with his death but with his legacy. 
Immediately after he died, as was custom, the government sealed his estate and conducted an 
inventory that according to Âsım brought to light some 800 purses and 100,000 kuruş in hoarded 
Spanish gold. Given Vâsıf’s reputation for greed and the fact that he died with heavy debts, this 
sparked a minor scandal.
75
 We also have a few details about the historian’s family. Although his 
wife’s name is unrecorded, he had at least three children: a son named Lebîb Efendi, later a 
judge and poet of some renown; an elder daughter named Züleyhâ; and a younger daughter 
named Hanîfe. The Sicill-i Osmânî notes a second son, Vassâf Efendi, also a judge, yet his name 
does not appear in other sources or as a beneficiary of Vâsıf’s estate. Documents on the 
remaining children continue into the mid-nineteenth century.
76
 
 A lesser known part of Vâsıf’s intellectual stature is his poetry. He was the author of at 
least a partial divan, which exists in a single “defective” copy at Istanbul University, though a 
second copy catalogued under his name may exist at the Austrian National Library in Vienna.
77
 
Besides this divan, Vâsıf adorned his prose work with verse and frequently wrote occasional 
poems like chronograms for court ceremonies. Yet it seems he was more poetaster than poet, and 
made little lasting impression. Âsım, for example, derides his skill, claiming that he invited 
satirical imitation, and Babinger characterizes his verse as mediocre. When Fâtin included him in 
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a mid-nineteenth century anthology of poets, he claimed that almost all of Vâsıf’s verse had been 
lost.
78
  
 Ahmed Vâsıf in life was a surely a polarizing, forceful personality. He was ambitious, 
opinionated, and seen by peers as grasping, playing the pauper (fakîr) with incessant petitions for 
aid and, it seems, embezzling on occasion. It is clear that he often alienated colleagues. His long-
running feud with Râşid Efendi is a better known instance of this habit, and the historian Âsım, 
whose biography of Vâsıf reveals deep-seated enmity, describes him as a pompous, jealous, 
arrogant, self-satisfied man.
79
 On the other hand, Vâsıf must have had certain saving graces. That 
he was capable of loyalty is evinced by his long relationships with friends and patrons, especially 
Kel Ahmedpaşazâde Ali and Abdürrezzâk Efendi, and his ability to navigate court politics, 
sometimes merely to survive, speaks to skill in social climbing and a native, if insincere, charm. 
Finally, there is no doubt that he was a brilliant mind, an exceptional stylist, and a gifted 
historian who earned peers’ grudging admiration and produced one of the most important, and 
possibly one of the largest, chronicles in Ottoman history. Although Cevdet griped about his 
prolixity and errors, Vâsıf’s reputation as a historian remained high through the mid- to late 
nineteenth century and the publication of a partial French translation gained him some notoriety 
among the European public.
80
 It is now to a better understanding of this work that we turn. 
 
                                                 
78 Âsım, 1: 258; GOW, 336; Davud Fâtin, Tezkere-i Hâtimetü'l-Eş‘âr (İstanbul, 1854), 432. 
79 Âsım, 1: 258-259. 
80 Criticism aside, Cevdet generally joins other Ottoman commentators in admiration. For 
example, Târih-i Cevdet, 8: 78-79; Fâik, 149; Fâtin, 432-433; Karslızâde, 65-66; and Mücteba 
İlgürel, “Cevdet Paşa Tarihi’nin Kaynaklarından Vâsıf Tarihi,” in Ahmed Cevdet Paşa 
Semineri: 27-28 Mayıs 1985 (İstanbul, 1986), 115-126. Caussin de Perceval reorders the work 
and is often quite liberal in his translation, Précis historique de la guerre des Turcs contre les 
Russes depuis l’année 1769 jusq’uà l’année 1774, tiré des annales de l’historien turc Vassif-
Efendi (Paris, 1822). 
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Vâsıf and the Practice of History 
As indicated above, Vâsıf's chronicle is actually a number of separate works, six or seven 
depending on the reckoning, written during four terms as vekâyi‘nüvîs between 1783 and 1805. 
These volumes are in varying stages of completion. Moreover, because the author's vision for the 
history changed over this period, as did his concerns, it is well to examine more closely the 
characteristics of the whole.  
 The chronicle consists of two types of volumes. Some record contemporaneous history. 
These include the periods 1783-1787, 1800-1805, and parts of 1789-1794 and 1794-1800. Others 
are revisions that Vâsıf, commissioned by Selim III, made of previous court chronicles. These 
include the intervals 1753-1768, 1768-1774, 1774-1779, and most of 1789-1794 and 1794-1800. 
In addition to two essays on historical subjects – one the Tesliyetnâme and the other on the Egypt 
campaign – a manuscript on the French invasion of Egypt, seemingly unfinished, is a 
compilation from other chronicles. Vâsıf’s oeuvre therefore has two major gaps: the years 1779 
to 1783 and 1787 to 1789.  
 Like other court chronicles, Vâsıf's content generally follows the daily, monthly, and 
yearly patterns of court life. The eighteenth century Ottoman court adhered to a rhythmic 
schedule of ceremony and celebration. For instance, each year in the month of Receb the sultan 
customarily sent a donative to the Holy Cities; the imperial fleet left Istanbul in the spring and 
returned in the fall; and yearly appointments occurred in late Muharrem or early Şevval.81 All of 
these were added to the dynastic chronicle. Vâsıf also records irregular appointments, council 
meetings, and military engagements, and frequently inserts addenda to analyze events and 
suggest moral lessons.   
                                                 
81 Bekir Kütükoğlu, “Müverrih Vâsıf'ın Kaynaklarından Hâkim Târihi,” in Vekayi‘nüvis 
Makaleler, 142. 
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 We know a fair deal about how Ahmed Vâsıf actually wrote through his own words and 
material evidence like drafts, manuscript copies, marginal notes, and other clues. His working 
procedure is one of the easier aspects to reconstruct. As court historian, Vâsıf was expected to 
present regular (usually annual) installments of dynastic history in exchange for a yearly salary 
and, in addition, special commissions. Through his post he enjoyed privileged access to 
government archives, which formed one of his major sources, and when finished he presented 
these sections (cüz, pl. eczâ) to the sultan via the Grand Vezir for approval. It appears that 
Abdülhamid I and Selim III did in fact read his submissions, as they often returned the work with 
a critical judgment, orders for clean copy, or editorial recommendations, the latter of which 
survive in decrees and the margins of certain manuscripts. The sultan also very often rewarded 
Vâsıf’s submissions with an emolument.82  
 Vâsıf composed his work in several stages. For example, his extant drafts indicate that he 
kept a notebook in which he first seems to have recorded events. Those that survive show 
extensive additions and emendations and also drafts of other non-historical works, poetry, and 
petitions.
83
 Vâsıf next revised his notes for submission, after which he made the sultan’s 
suggested changes and combined several preapproved sections into a continuous chronicle. The 
                                                 
82 On the vekâyi‘nüvîs' sources, operating procedures, and rewards see Bekir Kütükoğlu, 
“Vekayi‘nüvis,” 107-111; idem, “Osmanlı Arşivleri ile Vak‘anüvis Tarihleri Arasındaki 
Bağ,” in Osmanlı Arşivleri ve Osmanlı Araştırmaları Sempozyumu (İstanbul, 1985), 123-125; 
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petition on the submission of a cüz, BOA.HAT 13135.  
83 The author’s drafts, which came into the possession of Ahmed Cevdet and bear notations 
from Cevdet’s son, are now dispersed in various locations: BOA.Y.EE. 90; Beyazıt 
Kütüphanesi, Nadir Eserler Bölümü, V3497-200; Millet Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri layihalar nr. 
74.  
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author’s copy of Vâsıf’s first volume displays this transitional stage. It is not a clean copy but 
shows major revisions in the margins and text and appears to consist of different sections, bound 
together.
84
 The final stage, meanwhile, was the presentation copy – a clean copy, professionally 
executed and modestly adorned for submission to the sultan and hopefully a liberal reward. 
Several surviving manuscripts of Vâsıf’s work, some in the Topkapı Palace library, are probable 
presentation copies.
85
  
 Ahmed Vâsıf drew on both written and oral sources for his history. Sometimes these are 
indicated in the work, but often they are not. Apart from his most prominent sources – 
preexisting court chronicles – Vâsıf utilized archival documents including but not limited to 
council minutes and legal codes or kânûnnâme. A cursory inventory also indicates a large sample 
of self-quotation and other authors like İdris Bitlisi,86 Abu’l-Fidâ,87 Kâtib Çelebi,88 Ibn 
Khaldûn,
89
 al-Wâqidî,
90
 al-Ṭabarî,91 al-Mâwardî,92 and works ascribed to Apollonius and 
Aristotle,
93
 all of which he used to substantiate arguments and interpretation rather than for their 
strictly factual content. These sources are not exhaustive, though, and Vâsıf made uncited use of 
many others. Thus he utilized Ahmed Resmî and İbrahim Müteferrika as unattributed sources for 
                                                 
84 See for example MEHÂSİN 1, 300a.  
85 Examples include TOP Hazine nr. 1405 and İÜ nr. 5972. These manuscripts have fine incipit 
pages with illuminated headpieces, gold framing, rubrication, complete fihrists, and are 
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86 MEHÂSİN 2, 162b-163b. 
87 MEHÂSİN 3, 221a.  
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90 MEHÂSİN 3, 234a-240b. 
91 MEHÂSİN 4, 315b-319a.  
92 Ibid, 315b-319a.  
93 MEHÂSİN 1, 227b-230b; MEHÂSİN 2, 163b-164a; MEHÂSİN 4, 5b-11b; MEHÂSİN 6, 
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37 
 
his volume on the 1768-1774 Russian-Ottoman war, and relied extensively on Kınâlızâde Ali 
Çelebi’s seminal work of ethics, Ahlâk-ı Alâî.94 
 Vâsıf made good use of eyewitnesses in his chronicle, as well, with four main sources. In 
chronologically early parts of the chronicle, for example, he relates a number of events on the 
authority of Kel Ahmedpaşazâde Ali Paşa, his late patron. During the 1768-1774 war and 
thereafter, he cites Grand Vezir Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa and more frequently Abdürrezzâk 
Bâhir Efendi.
95
 Very often, though, the historian is his own most important witness, as he 
frequently projects his own recollections into the narrative. But this does not mean Vâsıf made 
no recourse to other informants. In one telling instance, he refers to checking archival 
information against the oral testimony of Arab merchants living in Istanbul, “following the 
custom of historians.”96 
 Like a typical Ottoman gentleman, Vâsıf mastered Turkish, Persian, and Arabic and 
availed himself of material in these languages. Whether he knew others is speculative. Mükrimin 
Halil Yınanç claims that Vâsıf knew French, but he produces no evidence and there is no 
indication whatsoever in the chronicle that this was the case.
97
 Contemporary Spanish sources, 
dating from Vâsıf’s embassy, meanwhile indicate that the historian knew Greek and Russian, and 
while his writing betrays no hint of Greek, at least one passage does exist in which Vâsıf 
                                                 
94 See Resmî, 24-29. Compare also the similarities between the tale of the “Frankish king” in 
Müteferrika’s İbrahim Müteferrika ve Usulü'l-Hikem ve Nizâmi'l-Ümem, ed. Adil Şen 
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96 MEHÂSİN 1, 260a-260b. 
97 Mükrimin Yınanç, “Tanzimat'tan Meşrutiyet'e Kadar Bizde Tarihçilik,” in Tanzimat: Yüzüncü 
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transliterates and explains the Russian term for a type of field gun.
98
 This may confirm that he 
learned some Russian, most likely during his 1771 captivity, but we cannot know for certain. 
 The title of Vâsıf’s chronicle is another point of interest. Scholars generally refer to the 
work as Târih-i Vâsıf (The History of Vâsıf) or Mehâsinü’l–Âsâr ve Hakâikü’l–Ahbâr (The 
Charms and Truths of Relics and Annals), while the second volume occasionally appears as 
Dürrü’l-manzûm (The Strung Pearl).99 There is some ambiguity about which of these is correct. 
Vâsıf never personally used the first or last titles and adopted Mehâsin only after 1793, and that 
in the same work sometimes identified, mystifyingly, as Dürrü’l-manzûm.100 Furthermore, 
Mehâsin suggests a digest – more precisely, a digest of the most pleasing, truthful aspects of 
other sources – and creates the impression that he might have applied it specifically to his 
revisions of earlier court chronicles. Yet Vâsıf also called his fourth volume, a contemporary and 
original account of the years 1800-1805, the “third” volume of Mehâsin.101 It therefore appears 
likely that Mehâsin was in fact his title for the work as a whole, at least as he conceived it in later 
years.    
 As might be expected, Vâsıf’s conception of the chronicle and his numbering of different 
volumes changed over the course of his lifetime. Despite this, there is evidence that in later years 
he increasingly thought of the work as a coherent whole. By the early nineteenth century Vâsıf 
began to claim that he had written the empire’s history for the entire period from 1753 to the 
                                                 
98 Aceituno, 35. In MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 261 he describes this as a “concealed cannon” or esrâr topı: 
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present day “in a single sequence.”102 This assertion may have been premature given the two 
chronological gaps in his coverage, but Vâsıf does appear to have intended an unbroken history 
covering the entire second half of the eighteenth century and Selim III’s reign. The revision of 
his first volume, started but likely abandoned in 1805, would have closed these two gaps and 
realized his impressive historical vision.  
 
History Defined 
History in Ottoman times was part entertainment, part political instruction, part moral science.
103
 
An idea common to most premodern historical traditions is that the study of the past offers 
exempla which may be applied, by analogy, to present situations; or, following the Latin, that 
history is a “teacher of life (historia magistra vitae).” The Ottomans too subscribed to the idea of 
history as a moral field of knowledge. Vâsıf first expressed his own views on the subject early in 
the 1780s, indicating that to him, the past was instructive if nothing else. As his most explicit 
definition of history, this passage is worth quoting in full: 
Linguistically, history [târîh] means the dating of time…The original meaning of history 
is the dating of a document, and it is the verbal noun of the root W-R-KH in the second 
form. It is also customary to first know the definition, subject, aim, and benefit of each 
science. The definition of historiography [‘ilm al-târîh] is a science through which the 
affairs of nations and their genealogies, crafts, events, and circumstances are known; its 
subject includes the conditions of past prophets, kings, philosophers, and others; its aim is 
knowledge of these events; and its benefit is admonition and good counsel. Some of the 
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for Royal Profit,” 127-151. 
40 
 
ulema aver that the teaching and study of historiography verge on the obligatory. Since, 
therefore, it upholds the good order of the realm and immaculately preserves past rulers’ 
customs and practice, we see through proof of reason that historiography’s judgments, by 
use of analogy, are a guiding principle, and that the comparison of predecessors’ 
circumstances to our time yields great advantage.
104
 
 Vâsıf's definition of history as a useful, didactic field of knowledge was by no means 
unique. In fact he is borrowing heavily in this passage from the seventeenth century thinker 
Kâtib Çelebi (d. 1657), who offered a nearly identical formulation in his Arabic bibliographical 
work Kashf al-ẓunûn, and who in turn lifted the definition from the sixteenth century 
encyclopedist Taşköprüzâde (d.1560). Kâtib Çelebi also introduces “historiography (‘ilm al-
târîh)” with a philological definition, saying that, linguistically, history (târîh) means the precise 
dating of time, especially in relation to specific events that can serve as a locus for chronology. 
Historiography, he continues,  
...is knowledge of the affairs of nations and their countries, customs, practices, crafts, 
genealogies, obituaries, and so forth. Its subject is the conditions of past prophets, saints, 
scholars, philosophers, kings, poets, and others. Its aim is knowledge of the past. And its 
benefit is admonition and good counsel through those events and the acquisition of 
experience [al-tajârub] through an awareness of the vicissitudes of fortune, in order to 
avoid injuries akin to what is related about the evil things and gain more positive 
outcomes. 
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Kâtib Çelebi concludes, again following Taşköprüzâde, that historiography is a veritable “second 
life” for those who study it, with benefits akin to those that accrue to the traveler.105 
 Vâsıf's later definitions of history continued to emphasize these admonitory qualities, in 
particular its value to rulers and statesmen. In his second volume, for example, he declares that 
rulers cultivate historical writing as a rule, for “the admonitory accounts of histories of kings of 
olden times clearly give counsel to posterity and correct public morals.”106 In the preface to his 
third volume, the historian further argues that rulers patronize historians because they present a 
great many “sovereign benefits and pearls of strategy.” A knowledge of the past therefore guides 
such men in the precepts of governance, allowing them to foresee the present from the past and 
also, from the present, where the future may lead.
107
 A grand summation from the early 
nineteenth century, near the end of his life, affirms that Vâsıf held these opinions to the last: 
Be it known that after the glorious Quran and Hadith, the pride of the two worlds, the 
august craft of history is the most delicious and best of sciences, and the noblest and most 
precious of arts. Containing the deeds and traditions of great prophets and saintly and 
regal tales, it not only sets forth past events but, according to the sense of the verse, 
“Whenever one studies history, one descries the world and perceives each generation,” it 
is an initiate in the vault of insight for many an episode and exploit lost to consideration; 
it is an eavesdropper in the corridor of hearsay on curious rumors of all corners. The aim 
of history is instruct and admonish, by achieving certitude over ancestors' affairs and by 
studying the character of the two worlds and heavens. Merely as it is a dear commodity 
                                                 
105 Kâtib Çelebi, Kashf al-ẓunûn ‘an asâmî al-kutub wa’l-funûn (Beirut, 2008), s.v. “‘Ilm al-
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106 MEHÂSİN 2, 4a. 
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42 
 
does this craft prevail. Whereas it rights the mind, elevating the ignorant to a level of 
wisdom through its mastery, versing the ill-opinioned through test and trial, by means of 
this universal boon the elite of mankind is privy to that which was worthy of kings of 
Araby and Rum...From successor to predecessor, time's harvest is a memento, and from 
predecessor to posterity, the wayfarer's gift of admonition.
108
 
The point is clear – to Vâsıf historiography was a field of knowledge made useful through its 
lessons.  
 
History and Knowledge 
The link between human knowledge and the study of history has a long lineage in Islamic 
thought, going back to Ibn Khaldûn and earlier thinkers, as part of larger discussions of 
epistemology: how, that is, humans acquire knowledge. The basic idea is that the past lies 
outside of our actual experience but that it is still possible to have “knowledge” of these events. 
As a philosophically-minded historian, Vâsıf too explored the epistemological basis of history 
and especially how it realized a moral, instructive aim. As it happens, the three – knowledge, 
history, and morality – are closely entwined.  
 Vâsıf outlines his epistemology at length in a key passage found in two prefaces. 
“Knowledge of objects,” he begins, “is ordained to mankind through sense and intellect, and of 
the whole of sensibilia some things are gained through sight and some sound.”109 But the 
historian admits that no one can accumulate the world’s knowledge entirely on their own. In this 
the study of history serves as an aid: 
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But as it is consequently impossible to fully perceive the world, or for one man to see all 
of it on his own or to be aware of its good and evil through personal inspection, a 
faultless knowledge of creation and peoples can necessarily be achieved by recourse to 
histories that contain this information…In particular, laudable sovereigns unto whose 
judgment the great matters of the world and divers affairs of the nations are admitted 
require, with strongest need, this science, for they are charged with advancing or 
repelling the good or ill, the profit or injury, that occurs in their reigns.
110
  
The historian, of course, indicates that history gives students proxy knowledge of the past, which 
they might apply, by analogy, to current problems. This is what Kâtib Çelebi and Taşköprüzâde 
meant when they called history a “second life.” Another seventeenth century historian, 
Müneccimbaşı (d. 1702), phrased it somewhat differently by saying that history is a “virtual 
return.”111 
 Yet Vâsıf goes further than these earlier historians in detailing an explicit epistemology. 
“Scholars say that experience in affairs is without doubt to be reckoned one of mankind's virtues 
and that human judgment reaches maturity through experience,” he continues. Yet how does one 
gain such experience?  
Philosophers have proven different levels of intellect and assigned each one a name. One 
of these is the “experiential intellect.” Although the remainder are outside of this 
treatment, I adduce them here for further benefit, by way of digression. Let it be known 
that there are four levels of intellect. The first is the material intellect [‘akl-ı heyûlânî], 
which is a sheer capacity to perceive noumena. This is a purely potential faculty. Like the 
intellect of infants, the soul [nefs] at this stage is as primordial matter, matter that by its 
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essence lacks universals. The second is the habitual intellect [‘akl bi'l-meleke] through 
which necessary knowledge [zarûriyât] is gained, and this is thought to be how soul 
acquires discursive knowledge [nazariyât]. The third, the acquired intellect [‘akl-ı 
müstefâd], is actualized in the discursive knowledge it perceives such that it becomes 
self-aware…And the fourth is the experiential intellect [‘akl-ı tecârübî], which results 
from studying histories new and old and investigating the vicissitudes of fortune. And 
philosophers say that historiography is an illustrious science and that many benefits are 
compassed therein. Not only does it admonish and lead latter-day men to distinguish 
between good and bad behavior, but through historical knowledge it verses them in 
affairs and makes them sage counselors in public matters.
112
  
 To understand what Vâsıf means by “levels of intellect,” it is helpful to visit earlier 
epistemological thought. In Islamic tradition the acquisition of knowledge relies on the intellect 
or ‘aql. This term refers to unaided reason, divorced from revelation, and that part of the human 
soul (nafs, Trk. nefis) which “knows” or “thinks.” Derived from Hellenic philosophy – the Greek 
nous and Latin ratio and intellectus – it is usually divided into a “speculative” faculty (al-
naẓarî), which apprehends universals or quiddities, and a “practical” faculty (al-‘amalî) that 
contemplates future actions.
113
 According to Rosenthal, these ideas were not restricted merely to 
philosophers but spread even to the foundations of Islamic theology and jurisprudence. In this 
way, they “penetrated right to the core of Muslim thinking.”114 
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 Following Aristotle’s De Anima and its commentators, medieval philosophers posited 
that the human soul traversed different levels of intellect ranging from an absolute potentiality to 
full actualization. Although they differed in classifying these levels, sometimes markedly, they 
generally held that the soul’s progress reflected interactions with a so-called Active or Agent 
intellect (al-‘aql al-fa‘‘âl), the least of the intelligences which, in Aristotelian and Neoplatonic 
cosmology, parallel the celestial spheres and emanate from the First Intellect or First Cause. The 
Active Intellect was thought to parallel the sublunary sphere, the “world of generation and 
corruption (‘âlam al-kawn wa’l-fasâd),” where it somehow impressed knowledge on the human 
intellect.
115
  
 One of the most famous epistemologies in this tradition belongs to Ibn Sînâ (d. 1037), 
who created a fourfold hierarchy rising from the concrete to the abstract. Ibn Sînâ argued that the 
human mind begins in a potential intellect (‘aql hayûlânî or intellectus potentialis/materialis). 
This is the intellect in its untapped, purely potential state. From there it climbs incrementally 
through ‘aql bi'l-malaka (intellectus in habitu), a midpoint between potential and actualized 
intellection where the mind gains knowledge of general axioms (the primary intelligibles or 
“necessary” knowledge) and an ability to think, and the actual intellect (‘aql bi'l-fi‘l or intellecus 
in actu), where knowledge is clarified by deriving discursive knowledge from the general axioms 
(the secondary intelligibles). Finally, the intellect becomes “acquired” (‘aql mustafâd or 
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intellectus acquisitus) when it contemplates these intelligibles and merges with the Active 
Intellect.
116
 
 With variations, this theory mostly coincides with the levels of intellect later thinkers like 
Vâsıf describe. Kâtib Çelebi cited a fourfold hierarchy in his Kashf al-ẓunûn, including potential, 
actual, habitual, and acquired intellects, adding that the latter is the ultimate aim in perfecting the 
soul’s theoretical faculty.117 In the famous Muqaddima, the historian Ibn Khaldûn posited a 
three-level hierarchy of discerning (tamyîzî), speculative (naẓarî), and experiential (tajârubî) 
intellects. Ibn Khaldûn rated this “experiential intellect” below the speculative, saying that it 
recognized evil through the study of events, their outcomes, and the experience derived 
therefrom. Such  knowledge did not require direct observation but might be obtained through the 
examples of others.
118
  
 Although it is impossible to say here whether it was his innovation, Ibn Khaldûn’s 
elevation of experience to the level of intellect is certainly a departure. Al-Ghazâlî (d. 1111), for 
example, had recognized inductive or experiential knowledge (al-mujarrabât), but as a form of 
cognition (al-mudrik) rather than an intellect in its own right. Al-Ghazâlî divided knowledge into 
the necessary (al-ḍarûrî) and the discursive (al-naẓarî). In his understanding, necessary 
knowledge is what imposes itself on the intellect and does not admit doubt, while discursive 
knowledge relies on logical proof and takes necessary knowledge as its source. In the work 
Mi‘yâr al-‘ilm, he organized these into four total types of cognition, the first two “necessary” and 
the latter two “discursive”: a priori (al-awwaliyyât al-‘aqliyya al-maḥḍa); sensory (al-maḥsûsât); 
                                                 
116 EI², s.v. “‘Aḳl”; DİA, s.v. “Akıl.” 
117 Kashf al-ẓunûn, s.v. “‘Ilm al-ḥikma.” 
118 Ibn Khaldûn, Muqaddima Ibn Khaldûn, prolégomènes d'Ebn-Khaldoun, texte arabe, ed. M. 
Quatremère (Paris, 1858), 2: 412-413, 417-419. Translation from idem, The Muqaddimah: an 
Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton, 1967) 2: 418-419. 
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inductive or experiential (al-mujarrabât); and deductive (al-ḳaḍâyâ allâtî ‘urifat lâ-bi-nafsihâ 
bal bi-waṣat).119  
 Ahmed Vâsıf's epistemology combines these elements into a slightly different 
configuration. He adopts experience in Ibn Khaldûn’s sense, adding it to the intellects, but places 
it higher in a more customary hierarchy and, indeed, above speculative knowledge. To Vâsıf the 
experiential intellect, which allows knowledge of the past, sits atop ever more complex forms of 
human knowledge. The potential and habitual intellects furnish the mind with “necessary” 
knowledge, primary intelligibles which are the basis of all higher discursive knowledge – what 
allows us to form reasoned judgments and make decisions. But while the acquired and 
experiential intellects are both discursive, in that they work through logic and argument, 
experience for him seems to form a sort of shortcut that bypasses direct observation.
120
  
 By putting the experiential intellect at the top of his hierarchy, Vâsıf does two things. 
Firstly, he raises history’s stature, implying that knowledge gained through experience (and 
hence history) crowns all human knowledge – as good a reason as any why he and Ibn Khaldûn, 
historians both, included it among the intellects. Second, and perhaps more importantly, his 
theory of knowledge signifies that history-writing is at its deepest, epistemological level an 
instructive act. History, to Vâsıf and undoubtedly others, consisted entirely and literally of 
exempla. 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 Mi‘yâr al-‘ilm (Egypt, 1961), 186-193. See also Bernard Weiss, “Knowledge of the Past: the 
Theory of 'Tawâtur' According to Ghazâlî,” Studia Islamica 61 (1985): 81-105; Rosenthal, 
Knowledge Triumphant, 216-217; von Grunebaum, 4-5. 
120 Hagen and Menchinger, 103-104. 
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History and Morality 
It is important at this point to place Vâsıf's epistemology within a still larger complex of ideas, 
namely that of philosophy (hikmet), moral education (edeb), and the perfection of the human soul 
(nefs). For in Islamic thought the intellect is not morally neutral; there is a direct connection 
between it and right conduct. As von Grunebaum writes, Islamic thinkers considered the intellect 
not just a source of knowledge but a natural way of knowing what is right or wrong without the 
authority of revelation, a sort of “lumen naturale.” What distinguishes man from animals, what 
gives his actions meaning, what makes him a responsible agent, is intellect. In this understanding 
of knowledge, the “rational sciences (al-‘ulûm al-‘aqliyya, Trk. ‘ulûm-ı ‘akliyye)” in Islam 
encompassed everything that unaided reason might acquire, including ethics and the “natural 
value of law and morals.”121  
 The term hikmet must begin any attempt to appreciate the relationship between 
knowledge, history, and morality in Vâsıf's work. Usually translated as “philosophy” or 
“science,” hikmet was in fact a more expansive, “lofty spiritual conception of the world, 
penetrating all knowledge within the grasp of man, and even attaining to faith in God in 
revelation.”122 Ottoman thinkers like Kâtib Çelebi and Kınâlızâde Ali defined philosophy or 
hikmet as a field of knowledge examining things in their essence, both in substance and in the 
mind, insofar as man is able.
123
 Generally, and like the intellect itself, philosophy was divided 
into “speculative” (nazarî) and “practical” (‘amelî) spheres. Speculative philosophy (hikmet-i 
                                                 
121 Von Grunebaum, 4-5; DİA, s.v. “Akıl.” 
122 EI², s.v. “Ḥikma.” While philosophy became synonymous with hikmet, some thinkers 
specified that it was not hikmet itself but the love and acquisition thereof. Still others claimed 
hikmet was only metaphysics and excluded the “particular” sciences, or that it encompassed 
all the natural sciences. See DİA, s.v. “Hikmet.” 
123 “Huwa ‘ilm yubaḥathu fîhi ‘an haqâ'iq al-ashyâ ‘alâ mâ hiya ‘alayhi fî nafs al-amr bi-qadr al-
ṭâqat al-bashriyya wa mawḍû‘ahu al-ashyâ al-mawjûdat fî al-a‘yân wa al-aḍhân.” Kashf al-
ẓunûn, s.v. “‘Ilm al-ḥikma.” Also Kınâlızâde, 41-42. 
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nazariyye) concerned what might be called truth or “pure” knowledge, fields that exist 
independently of human volition like metaphysics, physics, mathematics, astronomy, and others. 
Practical philosophy (hikmet-i ‘ameliyye) meanwhile aimed at outcomes arising from voluntary 
action, and so fused under the heading “ethics” or ahlâk personal morality, household economy, 
and politics. The ultimate end of philosophy was the Good, which in an Islamic context meant 
the soul's perfection and felicity in the here and hereafter.
124
 
 To philosophers the way to the Good was twofold, through knowledge and action. One 
aspired to perfection in both spheres of philosophy and the person who realized them would 
attain felicity. Yet they also held that knowledge was a necessary antecedent to action. The soul 
must first progress to the highest level of intellect and become perfect in thought, after which 
perfection in deed could follow. Kınâlızâde opened his seminal work of ethics, Ahlâk-ı Alâî, by 
stating that voluntary actions depend on two things: knowing what the truth of a thing is, either 
in essence or form, and understanding its benefit. Although philosophy as a whole was the soul's 
acquisition of “knowledge and action and reaching perfection in both,” he made it clear that 
speculative must precede practical philosophy. Only when the soul properly knows objects and 
their essences can it perceive God's attributes and sound belief. And only when it acquires a 
proper belief in God through speculative philosophy, and rids itself of error, can it come to 
distinguish good behavior from bad, and virtues vices, through practical philosophy.
125
 
                                                 
124 On hikmet and its definitions, divisions, and aims, see EI², s.v. “Ḥikma”and “Naẓar”; DİA, 
s.v. “Hikmet”; Kashf al-ẓunûn, s.v. “‘Ilm al-ḥikma”; Kınâlızâde, esp. 41-53; Marlene Kurz, 
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125 Kınâlızâde, 39, 41, 47-48. See also DİA, s.v. “Ahlâk”; Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 
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 Practical philosophy came to the Ottomans through Persianate works of ethics and moral 
education (edeb), themselves ultimately derived from the Aristotelian tradition. The touchstone 
of Ottoman ethics, the Persian philosopher Naṣîr al-dîn Ṭûsî (d. 1274), characterized practical 
philosophy as the study of voluntary, disciplined actions “in a way that conduces to the ordering 
of the states of man's life in the here and hereafter, necessitating arrival at that perfection to 
which he is directed.”126 This definition was adopted by later popularizers like Davvânî, Ḥusayn 
Vâ‘iz, and Kınâlızâde Ali, the latter of whom wrote the standard Ottoman ethics in the sixteenth 
century. These works normally divided ethics into three parts. Personal ethics (ahlâk) taught the 
individual to cultivate virtue and abjure vice; household economics (tedbîr-i menzil) the proper 
relationships in and management over a shared household; and politics (siyâset-i müdün; lit. “the 
governance of cities”) the rule of larger social structures and polities.127  
 The key to this tradition was moral education. “The formation of character and 
acquisition of good manners and ways of behavior” was the basic premise of Persian and 
Ottoman ethical works, and they sought to give information about the soul and hence train it to 
produce virtuous acts toward the goal of felicity.
128
 But as Baki Tezcan notes, it would not be 
incorrect to see practical philosophy more widely as a sort of “art of human governance.” 
Personal ethics, for instance, teaches self-governance, economics the governance of the 
household, and politics the governance of a polity. Practical philosophy's three parts, ascending 
from the individual human soul to larger associations, also suggest that personal ethics is the 
                                                 
126 Ṭûsî, The Nasirean Ethics, 26-29.  
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base upon which all else is built. This means that politics functions as a domain of or adjunct to 
personal ethics, and that politics must reflect moral principles.
129
 In this way, then, moral 
education, ethics, and politics all work toward a single end – the perfection of souls, and 
individual and communal salvation.  
 Of course, philosophy was not the only or even the most popular approach to ethics, and 
made suppositions that many Ottomans, for religious reasons, could not admit. The major 
objections were over ontology and knowledge: what are moral values and how can humans know 
them? The view endorsed by the empire’s legal and theological schools, the consensus view in 
Islam since the medieval period, was a legal, ethical voluntarism. This meant that divine will 
preceded reason – that right and wrong were not based on abstract categories (and certainly not 
on human reason) but on God’s command in revelation and holy law. While it might be animated 
by a “dialectical spirit” or the literal interpretation of scripture, voluntarism relegated reason to a 
dependent role; where philosophers insisted that human reason could discern moral values, 
voluntarists effectively merged ethical action with legal justice.
130
   
 The choice made in favor of philosophy and a larger role for reason is therefore 
significant. Ahmed Vâsıf quite naturally assumed that the experiential intellect, and so history, 
served practical philosophy and hence individual and political morality. His words on education 
and knowledge demonstrate as much. As said above, humans progress through different levels of 
intellect that allow them to discern noumena and gain necessary and discursive knowledge. This 
knowledge should serve the end of knowing God and living well. For if we fail to give these gifts 
                                                 
129 Tezcan, “Ethics,” 111, 117. 
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proper use, asks Vâsıf, how can we possibly escape divine punishment in this world and the 
next?
131
 Vâsıf likewise used practical philosophy within his work to draw explicit morals. These 
range from discourses on individual virtues and vices to counsel on proper administration and 
kingly justice.
132
  
 An example from his second volume clearly establishes this link between the experiential 
intellect and morality. In an entry for the year 1774, Vâsıf records the execution of a vezir named 
Osman Paşa. Vâsıf and Osman had met in Silistre during the 1768-1774 war, where the latter 
was serving as garrison commander. Yet while he was intelligent, cultured, and energetic, says 
the historian, Osman Paşa harbored an overweening conceit and became unjust and rebellious. 
“Alas!” he laments,  
His Excellency was not destined to mend his morals through the guide of experiential 
intellect [delâlet-i ‘akl-ı tecârübî], nor, rescued from his carnal vices, was he able to find 
the safe path of justice. He ultimately gave his life in youth's first bloom and shed his body 
and head as so many leaves in the cold wind of crushing fate.
133
  
By contrast, in another entry Vâsıf praises the Grand Vezir Yusuf Ziyâ Paşa for his justice, 
compassion, and sound governance based on the precepts of practical philosophy.
134
 
 Moral reform through experiential knowledge was not an idea isolated to Vâsıf. 
Kınâlızâde spoke briefly about epistemology in relation to ethics, and on at least one occasion 
linked experience (tecârib) to the kingly virtue of sound judgment (isâbet-i rey), adding that it 
                                                 
131 MEHÂSİN 3, 215b. 
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might be gained personally or through the study of history.
135
 Earlier Ottoman chroniclers like 
Naîmâ and Kınâlızâde’s one-time student Mustafa Âli also incorporated tenets of practical 
philosophy to their work,
136
 making history and its instructive qualities in some sense 
handmaidens to ethics. On the other hand, Vâsıf arrogated such importance to the experiential 
intellect in his epistemology, and placed such weight on practical philosophy in his work, that he 
may well have been claiming more. It is not a stretch to wonder if, for Vâsıf, history was less a 
handmaiden than an umbrella science for ethics. 
 To conclude, Vâsıf’s epistemology reveals his assumptions about knowledge, history, 
and morality. Most narrowly, it indicates that he believed history had a didactic aim and 
consisted of exempla meant to edify readers. Still more broadly, Vâsıf saw experience and 
historical knowledge in close association with moral education and practical philosophy – ethics, 
household economics, and politics – and hence with philosophy’s ultimate aims: fostering proper 
belief in God, knowledge of right and wrong, the perfection of the human soul, and individual 
and communal salvation. Along with his definitions, these assumptions should dispel any doubt 
that to Vâsıf history was an inherently, inescapably moral science. 
 
Criticism and Self-Praise 
Criticism provides further insight into how Vâsıf understood the practice of history. A forceful 
personality, he was not averse to expressing opinions, almost always negative, about the taste, 
literary style, and value of earlier chroniclers’ work, nor was he abashed at self-praise. His 
comments on this subject and critique of specific historians therefore say much about his views.  
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 Mehmed Hâkim Efendi was the target of some of Vâsıf’s most vicious hatchet-work. As 
a court historian under Mustafa III and a poet of name, Hâkim left an enormous chronicle 
covering the period 1753-1768. However, as Kütükoğlu and others observe, his historical output 
is now largely neglected. This probably owes as much to Vâsıf’s revision of the work around the 
year 1800 as it does to his vocal denigration.
137
  
 Vâsıf’s disdain for Hâkim surfaces early on in the fifth volume’s preface. “Although 
Hâkim Esseyyid Mehmed Efendi is renowned for being well-versed and learned in the sciences,” 
we read,  
…in the art of rhetoric he was pedestrian, more faltering, perhaps, than a simple-simon. 
But notwithstanding, the events he recorded were merely of the divan’s appointments and 
dismissals; he was allusive out of the exigencies of time and place, forsaking and omitting 
causation. His work was bereft of the sound narration and moral lessons that are precepts 
of the historical craft, and his wretched style incurred scholars’ disgust and weariness.138 
Vâsıf also impugns his sources, “inveterate liars (kezzâb)” like Evliya Çelebi. Because of 
Hâkim’s incompetence, he claims, he had labored to rewrite the work to make it usable. Only 
after reducing it to a “digest (fihrist),” stripping it of superfluities, and supplying its defects could 
he produce a demonstrably superior version.
139
  
 Further criticism of Hâkim can be found elsewhere. A letter Vâsıf wrote during these 
revisions, most likely to the Grand Vezir, repeats that he is turning the work into a digest, 
removing Hâkim’s “fatuous” tales, and adding certain morals. Here his disgust is visceral. How 
                                                 
137 Kütükoğlu, “Müverrih Vâsıf,” 139-194; Madeline Zilfi, “Hâkim's Chronicle Revisted,” 
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could such a meager talent ever have become court historian, especially in the cultured era of 
Grand Vezir Koca Ragıb Paşa, he wonders? Indeed, Vâsıf writes that the revisions have 
discouraged him and made him physically ill: “the man’s painful expressions make a healthy 
man sick, let alone wish to write!”140 Marginalia in Hâkim’s chronicle in the Topkapı Palace 
library seem to corroborate Vâsıf’s frustrations. A portion of these appear to be his, perhaps as 
one, on a distich of poetry, reading, “My God, man! Half the history is filled with this very same 
verse!”141 
 Two scholars have asked whether these criticisms are entirely just. In a famous article, 
Bekir Kütükoğlu attempted to test Vâsıf’s strictures against Hâkim through a textual comparison, 
concluding that his revisions were unclear, slapdash, lacked underlying logic, and made 
omissions “at random.”142 Kütükoğlu’s example is instructive. An erudite, meticulous researcher, 
he was unable to assess Vâsıf without applying his own values as a twentieth century historian, 
or at least to concede that these might have differed from those of an eighteenth century 
Ottoman. Kütükoğlu never looked beyond his own historiographical priorities. In finding Vâsıf’s 
criticism to be utterly unfounded, he more successfully highlighted his own limitations.  
 Madeline Zilfi has recently put forward a different view. She argues instead that Vâsıf’s 
criticism of Hâkim reflects their differences in worldview, social position, and vocation. While 
Hâkim focused on the minutiae of Istanbul life and lesser social figures, a “mahalle” cum court 
historian, Ahmed Vâsıf wrote from a rarefied position, and his edition “is symptomatic of an 
historiographical approach that brought its own distortions to the world about which he wrote.” 
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She also suggests that his words be taken with a certain grain of salt, as a way of privileging his 
own version of events.
143
  
 It remains that Vâsıf’s major concerns with Hâkim were stylistic, causal, and moral. 
There may be truth in his complaint that the work forsook causality, for Hâkim noted in one 
manuscript that he had been ordered to disregard cause and effect.
144
 Vâsıf’s aversion to Hâkim’s 
prose is harder to pinpoint; clearly he felt it lacked taste and inventiveness, yet he also ventured 
that Hâkim’s “painful expressions” were simply the style of the time and were to all appearances 
popular.
145
 Above all, though, one sees Vâsıf’s concern for history’s didactic qualities. 
Justifiably or not, he claims to have made the work “useful to both high and low” by expurgation 
and augmenting it with morals.
146
  
 Sadullah Enverî Efendi was another of Vâsıf’s favorite targets. This is not altogether 
surprising, as Enverî rivaled Vâsıf as court historian for some two decades and wrote much of 
the material he later revised under Selim III.
147
 Interestingly, the historian’s regard for Enverî 
seems to have undergone a change. While his first volume praises Enverî’s skill and knowledge, 
though it also occasionally draws attention to his omissions,
148
 Vâsıf turned against his rival after 
the 1787-1792 war, during which both men served as court historian. As said above, Enverî came 
into possession of Vâsıf’s notes and added them, word-for-word, to his chronicle, for which 
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Vâsıf accused him of plagiarism. Thereafter he had little good to say about Enverî as a historian. 
In marking the latter’s death in 1794, Vâsıf barely even mentioned his work.149  
 The most explicit critique of Enverî is found in the preface to Vâsıf’s volume on the 
1768-1774 war, the events of which he, Enverî, originally compiled on the war front. Here Vâsıf 
wastes little time and directs a killing-blow at his rival’s competence. He writes: 
The events Enverî Efendi recorded…are filled with copies of letters and other curiosities, 
and his history is an assemblage of mistakes and defects arising through ignorance of 
every occasion. What is more, as it was clear to the sultan who receives God’s blessing 
that he had wasted much ink recording certain circumstances unsuitable to history, he 
suggested to this humble servant his illustrious will that the said history be rewritten like 
Hâkim’s and the others’ works, and that I correct his contents and emend his errors. 
Vâsıf then claims that his own wartime position in the bureaucracy, coupled with negotiation 
service, gave him more authority than Enverî.
150
 Nor is this the extent of his criticism. The 
historian conducts regular side commentary on Enverî’s work, faulting him for appending 
unnecessary documents, omitting important details, giving unsatisfactory descriptions of winter 
quarters, and, in another possible case, of confusing the death date of Abdülhamid I.
151
  
 Following Kütükoğlu, Filiz Çalışkan has tried to test these claims through a textual 
comparison and reaches similar conclusions: that Vâsıf’s critique is unfounded, his revisions 
unclear, haphazard, and prone to error. Notably, at least one Ottoman contemporary agreed. 
Ahmed Âsım Efendi ridiculed Vâsıf’s chronicle of the war years, saying that it was entirely 
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derivative and no different from Enverî’s “except for the preface.”152 However, Âsım harbored a 
deep resentment against Vâsıf and may have had ulterior reasons for disparaging the work. 
 As in the case of Hâkim, Vâsıf’s criticism of Enverî was probably some combination of 
ambition, rivalry, and a different historiographical approach. There is no question that Enverî 
was the less talented stylist. Aksan sheds light on this fact in characterizing his work as akin to 
reportage, an undigested, uncensored account.
153
 His approach grated with Vâsıf’s sense of 
selectivity, his literary scruples, and his belief that historians must pay close attention to the 
value of reports, both for factual content and usefulness. Vâsıf’s concluding remarks in the 
volume put this into perspective, vaunting his own “unpracticed idiom” and likening its 
eloquence to that of the Persian historians Vassâf and Juvaynî. Unlike his less skilled peers, 
moreover, he notes that he included precepts of morality (ahlâk) and practical philosophy 
(hikmet-i ‘ameliyye) for the reader’s benefit, through they could derive “pearls of wisdom” and, 
applying these by analogy, distinguish themselves among their peers.
154
 
 Twice late in his career Vâsıf made statements about the general quality of Ottoman 
historians, which are also telling of his views on the craft. The first ends his treatment of the 
1768-1774 war. Here, with no small amount of bombast, Vâsıf says that some of his 
predecessors had muddied their work with “obscure or tenebrous prose,” while still others, 
lacking in proper discernment, wasted ink with poor phrasing or bizarre, strange expressions. 
All, he contends, were “crumbs in the mouths of men of dignity and talent” who gave heed 
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neither to benefits of state, the fine points of philosophy, nor “the truths of cosmic revolutions 
that are tenets of the historical science.”155  
 Another more expansive statement appears in the preface to his final, unfinished volume. 
On this occasion Vâsıf progresses through an almost a canonical list of Ottoman historians, 
against whom he presumably hoped his own work would be judged, and picks each one apart. He 
proceeds: 
The history Hoca Sadeddîn wrote has a sort of eloquent charm but his prose disagrees 
with this era’s scholars, and, in truth, his repetitions to balance rhymes are excessive, and 
his history is filled with Turkish and simple verse. As for [Mustafa] Âli Efendi, he had to 
use unusual expressions and the events he recorded lack literary taste and graceful 
substance. The works of Solâkzâde, Neşrî, Uruc Bey, Hadâdî, and Malkoçzâde are 
vulgar, wretched, and their successors of the same sort. The late Naîmâ prepared the 
events that Şârih-i Menârzâde skillfully collected in the Imperial harem, and arranged 
them with important addenda. His history is pleasing to temperaments high and low. His 
successors Râşid Efendi and Çelebizâde Efendi each wrote a choice history, moreover – 
their eloquent works pleased all. The quality of later chroniclers is quite clear from their 
histories; their bungled writings are unmistakable to practiced stylists.
156
 
By way of contrast, Vâsıf says that when it came his turn as vekâyi‘nüvîs, he “chose a novel style 
neither simple nor obscure, and, as the occasion presented itself, carried out [his] design by 
adding advice, morals, and certain precepts of practical philosophy that the others had neglected 
through ignorance.”157 
                                                 
155 Ibid, 2: 314. 
156 MEHÂSİN 6, 4a-4b. 
157 Ibid, 4b. 
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 It is true that Vâsıf was not wholly negative in appraisal of others. He admired the court 
historian Süleyman İzzî, for instance, calling his prose “prolix” but “still sweet of expression,” 
and had warm words for two other court historians: Küçükçelebizâde Âsım Efendi, whom he 
deemed a “paragon of the age” and master of prose, and Mehmed Subhî Efendi.158 As for non-
Ottoman historians, Vâsıf obviously venerated the Persian master (and his near-namesake) 
Vassâf. Apart from explicit self-comparison, he may have named a son Vassâf and certainly 
compiled a specialized dictionary on him. 
 
Conclusions: Vâsıf and the Post of Court Historian 
On the whole these critiques raise Vâsıf at the expense of his earlier rivals. Yet they also make a 
strong statement about how he saw the post of vekâyi‘nüvîs. Vâsıf often wrote about the 
admonitory role of court history in Ottoman and Islamic dynasties,
159
 and it is significant, then, 
that he mostly discounted Râşid’s and Çelebizâde’s successors from the mid-eighteenth century 
onward, for he had an editorial hand in printing or rewriting every single one – Subhî, İzzî, 
Hâkim, Enverî, and others. In fact, Vâsıf argued, prior to him the post of vekâyi‘nüvîs had 
become broken, “disordered” such that decades of history were in danger of being lost.160 This is 
a somewhat odd view, since many of the chronicles he rewrote, like Hâkim’s, were complete, 
polished works. Implicit also is the claim that Vâsıf was somehow restoring the post to its proper 
dignity. What accounts for this? 
 There is indeed some evidence that the prestige of the vekâyi‘nüvîs had declined in the 
second half of the eighteenth century. Lower-level scribes, not always skilled stylists, were 
                                                 
158 Respectively, MEHÂSİN 5, 1: 51-52, 179-180, 2: 7-9. 
159 For example, MEHÂSİN 2, 4a. 
160 MEHÂSİN 6, 5a. 
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increasingly appointed. Another problem appears to be that these historians were not afforded 
sensitive information, or “state secrets (esrâr-ı devlet).”161 Hâkim complained that he had been 
ordered to ignore causes, for example,
162
 with the result that Vâsıf characterized his work as a 
litany of appointments and dismissals. Edîb Efendi likewise wrote in the 1790s that he was 
unable to access sensitive documents, so that his chronicle “was but limited to a history of the 
appointments and dismissals of men of rank, along with daily events.” In 1795/96 furthermore, 
Halil Nûrî Bey petitioned Selim III to restore “ancient practice” to the office of vekâyi‘nüvîs. The 
resulting administrative reforms were to supply the historian with an unrestricted stream of 
information, and Selim on another occasion ordered that they be sent regular intelligence on 
Europe. Vâsıf noted that the goal of these actions was to realize the benefits of studying 
history.
163
  
 Another point of interest is the overall trajectory of the dynastic chronicle under Selim 
III. Selim appears to have been interested in creating a vision of the past consistent with his own 
views and those prevailing at court. This involved overhauling the most recent works; between 
his accession and death in 1807, Selim had revised the histories of Hâkim, Çeşmizâde, 
Mûsazâde, Enverî, Edîb, and Nûrî Bey. These revisions bear the semblance of a developing, 
systematic program, an impression strengthened by his reform of the vekâyi‘nüvîslik and move to 
print dynastic records in the early nineteenth century. Whether Selim acted of his own accord or 
at Vâsıf's instance is impossible to say. Interestingly, though, he relied entirely on the historian to 
execute these tasks. Combined with his involvement in the imperial printing press and role in 
                                                 
161 Kütükoğlu, “Vekayi‘nüvis,” 108; EI², s.v. “Waḳa‘nuwîs.” 
162 Kütükoğlu, “Vekayi‘nüvis,” 108, n. 27; idem, “Müverrih Vâsıf,” 146-147. 
163 Kütükoğlu, “Vekayi‘nüvis,” 107-108. On Edîb see Çınar, “Mehmed Emin Edîb,” 117-118. 
For Nûrî’s petition, Târîh-i Nûrî, Beyazıt Kütüphanesi nr. 3369, 91a-93a. See furthermore 
BOA.HAT 5094, 11187. Vâsıf comments on these reforms in MEHÂSİN 3, 41a-41b. 
62 
 
publishing editions of Subhî and İzzî, we may at least concede that the idea that Ottoman court 
chronicles provided a continuous, printed record of the dynasty
164
 owes much to Vâsıf's labors 
for Selim III.  
 Ahmed Vâsıf's pursuit of moralizing historiography was not a cliché or empty bombast. 
His gradual move toward interpretive frameworks, realized most fully in his volume on the 
1768-1774 war; his epistemology linking history to practical philosophy and hence the perfection 
of the soul; his critiques of peers and predecessors and unabashed self-praise; his very definition 
of history – all of these indicate that he took his vocation seriously and that to him history was 
not merely a record of the past; it was a guide in man’s hazardous portage from this world to the 
next.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
164 EI², s.v. “Waḳa‘nuwîs.” 
63 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Ahmed Vâsıf on Agency and Causality: a “Reformist” Philosophy of History 
 
Even when not intentionally didactic, we expect a work of historiography to mirror, to greater or 
lesser extent, the anxieties and preoccupations of its author and their milieu. Ahmed Vâsıf’s 
work is no different. Like so many of his peers, Vâsıf was gravely troubled by events of his 
lifetime which for an educated Ottoman posed profound moral and historical dilemmas. Military 
collapse, eroding power, bankruptcy, and the rise of hostile powers like Russia seemed to 
undermine any pretense of “Ottoman exceptionalism,” the widespread belief that the empire was, 
somehow, divinely favored, while at the same time they demanded cogent answers: Why did this 
happen? How could this happen? What must be done?  It is no surprise, then, that Vâsıf tried 
throughout his life to grapple with these problems. In his work, particularly his chronicle and 
historical essays, he not only made Ottoman defeat and reform a key concern but more generally 
outlined a framework for understanding the universe, causation, and historical change. His was a 
complex, cerebral response – we might even say a philosophy of history.165   
 This chapter traces Ahmed Vâsıf's understanding of agency, causality, and the universe, 
moving from his earliest words in the 1780s through his later chronicles and final written work. 
                                                 
165 Ottoman historians never developed a coherent theory of history. By “philosophy” I instead 
mean a more ad hoc grasp of historical patterns, how history unfolds, how events occur, and a 
possible teleology; in a different sense, Vâsıf on these topics is also highly philosophical in 
that he is grounded in pertinent discourses in Islamic thought. My findings in this chapter 
shall shortly appear as “A Reformist Philosophy of History: the Case of Ahmed Vâsıf 
Efendi,” Journal of Ottoman Studies (forthcoming, 2014). See Hagen and Menchinger on 
Ottoman historical thought in general.  
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Though couched in theological terms, Vâsıf's philosophy of history urges concrete action within 
a regular, predictable universe. He censures those who would trust to fate, arguing that initiative 
is in fact a moral and religious obligation. This creates a powerful intellectual justification for 
reform that buttressed the efforts of his patrons. Over time, moreover, Vâsıf refined his views, or 
at least expressed them more directly, applying them in later work as a coherent interpretive 
framework. 
  
Ottoman Exceptionalism and the Problem of Causality 
The late eighteenth century was to all appearances a time of deep moral and intellectual crisis.
166
 
A certain militancy and sense of divine favor, what might be called “Ottoman exceptionalism,” 
had long been central to the self-perception of the empire's elite. Gottfried Hagen defines this as 
the teleological belief that history culminates in the Ottoman dynasty. Ottomans like Vâsıf and 
his peers believed that their rulers had a greater devotion to the faith, sustained believers like 
none before, and that the dynasty itself, divinely supported, combined ultimate justice and zeal in 
jihad and would last till the end of time; that God had sent them to renew the faith and that their 
success, witnessed in the fall of Constantinople and far-flung conquests, was proof positive of 
His aid.
167
  
                                                 
166 For the idea of a moral crisis in the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire, Niyazi Berkes, The 
Development of Secularism in Turkey, (Montreal, 1964), 26-30; George W. Gawrych, “Şeyh 
Galib and Selim III: Mevlevism and the Nizam-ı Cedid,” International Journal of Turkish 
Studies 4 (1987): 93-96. 
167 Gottfried Hagen, “Afterword: Ottoman Understandings of the World in the Seventeenth 
Century,” in An Ottoman Mentality: The World of Evliya Çelebi (Leiden, 2004), 233-241; 
Hagen and Menchinger, 100-101. See further Colin Imber, “The Ottoman Dynastic Myth,” 
Revue d'etudes turques 19 (1987): 7-27. For examples of Ottoman exceptionalism, 
Müteferrika in Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 4: 1896-1899; Mehmed Dürrî, Nuhbetü'l-Emel fî Tenkîhi'l-
Fesâdi ve'l-Halel, TOP nr. 1438, 283a-285a. Vâsıf often voices such beliefs. See MEHÂSİN 
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Ottoman exceptionalism was also enmeshed in the realm’s frontier origins – it seemed to 
both grow out of and explain the early empire’s gazi traditions and dizzying expansion. In any 
event it gave pride of place to warfare. Because of their devotion to gaza and jihad, Ottomans 
saw themselves as superior to Europeans and even to other Islamic dynasties. The “zeal of 
Islam” and duty of jihad supposedly made Ottoman soldiers more innately brave than non-
Muslims, and hence, all other things being equal, they could and would always prevail.
168
  
Although Rhoads Murphey argues that this ideology was largely spent by the seventeenth 
century, it survived, at least in rhetoric, well into the eighteenth, surfacing again and again after 
1768.
169
 It is therefore preferable to follow Aksan, who believes that militant exceptionalism as 
an ideology was not seriously questioned until the very survival of the Ottoman way of life was 
in danger and war “no longer profitable – financially or psychologically.”170  
 While many scholars focus on the martial overtones of Ottoman exceptionalism, it must 
be said that this belief was a more complex, pervasive worldview – one that avowed complete 
faith in the empire’s superiority and its ability though God’s aid to overcome all challenges, 
domestic as well as foreign. The troubles of the eighteenth century were not simply a blow to 
Ottoman military pride. They also opened a wide rupture between ideology and reality, and 
between self-perception, aspiration, and the empire’s real frailty. When disaster struck, perhaps 
the biggest concern of eighteenth century intellectuals was therefore to salvage exceptionalism or 
somehow harmonize it with events. Discussions of agency were an important part of this effort. 
                                                                                                                                                             
1, 5a-5b, 9b, 102b-103a; MEHÂSİN 2, 2a-4a; MEHÂSİN 3, 1b-3a; MEHÂSİN 4, 308b-310a; 
MEHÂSİN 5, 1: 4-10, 2: 182-183. 
168 Usulü'l-Hikem, 170-171, 191; MEHÂSİN 1, 41b-42a, 131a-131b; MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 260-263. 
169 Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700 (NJ, 1999), 145-146. 
170 Virginia Aksan, “War and Peace,” 3: 116. See further Ahmed Resmî's remarks on the rhetoric 
of war in the 1760s, A Summary of Admonitions, 2a-5b. 
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 Causality and human agency are subjects with an old pedigree in Islamic thought. The 
crux of the issue is the extent to which humans, as created beings, are responsible agents. In 
other words, how much influence, if any, do humans have over their actions and the surrounding 
world – are we masters of our fate or puppets moved from on high?  
For medieval Islamic theologians this question impinged on two particular aspects of the 
divinity – power and justice – and called for an attempt to reconcile God’s omnipotence and 
righteousness. Already by the eighth century two basic views had emerged. On one hand, a party 
known as Fatalists or Predestinarians (jabriyya or mujbira) championed God’s omnipotence, 
arguing that humans have neither will, choice, nor power to make decisions and that their 
behavior must be the result of God’s will alone, for He can have no rivals in power. Opposed to 
the Predestinarians were supporters of free will (qadariyya), who objected that, being all-just, 
God must have granted mankind some measure of agency. Otherwise, religious obligation and 
indeed moral right and wrong would be meaningless. Their opinion was that after creating the 
necessary substructure, God gave humans will as a test and left them to their own devices, good 
or ill. To preserve divine power, they maintained that God wills and creates all human actions, 
but only those that are volitional. Such was the belief of a famous party of rationalists known as 
the Mu‘tazila.171  
 A synthesis of these views came about via two later, highly influential theologians, Abû 
al-Ḥasan al-Ash‘arî (d. 935/36) and al-Ghazâlî (d. 1111). Al-Ash‘arî pointedly emphasized 
God’s omnipotence by adopting an occasionalist or atomistic cosmology, in which God 
                                                 
171 I can give only the barest summary of these often convoluted arguments. For a readable 
account of the formative period, Montgomery Watt, Free Will and Predestination in Early 
Islam (London, 1948). Also Oliver Leaman, ed., The Biographical Encyclopaedia of Islamic 
Philosophy, (New York, 2006), s.v. “Jabr”; DİA, s.v. “Ahlâk,” “İlliyet”; EI², s.v. “Djabriyya,” 
“Ḳadariyya”; Ulrich Rudolph, Al-Mâturîdî und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand 
(Leiden, 1997).  
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continually “rearranges all the atoms of this world and creates their accidents anew – thus 
creating a new world every moment.”172 This Ash‘arî atomism holds that the universe consists of 
bodies made from atoms and the accidents which inhere therein. On earth, the lowest, sublunary 
sphere, God at every moment recreates these atoms according to His will, continually joining and 
separating them in a process of generation and corruption (kawn wa fasâd, Trk. kevn ü fesâd).
173
 
Rejecting the idea of any kind of “natural law” or causality outside of God, as such would limit 
divine power and will, al-Ash‘arî nonetheless acknowledged a rather complex scheme in which 
humans “acquire (kasb)” actions created by God, and thus accept responsibility for them. This 
theory of acquisition was not wholly satisfying, called by some a “moderate fatalism.”174 
Al-Ghazâlî, who is generally considered a follower of al-Ash‘arî, effectively merged 
Ash‘arî occasionalism with Aristotelian causality and added finishing touches to what eventually 
became Sunni Islam’s predominant theological orthodoxy.175 He achieved this through the notion 
of “God’s custom (‘âdatullah, Trk. ‘âdetüllah).” Al-Ghazâlî argued that God wills and creates 
every event – that is, He is the only true agent in the cosmos – but chooses to create through the 
mediation of secondary causes, or, at least, through the semblance of causes. God is the only 
efficient cause, the Primary Cause or more specifically “the one who makes causes function as 
causes (musabbib al-asbâb).” But this distinction is somewhat immaterial on a mundane level. 
                                                 
172 Frank Griffel, Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology (Oxford, 2009), 126.  
173 More generally on the concept and origins of Islamic atomism, Michael Marmura in The 
Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor 
(Cambridge, 2005), 142-143; Alnoor Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kalâm: Atoms, Space, 
and Void in Basrian Mu'tazilî Cosmology (Leiden, 1994); Biographical Encyclopaedia of 
Islamic Philosophy, s.v. “Atomism,” “Al-Ghazali,” and “Maturidi”; Shlomo Pines, Studies in 
Islamic Atomism, trans. Michael Schwartz (Jerusalem, 1997). On generation and corruption, 
DİA, s.v. “Âlem”; Nasr, 240-241. 
174 On al-Ash‘arî generally, Biographical Encyclopaedia of Islamic Philosophy, s.v. 
“Ashariyya”; Griffel, 124-133; Watt, 147-152. 
175 Al-Ghazâlî's Ash‘arîsm is still a point of debate. Cf. Griffel with Marmura, 142-143; “Al-
Ghazali” in The Biographical Encyclopaedia of Islamic Philosophy, 1: 158-168. 
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For while God remains unconstrained, able to abrogate causality at any time, His custom links 
cause and effect and creates a visible “natural law” upon which humans must rely in day to day 
affairs.
176
 Incidentally, then, Ghazâlî pointed to an important distinction between fate as a matter 
of theological doctrine and fatalism as an approach to life. 
We can have no doubt that when Ottoman intellectuals spoke of causality, they did so 
with this theological superstructure in mind. Worldly causes (esbâb) were understood as 
“secondary” in that they were actualized by God, the Primary Cause.177 In the eighteenth century 
such problems held an especial urgency, as they were closely tied to political reform, the 
outcome of matters like warfare, and to the imperial mystique. For theologians and Sufis, the 
concern surfaced in tracts on free will, which flourished from the late seventeenth into the 
nineteenth century, and in the rise and popularization of “particular will (irâde-i cüziyye),” a 
concept discussed below. For statesmen and intellectuals who dealt with the immediate ends of 
human agency, the question was more practically limited to whether or not to act through 
worldly causes.  
                                                 
176 Griffel, 216-222, 276-278; DİA, s.v. “İlliyet.” As Mardin observes, the distinction is between 
a natural law depending on God’s will and one existing independently of the deity; or, 
following Aquinas, natura naturata as opposed to natura naturans, The Genesis of Young 
Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Syracuse, 2000), 
86-94. Natural laws are therefore “due to habit and have no more than a juridical status,” 
Nasr, 8-10. For more on ‘âdetüllah and miracles as its abrogation (khârq al-‘âda), Jonathan 
Brown, “Faithful Dissenters: Sunni Skepticism about the Miracles of Saints,” Journal of Sufi 
Studies 1 (2012): 123-168; DİA, s.v. “İlliyet.”  
177 Gottfried Hagen, “Osman II and the Cultural History of Ottoman Historiography,” H-Net 
Reviews (2006): 8, n. 16; Hagen and Menchinger, 101-102. Sources also call these causes 
“visible (esbâb-ı zâhire),” “virtual (m‘anevî sebebleri),” and “customary (umûr-ı zâhirede 
esbâb-ı mu‘tâde).” For example, Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 2: 493. 
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 Ottoman elites were divided, however. While many held that mankind had free will in 
moral, civil, and political life, and indeed that to deny its existence was sinful,
178
 there are strong 
indications of a sentiment – how widespread is not known – of fatalism, or at least of resigned 
despair, at even the very highest levels. Mouradgea D'Ohsson, for example, Vâsıf’s 
contemporary, states that a notion of total predestination held increasing sway over much of the 
population and that any complaint against inertia was seen as a gross impiety.
179
 This vein of 
thought may have been an outgrowth of popular Sufistic beliefs in the annihilation of the will.
180
 
Meanwhile, in another facet of what Berkes calls “an incipient crisis in moral life,” it appears 
other Ottomans, at least in private, denied that God interfered in human affairs at all and owned 
what sources describe as deism, materialism, or atheism.
181
 
 The rhetoric of fatality cut across all groups but is most linked in sources to two: military 
men and the religious authorities, or ulema. For the former, blaming defeat on God’s will was an 
understandable reaction in light of Ottoman exceptionalism, for it implied a divine trial and not 
                                                 
178 Mouradgea D'Ohsson, Tableau général de l'empire othoman (Paris, 1788-1824), 1: 166-168; 
Şerif Mardin, “The Mind of the Turkish Reformer, 1700-1900,” in Arab Socialism: a 
Documentary Survey  (Salt Lake City, 1969), 29-30. A large number of Ottoman-era tracts on 
free will survive. Altun examines many of them in “Kazâ ve Kader Risâleleri.” Also Şamil 
Öçal, “Osmanlı Kelamcıları Eşarî miydi? Muhammad Akkirmânî'nin İnsan Hürriyeti 
Anlayışı,” Dinî Araştırmalar 5 (1999): 225-254; and Arif Yıldırım, “Karslı Davud (Davud-i 
Karsî) Efendi'nin İrade-i Cüz'iyye Anlayışı,” Ankara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları 
Enstitüsü Dergisi 15 (2000): 189-199.  
179 D'Ohsson, 1: 166-168.  
180 For an excellent discussion of the human will versus God’s power, see Kurz, 159-171. Gibb 
and Bowen ascribe eighteenth century fatalism to a vulgarization of mysticism, Islamic 
Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the 
Near East (London, 1957), 2: 205-206. 
181 Elias Habesci, The Present State of the Ottoman Empire (London, 1784), 135-137; Lady 
Mary Wortley Montagu, The Turkish Embassy Letters (London, 2006), 62, 110-111; and Sir 
James Porter, Observations on the Religion, Law, Government, and Manners of the Turks 
(Dublin, 1768), 31-32. Some of these are quoted by Berkes, 28-29. Of course, these observers 
were outsiders to Ottoman society and their accounts may reflect misunderstandings. 
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necessarily any moral or material advantage on the part of the enemy.
182
 It was practical, too. 
Vâsıf himself advised commanders to invoke God’s will following a loss, for example, to 
preserve discipline and as a sop to morale.
183
 For the latter, meanwhile, denying human agency 
was an assertion, albeit an extreme one, of the general belief in Sunni theology that God creates 
all worldly events and human deeds, and of believers’ obligation to trust in Him absolutely.184 
Fatalism, like other causal positions, was therefore simply one way of answering the problem of 
theodicy – simply one way of reconciling calamities with a just and almighty God. 
 Given the empire’s traumas, it is not surprising that some Ottomans took refuge in 
fatalism. But whether this attitude was sincere is largely moot. For example, it is noteworthy that 
fatalism – essentially a theological viewpoint – could be used to shut down arguments and assert 
the status quo, particularly for two groups like the military and ulema threatened by reform.
185
 It 
also offered a convenient way to evade responsibility: this is why, wrote the memorialist Canikli 
Ali Paşa, people blamed Providence whenever there was a flaw in human strategy.186 Causal 
discourse was in any event common currency to all parties. Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals 
                                                 
182 For example, A Summary of Admonitions, 34b; MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 46, 169, 271; MAC, 77. 
Human agency in warfare seems to have been hotly debated: Mardin, “Mind of the Turkish 
Reformer,” 30.  
183 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 269. 
184 In Islamic theology the relationship between the creation of acts and human will is quite 
vexed. See Daniel Gimaret, Théories de l'acte humain en théologie Musulmane (Paris, 1980), 
esp. ix-xiii, 61-64, 232-234; Altun, 2-19. Defective trust in God is an act of infidelity, 
D’Ohsson, 1: 329; Watt, 155. 
185 Not incidentally, they formed the biggest opposition groups. Berkes, 61-63; Beydilli, “Islâhât 
Düşünceleri,” 25-26; Gibb; 2: 107-108. 
186 “Tedbîrde noksan oldı takdîre bühtân etdiler.” Canikli Ali Paşa, Tedbîr-i Cedîd-i Nâdir, ÖN 
nr. H.O. 104b, 1b. Also Yücel Özkaya, ed., “Canikli Ali Paşa'nın Risalesi 'Tedâbîru'l-
Gazavât,'” Ankara Üniversitesi Dil-Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Araştırmaları Dergisi 7/13-14 
(1969): 137. D’Ohsson and Gibb allude to this use of fatality. 
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used these theological arguments, cynically or in earnest, to political ends.
187
 Reform, reaction, 
war, peace, and other topics were all debated in causal terms. In this regard, Ahmed Vâsıf's 
treatment of human agency is unique only in its more extensive degree of detail. 
 
The 1784 Risâle 
Some of Vâsıf's earliest words on reform, causation, and historical change occur in a short essay 
(risâle) he wrote at the behest of Abdülhamid I and inserted in a chronicle entry for 1784.
188 
The 
timing was no coincidence. For some ten years the Ottoman court had been mired in indecision 
and bickering, loath to accept the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca and in particular the loss of 
the Crimean peninsula. The task of reform fell eventually to Vâsıf's patron Grand Vezir Halil 
Hamid Paşa (1782-1785), whose efforts elicited the historian's hope and lavish praise.189  
 That year, Vâsıf tells us, the Duke of Montmorency-Luxembourg190 sent the sultan a 
letter by leave of the French king. Within the Duke suggested that Ottoman territorial losses were 
due to inadequate training and that their forces were ill-prepared in military science. He hence 
                                                 
187 To give a cynical example, in a 1784 meeting with the French ambassador de Choiseul-
Gouffier Grand Vezir Halil Hamid Paşa, certainly no fatalist, refused to discuss commercial 
privileges on the Black Sea, saying only: “Everything depends on providence; it will happen 
when the ordained time comes.” When the ambassador intimated that “providence” was his 
caprice, the Grand Vezir retorted that everything depends on providence, to deny which is 
illicit. Mehâsin (İlgürel), 196-198. 
188 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 149-152; MEHÂSİN 1, 129a-132b. Cevdet adds a condensed version to 
Târih-i Cevdet, 3: 85-88. Mardin also discusses the essay in “Mind of the Turkish Reformer.”  
189 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 5-9; MEHÂSİN 1, 5a-8b. Vâsıf goes so far as to call the Grand Vezir the 
“sâhib-i mia,” or the one whom “the Lord God sends to this community at the beginning of 
every 100 years...who restores its religion.” On Halil Hamid Paşa, Sefinet, 118-120; DİA, s.v. 
“Halil Hamîd Paşa”; and İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, Sadrazam Halil Hamid Paşa (İstanbul, 1936). On 
the era's politics, Christoph Neumann, “Decision Making Without Decision Makers: Ottoman 
Foreign Policy Circa 1780,” in Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire 
(Missouri, 1993), 29-38.  
190 Probably Anne Charles Sigismond de Montmorency-Luxembourg (d. 1803), a French 
commander and the Duke of Piney-Luxembourg. 
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proposed a mission to instruct the Ottoman army in fortification, mortars, and cannonry.
191
 
Abdülhamid was inclined to accept the French offer and gave a guarded assent. However, he 
asked his court historian Vâsıf to first prepare a tract on the soldiers used by Christian kings and 
related topics.
192
  
 The 1784 essay stridently rejects French assistance. Muslim and Christian armies are 
inherently different, Vâsıf proceeds. While European rulers use orphans as soldiers or conscript 
peasants, employing them under duress, Ottoman levies are virtuous, devoted to their leaders, 
and cannot be compelled. Their unity and commitment to holy war guarantee victory, even if, 
from time to time, the infidel prevails. Nor does Vâsıf think such men will ever stoop to learn 
enemy arts.
193
   
 Vâsıf thus begins from the vantage-point of Ottoman exceptionalism, a belief he shared 
with many, if not all, of his peers. But affairs raised a disturbing question: if the Ottomans were 
favored by God, if they were guaranteed victory, why did they now fare so poorly in war? Vâsıf 
presents this dilemma first and foremost as a divine trial. “If things have now altered so that our 
soldiers are denied victory,” he says, “and if the enemy sometimes prevails by land or sea, this is 
an effect of their faculty of istidrâc, produced by satanic efforts.”194 To Vâsıf istidrâc – a 
theological concept and miracle (khârq al-‘âda, Trk. hârikülâde) whereby God gives infidels 
success, making them prideful, in order to lure them to damnation and test believers' fidelity – 
has led to recent Ottoman defeats. However, he assures us that istidrâc is rare and cannot last 
                                                 
191 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 149; MEHÂSİN 1, 129a-129b. 
192 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 150; MEHÂSİN 1, 130a. 
193 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 150-151; MEHÂSİN 1, 130a-131a. Vâsıf’s rejection of conscription is 
related to the traditional Islamic view (discussed in Chapter Three) that discipline and 
compulsion are not needed, as war is an obligation and essentially a sacrifice on the part of 
the believer. See also Ebubekir Râtib Efendi, 139.  
194 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 151; MEHÂSİN 1, 131a.  
73 
 
long.
195
 The enemy's arms and organization are no different than in the past and in the end the 
Ottomans shall continue to prevail. This fine point is tied to God's will.
196
 
 By invoking God's will, the 1784 essay raises precisely those problems of historical 
causation and agency that were at the heart of eighteenth century intellectual debate. Vâsıf's 
rejection of the French offer leads him to speak openly on this subject, in a passage that merits 
quotation: 
Indeed do victory and defeat depend on the will of God. As for Christian nations, their 
beliefs dispute this. Hence they say, following a group of philosophers, that the 
circumstances of war are among particular events [umûr-ı cüziyye] and that God – 
Heaven forfend! – has no effect on particular events. They not only ridiculously contend 
that whichever side can muster superior means [esbâb] of warfare will prevail, but they 
produce proofs weaker than a spider's web, crediting victory to the perfection of means 
                                                 
195 “İstidrâcın hükmü ise kalîl ve her zamân emeli câri olmak müstahîl.” Mehâsin (İlgürel), 151; 
MEHÂSİN 1, 131a. According to Lane this meaning was already established in early 
exegetical works and in the most important medieval Arabic lexicons. For example: “He 
brought him near to punishment by degrees, by means of respite, and the continuance of 
health, and the increase of favour”; “He (God) took him (a man) so that he did not reckon 
upon it; [as though by degrees;] bestowing upon him enjoyments in which he delighted, and 
on which he placed his reliance, and with which he became familiar so as not to be mindful of 
death, and then taking him in his most heedless state.”An Arabic-English Lexicon, s.v. “D-R-
J.” Ibn al-‘Arabî also discusses this “divine guile” in some detail in al-Futûhât al-Makkiyya, 
summarized by William Chittick in The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-Arabi’s Metaphysical 
Imagination (Albany, NY, 1989), 267-269. Brown says that by the 15
th
 century istidrâc was 
reckoned a specific type of miracle (khârq al-‘âda), 133-134. The 19th century scholar 
Abdülhakîm b. Mustafa Arvâsî gives this definition: “Fâsıkların (günahkârların), bilinmeyen 
bâzı şeyleri haber vermeleri, âdet üstü hârikulâde hâdiseler göstermeleridir. Allahü teâlâ, her 
şeyi bir sebeb altında yaratmaktadır. Allahü teâlâ, sevdiği insanlara, iyilik ve ikrâm olmak için 
ve azılı düşmanlarını aldatmak için, bunlara âdetini bozarak sebepsiz şeyler yaratıyor. Bunlar 
kâfirlerden, fâsıklardan, günâhı çok olanlardan zuhûr ederse, istidrâc denir ki, derece derece 
kıymetini indirmek demektir.” Quoted in Evliyalar Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul, 1992-1993), 1: 21. 
Cf. Şemseddin Sâmî, Kâmûs-ı Türkî (İstanbul, 1899/1900), 98.  
196 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 151; MEHÂSİN 1, 131a. 
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[esbâb] and necessities and heedless of the sacred import of “Not the least atom is hidden 
from Him” and “There is no aid but from God the Almighty.”197 
Vâsıf, to refute this view, then cites past campaigns when Ottoman troops won in spite of ill-
preparedness and disorder. With such counterexamples, “how,” he asks, “can anyone impute 
victory to refinement of the means of war [tekmîl-i esbâb-ı ceng] and defeat to inadequate 
arms?”198 
 This passage needs some explanation, for it partakes in a long-standing philosophical and 
theological discourse. “Particular events (umûr-ı cüziyye)” and their counterpart “universal 
events (umûr-ı külliyye)” are key terms in the Ottoman causal lexicon on relations between the 
earthly and divine. Both are traceable to earlier thinkers and were current in some schools of 
Islamic theology along with the concept of “particular will (irâde-i cüziyye).” Particular will, 
sometimes translated less strictly as “free will,” denotes human will as the end product of the 
divine will (irâde-i külliyye). Put simply, “particular events” are worldly events that humans can 
affect and that admit agency, while “universal events” encompass larger historical processes 
linked to divine preordination.
199
  
As said before, Ottoman intellectuals were quite familiar with this discourse. In the 
seventeenth century work Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr, the polymath Kâtib Çelebi explains at some length 
how worldly causation operates.
200
 God, he says, is the Almighty and Primary Cause 
(müsebbibü'l-esbâb) who decrees all things in His earthly dominion. However, God also created 
                                                 
197 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 151; MEHÂSİN 1, 131a-131b. Quotations are from the Quran, 34:3 and 
3:126, 8:10 respectively. Mardin too quotes this passage, “Mind of the Turkish Reformer,” 
28.  
198 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 151; MEHÂSİN 1, 131b. Vâsıf cites the Eğri campaign of 1596 and the 
battle of Hisarcık. 
199 Şerif Mardin, “Mind of the Turkish Reformer,” 28-29.  
200 Kâtib Çelebi, Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr fî Esfâri'l-Bihâr (İstanbul, 1911), 163-164. Discussed by Hagen 
in “Osman II,” 6; Hagen and Menchinger, 101-102. 
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the world as a world of causes (‘âlem-i esbâb) so that each event is revealed by way of a 
cause.
201
 He furthermore, through benevolence, endowed humans with particular will (ihtiyâr-ı 
cüzî) and made a custom (‘âdet) of creating as an outcome thereof. Kâtib Çelebi consequently 
argues that it is man's duty to exert free will through these “secondary causes (esbâb).” While 
humans are not, strictly speaking, the cause of events, they are enjoined and empowered by God 
to take initiative: “Man must therefore concern himself with causes in order to conform to the 
divine command that is needful to him,” he writes. “With initiative, man has performed his duty 
and thereafter the matter's resolution abides with the will of God the Primary Cause.” Though 
God might sometimes test believers with adversity, it rests on them to struggle through causes.
202
  
Kâtib Çelebi's is an atomistic universe in which God is the sole true agent, a view closely 
aligned with al-Ghazâlî and the Ash‘arî school of theology. While worldly events seem to follow 
cause and effect, then, they are in truth only concomitant and “caused” in a strict sense by God's 
divine power and given the semblance of regularity through His custom (‘âdetüllah). But lest 
humans be freed from moral responsibility, as agency gives meaning to sin, piety, and religious 
duty, theological schools like the Ash‘arîs and others sought by means like “particular will” to 
preserve human agency without running roughshod on God's omnipotence.
203
 As Kâtib Çelebi 
                                                 
201 Ottoman authors often refer to ‘âlem-i esbâb, though more often than not the idea is assumed. 
For example, Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 1: 11, 2: 476, 493; Robert Anhegger, “Hezarfenn Hüseyin 
Efendi’nin Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilâtına Dair Mülâhazaları,” Türkiyat Mecmuası 10 (1953): 
382; Mehmed Atâullah Şânîzâde, Şânîzâde Târîhi (İstanbul, 2008), 1: 33-34.  
202 “[Allah] bu ‘âlem-i dünyâyı...‘âlem-i esbâb kılub kevn ü fesâdda cümle mukadderât ve 
tasarrufâtı sebeb yüzünden gösterüb...mahz lutf ve kereminden kullarîn ihtiyâr-ı cüzî sâhibi 
kılub herkese ihtiyâr-ı cüzîsini bir tarafa sarf etmeğe temkîn ü ikdâr edüb ‘akabinde halk 
etmek üzere ‘âdetini icrâ eyledi.”Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr, 163-164.  
203 Rudolph, 336-343. Mehmed Akkirmanî in the eighteenth century reiterates that human agency 
gives sin and piety meaning: “Zîrâ teklîf, ihtiyâr-ı fi‘le ve sarf-ı kudrete sebeb olur. Allah 
teâlâ dahî eğer mâni‘ yok ise evvel fi‘li halk eder. Abd'dan bu ihtiyâr sebebiyle sâdır olan fi‘l 
şari‘in taleb etdüğüne muvafık olursa taat olub sevâba alâmet olur; muhâlif olursa ma‘siyet 
olub ‘ıkâba alâmet olur.” Öçal, 236. 
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indicates, God commands humans to act; to ignore worldly causes is therefore sinful and 
initiative itself a moral imperative. 
The lineage of these ideas in the Ottoman Empire is not entirely clear. Şerif Mardin 
credits them to Ibn Sînâ's Aristotelian cosmology by way of the popular ethical treatise Ahlâk-ı 
‘Alâî,204 but the latter contains none of the key words or even a detailed discussion of causality. 
The matter is further confused by whether they are Ash‘arî or Mâturîdî, probably too clumsy a 
distinction. While on one hand Ottoman theology is usually considered to have been Mâturîdî in 
orientation, there is some doubt over its formal affiliation
205
 and concepts like ‘âdetüllah and 
müsebbibü'l-esbâb are almost certainly linked to al-Ghazâlî’s atomistic causality. Furthermore, 
Philipp Bruckmayr demonstrates that the concept of irâde-i cüziyye stems from the Ottoman 
pietist Birgivî Mehmed (d. 1573), and was spread and popularized only in the late seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries in treatises on free will. These tracts derived from a mixed milieu, one 
characterized by “harmonization” of Ash‘arî and Mâturîdî ideas and purveyed, above all, by Sufi 
Nakşbendî authors.206 It is hence probably wrong to look for their origins in any one school of 
theology. For just as “God's custom” or ‘âdetüllah effectively aligned Ash‘arî atomism with 
Aristotelian cosmology, at least in terms of its practical implications, so any Ash‘arî – Mâturîdî 
distinction is likely minor in everyday application.
207
  
                                                 
204 Mardin, “Mind of the Turkish Reformer,” 28-29. 
205 Öçal, 225-226.  
206 Bruckmayr, esp. 10-11. Altun also notes a trend toward harmonization and a strong link 
between the authors and Sufism, 84-87. See also Kurz, 12. 
207 Öçal, for example, argues that this system of ideas displays Ottoman Mâturîdism. Mardin, 
too, associates it with the Mâturîdis, Young Ottoman Thought, esp. 407. The point is 
academic. Gimaret outlines three basic positions in Sunni Islam: that man controls neither his 
will, power, nor actions, which are entirely created by God; that man is an actual agent but his 
power and will are created by God; that God creates acts in all elements save one, the decision 
of the human. Gimaret says that historically the first option is most closely aligned with the 
Ash‘aris and the third with the Mâturîdis, who affirmed the reality of the human act, 232-234; 
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 If we return to the 1784 risâle in this light, we can see that Vâsıf sketches, if vaguely, a 
stance that can be called “activist.”208 At no time does he deny that humans have particular will 
or that warfare is a “particular event.” His mere use of the phrase suggests otherwise. What he 
instead rejects is the idea that God has no part in such outcomes – that victory rests only on 
human initiative through causes, an impious notion to say the least.
209
 That Vâsıf connects this 
idea to a group of “Christian philosophers,” moreover, suggests he is to some degree aware of 
intellectual trends in Europe. His words are a recognition and firm rejection of Enlightenment-
era materialism, and maybe of any homegrown materialist tendencies.
210
  
 Nor does Vâsıf question the utility of action. This becomes clearer when he turns to his 
patron Halil Hamid Paşa's reform efforts. “Ultimately,” he writes, “there is still reason to 
struggle for the causes/means [esbâb] at the heart of our discussion; and these, praise to God, are 
now being readied and gradually brought to completion.”211 In his conclusion, Vâsıf extols Halil 
Paşa and his circle for their cooperation and reform initiatives. The French offer was not to be 
trusted and is in any case unnecessary. For should the Grand Vezir and his colleagues continue, 
                                                                                                                                                             
also Altun, 2-19. Once terminological niceties are put aside, I tend to agree with Fakhry: that 
“their positions are almost identical,” 47. See also Griffel, 124-146, 276-287; Hagen and 
Menchinger, 101-102. 
208 The term is Mardin's. “Mind of the Turkish Reformer,” 33; idem, Young Ottoman Thought, 
particularly 171-173.  
209 According to Rudolf, absolute human free will was seen as a form of unbelief in that it 
ascribes divine attributes (creative power) to mankind, while fatalists commit unbelief by 
anthropomorphizing God, associating Him with human wickedness, 336-339. 
210 On materialism, Louis Dupré, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern 
Culture (New Haven, 2004), 18-44. 
211 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 151; MEHÂSİN 1, 131b-132a. 
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by God’s grace, to attend to state affairs, “the means/causes will undoubtedly come to full 
fruition.”212 
 If Vâsıf's essay seems unsystematic and lacking in detail, this may suggest that his 
audience was already familiar with its main ideas. In any event, the rest of his first volume gives 
the less adept modern reader hints about what “particular events” more or less encompassed. 
Certainly they included warfare in its many aspects. Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa, one of the 
major statesmen of the 1780s, put it succinctly when quoted by Vâsıf, stating that war must be 
conducted through causes, among which are the treasury, the army, and quality of 
commanders.
213
 To these the author adds provisions and unity among statesmen. Waging 
successful warfare without any of these factors is impossible, he writes, and in his opinion the 
empire’s defeats have occurred through bankruptcy, insufficient ordnance, cowardice, and a 
willful neglect of the military.
214
  
 What is more, the chronicle obliquely outlines what Vâsıf felt would produce victory. 
Foremost, of course, were Halil Paşa’s reform efforts: his ordering of the military, reorganization 
of lapsed land grants, and introduction of new weapons and tactics, for, as Vâsıf says, “it is 
among the secondary causes [esbâb-ı zâhiriyye] of victory for every state to acquire weapons to 
match those of its enemy.”215 Another telling passage reports an Ottoman rout in the East, a 
“particular event” caused by the army's tribal levies, and namely their disobedience on the field 
                                                 
212 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 151-152; MEHÂSİN 1, 132a-132b. Vâsıf accuses the French of base 
motives, such as designs on the island of Crete where they proposed to offer training. Cf. 
Berkes, 65-66. 
213 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 91; MEHÂSİN 1, 78b. 
214 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 99; MEHÂSİN 1, 85b. 
215 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 8; MEHÂSİN 1, 7b. 
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and greater interest in plunder and prisoner-taking than in fighting. Elsewhere Vâsıf mentions, 
again, supplies and well-defended frontiers as causes of victory in war.
216
  
As the 1784 risâle specifies, though, victory could not rest on material factors alone. 
“Spiritual provisions” were significant, too. “From ever of old,” Vâsıf avers, 
The customary needs and secondary causes of gaza and jihad have been secured, 
according to the favor of the time, entirely through God's aid and the succor of royal 
prayers. Yet while, praise be to God, be He lauded and extolled, the Sublime State has 
always swiftly gained advantage, the statesmen decided to trust not in causes alone but in 
God's aid, according to the holy verse, “There is no aid but from God the Almighty,” and 
to begin spiritual provisions [rûhânî tedârükât] and binding rituals.
217
  
One of these rituals was the recitation of the Kitâb al-shifâ and Bukhârî’s Ṣaḥîḥ by ascetics as far 
afield as Egypt, Damascus, the Holy Cities, and Baghdad. In the past the empire, supported by 
God, had recovered quickly from disasters through the piety of its rulers. Such spiritual 
measures, it was hoped, would now offset Russian istidrâc and, along with military reforms, help 
to secure victory.
218
 The spiritual side of Vâsıf's causality must not be overlooked. In his work 
action and absolute trust in God's aid always go together, and are indeed a duty of statesmen. 
 At least one scholar, Şerif Mardin, characterizes Vâsıf's 1784 risâle as a “fatalist,” arch-
conservative position.
219
 On the contrary, in the larger debate of the time it is neither fatalist nor 
conservative but toes a fastidious line between fatality and a godless materialism, a stance 
usually seen as “orthodox” in Sunni Islam. Vâsıf considers military defeat a divine trial, or 
                                                 
216 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 204, 261-262, 305-306; MEHÂSİN 1, 149b, 199a-200a, 236a-237a. 
217 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 52; MEHÂSİN 1, 42b. 
218 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 52-54; MEHÂSİN 1, 42b-44a. 
219 Mardin, “Mind of the Turkish Reformer,” 28-30, 32; idem, Young Ottoman Thought, 172-
173. Cf. Berkes, 66.  
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istidrâc. At the same time, however, he advises action and his understanding of causation affirms 
that humans have a role to play, albeit a limited one. Like Kâtib Çelebi, Vâsıf sees the world as a 
world of causes. He hence ties the military success of the empire to moral considerations but 
allows room for reform and activism. These same ideas, moreover, would play a large and 
growing role in Vâsıf's philosophy in following years. 
 
Vâsıf on the Natural and Supernatural 
Ahmed Vâsıf’s view of causality can be better understood through his conception of the natural 
and supernatural. Here it is again worth saying a few words about the concept ‘âdetüllah. While 
Ash‘arî atomism holds that God is the only true agent in the universe, ‘âdetüllah in fact 
reconciles it with worldly causality. Because God chooses to persist in His custom, events will 
always, or nearly always, act as if by joined in a series of cause and effect. There is therefore no 
outward contradiction between worldly causes and the idea that God is an absolute agent (fâ‘il-i 
muhtâr) who creates and governs the universe.
220
 Vâsıf was of course well aware of this fact. His 
epistemology, for example, discussed above, depends on the point: to deny regularity and 
causality makes all discursive knowledge (and history) impossible.
221
 
Vâsıf’s work depicts an atomistic universe made intelligible by God’s custom. Further, 
since the universe operates according to visible and customary secondary causes, humans are 
able to predict and in some cases manipulate outcomes. This picture emerges more clearly when 
the historian speaks of the natural world, as, for instance, in several entries on eclipses. Vâsıf, 
whose interests ranged widely, seems to have been disquieted by a popular belief that these 
events were actually portents. In recording a partial solar eclipse on 14 June 1760, he likens the 
                                                 
220 Griffel, 276-278; DİA, s.v. “İlliyet.” 
221 DİA, s.v. “İlliyet.” 
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event to the famed eclipse that immediately followed the death of İbrahim, a son of the Prophet. 
According to Vâsıf, when the Prophet discovered that some people were calling the eclipse a 
miracle caused by İbrahim’s death, he corrected them, saying, “Verily are the sun and moon two 
of the divine signs; they are not eclipsed for the death of one man.” Vâsıf then enumerates the 
physical conditions under which sun, earth, and moon create eclipses.
222
 For a lunar eclipse on 4 
February 1795, meanwhile, Vâsıf goes so far as to accuse the ulema of denying God’s custom. 
After explaining that the moon is eclipsed because the earth blocks out the sun’s light, he adds 
that the prophetic hadith does not contradict astronomical writings, since  
The divine actions of God occur sometimes regularly [‘alâ hasbe'l-‘âdet] and sometimes 
irregularly [lâ ‘alâ hasbe'l-‘âdet] and His omnipotence rules over both causes [sebeb] and 
effects [müsebbeb]. The learned ulema however, believe, as a point of faith, in a divine 
omnipotence that does not follow general laws [‘alâ harki'l-‘âdet-i ‘umûm] and whenever 
something strange occurs they take fright due to this conviction.  
Vâsıf concludes that with eclipses they cannot deny certain causes related to divine habit.223  
                                                 
222 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 184-185. While it is impossible to tell whether this account depicts a geo- or 
heliocentric universe, and though eighteenth century Ottoman intellectuals knew of the 
heliocentric model, Vâsıf’s usual acceptance of an Aristotelian/Ptolemaic cosmology makes 
the latter a remote possibility. This passage parallels İbrahim Hakkı Efendi (d. 1780), quoting 
al-Ghazâlî’s Tahâfut al-falâsifa, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, “The Introduction of Western 
Science to the Ottoman World,” in Science, Technology, and Learning in the Ottoman 
Empire: Western Influence, Local institutions, and the Transfer of Knowledge (Burlington, 
2004), 2: 24-25. See also Robert Morrison, “The Response of Ottoman Religious Scholars to 
European Science,” Archivum Ottomanicum 21 (2003): 187-195. 
223 “Hakk sübhanehü ve te‘alâ’nın ef‘âl-ı ilahiyyesi ba‘zen ‘alâ hasbe'l-‘âdet ve ba‘zen lâ ‘alâ 
hasbe'l-‘âdet vukû‘ bulub kudreti sebeb ü müsebbeb üzerine hâkimdir. ‘Ulema-yı 
mütebassırîn ‘alâ harki'l-‘âdet-i ‘umûm kudret-i samadâniyyeye mu‘takid olub bir şey-i garîb 
vukû‘ buldukda zalike’l-i‘tikâd sebebi ile havf ederler. Bu sûretde bu ‘âdetin cereyânı içün 
ba‘zı esbab zuhûrını men‘ ü inkâr etmezler.” MEHÂSİN 2, 196a. Cf. the eclipse in 
MEHÂSİN 4, 274b-275a. Although he was not a religious scholar, Fazlızâde Ali took a 
similar stance, rejecting the notion of divine custom and all manner of causal connections, 
real or apparent. Kurz, 183-196. 
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These comments are paralleled by the author’s more or less firm mistrust of astrology 
(ahkâm-ı nücûmiyye). Many Ottomans had no scruples in consulting the stars, over the protests 
of certain religious authorities. Naîmâ, for example, had recommended to aspiring historians that 
they incorporate the effects of conjunctions and astrological influences in their work.
224
 Vâsıf 
granted that God used the heavens to convey signs, but he could not accept that astral bodies had 
any independent causal influence. In one decisive passage from his first volume, he urges his 
audience to obey the will of God by taking initiative, trusting in Him, ignoring astrology, and 
rejecting philosophers who endorse it, quoting a distich – “He who plans by the stars knoweth 
not / For the Lord of the Star doeth what He will” – and verse by the poet and alchemist al-
Ṭughrâ’î (d. 1121): “God governs alone, neither stars / Nor sun nor moon share in His rule.”225  
Vâsıf’s treatment of earthquakes elicits many of the same details. Recording a massive 
quake in 1784, which killed a certain brutal vezir in Erzincan, he is quick to disavow that 
earthquakes are divine interventions. While the ulema attribute earthquakes to sin and injustice, 
he says, and corroborate their claims through scripture, philosophers explain that quakes occur 
from the accumulation of vapors under the earth. The surface of the earth in this state becomes 
unyielding, hence the vapors are unable to escape, become heated, and rise. An earthquake 
occurs if they cannot find an outlet. Yet Vâsıf, the son of a religious scholar but unimpressed by 
the current profession, pointedly adds that the ulema hold this opinion in contempt.
226
  
                                                 
224 Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 1: 5; Thomas, 114; el-Rouayheb, 201-202; B. Harun Küçük, “Natural 
Philosophy and Politics in the Eighteenth Century: Esad of Ioannina and Greek 
Aristotelianism at the Ottoman Court,” Journal of Ottoman Studies 41 (2013): 140. 
225 See on the Silistre governor Hasan Paşa, who was ruined by an interest in occult sciences. 
Mehâsin (İlgürel), 49-50; MEHÂSİN 1, 142a-142b. On al-Ṭughrâ’î, author of the Lâmiyyat 
al-‘ajam, Brockelmann, 1: 247; EI², s.v. “al-Ṭughrâ’î.” 
226
 “‘Ulemâ-yı şer‘-i şerîf bu akvâlı ibtâl ve tezyîf eyledikleri mahallinde mestûrdır,” Mehâsin 
(İlgürel), 184-185. Vâsıf called the ulema of his day unqualified, corrupt, ignorant, and 
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 This regular, predictable view of the universe also allows humans to act on the world 
around them. When Abdülhamid shuttered two profitable bullion mines in 1785/86, ostensibly 
out of concern for public order, Vâsıf informed his superiors that the loss could be recouped 
through artificial means: alchemy. To begin, he writes, most philosophers agree that the essence 
of the seven precious metals is the same – gold – but that they differ in accidental properties (min 
ciheti’l-a‘râz). These accidental properties develop over long periods of time, according to the 
degree to which the climate deviates from the mean in hot, cold, damp, or dry. Gold, for 
instance, needs intense heat to keep its purity; silver is produced in moderate cold; lead in cold 
and excess dry; copper arises where heat overpowers moisture. All metals, he argues, are 
produced by variations against the mean.
227
 Following this logic, it should therefore be possible 
to produce them artificially (sınâ‘at-ı hikemiyye ile), for God’s consummate wisdom created 
most perfectly, among metals, both the pure matter capable of becoming gold and silver and the 
active matter to transmute it (anı tedbîr ü tekmîl edici madde-i fâ‘ile). He also revealed to 
philosophers how to refine it by fire. When the debased metal (ma‘den-i nâkıs) is treated by 
alchemy (esrâr-ı hikmet), then, and by imitating the actions of nature (muhâkât-i fi‘l-i tabî‘at), 
the cause of its defect is removed and it can be turned into gold and silver. Just as it is possible to 
                                                                                                                                                             
illiterate sponges, MEHÂSİN 4, 42a-42b. Cf. Anhegger, 392. His account of earthquakes is 
based on Aristotle’s theory of vapor and exhalation, Nasr, 240-247; İhsanoğlu, 2: 25. 
227 This account is informed by Galenic humoralism, whereby the four elements earth, air, fire, 
and water have distinct characteristics and condition the human body as well as other natural 
objects. A competing theory argued that all metals consist of sulphur and mercury in different 
degrees and denied that alchemy can change a metal’s basic principles. Miri Shefer-
Mossensohn, Ottoman Medicine: Healing and Medical Institutions, 1500-1700 (Albany, 
2009), esp. 23-24, 66-68; Nasr, 244-247; István Ormos, “The Theory of Humours in Islam 
(Avicenna),” Quaderni di Studi Arabi 5/6 (1987/1988): 601-607. 
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produce wonders through artifice, he closes, or to cure illness with medicine and alter plants, so 
too is it possible to rid metals of accidental properties and imperfections.
228
 
For all Vâsıf’s causal reasoning, for all his physical explanations, for all his emphasis on 
the world’s regularity – for all that, he nonetheless did not disclaim miracles. This is because 
‘âdetüllah, though regular and predictable, is not a necessary course of events. God chooses to 
act through custom but may abrogate it according to His will.
229
 During a drought in the spring 
of 1794, Vâsıf on these grounds heatedly denied that a famine was imminent: 
While the Creator of elements, compounds, and all creation has sometimes bound His 
divine omnipotence and will to secondary causes, let there be absolutely no doubt that He 
must ever needs use an intermediary. His consummate power in creating and producing 
without cause [bilâ ‘illetin min’l-‘ilel halk u ihtirâ‘] is a self-evident fact. And in order to 
save from turmoil and various sufferings those materialists who are heedless of the secret 
wisdom, “His command, when He desires a thing, is to say to it ‘Be,’ and it is,” He now 
made abundant clouds...
230
  
And the rains came. Not only does the author in this passage thereby affirm God’s power to 
ignore regular order, but once again he toes an “activist” middle ground, chiding those who see 
only external causes just as those who see only the miraculous. 
 
                                                 
228 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 293-298; MEHÂSİN 1, 226a-230b. Reading fâ‘ile for İlgürel’s gâile. 
229 Marmura, 142. 
230 “Âferînende-i besâît ve mürekkebât ve rûzîdihende-i kâffe-i mahlûkât zuhûr-ı kudret ü 
meşiyetini ba‘zen esbâb-ı zâhireye rabt etmiş ise dahi kati‘en li-maddeti'ş-şübheti müzâvele-i 
‘amel ve isti‘mâl-ı alete iftikârı olmayub bilâ ‘illetin min’l-‘ilel halk u ihtirâ‘ ve icâd u ibdâ‘da 
ta‘ayyün-i kemâl kudreti dahi iclâ-yı bedîhiyyâtındandır. Innamâ amruhu idhâ arâda shayan 
an yakûla lahu kun fa-yakûnu idrâk-ı hükm-i hafiyyesinden rû-pûş-ı gaflet olan erbâb-ı 
zevâhir inkılâb-ı derûn ve iztırâb-ı gûnâgûndan tahlîs içün bu esnâda gamâm-ı latîfü'l-insicâm 
dahi feyzân edüb.” TOP nr. 1638, 10a-10b. On miracles and their typology, Brown, “Faithful 
Dissenters.” 
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The 1787-1792 War: the Morality of Victory and Defeat 
The Russian-Ottoman and Austrian-Ottoman Wars of 1787-1792 led Ahmed Vâsıf to a more 
coherent, philosophical statement of agency. Sparked by Grand Vezir Koca Yusuf Paşa (1786-
1789, 1791-1792), who forced an ill-advised declaration of war against Russia on 14 August 
1787, the conflict pressed the Ottomans into a campaign along the Danube against Russia and 
Austria, raising anew the spectre of Ottoman collapse. Vâsıf himself served at the front from 
1791 to 1792, witnessing the signal Ottoman rout at Maçin, which effectively ended the war, and 
negotiating a truce with General Nikolai Repnin in August of 1791. He later reflected on these 
events, when bidden by Sultan Selim III in 1793 to produce a history of the war from the work of 
earlier chroniclers Sadullah Enverî and Mehmed Edîb.
231
 Most notably, the historian used this 
occasion to explain the failure of the empire's arms, elaborating on human action and the causes 
of victory and defeat.  
 Vâsıf's most explicit words on this subject come in his account of the Ottoman defeat at 
Foksani. In July of 1789, Koca Yusuf's successor Hasan Paşa (1789-1790) stationed the bulk of 
his forces at Foksani in Moldavia to prevent a joint Russian and Austrian assault on Bucharest. 
By means of a forced march, however, the Russians under General Suvorov arrived earlier than 
expected. The Ottoman force was taken completely by surprise and disintegrated when the 
Russians and Austrians attacked together on 30 July.
232
  
 Contrasting the Ottoman and enemy armies, Vâsıf argues that a disobedient mass of 
soldiers who disregard secondary causes (esbâb-ı zâhire) cannot match the obedient, disciplined, 
                                                 
231 Vâsıf was sent to the army to serve, among other things, as court historian. This appointment's 
date is uncertain but seems to have taken place in April of 1791. Vâsıf was certainly at the 
front by June of that year. Kütükoğlu, “Vekayi'nüvis,” 118-119. Also MEHÂSİN 2, 81a, 87b-
89a; Mehâsin (İlgürel), xxix; and related documents, BOA.HAT 10467, 11579, 57475.  
232 Shaw, 36; MEHÂSİN 2, 25a-26a.  
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new-style soldier fielded by Russia and Austria; indeed it is outwardly difficult, if not 
impossible, to defeat an enemy without equal or superior organization. The pressing concern, 
then, lies in “secondary causes,” which, he says, “encompass warfare and the arts of combat 
[kanûn-ı muhârebe ve fünûn-ı müzârebe] – in other words, the new [military] organization which 
is part of the mathematical sciences [fünûn-ı riyâziye].”233 Vâsıf then presses the argument at 
length, stating: 
According to the philosophers, everything is contingent; what is contingent admits 
influence; and what admits influence cannot be without cause. The Sunnis say that 
although everything issues un-contingent from God and man's deeds have absolutely no 
effect nor influence on causes or ability to influence the course of events, it is God's 
custom to create everything as an outcome of secondary causes [‘âdetüllah bunun üzere 
cârîdir ki her şeyi esbâb-ı zâhire ‘akabinde halk ede] Therefore, is it is ever incumbent 
on all sects that when they must undertake a matter they should secure the secondary 
causes forthwith and complete necessities pertaining to the circumstance, then await 
God's victory and seek the fruits which derive from the sense of “Hobble your camel and 
trust in God.”234  
Vâsıf therefore links acting through secondary causes both to obedience to God and success in 
battle. The Prophet himself offered this wisdom: “War is a trickery (al-ḥarbu khud‘a).”235 
                                                 
233 MEHÂSİN 2, 26a-26b. Vâsıf's association of mathematics and warfare here and elsewhere 
seems to corroborate Adnan-Adıvar's claim that modern math entered the Ottoman Empire 
“through the military channel.” See Berkes, 49. 
234 MEHÂSİN 2, 26b-27a. The proverb is from a hadith, G.W.F. Freytag, Arabum proverbia, 
vocalibus instruxit, latine vertit, commentario illustravit et sumtibus suis editit (Bonn, 1838-
43), 2: 112. 
235 MEHÂSİN 2, 26b. 
87 
 
 A similar grasp of causality can be found elsewhere in Vâsıf's day in the work of scholars 
and statesmen. Indeed, this was a matter of fierce debate. While theologians like Mehmed 
Akkirmanî (d. 1760) and Davûd-ı Karsî argued that human agency was both real and 
obligatory,
236
 would-be reformers called especially for warfare based on worldly causes. For 
example, İbrahim Müteferrika (d. 1745) acknowledged that victory and defeat depend on God's 
will but that “God has consigned the outward realization of every matter to initiative through 
causes. Man must operate thus.” The victorious army is hence pious and just as well as well-
trained, well-led, disciplined, and informed of tactics and weaponry.
237
 The 1768-1774 war, 
provoked and prolonged by men who argued precisely the opposite – that God grants victory on 
zeal alone – intensified this debate and produced a spate of treatises in the 1770s and 1780s. 
Among them, Ahmed Resmî's (d. 1783) trenchant Hulâsatü'l-İtibâr (A Summary of Admonitions) 
rejected the war and its authors' insouciance, and exposed the empire's decrepit military system. 
Resmî agreed that Russian power was divine punishment (istidrâc) for Ottoman moral failings, 
but called for reform and a pacific foreign policy.
238
 Even Canikli Ali Paşa's (d. 1785) 
                                                 
236 Such men argued, according to D'Ohsson, that “dans toutes les circonstances de la vie et dans 
toutes les entreprises publiques ou particulières, on doit d'abord implorer les lumières célestes, 
par l'intercession du Prophète et de tous les saints du Musulmanisme; ensuite réfléchir, 
délibérer, consulter ses propres lumières, en usant de tous les secours que peuvent suggérer la 
prudence, l'expérience et la raison. Ce n'est qu'après avoir employé ces moyens, que l'on peut 
attribuer aux décrets éternels les événemens humains, auxquels on doit alors se soumettre 
avec une résignation absolue.” 1: 168.  
237 “It is secret wisdom that victory, success, and triumph over the enemy depend always and 
utterly on the Lord God’s infinite aid to believers; that rule rests on His exalted will; and that 
victory and defeat lie within His preordination. However, God has consigned the outward 
realization of every matter to initiative through causes. Man must operate thus.” Usulü'l-
Hikem, esp. 148. See also Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 74.  
238 Resmî attacked his peers' bellicosity and blind faith in the “zeal of Islam,” A Summary of 
Admonitions, 1b-2b, 4b-5b, 24b-25a, 33a-36a, 44b-45a, 48a-48b. Berkes, following Resmî, 
blames the war on “conservatives” who hoped to show that pious zeal was enough to bring 
victory, 55-59. Also D’Ohsson, 1: 264-266, 5: 49-75. For a discussion of this work and others 
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conservative Tedbîr-i Cedîd-i Nâdir (The Rare New Stratagem) admitted, if in a vague way, that 
divine preordination and worldly causes work in tandem, and that the Ottomans must attend to 
strategy if they are to reverse their fortunes.
239
 Ottoman reformers seem to have internalized this 
discourse by the reign of Selim III. While Vâsıf derided Canikli Ali's essay as outmoded, he 
found no fault in its notions of causality.
240
 
 What, then, did “secondary causes” mean to Ahmed Vâsıf? The historian gives some 
inkling of this when he clarifies the link between these causes and victory and defeat. Victory 
over the enemy, he asserts, occurs through sound judgment and good strategy, together with 
great effort and preparation, proper order, and bearing hardships on campaign. After this comes 
wholehearted trust in God's aid. Above all, a successful army is well-trained and can fight on any 
ground and at a moment’s notice.241 Defeat, on the other hand, is essentially a moral failure. Sin 
incurs God's wrath, he says – a sinner betrays the faith and the traitor is fearful by nature, hence 
Ottoman armies fare poorly because, as sinners, they lack strength of heart.
242
  
 Vâsıf also rejects the idea that zeal and bravery suffice for victory. Rather, he says that 
armies must assign each matter to experts and have men of strategy, effort, and vision as leaders 
“to illumine the darkness of affairs with the light of the proper path of reason, to stand against 
                                                                                                                                                             
after the 1768-1774 war, Virginia Aksan, “Ottoman Political Writing, 1768-1808,” in 
Ottomans and Europeans, 25-44. 
239 For example: “Gerçi takdîr-i ilahî böyle imiş lâkin tedbîrde ‘azîm hatâ etdiler.” ÖN nr. H.O. 
104b, 60a-60b; Özkaya, 136-137, 144-145, 167. On Canikli Ali, Rıza Karagöz, Canikli Ali 
Paşa (Ankara, 2003).  
240 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 278; MEHÂSİN 1, 214a. Kahraman Şakul argues that by Selim's time 
reform had become the only legitimate discourse. Debate therefore centered around the nature 
of the reforms themselves, 129, 145-148; Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri,” 37-42.  For 
instances of such causal language in decrees see, for instance, BOA.HAT 9284, 56252.  
241 MEHÂSİN 2, 27b-29b. Cf. Müteferrika, who lists attention to holy law and justice, awareness 
of tactics and weaponry, discipline, good intelligence, trust in God, and the Prophet's 
intercession. Usûlü’l-hikem, 170-172.  
242 MEHÂSİN 2, 33a, 83a. It is incumbent on the ruler to restrain such behavior as drinking, and 
encourage the vicious to reform. 
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enemy arms, and to adapt their forces according to the rules of war when is proper.”243 
Secondary causes, then, embrace military preparations, strategy, and the active removal of vice 
through measures like shuttering taverns. It is significant as well that in this volume Vâsıf, unlike 
in his 1784 essay, admits the old ways are obsolete and that Europe's military arts must be met 
like for like, a notion we will encounter frequently.  
 We therefore see that victory relies partly on the individual’s moral constitution. Piety, 
firmness in battle, trust in God, and leadership are all personal qualities whose neglect incurs 
divine wrath. As the historian notes, the defeat at Foksani was due mostly to the rank and file’s 
sinfulness, disobedience, and greed. While Ottoman forces were large enough to repel an attack, 
they showed less interest in fighting or order than in drawing pay and the commanders, for their 
part, were utterly unaware of Suvorov’s position. If they had traced his movements, as the 
Russians did theirs, the rout might have been avoided.
244
 Vâsıf’s address at Maçin, discussed 
above, likewise paints the outcome of war in personal, moralistic terms: defeat as punishment for 
Ottoman cowardice, disunity, and sin, and victory as God’s promise to believers if the men but 
abjure their disobedience and hold firm in battle. Victory depends on this individual effort, for 
“however keen our swords and swift our steeds, the sword does not cut or the horse charge on its 
own.”245  
 At the same time, however, the chronicle puts victory into a larger causal picture. Vâsıf 
chiefly connects secondary causes with Selim III’s reforms and declares that these efforts – 
drilling soldiers in the new exercise, organizing provisions, improving armaments, and correcting 
                                                 
243 Ibid, 33a.  
244 Ibid, 26a-27b. 
245 “Sâniha,” in ibid, 96b-99b. 
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men’s natures – are all means to victory.246 The reforms that initiated the Nizâm-ı Cedîd in 1792 
were by no means limited to the military sphere. Yet by Vâsıf's lights all of them serve to 
strengthen the empire and to confirm Ottoman exceptionalism.
247
 Furthermore, whether 
individual or collective, and though they admit of human agency, all secondary causes depend 
ultimately and utterly on God. After the rout at Maçin, the historian expresses this reliance in 
prayer:  
May God the Primary Cause grant good foreordination to the Sublime State’s attempt to 
reorganize; and may He ordain its completion while the opportunity is in hand, grant us 
the ability to take revenge on the enemy, and fill the hearts of all believers with the joy of 
illimitable victory, Amen.
248
 
 Vâsıf’s 1789-1794 volume uses striking and deliberate causal rhetoric to convey a point: 
if God ordains everything and is the only true agent in a theological sense, humans must still live 
as though their actions were their own, as God has commanded.
249
 This stance resembles those 
taken by İbrahim Müteferrika and Ahmed Resmî, with whom Vâsıf was familiar and whose 
work he had thoroughly digested.
250
 However, Vâsıf is more explicit than either in outlining a 
                                                 
246 MEHÂSİN 3, 5a-6b; on the reform of timars and zeamets, 51b-52a.  
247 Berkes, 71-74; Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri,” 25-26. Şakul presents the reforms as part of a 
larger ideological “movement.” Vâsıf himself calls them the means to order the army, obtain 
victory, strengthen the faith, and right injustice. MEHÂSİN 3, 2a-4a, 12b-14a. 
248 MEHÂSİN 2, 27b. In another volume he writes: “May the Lord God create the causes that 
lead to their increase and may He make the enemy’s new methods of warfare successful 
against various military dispositions, Amen.” MEHÂSİN 3, 6b. 
249 This recalls the axiom attributed to Muslim ibn Yasar (d. 718 or 720): “Act therefore like 
someone who knows that only his own acts can still save him; and trust in God like someone 
who knows that only that will strike him which was meant for him.” Eric L. Ormsby, 
Theodicy in Islamic Thought: the Dispute over Ghazâlî’s “Best of All Possible Worlds” 
(Princeton, 1984), 71.  
250 Vâsıf knew Resmî personally and used his Hulâsat as a source. A Summary of Admonitions, 
24-29. Vâsıf's intellectual debt to Müteferrika meanwhile began in printing, but he seems to 
have read at least Usûlü'l-Hikem and used some of its material. 
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sort of calculus for war, a morality of victory and defeat. In this calculus human initiative is a 
moral duty and weighed with piety, zeal, and other factors. To Vâsıf “observing Islamic practice 
and perfecting causes” will result in victory; impiety and sin, defeat.251    
 
The 1798 Tesliyetnâme: a Theodicy 
The next representative text dates four years later, to the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt. 
According to Yüksel Çelik, the French landing at Alexandria on 1 July 1798 took Selim III and 
his ministers unawares. The sultan was sorely affected and dismissed Grand Vezir İzzet Mehmed 
Paşa and şeyhülislâm Dürrîzâde Ârif Efendi, sending them into exile.252 The other ministers 
feared Selim's volatile moods. In an attempt to calm him, they summoned Ahmed Vâsıf to the 
Porte and asked him to compose a tract that would sooth and admonish the sultan. Vâsıf hastily 
put together a few folios of material to submit. The result was an essay in the epistolary form of a 
tesliyetnâme, or letter of consolation.
253
   
Yet the 1798 Tesliyetnâme is much more. It is a historical essay, as Vâsıf uses fourteen 
historical examples to draw parallels to the French invasion and demonstrate to the sultan that 
their disturbance is temporary. It is also, more importantly, a fully developed theodicy. Although 
                                                 
251 MEHÂSİN 2, 33a. 
252 Çelik, “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 88-95.  
253 This story is related in Süleymaniye Serez nr. 1890, a copy commissioned by one of Vâsıf's 
sons, probably Vâsıfzâde Lebîb Efendi, 1b-2a. Also Çelik, “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 94-98, 116-117; 
Târih-i Cevdet, 7: 7. In the presentation manuscript, Vâsıf writes in a marginal note that he 
tried to submit the work to the Porte but was thwarted by administrative turn-over. The work 
went unread and he resubmitted it, hoping it might preface another, separate work on the 
Egypt campaign, 117; TOP Hazine nr. 1625, 1b. The latter appears to be the unfinished 
MEHÂSİN (EGYPT). See also Bekir Kütükoğlu, “Münşeat Mecmuaların Osmanlı 
Diplomatiği Bakımından Ehemmiyeti,” in Vekayi‘nüvis Makaleler, 219-221. A tesliyetnâme 
was presumably very similar to a tâziyetnâme.  
92 
 
Vâsıf's earlier work contains seeds of theodicy,254 the Tesliyetnâme marks his first defense of 
Ottoman exceptionalism in these terms as well as his first experiment with a coherent 
interpretive framework.
255 
The work consequently presents the invasion as a historical problem, 
lending more insight into the author's view of causation, historical change, and the universe at 
large. 
Vâsıf opens the essay by asserting that the invasion, while serious, is no cause for 
despair. The French have taken Alexandria but are in an untenable, doomed position. They 
betrayed in the empire a friendly and generous power and have become haughty in their faculty 
of istidrâc; their pride is extreme and scripture confirms they will soon suffer God's wrath.
256
 
The Tesliyetnâme therefore invokes in the idea of istidrâc the same divine providence as the 
1784 essay. As further consolation, however, Vâsıf reassures the sultan that such mishaps occur 
because the universe is naturally variable. “This world,” he declares, “is the world of generation 
and corruption (‘âlem-i kevn ü fesâd).” 
Its edict is changeable, ephemeral, and always prone in base bodies to give rise to sundry 
accidents. It defies the natural course of the world for nations' circumstances to remain in 
a single disposition [nüsûk-ı vâhid üzere ber-karâr bulmak] or for states' affairs to be free 
of accidents affecting the realm [umûr-ı düvel ‘âvarızât-ı mülkiyyeden vâreste olmak]. 
                                                 
254 For instance: “[Selâtîn-i ‘osmâniyye] a‘zam-ı hasâis-i düvel-i islâmiyyeden olan ba‘zı ıztırâb-ı 
mülkiyyeye dûçâr olsalar dahi der-‘akab nizâm-ı esbâb-ı hâle muvaffak belki sâbıkından evfer 
ü akvâ kudret ü miknete mâlik olageldikleri mütetebbi‘-i tevârîh olanlara muhakkakdır.” 
MEHÂSİN 1, 5b. 
255 Çelik, who published the text, analyzes it as a literary piece with little “real” historical value, 
“Tesliyet-Nâme,” 96-99. 
256 “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 118; TOP Hazine nr. 1625, 1b-2a. 
93 
 
And though the various aspects inscribed by God in the cosmos at times take loathsome 
form, holy scripture demonstrates that they lead to great good and benefit.
257
 
Historical examples then follow to prove Vâsıf's thesis: that calamities have occurred “from the 
beginning of the world and Sublime State till our own day” but lead, ultimately, to the good.258  
 The Tesliyetnâme's historical examples number fourteen and are taken from Ayyubid, 
Mamluk, European, and Ottoman history. Generally these examples show the hand of 
providence or a fortuitous Muslim victory. For example, during the Fifth Crusade crusaders 
landed in Egypt and took Alexandria and Damietta. They then marched on al-Mansura. In the 
course of the siege, however, the Nile flooded and cut off the crusaders' path of retreat. 
Desperate, they were forced to negotiate with the Ayyubids and surrender Damietta in exchange 
for safe conduct.
259
 In another example, the Andalusian emir Ebü'l-Velîd İsmail met a huge 
Christian army outside Grenada with only 5,000 men and slaughtered over 50,000.
260
  
Vâsıf even adds an anecdote of his own. During the 1768-1774 campaign, he relates, the 
Russians besieged Silistre with 70,000 soldiers, routing two Ottoman commanders in turn. 
Silistre was hopelessly surrounded. Yet, at the time of the final assault 6,000 Ottomans made a 
sally, “like a speck of white on a black cow,” and with God's aid crushed the Russians and broke 
the siege. Vâsıf himself passed through Silistre after the battle as a courier. He claims the defeat 
was such that cannons and munitions lay scattered everywhere, abandoned, and that the road was 
nearly impassable from heaped Russian corpses.
261
  
                                                 
257 “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 118-119; TOP Hazine nr. 1625, 2a. 
258 “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 119; TOP Hazine nr. 1625, 2b. 
259 “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 119; TOP Hazine nr. 1625, 2b-3a. 
260 “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 121; TOP Hazine nr. 1625, 4b. 
261 “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 121-122; TOP Hazine nr. 1625, 4b-5a. Vâsıf was there to announce the 
accession of Abdülhamid I. MEHÂSİN 6, 22a-23a. 
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 Vâsıf's examples on one hand show that the fates of rulers in all ages are subject to flux. 
“Were I to detail these affairs, the quarrels between states, and the property thereby wasted,” he 
insists, “they would form a weighty, instructive tome. Sovereignty and dominion are never 
without cares nor rulers without enemies.”262 On the other hand, these selfsame events confirm 
God's solicitude for believers. According to the Tesliyetnâme, God will support the Ottoman 
Empire until Judgment Day and despite reverses, as history and scripture attest. Vâsıf therefore 
encourages Selim III to bestir himself against the French. The remedy, he says, “is to 
immediately put trust and forgiveness with God and, asking aid from the Prophet, to purify 
intent, strive with all effort, and spend might and main to perfect secondary causes [esbâb-ı 
zâhire] before any time is lost.”263 Vâsıf then suggests certain administrative and military 
reforms should the sultan succeed in regaining Egypt, including dividing Egypt into three 
provinces, transferring Mamluk posts to loyal men for three-year terms, and stationing a flotilla 
at Alexandria.
264
 
 The Tesliyetnâme responds to many of the same problems as the 1784 risâle and 1789-
1794 chronicle. Perhaps most pressing to Vâsıf and his peers was to reconcile Ottoman 
exceptionalism with the reality of defeat, which he does here, most outstandingly, by theodicy. 
As in earlier work, Vâsıf interprets defeat as a miraculous divine trial. However, at the same time 
he adds that accidents are universal. The world is one of constant change, of atomistic 
“generation and corruption,” through which God realizes His perfect cosmic plan and where 
apparent evils are in fact good.
265
 These two premises are not entirely congruent but do not 
                                                 
262 “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 121; TOP Hazine nr. 1625, 4a. 
263 “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 122-123; TOP Hazine nr. 1625, 5a-5b. 
264 “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 123; TOP Hazine nr. 1625, 5b-6a. 
265 Ormsby calls this explanation of suffering “apparent evil, real good.” This type of theodicy 
holds that divine wisdom is hidden within suffering. Evils are really disguised goods, and all 
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contradict each other. Vâsıf's argument, furthermore, rationalizes French power while still 
upholding the semblance of exceptionalism. His parallels suggest that the Ottomans, and 
believers more generally, experience peaks and valleys, times of good fortune and ill, but that 
history and their role within it progresses onward to God's ordained end. Everything changes, as 
it were, while nothing really changes at all. The French invasion is no different.  
 In terms of causality, Vâsıf must also, again, address man's power to affect outcomes. His 
universe is one in which change is a fixed principle and through which God, the Primary Cause, 
reveals His will. Humans are powerless in this universe's larger revolutions. Victory follows 
defeat by God's grace, as Vâsıf illustrates, and believers to an extent must simply remain faithful 
and trusting. Yüksel Çelik deems this view “irrational” and “fatalistic,” but such is not the 
case.
266
 To Ottoman intellectuals the link between worldly and divine causation was complex but 
reasoned. Humans could not compass larger historical processes or “universal events,” as said 
above, yet they could exert will in “particular events” by taking initiative and preparing 
secondary causes that God, if He desired, would realize. This is why Vâsıf ends the Tesliyetnâme 
with a plea for action. An arch-fatalist would neither urge the sultan to “perfect secondary causes 
before any time is lost” nor suggest reforms. Since God allows humans to act, at least in some 
cases, Vâsıf holds that initiative through secondary causes – here administrative as well as 
military – complements faith and trust in God as a solution.  
Vâsıf’s 1798 Tesliyetnâme is by no means “fatalistic.” Like his earlier writing it enjoins 
moral considerations alongside action and is in fact sympathetic to reform. It depicts a universe 
                                                                                                                                                             
evil contains some hidden benefit such that the good would come to naught were the evil 
removed. The reverse can also be true, with apparent blessings working evil, 255-257. Also 
Griffel, 225-231.  
266 See “Tesliyet-Nâme,” 111 for a clear example. Here Çelik ascribes Vâsıf's “fatalism” to “a 
submissive understanding that takes refuge not in analysis but in categorical perceptions of 
religion and the world...” 
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where men are partly bound to flux and destiny, partly able to foresee and condition outcomes. 
This is a universe of “generation and corruption” as well as one of “causes.” Finally, and as said 
above, Vâsıf’s later adaptation of the letter shows that by the early nineteenth century he was 
actively forging these ideas into an interpretive framework. As the preface to an unfinished 
chronicle of the French expulsion from Egypt, the Tesliyetnâme offered, through its theodicy, a 
guide to readers, a vindication of Selim’s reforms, and compelling proof of the empire’s 
exceptionalism. 
 
Refuting the Rabble: Polemic and Reform 
A further illustration of Vâsıf's philosophy of history comes from a tract written around 1803, or 
several years before his death, entitled Muhassenât-ı ‘Asker-i Cedîd (The Merits of the New 
Soldiery).
267
 A polemical treatise, this work acidly defends Selim III's reforms by placing them 
in historical perspective. Although Vâsıf's express purpose is to silence critics, he also draws on 
his earlier conceptions of historical agency and change in order to argue the need for reform.  
 It must first be recalled that Muhassenât’s authorship is subject to debate. The 
anonymous work has long been attributed to one “Koca Sekbanbaşı,” about whom no 
information exists outside of the text. Our one clear identification comes from Esad Efendi’s 
Üss-i Zafer (The Roots of Victory), an account of the Janissaries’ 1826 destruction, where he 
positively and repeatedly names Vâsıf as Muhassenât’s author and quotes the work 
                                                 
267 Unfortunately, no manuscript survey has ever been conducted or a reliable text established. 
For an Ottoman version of this work, see appendix, Târîh-i ‘Osmânî Mecmuası Encümeni 
37/42 (1910). For a Latin transcription and modern Turkish translation, MT. An English 
translation is contained in William Wilkinson, An Account of the Principalities of Wallachia 
and Moldavia (London, 1820), 216-294. Analyses of the work can be found in Aksan, 
“Ottoman Political Thought,”; Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri”; Şakul, “Nizâm-ı Cedid 
Düşüncesi”; and DİA, s.v. “Koca Sekbanbaşı Risalesi.” 
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extensively.
268
 And, as said above, although Hakan Erdem’s putative author’s copy would 
discount Vâsıf on the basis of date and hand, on closer inspection there is little reason accept this 
incomplete, annotated draft as an original.
269
 Barring further evidence, we can cautiously accept 
Esad Efendi's testimony.  
 Muhassenât takes the form of a dialogue between the author and Janissary opponents of 
reform. Vâsıf rebuts claims made by these men – “a set of contentious and ignorant men, 
incapable of learning reason” – that the Nizâm-ı Cedîd is the “cause of all disorder in the 
world.”270 He argues this is decidedly untrue. Did the Nizâm-ı Cedîd cause earlier rebellions, or 
Ottoman defeat in 1774 or 1792, before it even existed? No, but there is at present disorder in all 
regions of the world, from Europe and the New World to Arabia, Persia, China, and India.
271
 
“These despicable wretches,” he says,  
Have never issued from the castle-gate, nor travelled a single stage from home, neither do 
they know what war and peace mean, nor from what cause the troubles of the world have 
sprung, and whence they are likely to arise in the future; some of them are so ignorant of 
what belongs to pure religion, that in repeating a short prayer they commit mistakes from 
                                                 
268 Üss-i Zafer, 119-120, 122, 125-127; Beydilli, “Sekbanbaşı Risalesinin Müellifi Hakkında,” 
221-224. Prof. Beydilli also communicated this to me orally in October 2011. For the earlier 
debate see Ali Birinci, “Koca Sekbanbaşı,” 105-120. Beydilli is highly critical of Birinci's 
methodology and working assumptions, “Evreka, Evreka,” 45-66. Cf. Hakan Erdem, “The 
Wise Old Man,” 154-177. 
269 Erdem, 164-165. The copy, which I have carefully compared to Vâsıf's drafts, does not 
resemble his hand. The annotations also hold two dates, one 1222 and the other Muharrem, 
1222, or several months after Vâsıf's death. However, these do not seem to be additions to the 
text, as Erdem states, but comments from a sympathetic reader. BOA.HAT 48106-a, 48261. 
My thanks to Aysel Yıldız for providing me with this copy.  
270 MAC, 32; Wilkinson, 221-222. Wilkinson’s translation. 
271 MAC, 32-35; Wilkinson, 222-225. This section bears a resemblance to parts of Vâsıf’s 
chronicle. For example: “Bu hilâlda tekevvün eden ihtilâl memâlik-i islâmiyyeye münhasır 
olmayub Fransızlar fitnesi akâsî ü edânî rüb‘-i meskûne sirâyet edüb mülk ü mâl cihetleriyle 
cemî‘ düvel mütekeddir ve memleketlerinde mütemekkin efrâd-ı insâniyyenin cümlesi bir 
sebebiyle mutazarrır olmuşdur.” MEHÂSİN 3, 213a-217b. 
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beginning to end; men in appearance only, vulgar of the lowest description, children of 
falsehood, who suppose that the Nizam-y-Gedid is the cause of confusion in the universe, 
and that if this ordinance were removed, and the old system restored, the world would be 
tranquil in five days.
272
 
 The reality Muhassenât presents is instead one of constant instability, in which all rulers 
must exert reason and prudence to preserve their realms from outside aggression.
273
 The Prophet 
himself used guile in war, we read, following the hadith, “War is a trickery,” while the 
Janissaries who so strongly object to the new forces began as a unit after defeats in the reign of 
Süleyman I. Vâsıf’s facts on the Janissaries' foundation are wrong but used to elegant effect: the 
opponents of reform are products of reform, one that led the Europeans to devise the very 
military innovations now troubling the empire.
274
 Success therefore depends on worldly causes – 
namely, adapting to one’s enemies. Moreover, all other things being equal, history shows that 
armies with better training and strategy will always prevail.
275
  
 Vâsıf’s basic point, then, is that threats to the empire must be actively countered, a 
religious duty incumbent on all statesmen which he reiterates with the sayings, “Even if your 
enemy is an ant, you should use every effort against him,” and “Danger must be averted before it 
                                                 
272 MAC,  75-76; Wilkinson, 276-277. Wilkinson’s translation. 
273 MAC, 29-30, 80; Wilkinson, 216-217. It is also the ‘âlem-i esbâb, as he says God created 
rulers as the “mundane cause (sebeb-i ‘âdî)” of earthly order, MAC, 29.  
274 MAC, 45-49, 69; Wilkinson, 240-245, 270. 
275 MAC, 69; Wilkinson, 270. Cf. Usulü'l-Hikem,148-149; MEHÂSİN 2, 26a-26b; MEHÂSİN 3, 
216a, where Vâsıf says the Ottomans ought to have matched the new tactics if they could not 
surpass them, but were misled by sophistry and went into the field with a battle array long 
since obsolete.  
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strikes.”276 Selim’s Nizâm-ı Cedîd forces are in this way a wise measure and source of victory, as 
demonstrated against the French in Egypt.
277
  
 It is worth noting that Vâsıf’s opponents raise other religious and anti-causal arguments. 
In their bombast they invoke the time-honored “zeal of Islam” and deny that there is any reason 
to adopt new methods of war:  
Is there any occasion for these new troops of the Nyzam-y-Gedid? At the time that the 
Ottoman race conquered the world with the sabre, there were no such forces. Let the 
enemy present himself, and we will lay our hands on our sabres, and at a single charge 
make piece-meal of him. Only let us see the intentions of our enemy, we will storm their 
camp, sword in hand, upset their Cral from his throne, trample his crown under our feet, 
and penetrate even to the most distant of their countries [Kızıl Elma].278  
Others, it seems, went so far as to say that victory did not depend on modern arms at all.
279
 A 
rigid, uncompromising, exceptionalist rhetoric underlines these arguments. In its logic, the 
reforms were merely so much infidel trickery and artifice, neither of which become Muslims.
280
  
                                                 
276 MAC, 30, 41; Wilkinson, 218, 233-334. In the latter case he calls action an individual duty of 
all statesmen: “Bunun dahi bir çaresi bulunmak cümle ümerâ-yı saltanat üzerlerine farz-ı ‘ayn 
addolunmakla...”  
277 MAC, 43-44; Wilkinson, 237-238. 
278 MAC, 44; Wilkinson, 238. Wilkinson’s translation. 
279 “Ve kimi dahi cevabında cenk alâtıyla oynamak gâvûr işidir, müslümâna göre gâvûr işi 
küfürdür. Ya tüfenk ü...ya top u humbarayı müslümânlar isti‘mâl edeyorlar dendikde 
cevabında ah işte nusret olmadığına sebeb bunlardır, yedi krala yalnızca kılıc yetişür dedi. Ya 
donanmâ gemîlerine top lâzım değilmidir dendikde cevabında sübhanallah Cezâîr gemîlerinde 
top yoğiymiş kefere gemîlerine çatan ‘asker dövür kırarız ve gemîleri alurız, tersâneye 
getüririz dediler. İşte gazânın tarîkini güzelce hayır aldık.” Marginalia in BOA.HAT 48106-a. 
280 MAC, 70; Wilkinson, 271-272. “Bu t‘âlîm maddesi kefereye mahsûsdur, müslümâna 
yakışmaz güft ü gû eyleyüb.” Cf. “‘Askerimizin bunda cevabı budur ki kefere tâîfesi işini hîle 
ile görür ki üste çıkar lâkin biz müslümânız, müslümâna hîle yakışmaz derler.” Marginalia 
BOA.HAT 48106-a. 
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 As might be expected, Vâsıf mocks these scruples and goes to great lengths to undermine 
them. For one, he alleges that many of the Nizâm-ı Cedîd’s detractors would accept the program 
were they not afraid of losing their livelihood. Such men may appeal to the “zeal of Islam” but in 
truth are more beholden to the “zeal for coin.”281 Those who claim that drilled soldiers injure the 
faith, meanwhile, are so many “blockheads” who have never before given any thought to faith, 
the empire, or religious probity; but now they show a mighty anxiety for religion.
282 
The 
historian writes that the rabble are ignorant of the art of war and causes of victory and defeat, and 
only trouble themselves over the loss of a few akçe.
283
 God forbid the government should listen 
to them! For at that time the enemy will be emboldened and  
We shall not derive the least service from those knaves who disapprove of the Nizam-y-
Gedid; they will merely say that it was thus ordained; that there is no contending with 
destiny; and if a great calamity befalls (which Heaven avert!) they will, without making 
more words about the matter, become the authors of trouble and distress.
284
  
 Muhassenât’s polemic is meant for a broader readership. It is therefore less interested 
than other works in detailing the universe’s inner workings. However, Vâsıf’s causal framework 
is still present and there is certainly nothing to contradict the activism he argues elsewhere. To 
the contrary, Muhassenât’s defense of initiative is Vâsıf at his boldest and most belligerent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
281 MAC, 52, 62; Wilkinson, 249, 262. Cf. “Bu bâbda cevâbları gayret-i dîniyye güzel lâkin 
gayret-i akçeviyye olmadıkça gayret-i dîniyye kavî olmaz...” Marginalia in BOA.HAT 48106-
a. 
282 MAC, 62-63; Wilkinson, 263.  
283 MAC, 70; Wilkinson, 272. 
284 MAC, 76-77; Wilkinson, 278. Wilkinson’s translation. 
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Final Chronicles 
Ahmed Vâsıf expanded and applied his ideas on an even larger scale in his final chronicles. 
Under Selim III, Vâsıf rewrote earlier court histories like those of Sadullah Enverî, Mehmed 
Edîb Efendi, and Halil Nûri Bey. These works covered Selim's reign from 1789 onward.
285
 But 
during his last term as court historian the sultan gave a further commission: to edit and rewrite a 
twenty-three year period of history back to the 1750s, including the work of Hâkim Mehmed 
Efendi and Enverî's account of the 1768-1774 war and Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. Vâsıf 
completed this work around 1803 and it was subsequently printed.
286
 It is the latter, the war 
chronicle, that is of interest to us.  
 Vâsıf's volume on the 1768-1774 war shows clearly his active interpretation and belief in 
edifying history. Here, as elsewhere, he not only reckons history's practical uses but adds 
analysis and morals to the text, usually as addenda or asides.
287
 Vâsıf also disparages Enverî's 
method and insists his version is superior because it makes use of moral and practical 
philosophy, understands “the cosmic revolutions that are tenets of historical science,” and seeks 
to profit the state. In this way, he claims, it will better instruct statesmen.
288
  
But there is more. In the 1768-1774 chronicle, Vâsıf forcefully reiterates his views on the 
universe, change, and causation. The history covers a dire military defeat that was still fresh in 
                                                 
285 Kütükoğlu, “Vekayi‘nüvis,” 118-122; Mehâsin (İlgürel), xxxix-xliv. 
286 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 3-4, 315. Vâsıf calls himself the “former chancellor (tevkî‘î)” in the first part 
of this volume but had regained the post by the second. Ibid 5, 1: 3, 2: 3-4. He therefore 
finished the first portion between his dismissal and re-appointment as tevkî‘î (18 February 
1801 – 7 February 1802), the second during his second appointment (8 February 1802 – 29 
January 1803). The work was printed in November/December of 1804. Also on these 
appointments, MEHÂSİN 3, 271a; MEHÂSİN 4, 49b-50a, 110b-111a, 171b; BOA.A.RSK.d 
1628/37; BOA.HAT 15168.  
287 Vâsıf reiterates the value of history, MEHÂSİN, 1: 2-3. A wider discussion is found in his 
first volume, Mehâsin (İlgürel), 1-4; MEHÂSİN 1, 2a-4a. 
288 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 3-4, 314-315.  
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Ottoman minds and which raised the problems of the 1784 risâle, the 1789-1794 chronicle, and 
1798 Tesliyetnâme on a massive scale. For the first and only time in a finished volume, Vâsıf 
applies his philosophy as an interpretive framework and is thereby able to broach issues like 
agency, morality, historical change, and reconciling defeat with exceptionalism.  
 To begin, the chronicle preface puts the 1768-1774 Russian-Ottoman war directly within 
a framework of the “universal” and the “particular.” Vâsıf writes: 
Because the universe is formed of constituent elements, and because it is changeable, the 
periodic appearance of misfortune on the face of the earth – now peace and harmony, 
now misery and war – is, according to men of great acuity, a precept of philosophy. The 
occurrence of these two opposing states, moreover, depends on certain causes that by the 
will of God and hidden verdict of fortune cause quarrel between peoples. Such it is that if 
one cares to scrutinize the universal and particular events that have occurred in the world 
from the creation of man till this age, all of them will be founded upon a cause. All things 
issue from God, who doeth what He will. But if man's deeds have, in fact, absolutely no 
effect on causes or ability to influence the course of events, then it is clear the Lord God 
(His Majesty be exalted) has a divine practice of creating something as the outcome of 
secondary causes [...bir şeyi esbâb-ı zâhiresi ‘akabinde halk etmek ‘âdet-i ilâhiyyesi 
olduğı muhtâc-ı beyân olmayub]. Indeed, this approximates what the philosophers say: 
everything is contingent; what is contingent admits influence; and what admits influence 
cannot be without cause.
289
  
The war, the preface continues, began because Russia's reform efforts had made them powerful. 
They grew bold through istidrâc and asserted themselves abroad, even in neighboring Poland, 
                                                 
289 Ibid, 2: 4. Vâsıf follows Kâtib Çelebi nearly verbatim. 
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while the Ottomans sought to make territorial gains, “commenced a serious matter of unknown 
outcome,” and declared war.290 Vâsıf lastly promises to retail the armies' movements and 
“whenever...through poor command, lack of provisions, or disloyalty among the troops, 
occasions arose which had consequences for the campaign.”291  
 The preface places human agency at the very heart of events. Vâsıf again evokes a 
universe of “generation and corruption” and “causes” wherein God alone is responsible for 
events leading to the war, His causes inscrutable, determined, and necessary. However, the 
historian leaves room for action alongside God's will, with the caveat, as in his earlier work, that 
secondary causes are meaningful. The Ottomans could not prevent Russia's rise through istidrâc, 
which led to the conflict. But Ottoman statesmen were perhaps rash and misjudged the situation. 
War was avoidable. Vâsıf, furthermore, indicates he will narrate so as to highlight secondary 
causes – movements, mistakes, and critical junctures all caused by decision-making – and to 
show how actions like poor strategy and preparation (“particular events”) contributed to a larger 
outcome: a disastrous Ottoman defeat (a “universal event”). Vâsıf consequently raises agency as 
a basic problem through which the campaign can be understood; his preface offers readers a 
legend to interpret the history as a whole. 
 An example will illustrate how Vâsıf draws these connections – the Ottoman defeat at 
Kartal in 1770. During that year's campaign season a large Ottoman army under Abaza Mehmed 
Paşa and Abdi Paşa joined a Tatar force north of the Danube at the ford of Falça. Vâsıf, himself 
an eyewitness, was serving in the entourage of Abaza Mehmed.
292
 After skirmishes with the 
main Russian force under Field Marshal Rumiantsev, Grand Vezir İvazpaşazâde Halil Paşa, 
                                                 
290 Ibid, 2: 4-5. 
291 Ibid, 2: 6. 
292 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 84-85. See also A Summary of Admonitions, 19a-19b; Aksan, An Ottoman 
Statesman, 148-151. 
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south of the Danube at the imperial camp, sent reinforcements with Jannisary Ağa Kapıkıran 
Mehmed Paşa. The Russians moved before Kapıkıran could arrive. The night of July 18, they 
caught the sentries asleep and attacked at dawn, causing the Ottomans to beat a hasty retreat and 
abandon their camp and ordnance.
293
   
 After Falça, Abaza Mehmed and Abdi Paşa regrouped at Kartal on the Danube, where 
they were joined by the Grand Vezir on 27 July. Six days later, on 6 August, Rumiantsev again 
advanced on the Ottoman entrenchments, and though the Ottoman center held firm, the wings 
dissolved, a general rout ensued, and Abdi Paşa and Abaza Mehmed Paşa both set out for İsmail 
while the rest awaited aid on the Danube shore. Vâsıf, who probably stayed with Abaza 
Mehmed, describes how the camp at İsmail quickly degenerated into mutiny and soldiers stole 
supply boats to flee south, most sinking in the Danube. The arrival of a new Russian force under 
Nikolai Repnin meanwhile led to another rout, as Abaza Mehmed retreated by barge with several 
thousand men and Kapıkıran Paşa led a contingent north.294  
 The chronicle's account of this event stresses agency. Vâsıf notes that some blamed the 
rout at Falça on the soldiers' negligence and others on the commanders, but he dismisses the 
latter claim. God, he argues, enjoins believers to jihad and other religious duties. The Russian 
victory was divine punishment because the soldiers had abused Ottoman subjects during the 
campaign, disobeyed orders, and behaved immorally. And as exegetes know, the inner truth of 
the matter (emrin hakîkati) is that scripture reveals what sort of behavior brings victory.
295
 To 
                                                 
293 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 85-88; A Summary of Admonitions, 20a-21a.  
294 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 92-97, 97-99. Cf. Resmî, who gives a different perspective, as he was in the 
Grand Vezir's camp, A Summary of Admonitions, 21a-23a; Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman, 
151-153. 
295 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 88. Aksan notes his analysis in An Ottoman Statesman, 151. 
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further defend his commanders, Vâsıf then turns from “inner truths” to “externals” connected 
with secondary causes: 
On the other hand, men who observe outward appearances [erbâb-ı zevâhir] claim that 
the Russian soldiers were trained in the newly developed principles of war and combat; 
that they were obedient to their officers; that they were assiduously drilled in all the 
means of artillery, prevented from luxury, and kept from rest; that there was no place in 
their forces for the untrained and, in most situations, victory will go to the trained, 
hardened soldier over the untrained, soft, disorderly soldier.
296
 
In this respect, he believes one cannot fault Abdi Paşa and the others, especially as the Tatars 
fled the field and induced panic.
297
 The defeat at Kartal, meanwhile, Vâsıf calls a guilty one. 
There had been nothing lacking in preparations, provisions, or expenditures. The soldiers had 
simply failed to obey God’s commands and committed all manner of sins. They fled when faced 
with the enemy; the defeat was a result of their cowardice.
298
  
 Vâsıf's analysis of Kartal balances concrete action and morality, the earthly and the 
divine, in what is, once more, a calculus of victory and defeat. “External” factors like order, 
provisioning, obedience, and up-to-date strategy are juxtaposed with “internal” moral factors. 
Neither is preferred over the other. Yet Vâsıf's preface suggests divine and human agency are 
closely entwined and do not merely coexist.
299
 As Kâtib Çelebi writes in Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr, God 
determines outcomes but it remains for humans to obey and discharge their duties, both in living 
                                                 
296 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 88. 
297 Ibid, 2: 88. 
298 Ibid, 2: 97-99. 
299 See Hagen, “Osman II,” 6, where he is critical of Piterberg's statement that divine and earthly 
causes “simply coexist” and are un-problematical. Cf. Gabriel Piterberg, An Ottoman 
Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play (Berkeley, 2003), 89. 
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morally and exerting particular will; “inner” and “outer” causes are thus complementary.300 The 
soldiers at Kartal forsook their duties, especially waging war, and failed to behave obediently. 
However, Vâsıf's explicit contrast of the two forces indicts the Ottomans' preparation, training, 
and seriousness, all secondary causes which ought to have been prepared beforehand. Here as 
elsewhere, his remedy lies in a mixture of moral renewal and activism. The lesson of the 
passage, furthermore, is not simply historical. Its reformist implications would have been clear to 
readers in 1804.  
 Ahmed Vâsıf also applies his philosophical framework to war and peace. For Ottomans 
the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which ended the war, was a humiliating blow.
301
 One of the 
volume’s chief aims is to explain why this treaty was necessary and perhaps, with different 
decisions, how it might have been avoided. Vâsıf's own position is clear. He believed that 
internal bickering and failure to agree to initial settlements ultimately meant the more onerous 
terms of Kaynarca.  
 As in all things, war and peace to Vâsıf result on a universal scale from change and 
instability. This is why the 1768-1774 campaign inclined toward peace:  
The Lord God, who doeth what He will, settled this world of generation and corruption 
with mankind, and since human nature consists of contrary elements, enmity and 
opposition being natural to this creature, the wars that occasionally occur between states 
can be considered a precept of philosophy. The universe, however, is not fixed in a single 
disposition [nesak-ı vâhid üzere ber-karâr olmayub]. However long warfare lasts, the 
ephemeral conditions of the universe demonstrate that accidents – here peace and repose, 
                                                 
300 Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr, 163-164. 
301 On Kaynarca see DİA, s.v. “Küçük Kaynarca Antlaşması”; İA, “Küçük Kaynarca”; and 
Osman Köse, 1774 Küçük Kaynarca Andlaşması (Ankara, 2006), esp. 107-232. 
107 
 
there war and suffering – will befall people settled on the face of the earth. The will of 
God inevitably deigned that the quarrel between the Sublime State and the Russians give 
way to peace; and there being now truce and now negotiation, the foundations for a 
reconciliation of both parties began to be laid.
302
  
 On a lesser scale, nevertheless, humans have influence over war and peace. For example, 
after the Battle of Kartal in 1770 Marshal Rumiantsev wrote İvazpaşazâde Halil Paşa to propose 
peace negotiations. The Grand Vezir deferred to Istanbul, where the sultan's circle dismissed the 
overtures.
303
 Vâsıf laments this failure by saying that war is uncertain. Since ancient times men, 
and especially Europeans, have therefore made it a habit to be peaceable in wartime, warlike in 
peacetime, and to secure victory whenever possible. Hence the Ottomans refused peace for 
nothing but more lost blood and treasure.
304
  
 Vâsıf pursues this point further in an addendum to the text. As the scholar al-Munâwî 
writes in his commentary on al-Suyûṭî's al-Jâmi‘ al-ṣaghîr, he says, it should be considered a 
sort of victory if believers cannot win outright and make peace to preserve Muslim life, territory, 
and property. Al-Munâwî and Ibn al-‘Arabî both illustrated this precept with the tale of Maslama 
b. Abdülmalik, who was censured by caliph Umar II after besieging Constantinople in the years 
717/18.
305
 The caliph's harsh reprimand, the historian emphasizes, served to warn against 
wasting men on a distant campaign or putting soldiers in unnecessary peril. Yet he concludes 
these lessons were lost on the Ottomans, for “had the state acquiesced when the Russians showed 
                                                 
302 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 196-197. 
303 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 111-114. For more on these peace overtures, A Summary of Admonitions, 
24a-24b; Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman, 153-154; Köse, 52-57. 
304 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 114. 
305 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 114. On ‘Abd al-Ra‘uf Muḥammad al-Munâwî (d. 1621), see EI², s.v. “Al-
Munâwî.”  
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a desire for peace, the empire would surely have received a settlement several times better than 
Kaynarca.”306 
 War and peace too are therefore fitted on a framework of flux and causality. Vâsıf grants 
that God ordains the larger patterns of amity and enmity so that, for instance, an enemy might 
grow menacing or docile. Yet he also stresses that Ottoman decision-making forestalled peace 
and did the realm great harm. He repeatedly states that reluctance to make peace led to death, 
destruction, and in the end the bitterer terms of Kaynarca.
307
  
 These are pointed words if one considers prevailing attitudes. The consensus in the army 
was for peace, yet we are told the court refused to act, with opposition such that Grand Vezir 
Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa, Vâsıf's patron, and other statesmen considered wintering in Istanbul 
in 1772/73 to counter its influence.
308
 Proponents of war meanwhile marshalled causal (or, 
rather, anti-causal) arguments in pursuit of a “victorious peace.” The ulema for their part 
dismissed the overtures out of hand, vowing the “zeal of Islam” would inevitably arise; that “we 
shall have a good fight with the Muscovites and then have peace as we desire.” The sultan and 
court agreed.
309
 A contemporary, Ahmed Resmî, complains bitterly that such types demanded a 
resolution through arms alone, with disastrous results.
310
 Citing the fourth caliph Ali’s arbitration 
with Mu‘âwiya, he moreover links them by implication to the Kharijites, who protested Ali’s 
settlement with the words, “Judgment belongs to God alone” – namely, to an austere, warlike, 
                                                 
306 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 115 
307 Ibid, 2: 115, 203-204, 225-226, 244-246, 305-306.  
308 Ibid, 2: 238-239, 280.  
309 A Summary of Admonitions, 32b-33b. Also 24b: “The sword to Moscow, the sword to 
Moscow!...Still our words were unheeded, nor was a good sword drawn on the infidel, else, 
would the matter stand thus? We have the zeal of Islam!” Vâsıf adds the rescript published 
soon after, which said if they could crush the Russians but once, they would doubtless make 
peace as they desired. MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 249-250. 
310  “Şöyle böyle olsun. Pek metîn ve müsaffâ ve gıl u gışdan müberrâ olsun.” A Summary of 
Admonitions, 35b-36a. 
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literalist group that believed the community must “fight the insolent until they return to God’s 
command.”311  
 The opposition to peace was further emboldened by Mustafa III’s ineffectual leadership. 
The sultan, in deep despair, yielded to fatalism and in doing so left little accountability.
312
 He 
swore that peacemaking was destined to fail, saying, “There shall be no peace in our time,” 
words which others like Yenişehirli Osman Efendi used to subvert the first round of negotiations 
in 1772. Even the Grand Vezir refused from fear to assent to peace and thus, the historian says, 
showed grave moral weakness.
313
 If the “true” cause of peace's failure was God's will and 
istidrâc, then, Vâsıf still includes war and peace as secondary causes over which humans can and 
should exercise control.
314
 In this vision God, in essence, sets the basic conditions while man is 
left the choice – a moral one – to act or not.  
 In sum, Vâsıf's chronicle of the 1768-1774 war sets out what can be called a “reformist” 
philosophy. The work's main problem is agency and, in applying this question to Ottoman 
                                                 
311 A Summary of Admonitions, 36a. On the Kharijites see Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic 
History: Doctrines and Practices (Princeton, 2006), 125-126; Patricia Crone, Medieval 
Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh, 2004), 54-64; G.R. Hawting, “The Significance of the 
Slogan La hukma illa li’llah,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 41 
(1978): 453-463. 
312 “Merhûm Sultan Mustafa Han hazretleri dahî tedbîrde noksân etmedik lâkin mukadder-i ilâhî 
böyle imiş diyerek bu husûsa cümlesini hisse-yâb etdi ve bana kimsenin tedbîrinde noksân 
etdin deyü bahâne bulmağa mecâli kalmadı diyerek gice vü gündüz hâb ve rahatı terk edüb 
gâh paşa kapusına ve gâh ricâl konaklarına vararak işi bir dereceye iletdi ki büyük ü küçük 
fark olunmadan kaldı.” ÖN nr. H.O. 104b, 40a; Özkaya, 157. Resmî hints of this as well, A 
Summary of Admonitions, 66/121. Vâsıf has Mustafa invoking God's will on several 
occasions, the capture of the Crimea, for instance. MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 169. 
313 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 247, 280-281; Cf. Osman Efendi on peace in Çalışkan, “Vekâyi‘nüvis 
Enverî,” 347-348.  
314 Vâsıf sets human and divine causes side by side in this passage: “Bu mevâni‘ esbâb-ı zâhireye 
nisbetle serd olunub hakîkatda Cenâb-ı Hakk'ın irâdesi başka yüzden olub şu kadar nüfûs 
zâyi‘ ve ber-muktezâ-yı istidrâc katı çok emâkin ve mevâzi‘ istîlâ ile düşmân dilsîr-i menâfi‘ 
olacak imiş bu bâbda ‘ukelâ-yı devletin rey ü tedbîrini takdîr-i ilahî tagyîr ve ‘âkıbet 
Kaynarca musâlahası gibi kerîh bir musâlaha vukû‘ bulub.” MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 245-247. 
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history, it stresses the ability of humans to exert their will. To act, moreover, is not an idle 
decision. It is a moral one. Finally, the chronicle labors like Vâsıf's other writing under an even 
bigger problem: how can defeat be reconciled with Ottoman exceptionalism? The answer to this 
question is that the entire account forms a sort of theodicy. Like his other works, the chronicle 
depicts a universe in constant change but one bound ultimately to God's immutable will. In this 
universe, Vâsıf hopefully asserts, trust, piety, and abiding by the morality of victory and defeat 
will deliver the empire and community of believers now and till the end of time.  
 
Conclusions 
Hugh Trevor-Roper once wrote that “a great work of ‘philosophic history’ does not set out its 
philosophy in crude schematic form.”315 Vâsıf’s philosophy is difficult to articulate precisely 
because it is diffuse, developed over the course of decades and revealed throughout the massive 
chronicle in fleeting snatches and epiphanies of reflective insight. Nevertheless, we are still able 
to offer some observations by way of conclusion.  
 For one, Vâsıf’s history presents a coherent and rationalized view of the universe. He 
tackles moral and intellectual problems raised in contemporary Ottoman society, and attempts to 
reason through and understand them. Causality, theodicy, human agency, and reconciling defeat 
with Ottoman exceptionalism were not academic diversions; these were among the most urgent 
questions of the day and reflect a courtly milieu that was increasingly concerned with political 
reform, agency, and moral responsibility. As a whole, his history indicates these and similar 
ideas formed topics of passionate debate in the late eighteenth century.  
                                                 
315 Regarding another eighteenth century historian, Edward Gibbon. The Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire (New York, 1993), 1: lxxxvii. 
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 More specifically, Vâsıf’s philosophy of history can be described as “activist” or 
“reformist.” It refutes a fatalism that would rely on God’s will alone or rob humans of the ability 
to influence outcomes. While Vâsıf recognizes God as the ultimate Primary Cause, he holds that 
initiative is not only desirable but itself a moral obligation, enjoined by God alongside other 
divine commands. We ought to reiterate that these ideas are not overly novel but draw on much 
older lines of reasoning. They stem from native currents of thought going back to at least Kâtib 
Çelebi and derived from even earlier thinkers. Still, it is hardly a coincidence that Vâsıf’s work 
buttressed the type of efforts undertaken by reformers and especially his patrons Halil Hamid 
Paşa and Selim III. His position creates a powerful intellectual justification for reform, and even, 
if we are bolder, the basis for a secularized concept of history.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
Sheathing the Sword of Enmity: Vâsıf on Peace and Peacemaking 
 
The vagaries of war and peace dominated the late eighteenth century Ottoman Empire, as they 
did the life and career of Ahmed Vâsıf Efendi. Like many of his peers Vâsıf had direct, bitter 
experience with warfare and with battle, bloodshed, and captivity. He served on the front in two 
wars, was captured by the Russians at Yenikale in 1771, and his experiences at Kartal, Kozluca, 
and Maçin exposed him to some of the worst Ottoman routs of the century. On the other hand, in 
the years between 1768 and 1806, the year of his death, Vâsıf tirelessly defended peace and 
thrice negotiated truces and treaties in the field. It is therefore little surprise that peace and 
peacemaking form a prominent, recurrent concern in his oeuvre.  
This chapter situates Vâsıf’s views within a larger Ottoman intellectual discussion of 
peace – its terms, legality, and advisability. Moving again in chronological order, it suggests, 
contrary to some recent scholarship, that these debates were ongoing and unresolved by the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It further shows that Vâsıf himself shifted from 
prescriptive and legalistic defenses of peace early in his career to a more philosophical position 
late in life. This change points to a widened realm of human agency in the conduct of war. Short 
of condemning militant ideology outright, Vâsıf came to argue that war and peace were open to 
rational scrutiny, and hence that peace need not be a mere respite from war but should be 
pursued at all times.  
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Ottoman Views of War and Peace 
As noted in Chapter Two, Ottoman ideology placed great weight on military success and the 
empire’s pursuit of religiously sanctioned war, or gazâ. These ideas drew on the formulation of 
jihad in Islamic jurisprudence as well as on Turco-Mongol notions of world domination, 
bolstered by a conviction that the dynasty was just, divinely supported, and would endure, 
victorious, until the end of time.  
The classical, juristic view of jihad is well-known.
316
 As a universalizing legal tradition 
Islam divides the world into two basic spheres, a “realm of war (dâr al-ḥarb)” and a “realm of 
Islam (dâr al-İslâm),” which exist in a state of continuous, open or latent war. This division, 
which is “morally necessary, legally and religiously obligatory,” will continue until the former is 
absorbed by the latter. While cessations of hostility can occur and are at times even the rule, 
these pauses are strictly temporary and legal only when in the community’s best interest. A 
permanent peace is therefore impossible.
317
 
For the Ottomans this worldview was pervasive, and Hanafi law, to which they adhered, 
particularly stressed the division of the world into dâr al-ḥarb and dâr al-İslâm. This found 
common expression in the axiom, “Unbelief is a nation unto itself (Al-kufr milla wâḥida)” as 
                                                 
316 I list only a few titles for the sake of economy: Bonner, Jihad in Islamic History; Majid 
Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, 1955); Crone, 358-364; EI², s.v. 
“Dâr al-Ḥarb,” “Djihâd,” “Ḥarb,” “Hudna,” and “Ṣulḥ”; and DİA, s.v. “Cihâd,” “Dârülharp,” 
“Savaş,” “Sulh.” 
317 Quotation from Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago, 1988), 73. See 
also Khadduri, esp. 51-64; Bonner, 92-93; and Hans Kruse, “Die Begründung der islamischen 
Völkerrechtslehre: Muhammad aš-Šaibani – ‘Hugo Grotius’ der Moslimen,” Saeculum 5 
(1954): 223-224. Articles in DİA dispute this view, often in apologetic terms. They generally 
argue jihad was a response to Christian aggression.  
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well as a legal doctrine of war based on force majeure in which peace was only possible in two 
situations: submission to rule or truce.
318
 
 The Ottomans also inherited a stock of prophecies and legends, some Islamic, some 
Central Asian, auguring a destiny of world conquest. These were epitomized by the myth of the 
“Golden” or “Red Apple (kızıl elma).” Originally an apocalyptic legend about the fall of 
Constantinople, the “red apple” took its name from an orb held by an equestrian statue of the 
emperor Justinian and became a byword for world domination and continuous, successful 
expansion. While they avoided defining its location, Ottomans in the fifteenth century and after 
used this term in several distinct senses: for any distant goal of conquest, for the mythical place 
where their conquests would end, and for ensuing world domination.
319
 The result, by the 
sixteenth century, was an imperial mythos in which war was perpetual, peace the exception, and 
the Ottomans “always justified – and always at war.”320 
The depth and duration of this worldview is nevertheless debatable. Traditionally, 
scholars have argued that the Ottomans, hidebound to Islamic tradition, slowly divorced 
themselves from the ideal of perpetual expansion and adopted European models of war, peace, 
and diplomacy in the face of military defeat, in a transition that began in the late seventeenth 
                                                 
318 Colin Imber, Ebu’s-su‘ud: the Islamic Legal Tradition (Edinburgh, 1997), 67-70; Viorel 
Panaite, The Ottoman Law of War and Peace: the Ottoman Empire and Tribute Payers 
(Boulder, 2000), 80, 128-132; D’Ohsson, 1: 35-41. For this axiom in Vâsıf, Mehâsin (İlgürel), 
45, 86, 169; MEHÂSİN 1, 39a, 74b. 
319 Osman Turan, “The Ideal of World Domination among the Medieval Turks,” Studia Islamica 
4 (1955): 77-90; idem, Türk Cihân Hâkimiyet Mefkûresi Tarihi (İstanbul, 1969). On the 
legend of kızıl elma, Pál Fodor, “The View of the Turk in Hungary: the Apocalyptic Tradition 
and the Legend of the Golden Apple in Ottoman-Hungarian Context,” in Les traditions 
apocalyptiques au tourant de la chute de Constaninople: acts de la Table Ronde d’Istanbul, 
avril 13-14 1996, ed. Lellouch and Yerasimos (Paris, 1999), 99-131; Stéphane Yerasimos, 
“De l’arbre a la pomme: la genealogie d’un theme apocalyptique,” in ibid, 153-192. 
320 John F. Guilmartin, “Ideology and Conflict: the Wars of the Ottoman Empire, 1453-1606,” 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988): 726. Imber refers to “the pervasive ideology 
of the holy war,” Ebu’s-su‘ud, 77. 
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century and ended with fully reciprocal diplomacy under Selim III.
321
 Yet this interpretation has 
recently come under question. Panaite, for one, depicts the Ottomans’ ideology of war as less a 
comprehensive worldview than a tool to justify “purely military and political ambitions.”322 
Yurdusev, meanwhile, holds that the older interpretation is so much “latter-day prejudice” and 
that the empire was not even strictly speaking an “Islamic polity.” He rejects the idea that 
Ottomans saw the world through a prism of continuous warfare, stating that “by the seventeenth 
century, war was largely understood in terms of what we nowadays call reason of state.”323 Both 
authors emphasize the pragmatism and flexibility of Ottoman policy.  
A related question is when militant ideology ceased to move Ottoman hearts and minds. 
Rhoads Murphey, for example, holds that as a motivating force it was dead letter by the mid-
seventeenth century.
324
 Yurdusev and Mustafa Palabıyık argue that it yielded to pragmatic 
“raison d’état” already in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; by the early eighteenth century 
Ottoman society viewed war in a distinctly negative light, though gazâ received continued lip 
                                                 
321 The classic work is J. C. Hurewitz, “The Europeanization of Ottoman Diplomacy: the 
Conversion from Unilateralism to Reciprocity in the Nineteenth Century,” Belleten 25 (1961): 
455-466. Also idem, “Ottoman Diplomacy and the European State System,” Middle East 
Journal 15 (1961): 141-152; Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “The Adoption and Use of Permanent 
Diplomacy,” in Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional? ed. A. Nuri Yurdusev 
(New York, 2004), 131-150; Thomas Naff, “Ottoman Diplomatic Relations with Europe in 
the Eighteenth Century: Patterns and Trends,” in Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic 
History, ed. Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (Carbondale, Ill., 1977), 88-107; idem, “Reform 
and Conduct of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Reign of Selim III, 1789-1807,” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 83 (1963): 295-315. 
322 Panaite, 78. 
323 A. Nuri Yurdusev, “Ottoman Conceptions of War and Peace in the Classical Period,” in Just 
Wars, Holy Wars, and Jihads: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges 
(Oxford, 2012), 190-206; idem, “Ottoman Attitudes Toward Diplomacy,” in Ottoman 
Diplomacy, 5-35. Cf. Mustafa Palabıyık, “Türkiye'de Savaş Düşüncesi,” Uluslararası İlişkiler 
4 (2007): 185-215.   
324 Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 145-146. 
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service.
325
 Panaite for his part sees a shift from an “offensive” to “defensive” mentality in the 
late seventeenth century, but admits the eighteenth century was filled with “nostalgia” for 
aggressive warfare.
326
 Aksan, opposed to all, holds that militant ideology went largely 
unchallenged until the late eighteenth century.
327
 
Such views confront us with the perennial problem in intellectual history of the relation 
of the idea to the act, something Lindner calls “stimulus” versus “justification.” In other words, 
were Ottoman notions of war and peace “motive forces” – did they stimulate and direct action – 
or were they presented as sops, as ex post facto justifications?
328
 If we agree that the empire was 
not a perfect military society, organized for the sole purpose of war,
329
 it becomes easier to 
accept the idea that a warlike ethos functioned on a variety of levels. For one, there is no reason 
why Ottoman militancy could not have served as a source of inspiration and cohesion as well as 
a pragmatic tool, nor why Ottoman motives for war or peace must be either “religious” or 
“secular.”330 Furthermore, while it would be foolish to ignore Ottoman flexibility, or their 
extensive relations with Europe, or their increasing reliance on diplomacy in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, textual evidence signals that many Ottomans did in fact espouse 
traditionally “Islamic” views of war and peace and that these views were not seriously shaken 
                                                 
325 Yurdusev, “Ottoman Conceptions of War and Peace,” 190-191, 197-199; Palabıyık, 188-196. 
See also Ali Fuat Bilkan, “İki Sulhiyye Işığında Osmanlı Toplumunda Barış Özlemi,” in 
Türkler, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel et al (Ankara, 2002), 12: 598-605. 
326 Panaite, 78-79. 
327 Aksan, “War and Peace,” 116-117. 
328 Rudi P. Lindner, “Stimulus and Justification in Early Ottoman History,” Greek Orthodox 
Theological Review 27 (1982): 207-224. Boğaç Ergene, “On Ottoman Justice: Interpretations 
in Conflict (1600-1800),” Islamic Law and Society 8 (2001): 73. 
329 Murphey’s Ottoman Warfare attempts to debunk this myth. See also Kadir Üstün, “The New 
Order and its Enemies: Opposition to Military Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1789-1807” 
(Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 2013), 20-28.   
330 Yurdusev and Palabıyık divide sixteenth and seventeenth century wars into three: religious, 
political, and humanitarian. Yurdusev, “Ottoman Conceptions of War and Peace,” 197-199; 
Palabıyık, 190-192. 
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until quite late – perhaps the end of the eighteenth century. It is hard to mistake the tone of 
scholars like Yurdusev, who seems troubled that ideas now considered obsolete (if not offensive) 
held currency in the empire. Yet pained debate within the Ottoman hierarchy, discussed below, 
and labored, constrained defenses of peace all indicate that their concern with war was 
immediate and more than mere “nostalgia” or “lip service.” 
 Most important, revisionist treatments undervalue the force of an idea – a militant ethos – 
that was central to Ottoman self-identity and exceptionalism. They accordingly undervalue the 
effect success and defeat had on the Ottoman psyche and the dynasty’s legitimacy. As Abou-El-
Haj has noted, military success did nothing less than vindicate Ottoman beliefs about history and 
their role within it, while defeat bred ideological dissonance. To abandon this ethos required a 
shattering alteration in the way the Ottoman elite saw themselves, their dynasty, and the 
surrounding world.
331
 As will be seen, they clung fast to the idea in spite of reverses in the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
 
Defenses of Peace: Karlowitz 
Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals long argued the merits of peace. The author and moralist 
Ḥasan Kâfî al-Aqhiṣârî (d. 1616), an early example, ended his treatise Uṣûl al-ḥikam fî niẓâm al-
‘âlam (Precepts of Wisdom for the Order of the World) with a brief section on the topic. Aqhiṣârî 
first composed this work in Arabic during the Eğri Campaign of 1596 and later that year 
translated it into Ottoman Turkish.
332
 His is less a reasoned defense of peace than, as the title 
                                                 
331 Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Attitudes Toward Peacemaking: the Karlowitz Case,” Der 
Islam 51 (1974): 134-136. Aksan thinks this perspective may apply to the late eighteenth 
century, “Ottoman Political Writing,” 32 n. 1. 
332 For the Arabic text, Ḥasan Kâfî al-Aqḥiṣârî, Uṣûl al-ḥikam fî niẓâm al-‘âlam: risâla fî al-fikr 
al-siyâsî al-islâmî, ed. Iḥsân Ṣidḳî al-‘Amad (Kuwait, 1987). Mehmet İpşirli has published the 
118 
 
indicates, a series of axioms, prophetical wisdom, and scriptural quotations. For example, 
Aqhiṣârî begins the section with words from the Quran, “Settlement is best,” and cites proverbs 
from figures like the Persian kings Key Khusraw and Ardashir: “The greatest mistake is to fight 
him who wishes peace,” and “Except for the rebel I do not use the sword when the rod suffices; 
and I do not meet the enemy with violence if a word will soften him.” Aqhiṣârî also insists 
generally on honoring treaties, or pacta sunt servanda.
333
  
 Perhaps the first coherent defense of peace belongs to Mustafa Naîmâ (d. 1716), also the 
empire’s first court chronicler. Naîmâ wrote in the aftermath of the vitiating, sixteen-year War of 
the Holy League, which his patron Köprülü Amcazâde Hüseyin Paşa brought to a close in the 
1699 Peace of Karlowitz. At Karlowitz the Ottoman Empire made large territorial concessions to 
European states for the first time. Amcazâde Hüseyin had come to power after the battle of Zenta 
in 1697 against strong ulema opposition, seeking to secure peace and to enact reforms, and 
Naîmâ used the preface of his first chronicle in 1702 to endorse his patron’s widely unpopular 
foreign and domestic policies.
334
 It is the latter, his defense of Karlowitz’s unfavorable terms, 
which is of particular interest here.  
 Naîmâ’s preface consists of several parts which together liken Karlowitz to earlier 
Islamic peace treaties. He opens, after an unmistakable title,
335
 with the Prophet Muhammad. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ottoman translation and gloss as “Hasan Kâfî el-Akhisarî ve Devlet Düzenine Ait Eseri 
Usûlü’l-Hikem fî Nizâmi’l-Âlem,” Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi 10-11 (1979-1980): 239-278.  
333 “(Qâla) Kay Khursaw: A‘ẓam al-khaṭâyâ muḥâraba man yuṭalibu al-ṣulḥ. Qâla Ardashîr 
Bâbak: Lâ asta‘malu al-sayf illâ li-man ‘aṣâi, ḥaythumâ takafî al-aṣân, wa mâ atṣadâ li'l-‘adw 
bi'l-ṣawl wa'l-naṣl idhâ kâna yûthiru fîhi al-ḳawl al-faṣl.” Al-Aqḥiṣârî, 171-174. 
334 See Thomas on Naîmâ and his work. Also Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 1: xiii-xxxi; Kütükoğlu, 
“Vekayi'nüvis,” 111-112; DİA, s.v. “Naîmâ.” 
335 “[This preface] has been arranged in a foreword, two sections, and a conclusion in order to 
clarify the issue of making peace with infidel kings and the Christians of the whole world, that 
the realm may be ordered and subjects given respite.” Emended from Thomas, 70. Cf. text in 
Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 1: 10. 
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God ordains periods of war and peace, writes Naîmâ. But while Muhammad was endowed with 
divine power and could do as he liked, he taught the community to observe secondary causes in 
many matters. So, for instance, though he might have easily decimated the pagan Arabs, he 
chose in the Peace of Hudaybiya to uphold the appearance of causes (hıfzen li’-suveri’l-
esbâb).
336
  
 The historian in this passage is referring to one of the most famous treaties in Islamic 
history. At Hudaybiya in 628 the Prophet made peace with his Meccan enemies under harsh 
terms,
337
 recounted by Naîmâ in an extract from Yusuf Nâbî's prophetic vita. According to him 
the moral of Hudaybiya is to act through worldly causes. Muhammad was not forced to make 
peace but did so in order to teach the community a valuable lesson: “Well do wise men know 
that the Prophet's capitulation to the enemy at the Peace of Hudaybiya was not – forgive the 
expression! – due to weakness, but rather his desire to instruct the community to avail 
themselves of worldly contingencies.”338 
 As Naîmâ explains, the Prophet’s example remains valid for the Ottomans insofar as all 
dynasties and polities are subject to flux. After setting forth the various stages of dynasties 
following Ibn Khaldûn, he notes that wise men discourage kings from entering wars in the 
presence of serious disorder, of which extended campaigns and disunity are two causes. In the 
course of history many rulers have therefore preferred peace to war. Indeed, he says, some have 
even chosen the “lesser of two evils (ehven-i şerreyn)” and braved crises to preserve their realms 
                                                 
336 Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 1: 10-11.  
337 On Hudaybiya see EI², s.v. “Al-Ḥudaybiya” and “Hudna”; DİA, s.v. “Hudeybiye 
Antlaşması”; Khadduri, 210-213; and Wilson Bishai, “Negotiations and Peace Agreements 
Between Muslims and Non-Muslims in Islamic History,” in Medieval and Middle Eastern 
Studies in Honor of Aziz Suryal Atiya, ed. Sami A. Hanna (Leiden, 1972) 56-58. 
338 Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 1: 20. Thomas’ phrase “the means at hand” does not quite capture the causal 
connotations of suver-i esbâb-ı mümkine, 69-73.  
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from the infidel, drawing reproach for the sake of the general welfare. Naîmâ then offers two 
such examples from al-Maqrîzî and al-Shîrâzî on the Ayyubid struggle for Jerusalem: Saladin 
and al-Kâmil, who respectively retook the city from Crusaders in 1187 and ceded it to them by 
treaty in 1229.
339
  
 By way of conclusion Naîmâ comes full circle to the War of the Holy League. The 
prolonged nature of the war led to bankruptcy and military crisis, he writes. Restoring order and 
the treasury depended on a period of rest and tranquility, “so that it was necessary, through a 
truce, to sheath the vengeful sword.” Yet whereas leading jurists knew a truce was the only 
resolution, they prolonged the war in the hope of obtaining a “victorious peace (sulh-i 
gâlibâne).” Naîmâ lavishes praise on Amcazâde Hüseyin and his negotiators, who at last ended 
the war.
 340
 
All told, Naîmâ’s preface offers a shrewd defense of Karlowitz and conveys three main 
points.
341
 First, the historian shows that unfavorable terms with non-Muslims have historical 
precedent in the Peace of Hudaybiya and surrender of Jerusalem, both of which were treaty 
models par excellence.
342 
Second, he implies that the Peace of Karlowitz is strictly temporary. 
For, as Naîmâ's readers knew, both of the above examples ended in renewed war after a short 
reprieve. Finally, the preface communicates the notion that a temporary truce will aid the dynasty 
and lead to further conquest and the recovery of lost territory. The Prophet Muhammad captured 
                                                 
339 Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 1: 21-30, 30-33. 
340 Ibid, 1: 45-48. 
341 Here I follow Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Attitudes Toward Peacemaking”; idem, “The Formal 
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Mecca and the Ayyubids Jerusalem in the years following their treaties. This, too, Ottoman 
readers knew well.  
It bears reiterating that this defense is ideologically charged. Abou-El-Haj observes that 
Karlowitz was a watershed in that it marked Ottoman agreement to a more or less permanent 
peace with Austria, Russia, Poland, and Venice. However, the preface labors to present the treaty 
as consistent with the Ottoman militant ideal and with past agreements: as a temporary peace 
before resuming war against the infidel. Naîmâ was above all attempting to lessen the ideological 
dissonance caused by defeat. To accept peace as permanent would be to admit defeat, and “the 
acceptance of defeat...would amount to a total abandonment of the ideological justification of the 
Ottoman state and would have led to the dissolution of the emotional bond this theory effected in 
the Ottoman social fabric.” The result for Naîmâ was a sort of make-believe.343  
The preface, lastly, is filled with events and terms carrying heavy intellectual baggage, all 
marshaled to vindicate Karlowitz. Naîmâ’s mention of secondary causes recalls the very same 
debates on agency discussed in Chapter Two, for example. His historical examples bring to mind 
the triumphal career of early Islam and remind readers that peace, when necessary, is a justified 
but temporary respite. And his use of the terms “the lesser of two evils” and “victorious peace” 
introduce key arguments on the legal and moral merits of peace that, while not fully developed 
here, resurfaced frequently in later years.  
 
 
 
                                                 
343 Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Attitudes Toward Peacemaking,” 136; idem, “Formal Closure of the 
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The Early Eighteenth Century 
Some recent publications associate the early eighteenth century with a more pacific outlook. As 
said before, between 1699 and 1739 the Ottomans fought a number of limited wars with mixed 
success, partly redeeming their losses at Karlowitz and Passarowitz with the reconquest of Azov 
and the Morea, and securing the favorable Treaty of Belgrade. Whether these events overlay 
softening perceptions of war, however, is less certain.  
 In her study of the self-appointed social critic and crank Fazlızâde Ali, Marlene Kurz 
proposes the emergence of new values in this period centered on peace and tranquility – a 
“râhat-oriented” zeitgeist in her words. She bases this mindset in part on Fazlızâde’s 
interminable complaints, particularly what he saw as the neglect of jihad: 
Indeed our people no longer wage war [husûmet etmez] for the faith. Mind yourself! With 
most infidels there is concord – appeasement, that is. Both high and low have now put 
aside zeal for religion and the aim of gaza and wish to live with the infidel as brothers, 
since they have no desire to fight them for the sake of religion. Today everyone wants 
only income and profit, office and high rank, pleasure and comfort. You watch what will 
now befall them because they are thus!
344
 
For Kurz, the early eighteenth century was a time of worldliness and renewed Ottoman self-
confidence in spite of military failures, and witnessed the final rejection of the militant ethos. 
With this, she hints at a profound change in self-identity: “the privilege of being Muslim no 
longer needed to manifest itself in military successes, but resulted from the unique position the 
Muslim occupied in the universe and his intimate relationship with God.”345 
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 Besides Kurz, others have argued that a “negative” or at least “defensive” view of war 
emerged in the early century. This trend is usually illustrated by the sulhiyye, a rare poetic form 
eulogizing peace which emerged during the period. Bilkan, for instance, asserts that the sulhiyye, 
notable examples of which marked the Peaces of Karlowitz and Passarowitz, echoes a deep 
pessimism, a longing for peace, and an aversion to war in Ottoman society.
346
 In their studies of 
Passarowitz and Belgrade, furthermore, Murphey and Güngörürler respectively stress a transition 
from unilateralism to reciprocal diplomacy and a timid, defensive Ottoman mindset, a 
willingness to make peace even on unfavorable terms.
347
  
There is of course great variety in these interpretations and it may be that the early 
eighteenth century resists any unified characterization. Yet the idea that militant ideology was 
abandoned is unconvincing. To the contrary, Fazlızâde Alî’s protests equally suggest that some 
Ottomans still embraced a traditional view of the world and of relations with non-Muslims, and 
felt that peace was, far from a virtue, a moral peril. The very rarity of the sulhiyye also militates 
against using it as proof of major change.
348
 What is more, early eighteenth century political 
writing seems to contradict assertions of a widespread inclination to peace. Although Palabıyık 
would believe that intellectuals like İbrahim Müteferrika and Sarı Mehmed Paşa were averse to 
war, they do not in fact deviate much from traditional rhetoric. Certainly their work does not 
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in the Early Eighteenth Century,” in The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718 (West Lafayette, IN, 
2011), 73-91; Selim Güngörürler, “Governors, Authors, and the Porte: Ottoman Perceptions 
and Policies during the Period Preceding the War of 1736-1739,” Tarih 2 (2010): 69-91. 
348 Bayram Rahimguliyev has identified four. “Osmanlı Edebiyatında Dönüşümün Şiiri: 
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reject it.
349
 Even the more radical arguments for peace late in the century – particularly by 
Ahmed Resmî Efendi and Vâsıf – attest to rancorous debate, for they were directed at those who 
continued to see war as a glorious, profitable exercise. The early century was at best a time of 
tentative doubt, not of major change.    
 
Küçük Kaynarca 
The 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca ended a six-year war with Russia on the most unfavorable 
of terms. Kaynarca marked the first time in which the Ottoman Empire ceded a primarily Muslim 
territory, the Crimea, an illegal act according to holy law, and the Ottomans dragged out the 
conflict for over two further years to avoid this condition. Furthermore, Kaynarca sparked 
intense debate over reform as well as Ottoman militancy itself. Two defenses of the treaty figure 
here, one traditional and one more radical. Both authors, incidentally, were Vâsıf's 
contemporaries and peers.  
 The first is a short essay called Nuhbetü'l-Emel fî Tenkîhi'l-Fesâd ve'l-Halel (The Choice 
Desire for the Rectification of Disorder) by Dürrî Mehmed Efendi (d. 1794). Dürrî Mehmed, a 
scribe in the imperial chancery, held various wartime posts, helped negotiate a truce in 1772, and 
served as a delegate to the 1792 peace conference in Sistova. He was later reis efendi.
350
 He 
wrote Nuhbetü'l-Emel in 1774, he says, alarmed at the empire's many ills.
351
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350 On Dürrî Efendi's life and career, Kayhan Atik, “Kayserili Devlet Adamı Dürri Mehmed 
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 Nuhbetü'l-Emel is equally a reform tract and a justification of Kaynarca. Dürrî first 
explains that states, like men, pass through phases of growth, maturity, and decline. Thus while 
the young empire could fight ceaselessly against the infidel, it was eventually forced, in 
accordance with the nature of the age (ber-muktezâ-yı tabî‘at-ı dehr), to balance war with peace 
and now fight, now “sheath the vengeful sword in the scabbard of repose.” Dürrî dates this shift 
to approximately 1592, the hijri millenium, as the necessary result of the empire's maturity or 
stasis (sinn-i vukûf). It was no longer possible for the dynasty to wage continuous, victorious 
war, he says, and thereafter victory and defeat came in equal measure.
352
  
However, Dürrî maintains that this condition is not irreversible. It is the duty of statesmen 
to make a return to “the most preferable state of constant victory [hâleti evlâsı olan dâimâ galebe 
tavrı]” and, during peacetime, to purge defects in the body politic as so much bad blood. Wise 
men therefore value intermittent peace in order to protect the health of the realm. Dürrî further 
says that the 1768-1774 war with Russia weakened and bankrupted the empire. Consequently, 
“the statesmen preserved the dynasty from further debility by making peace and worked to gain a 
reprieve for reform [li-ecli't-tedbîr] according to the Persian verse, ‘Danger must be averted 
before it strikes.’” It was imperative to utilize this hard-won truce to enact reform.353  
 Dürrî returns to Kaynarca after setting forth a number of his specific reform proposals.
354
 
The empire made an unfavorable peace with Russia, he concedes, but although such a situation 
seems incomprehensible, as long as the statesmen pursue reform they can alter the treaty's terms 
and perhaps force the Russians to abandon their designs on the Crimea. He urges caution, 
however. It may require a period of at least five to ten years to prepare for war. If the Russians 
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make demands in the meanwhile, it would be better to dissimulate (müdârâ) “and perhaps 
sometimes…to agree to their demands in accordance with what holy law will allow [belki 
ba‘zen…mesûllarına dahi hasb-i mâ yüsâ‘adete’ş-şer‘ müsâ‘ade olunmak ehven görinür].” Dürrî 
punctuates the essay with a reflection on the 1099 fall of Jerusalem and its recapture by Saladin 
after a period of reconsolidation.
355
  
Nuhbetü'l-Emel is a fairly traditional defense. Like Naîmâ, Dürrî Mehmed depicts peace 
as a temporary and necessary reprieve, which has historical precedent and will ultimately benefit 
the dynasty. Peace here is a necessary evil, while “constant victory” remains the ideal. These 
similarities with Naîmâ are hardly coincidental. Dürrî's phrasing, use of the biological metaphor, 
and choice of historical example intimate that he took Naîmâ as a model.  
 The second defense of Kaynarca comes from the pen of Ahmed Resmî Efendi (d. 1783). 
Resmî, a diplomat and former ambassador, was like Dürrî Mehmed and Vâsıf a member of the 
chancery during the 1768-1774 Russian-Ottoman War with a very real stake in Kaynarca. 
Indeed, he had himself negotiated and signed the treaty on 21 July 1774 at the cost of rank and 
reputation. The treatment of peace in his last and most famous work, Hulâsatü'l-İ‘tibâr (A 
Summary of Admonitions), is thus highly personal and can be partly read as an apology.
356
  
Hulâsat is part history and part political advice. Composed around 1780, when the 
Ottomans were again on the verge of war with Russia, its purpose was to dissect the late war and 
to discourage statesmen from repeating similar mistakes. Many of Resmî's “admonitions” target 
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logistical and military matters like provisioning and leadership, but over and above these 
concerns is the critique of a mindset – the militancy of those who in his view had incited and 
prolonged the war with Russia.
357
  
Resmî not surprisingly puts war and peace at the forefront of his history, starting with the 
preface. While he grants that warfare is endemic to mankind, following the Quran, he disagrees 
that enmity must be the basis of “world order (nizâm-ı ‘âlem).” Reasonable minds know that 
prosperity depends on peace and always prefer peace over war:  
Yet the scoundrels who due to indiscretion and inexperience care not to attain such a 
customary, desirable rule, and believe it incumbent on the People of Islam to annihilate 
all infidels from the world, or to always grind the enemy's nose into the ground and show 
him his place, say: There is no blessing without action. These countries have been taken 
by the sword. The Padishah of Islam's fortune is supreme, his ministers well-seasoned, 
his sword keen; the Grand Vezir is devout and valiant, shrewd as Aristotle. After raising 
12,000 elite soldiers who pray with the community five times daily, what a blessing it 
shall be to go unto Kızıl Elma!358 
This sort of bellicose rhetoric is reproduced throughout the work to undermine the credibility of 
Resmî's opponents and expose their ignorance. His main aim is to contrast the wisdom of men 
like himself with the “ideological bankruptcy of the ‘scoundrels.’”359 
Resmî’s most novel contribution, however, is the idea of the “necessity and benefits of 
peace as the principle tenet of government policy.”360  As first signatory to Kaynarca, the author 
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naturally defends his role in securing a necessary treaty, but he also asserts the universal value of 
peace and the need to pursue it at all times, even during victory. In his most extended defense, 
for instance, inserted in the narrative following the failure of negotiations at Foksani in 1772, 
Resmî argues that peace is supported by both holy law and reason (şer‘an ve ‘aklan) and is 
always justified. Peacemakers through the ages have flourished, he says, “nor has the man been 
seen who was injured by peace.” Resmî adds, supplying many examples, that history is filled 
with the ruins of dynasties who failed to appreciate this fact.
361
 In doing so he draws a stark 
analogy between the behavior of his empire and its European adversaries; the analogy is implicit 
and unfavorable.  
Hulâsat’s defense of peace represents a distinctly radical strain. Aksan observes that 
Resmî played a key part in the “rationalization of war” in the eighteenth century: the 
development of an ethos among the Ottoman elite that allowed individuals a wider role in and 
greater control over the outcome of warfare. The rejection of war as a political imperative was 
part of this. Resmî argues here and elsewhere for peace, defined borders, and negotiation and 
diplomacy, thus repudiating two pillars of Ottoman ideology: militant exceptionalism and an 
ever-expanding state.
362
 To Resmî peace was no temporary evil but a virtue to be sought at all 
times. He also (perhaps for the first time in Ottoman history) explicitly linked peace to prosperity 
and military adventurism to destruction rather than glory.
363
 It is possible, albeit speculative, that 
his position rests in part on a dissenting view of the empire’s dynastic “age.” Whereas Dürrî 
Mehmed and Naîmâ thought they lived in an age of stasis (sinn-i vukûf), Resmî, an avid reader of 
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Ibn Khaldûn, in at least one earlier work links his cautious policy to the empire’s “decline (sinn-i 
inhitât).”364 This would at least explain his frequent references in Hulâsat to “the nature of the 
age (tabî‘at-ı dehr).”365 
 Yet perhaps because it was radical, Resmî’s argument does not initially appear to have 
had much influence. As Dürrî Mehmed’s more restrained defense reveals, the 1768-1774 war 
disabused many of the empire’s military superiority but the terms of debate remained much the 
same. Indeed, Resmî was himself constrained by them. Although he speaks of peace as a general 
good, he carefully qualifies this as müdârâ – dissimulation or feigned friendship – implying that 
peaceable relations with non-Muslims cannot be fully genuine.
366
 Moreover, as we will see 
below, not even Halil Hamid Paşa’s reformist circle in the 1780s, to which both Resmî and 
Ahmed Vâsıf were linked, was willing or able to endorse his style of pacifism. 
  
Vâsıf on Peace: the Crimean Crisis and the “Lesser of Two Evils” 
On 8 April 1783 Russia formally annexed the Crimea, the climax of a nine-year struggle 
following Küçük Kaynarca. The Ottoman elite had never truly accepted Crimean independence. 
In the years after 1774 they harbored hundreds of Tatar refugees, dispatched two failed military 
expeditions in 1778, and several times found themselves on the brink of war. Always they hoped 
the loss was temporary. The empire was thus faced with a stark choice: accept the annexation as 
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a fait accompli or prepare for war. As the crisis dragged into the summer and fall of that year, the 
mood in Istanbul was dark and foreboding.
367
  
Ahmed Vâsıf composed his chronicle’s first volume in the midst of this crisis, spending 
much ink in support of Grand Vezir Halil Hamid Paşa, his patron and leader of what is 
sometimes called the “peace party.” This title is a misnomer as all, at least in public, held that the 
peace was no more than a truce. As the historian writes, the Ottomans had always suspected 
Russian designs on the Crimea and were reluctant to make peace during the 1768-1774 war. 
Fearing the consequences, they rejected negotiated settlements to fight for better terms. But 
while military sedition eventually forced them to accept the “abominable” peace of Kaynarca, he 
says, the treaty remained a source of shame and they consoled themselves with the hope of 
revenge and, after a period of truce and military reform (mütâreke sûretinde), of retaking the 
Crimea.
368
 Clearly, then, this was not a debate over peace in the Resmian sense. The chief 
question was instead whether the empire was ready to wage war.   
The immediate Ottoman response was to temporize. Halil Paşa held a council at the home 
of the şeyhülislâm over whether to lodge a formal protest, which, as Vâsıf records, revealed deep 
divisions in the government. Halil Paşa argued against a protest on the grounds that his military 
reforms were incomplete and that it might be interpreted as a declaration of war; he wished to 
buy time until the spring. However, he met firm opposition from his rival the Grand Admiral 
Gazi Hasan Paşa and the şeyhülislâm. The dynasty’s honor was at stake. How could they stay 
silent when the Russians had so brazenly seized the Crimea? The council ultimately decided to 
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Powers and the Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1783-4,” The Slavonic and East European 
Review 37 (1958): 17-41; Alan Fisher, The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783 
(Cambridge, 1970), esp. 57-63, 128-152. 
368 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 9-10; MEHÂSİN 1, 8b-9a. 
131 
 
issue a protest, but Vâsıf notes that Halil Paşa delayed it until the empire’s military preparations 
were further advanced.
369
  
The arguments of each side can be better grasped in Vâsıf’s commentary on these events. 
While the Ottomans delayed and sought mediation, Austria, Russia’s ally, issued an ultimatum 
for losses against Mediterranean piracy. Meanwhile, the Prussians in the fall of 1783 advised the 
Ottomans that annexation set a dangerous precedent and that Austria, with regard to the “balance 
of powers [tarîk-i muvâzeneye i‘tibâren],” would likely try to wrest away a piece of the empire 
for itself. They urged the Porte not to capitulate but to find an ally and to mobilize for war.
370
  
Many statesmen clearly thought it best in this situation to act assertively and, in case of 
war, to trust in God for victory. In council over the Austrian ultimatum, for example, the Istanbul 
judge Müftîzâde Ahmed Efendi stood and implored his colleagues to reject the demands, come 
what may, as they were a pretext and against holy law. A “decisive response” was best [kat‘îce 
cevâb verilmek evlâdır]: “And if by their own choosing they break the treaty…then God willing 
the winds of victory will doubtless blow to our armies and this Sublime State’s ill-wishers will 
be confounded.” All in attendance agreed.371 Müftîzâde repeated these sentiments in another 
council on 29 November 1783. Although he was willing to accept mediation with the Russians, 
he said, no doubt if war broke out God’s ordination would manifest itself and whoever broke the 
treaty would suffer His wrath. Halil Paşa could continue his reforms thereafter.372 
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 Vâsıf, conversely, stresses caution and means other than war – in his words, the “lesser of 
two evils (ehven-i şerreyn).” Given Austria’s vehemence, he says, it was obvious they would 
have broken the treaty on the least pretext and attacked. Everyone favored decisive action, but 
the Ottomans yielded in order to buy time:  
The danger in waging war before the state’s preparations were complete was manifestly 
clear, hence all honest, disinterested men agreed that to presently dampen this 
conflagration, purely with a desire to gain time, was an act of good policy and judgment. 
(Strophe by the author) “The wise man’s good judgment ‘tis / Often more handy than 
sword or spear / For whenever he useth his sword / All things are at once at stake.”373 
As for the Prussians, the historian claims they had vested interests in pressing the empire into an 
uncertain war (harb-ı mechûlü’l-netîce). Yet, he admits their proposal was not without benefit:  
If we suppose that the empire in capitulating chooses the lesser of two evils [ihtiyâr-ı 
ehven-i şerreyn] and immediately afterward unites with binding oaths, we would still 
require at least several years, by God’s grace, to purge our own differences, properly 
organize the army and ordnance, and respond against all enemies by land and sea. But if, 
as previously, we abandon foresight for recklessness, then God forbid the Prussians’ 
advice becomes probable. It need not be said that the ever opportunistic infidel will 
increasingly covet Muslim lands…However, if we avoid such imprudence and give total 
freedom to those who, as with the efforts of the past year, mind state affairs and are 
charged with reform [memûr-ı nizâm]; if, ignoring the slanders of the jealous and 
malicious, we are firm, courageous, and discount sophistry even in the face of initial 
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troubles, it is not improbable that the Lord, God willing, will us grant us the Crimea and 
many territories besides, just as He ordained victory in the Morea.  
He concludes with an Arabic hemistich: “We judge by what is external / God knows best the 
secrets of hearts.”374  
Here it is necessary to say a word about the phrase “lesser of two evils.” “Choosing the 
lesser of two evils (ihtiyâr-ı ehven-i şerreyn),” referenced earlier by Naîmâ, is a legal maxim and 
form of juristic preference (istihsân) based on necessity (zarûret).
375
 Hanafi law permits jurists in 
certain situations to make rulings more suitable, convenient, or conformable to a given case. 
Under necessity otherwise illegal acts can be lawful, as expressed in another maxim, “Necessity 
permits what is prohibited.”376 There are strict limits to the legal condition of necessity, though. 
These include that it is temporary and can relax the law only so long as it persists. Circumventing 
the law, moreover, must not lead to greater harm or injury.
377
 To “choose the lesser of two evils,” 
then, means, when faced in a state of necessity with two illicit options, to choose the less onerous 
and damaging.
378
 Vâsıf therefore deploys this term to justify otherwise illegal concessions. 
                                                 
374 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 60-61; MEHÂSİN 1, 49b-50b. 
375 On juristic preference see Saim Kayadibi, The Doctrine of Istihsân (Juristic Preference) in 
Islamic Law (Ankara, 2007); EI², s.v. “Istiḥsân.” Also Bahadır Eroğlu, “Türk Siyasetinde 
Anahtar bir Kavram: Ehven-i Şer,” Köprü 72 (2000).  
376 “Al-ḍarûrât tubiḥ al-maḥẓûrât” or in Ottoman “zarûretler memnû‘ şeyleri mubâh kılar.” 
Article 21 in Cevdet, Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı ‘Adliyye (İstanbul, 1882/3), 26. Also Kayadibi, 208-
210; EI², s.v. “Ḍarûra.” Uriel Heyd discusses this phrase in relation to nineteenth century 
reform, “The Ottoman ‘Ulemâ and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Maḥmûd II,” 
in Studies in Islamic History (Jerusalem, 1961), 63-96. 
377 Ali Haydar, Dürerü'l-hukkâm şerhu mecelleti'l-ahkâm, ed. Raşit Gündoğdu and Osman 
Erdem (İstanbul, 2000), 1: 53-57; Kayadibi, 215-217. 
378
 Article 29, Cevdet, Mecelle, 26. Haydar glosses: “Şerreyn, şerrin tesniyesi olub hayrın 
mukâbilidir ki nâ-meşrû‘ şey demektir. Yâni bir kimse iki şerden, ta‘bîr-i diğerle iki nâ-
meşrû‘ emirden birisini işlemeğe mecbûr olduğunda, hangisi ehven ve fenalığı az ise 21. 
maddeye binâen onu ihtiyâr ile yirmi ikinci madde hükmünce diğerini terk eder,” 1: 58. See 
also the commentary of Salî Rustum Bâz al-Lubnânî, Sharḥ al-majalla (Beirut, 1986), 32.  
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Two insights arise from the chronicle’s use of the “lesser of two evils.” One is that both 
Vâsıf and his opponents were disputing in legalistic terms. Austria had confronted the empire 
with two unacceptable choices: an indemnity or loss of territory in war.
379
 But while Müftîzâde 
Ahmed and others argued the illegality of submission and felt it their duty to venture war, 
trusting in God, Vâsıf held that submission was not only justifiable but preferable according to 
the law. The second insight is that “choosing the lesser evil” is provisional by definition. The 
legal literature makes it clear that necessity is strictly temporary and that legal exemptions expire 
with the state of necessity.
380
 Likewise, peace in this case was to be borne only as long as 
necessity dictated. The chronicle explains that after a period of reform the Ottomans could 
triumphantly resume conquests and recapture the Crimea, just as they had captured the Morea 
peninsula in 1715.
381
  
 It is also important to consider the causal premises of these disputes. Müftîzâde and 
others appear to have advocated action and implicit trust in their cause, the justness of which 
would be manifest on the battlefield. In early December, 1783 Müftîzâde complained bitterly to 
Gazi Hasan Paşa about Russia’s seizure of the Crimea and said, as he considered the matter, any 
compromise was impossible. What must happen if we respond firmly, he asked? Must we all 
simply acquiesce? If the Russians declare war we will trust in God and respond in kind – that is 
quite the truth of it! Gazi Hasan Paşa sympathized but pointed out that the empire faced two 
                                                 
379 Either of these would render an agreement illegal. Panaite, 290-291. 
380 Articles 22, 23, 24 in Cevdet, Mecelle, 26; Haydar, 1: 53-55; al-Lubnânî, 30-31; Kayadibi, 
216-217.  
381 The Morea appears to have been a touchstone for many Ottomans after 1774. See further 
Mehâsin (İlgürel), 79; MEHÂSİN 1, 67a. 
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powerful opponents and lacked all the requisite causes of warfare – troops, treasure, and able 
command.
382
  
By contrast, around the same time Halil Paşa solicited private suggestions from his 
councilors. Bekir Paşazâde Süleyman Beyefendi’s remarks embody the activist approach of the 
Grand Vezir’s circle. After recommending that war wait several more years and numbering the 
empire’s challenges, he reflected:     
While I have no doubt that God is almighty and powerful and will help the weak and 
oppressed, it is undeniable that the divine practice is always to create everything through 
causes. God alone has knowledge of the outcome of future events; therefore, to open the 
gates of war with such potent enemies while secondary causes [esbâb-ı zâhire] are 
entirely lacking, relying on a supernatural victory [nusret-i gaybiyye], is like taking 
mortal poison and trusting overconfidently in the antidote’s unknown efficacy…God 
forbid if there were a rout at the outset. It would be wretched for the empire.
383
  
This was likewise the point of Vâsıf’s above-quoted hemistich – to reiterate the recklessness of 
an anti-causal approach. 
 The debate over the Crimea came to a head on 18 December 1783. By Vâsıf’s account, 
with the Russians awaiting a final decision, and insisting any further delay meant war, 
Abdülhamid I ordered Halil Hamid Paşa to convene a general council “to decide on war or peace 
[ihtiyâr-ı selm ü harb zımnında].” The sultan desired a unanimous decision in strictest secrecy, in 
line with the empire's situation and holy law.
384
  
                                                 
382 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 82; MEHÂSİN 1, 70a-70b. Mentioned in Chapter Two above.  
383 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 85-86; MEHÂSİN 1, 73a-73b. 
384 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 89-90; MEHÂSİN 1, 76b-77a. Aksan dates this event 8 December 1783, 
An Ottoman Statesman, 182. The text shows 23 Muharrem or 18 December.  
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 The minutes of this council, which Vâsıf inserted into his chronicle, are remarkably vivid 
and emotional. Halil Paşa first had the relevant documents read aloud and addressed the council. 
He reminded them that they served the empire and should say candidly whatever was best for the 
realm, whether war or peace. There would be no recriminations but they must speak: “Here your 
stature does not matter. This council must end with a decision – do we capitulate or wage war? It 
is not possible to delay, nor to give any answer other than one of these two choices.”385 The 
Grand Vezir and şeyhülislâm met an initial hesitation with urgency: “Why are you silent? You 
must speak the truth, whatever it is!” Sâdık Molla Efendi, a member of the ulema, rose first and 
said that in the circumstances peace was preferable to war and the proper course. Müftîzâde 
Ahmed Efendi followed and remarked that the decision did not properly belong to them, but to 
the sultan. Halil Paşa rebuked him. This was not advice at all, he said, for the sultan had ordered 
the matter resolved in council.
386
  
 Certain voices next spoke in favor of peace. Gazi Hasan Paşa drew attention to the 
empire’s frailty, signaling that he now stood with the Grand Vezir. He said that war must occur 
through secondary causes, two of which, the army and treasury, were wholly absent. Launching a 
campaign without these would be suicide, yet he and Müftîzâde confirmed that the Russians 
wanted an immediate answer.
387
 Another statesman, Süleyman Penâh Efendi, for his part 
compared the situation to the late war with Russia, a disaster. Now they faced two formidable 
powers. Gazi Hasan surmised it was three or four if one counted minor allies. Penâh Efendi 
continued that the greatest danger lay in Istanbul's vulnerability and that peace was best.
388
 Halil 
Paşa too expressed his support for peace. “My own wish,” he said, “is not to shrink from war and 
                                                 
385 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 90; MEHÂSİN 1, 77b-78a. 
386 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 91; MEHÂSİN 1, 78a-78b. 
387 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 91-92; MEHÂSİN 1, 78b-79a. 
388 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 92-93; MEHÂSİN 1, 79b-80a. 
137 
 
say, 'Let there be no campaign.'” He vowed that were the empire ready he would trust in God and 
act, but such was not the case and a campaign was premature.
389
  
 The Chief Accounting Officer (muhâsebe-i evvel) Süleyman Feyzî Efendi then asked the 
ulema to comment on the matter's legality. Two, Müftîzâde and Tevfîk Efendi, said that the 
legality of war and peace depended on knowing the state' strength or weakness, of which they 
professed ignorance. Halil Paşa breathlessly castigated them: everything had just been detailed 
item by item. But he pursued the point and a long discussion ensued on the army’s readiness.390  
 At this stage the tide began to turn against war. The head of the arsenal (tersâne-i âmire) 
Sırrı Selim Efendi pointed out that even Gazi Hasan, the most militant vezir, was wary, and 
Hasan agreed, saying, “I cannot say war is fitting at a time like this. It would end badly, heaven 
forfend. In this case there is nothing better for the Sublime State than peace.”391 Halil Paşa again 
asked for a legal opinion on the matter. The şeyhülislâm consulted his peers and Müftîzâde 
Efendi answered that the law required they choose the lesser of two evils. Here, he said, if the 
evil of a campaign surpassed the evil of peace, they must choose peace. The defterdâr reminded 
him that the dangers of war had already been weighed. What were the dangers of capitulation? 
Müftîzâde’s response was that the Russians had broken a treaty and that there were many 
Muslims in the annexed territory. To capitulate was to accept this injury and the subjection of 
Muslims – an apparent danger. The judge Atâullah Efendi added that the Crimea gave Russia 
supremacy on the Black Sea, raising the specter of blockade.
392
  
 Other councilors were quick to qualify submission. Come what may, observed one, the 
empire must continue its reforms lest the Russians raise their demands. They should consider the 
                                                 
389 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 93; MEHÂSİN 1, 80a-80b.  
390 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 93-95; MEHÂSİN 1, 80b-82a. 
391 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 95; MEHÂSİN 1, 82a-82b.  
392 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 96-97; MEHÂSİN 1, 82b-83b.  
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matter temporary until better able to respond: “You cannot consider this a permanent peace [Bunı 
sulh-ı müebbed zann etmelü değildir]” he said.393 Halil Paşa, too, likened capitulation to a truce, 
as thereafter they could continue preparations and launch a campaign. At last returning to the 
point, Süleyman Feyzî Efendi prompted the ulema a third time. The fetvâ emîni said that if the 
empire's weakness and inability to wage war were thus, peace was permitted by holy law. His 
colleague Müftîzâde concurred that peace was lawful. The Grand Vezir polled all the men. Peace 
was unanimous but would be kept in complete secrecy. “God damn him who speaks of this 
meeting elsewhere,” said one.394  
 Vâsıf’s analysis of these proceedings, found in an addendum, also justifies peace as the 
“lesser of two evils.” The empire’s defense depends entirely on the treasury, army, provisions, 
and the statesmen’s unity, he proceeds, and it is self-evident that without even one of these 
factors resistance is impossible. The protracted campaigns of 1768-1774 had eroded state order, 
and since these matters had been ignored after the war the empire’s bankruptcy and incapacity 
and the army’s cowardice had allowed Russia to achieve its aims. “And so,” he writes,  
It was widely known that the empire was in grave danger, surrounded by enemies 
awaiting the least pretext. As a result, it was as if a cancer had stricken the realm’s 
vulnerable body. If care was not immediately taken to excise it, with sound ministrations, 
it would metastasize and (God forbid!) destroy the polity itself. Since a limb must as a 
rule be amputated for the health of others, the present decision, which was permissible 
according to the law and made unanimously, was under the circumstances a sort of 
“choosing the lesser of two evils.”395  
                                                 
393 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 97; MEHÂSİN 1, 83b.  
394 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 97-99; MEHÂSİN 1, 83b-85b. 
395 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 99; MEHÂSİN 1, 85b-86a.  
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It is well to add that Vâsıf’s imagery in this brief passage encapsulates the entire legal argument 
from necessity and recalls two further juristic maxims: “Choose the limited injury to avert the 
general” and “Remove the greater injury with the lesser.”396 
 Vâsıf anticipates possible objections to his argument, as well. Certain simpletons, he 
continues, could not fathom the empire’s malady and protested, saying, “What need was there to 
accept this situation [Bu hâletin kabûlüne ne zarûret mess etdi]?”397 Vâsıf refutes them through 
the Peace of Hudaybiya , when the Quraysh laid heavy claims on the early community and in 
which the empire’s situation has precedent (mebnî ‘ale'l-esâs). Yet Vâsıf is careful to specify 
that these two events are not commensurate. The Prophet’s hand was not forced and he might 
have annihilated his enemies without drawing his sword, with a mere coup d’oeil. His inclination 
to peace was simply “instruction in a blessed matter to the community,” as Muhammad 
necessarily had knowledge of what was and what is to come.
398
  
 This passage bears an unmistakable resemblance to Naîmâ’s defense of Karlowitz. In 
addition to using Hudaybiya to show precedent, Vâsıf introduces a distinctly causal rationale for 
peace that supports the reform efforts of his patron. Also as in Naîmâ, his inference is that peace 
is a necessary but temporary evil, no more than a truce. These similarities suggest that the 
addendum, like Dürrî Mehmed’s essay, may have found its ultimate inspiration in Naîmâ. The 
fact that Vâsıf places more weight than the latter on legal grounds for peace – the “lesser of two 
evils” – takes nothing away from his overriding point. This was to be a temporary peace.  
                                                 
396 “Zarar-ı ‘âmmî def‘ içün zarar-ı hâss ihtiyâr olunur” and “Zarar-ı eşedd zarar-ı ahaf ile izâle 
olunur.”Articles 26 and 27, Cevdet, Mecelle, 26; Haydar, 1: 56-58; Kayadibi, 216. The classic 
case is the government’s demolition of private houses to prevent a fire from spreading. 
397 MEHÂSİN 1, 86a. İlgürel transcribes this passage incorrectly, Mehâsin (İlgürel), 100.  
398 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 100; MEHÂSİN 1, 86a-86b. 
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 Vâsıf’s earliest treatment of peace lends itself to the following conclusions. Firstly, war 
and peace during the Crimean crisis seem to have been matters of causal and legal controversy. 
The acrimonious disputes of the period turned largely on the extent to which war could or should 
be constrained by human reason and the law. These issues were left unresolved when the empire 
officially recognized the annexation of the Crimea on 8 January 1784. Second, the terms of 
debate over war and peace in the 1780s remained much as they had been in the late seventeenth 
century. Peace was still deemed exceptional, an expedient, and intellectuals like Vâsıf could 
draw on a literary model some eighty years old without, presumably, sacrificing effect. If 
militancy was on the wane, then, the rhetoric persisted. Even the most liberal Ottoman statesmen 
could not publicly escape it. 
 Still, the presence of this defense in the dynastic chronicle hints that even a qualified 
peace was highly contentious, at least toward Russia. The conservative backlash was 
considerable. The perception that the government had abdicated its duties was such that some 
ulema branded Halil Paşa an infidel and, evidently, threatened the statesmen with revolt and the 
sultan with deposition.
399
 Abdülhamid I, meanwhile, and with good reason, conferred with the 
şeyhülislâm about how the empire could legally break its agreement; nor were soldiers on the 
frontier informed of the council’s decision.400 While Halil Paşa’s circle carried the argument, the 
loss of the Crimea stoked popular rage and contributed in the following year, 1785, to the Grand 
Vezir’s fall and murder, the collapse of Vâsıf’s own reformist faction, and to the rise of 
belligerent voices in the divan. 
 
                                                 
399 Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri,” 26. See also Berkes, 67; Uzunçarşılı, Sadrazam Halil Hamid 
Paşa, 242-244, 246. Vâsıf records the appointment a hard-line şeyhülislâm and critic of Halil 
Hamid, İvâzpaşazâde İbrahim Efendi, Mehâsin (İlgürel), 234-235; MEHÂSİN 1, 173a-174a. 
400 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 108, 143; MEHÂSİN 1, 93a-93b, 124b-125a. 
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The Maçin Boycott, 1791 
Ahmed Vâsıf’s next major treatment of peace dates to the 1787-1792 war and the so-called 
Maçin Boycott. Following the Battle of Maçin on 9 July 1791, in which the Ottoman army was 
destroyed as a fighting force, Grand Vezir Koca Yusuf Paşa opened negotiations with the 
Russians. Selim III, who preferred a “victorious peace (ceng olunarak sulh),” had agreed but 
changed his mind upon learning their demands, in particular that the Dniester River should mark 
the new frontier. He instead instructed the Grand Vezir to fight for better terms.
401
 By that time, 
however, Vâsıf had already concluded a truce with Nikolai Repnin and Koca Yusuf’s 
commanders flatly refused to fight. On 11 August 1791 they engaged Vâsıf to put their refusal 
into words in a mahzar or memorandum, which they sent to the sultan. At least one scholar 
describes this event as unprecedented in Ottoman history.
402
 
Vâsıf’s role in the mahzar is somewhat unclear. Neither he nor many contemporaries 
mention the boycott and ensuing scandal. Only Edîb Efendi records it.
403
 In his chronicle, Vâsıf 
admits that Russian terms were harsh but stresses that the army had no power to resist. Indeed, 
Repnin was adamant and threatened to dissolve negotiations unless he could present a sealed 
voucher from the army. Vâsıf says he reported his situation in detail and advised the statesmen at 
Maçin to act according to whichever alternative, war or peace, was beneficial to the empire. In 
the end they decided to seize the opportunity, chose the “lesser of two evils,” and sent Vâsıf the 
said voucher to approve the truce and basic peace terms. Documents were exchanged with 
                                                 
401 Ahmed Fâiz provides Selim’s reaction in Istanbul in Rûznâme, 31-36. See also Shaw, 64-66. 
The sultan had rebuffed peace proposals in 1790 for similar reasons: “Be-fazl-ı Bârî fevz ü 
zafer-i yârî oldukda sûret-i galebede sulh ihtiyâr olsun.” MEHÂSİN 2, 47b. 
402 Beydilli, “Sekbanbaşı Risalesi’nin Müellifi Hakkında,” 221-222.  
403 In Çınar, “Mehmed Emin Edîb,” 239-247. I have compared the edited text against Târîh-i 
Edîb, UT nr. 5203, 118a-121a (former copy of Kilîslî Muallim Rıfat Bilge). The original 
document is still undiscovered. 
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Repnin on 10 August 1791 and the next day he returned to the army. The chronicle’s account 
ends there.
404
 
This reticence is not terribly remarkable. As mentioned in Chapter One, not only was the 
boycott a blatant, indeed shocking, insubordination, but Vâsıf personally drew the sultan’s wrath 
for yielding to Russian terms and soon lost his position, spending a year in professional limbo 
and, it seems, penury. It was probably unwise to recall Maçin so soon after his 1793 
reinstatement as court chronicler.
405
 For this reason Vâsıf’s connection to the work comes to us 
indirectly, through Üss-i Zafer, where Esad Efendi identifies him as the author of Muhassenât 
and the mahzar.
 406
 
The Maçin mahzar is dated to 11 August 1791, the very day Ahmed Vâsıf returned to the 
army from negotiations in Galatz.
407
 On the said day, the document opens, a number of officials 
and Janissary officers gathered in the kethüdâ bey’s tent. The Grand Vezir had received word 
from Istanbul and was reconsidering peace, he informed them:  
Today our prosperous lord wants to know whether you favor war or peace. His majesty 
the sultan has ordered by rescript that we fight, take revenge on the enemy, and so have 
an honorable peace [şânlû musâlaha]. Our lord says he shall therefore fight and cannot 
                                                 
404 MEHÂSİN 2, 108a-110b.  
405 MEHÂSİN 2, 121a-122a; Rûznâme, 36; Mehâsin (İlgürel), xxx-xxxi. 
406 Üss-i Zafer, 119-120; Beydilli, “Sekbanbaşı Risalesi’nin Müellifi Hakkında,” 221-223. Cf. 
MAC, 61-62. 
407 Çınar, “Mehmed Emin Edîb,” 242; UT nr. 5203, 118a. Âsım Efendi records a meeting, clearly 
the same, on 5 August, Târîh-i Âsım, 1: 25-29. This appears to be an error, however, as all 
other sources corroborate the document’s internal date. For example, Said b. Halil İbrahim, 
otherwise identical to Âsım, gives the date as 11 August, Abdullah Altun, “Said b. Halil 
İbrahim’in ‘Tarih-i Sefer-i Rusya’ Adlı Eseri: Transkripsiyon ve Değerlendirme,” (master’s 
thesis, Erciyes Üniversitesi, 2006), 87-90. Rûznâme also indicates that the decision reached 
Istanbul on 17 August; a delay of almost two weeks seems unlikely, 36. See also Târîh-i 
Cevdet, 5: 160-165. 
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act otherwise. He desires an answer. Discuss what is best here and then apprise the Grand 
Vezir, be what may.
408
  
Much discussion followed. All those present spoke of the army’s condition, raised various 
concerns, recalled the soldiers’ notorious lack of mettle, and how they were deserting on the least 
pretext. The mahzar relates that the officials confessed it impossible to wage war with such an 
army and that all preferred peace: “We swear to it here and in our lord’s presence – in a word, in 
both the here and hereafter. We have nothing else to say.”409  
 The officials were next summoned to the Grand Vezir’s pavilion where he addressed 
them:  
Earlier I submitted the peace terms from General Repnin to the sultan along with my 
other dispatches. But according to the sultan’s latest rescript and the kaymakâm paşa’s 
letters, to make peace with the enemy without a fight must dishonor the empire. How can 
peace be in the empire’s interest? What difference is there in having the Dniester as the 
border rather than the Danube? Immediately weigh war on one hand and peace on the 
other – let us win a victory, by God’s grace, and may it lead to an honorable peace 
[musâlahanın şânlû olmasını mûcib]. We are accused of not doing enough to fight, told to 
take revenge, with God’s aid, on the enemy. So, you see, the rescript’s contents are thus. I 
am ordered to war by the sultan. I cannot favor peace now. What say you?
410
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After clarifying the sultan’s will, Koca Yusuf concluded, “We will prepare immediately and 
return to battle tomorrow. All of you go, prepare your men and make ready, trusting in God. I am 
of no other mind or resolution.”411  
The mahzar continues that those in attendance swore obedience but asked, once more, to 
broach the situation. Nothing would be better than to win a victory to defend the realm, they said, 
and were it up to them they would forfeit their lives. Yet one must consider the great peril the 
empire and its subjects faced. What was more, the army was in no condition to fight. It was one 
thing to talk of returning to war, they observed, but between mass desertion and the enemy’s 
strong position a field battle (meydân cengi) was out of the question. They predicted the army 
would disintegrate if the Russians offered battle, with no one but officers and a few other men 
remaining: 
At present we cannot conceive of any remedy better than peace. And no matter how 
unfavorable this peace may be, since we are standing our ground against the enemy the 
empire’s honor – God be praised – will be secure [şân-ı Devlet-i ‘Aliyye li’l-lâhi’l-hamd 
yerinde olarak nizâm bulacakdır]. But if we give battle and are put to rout, what will the 
enemy do? They will issue heavy demands and force us to make peace under the shame 
of defeat [mağlûbiyet ârı üzerimizde kalarak sulha mecbûriyyet iktizâ eder].412  
All those in council, then, favored a voluntary peace as the best course. With God’s grace they 
could put the realm to order, reform the troops, arrange everything as necessary, and then five to 
ten years later seek revenge and retake what was lost. “It is impossible otherwise [illâ gayrî 
imkânı yokdur],” they said.413  
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412 Çınar, “Mehmed Emin Edîb,” 244-245; UT nr. 5203, 119a.  
413 Çınar, “Mehmed Emin Edîb,” 245; UT nr. 5203, 119a-120a. 
145 
 
 According to Vâsıf, Koca Yusuf Paşa replied that he too agonized over how to defeat the 
Russians and manage the army. Nothing had worked and he had inclined to peace to salvage the 
empire’s honor. But now the sultan ordered him to war. He could not disobey.414 The council 
answered in unison:  
The damage and disgrace of this will redound upon the empire! [bunun rezâleti ve 
mazarratı Devlet-i ‘Aliyye’ye râci‘ olub] What can weaklings like us do? If the army does 
not fight, must we not defend the fortresses remaining here and particularly Ibrail? If the 
imperial army moves hence we have no doubt Ibrail will fall to the enemy and that even 
greater humiliations will follow. We therefore favor this peace.
415
  
Koca Yusuf told them he could not send such an answer to the sultan. “You write out the proper 
course among yourselves and make your decision; you are responsible [siz bilürsüz].”416 
 The Grand Vezir next produced the voucher that had been approved, by correspondence, 
as the basis for treaty terms. “Now look here, the empire will opt for peace with the Russians on 
these terms,” he told them.  
Consider this carefully. Should we approve the voucher or not? Should we give battle or 
not? You must decide today and give me an answer. I am of no mind but to fight. I have 
allowed all of you to speak truly and in the future hold you responsible before God. No 
matter what sort of reckoning you give on Judgment Day, do not mince words here but 
answer and speak the truth.
417
  
 In the end all advised approving the voucher, chose peace, and had their decision 
recorded in a sealed memorandum. The council ended, says the mahzar, with a promise to defer 
                                                 
414 Çınar, “Mehmed Emin Edîb,” 245; UT nr. 5203, 120a. 
415 Çınar, “Mehmed Emin Edîb,” 245; UT nr. 5203, 120a.  
416 Çınar, “Mehmed Emin Edîb,” 245; UT nr. 5203, 120a. 
417 Çınar, “Mehmed Emin Edîb,” 245-246; UT nr. 5203, 120a. 
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to the sultan but also a plea for haste, as the Russians were unaware of the empire’s difficulty: 
“We consider this a blessing for both faith and country…We have chosen what will save the 
empire’s honor and what is beneficial for our religion.”418 
 The Maçin mahzar is not Vâsıf’s own view of the matter as such. The document reads as 
council minutes and is presumably based on actual conversations that took place, offering up an 
array of justifications for peace. Yet we can safely assume that Vâsıf subscribed to these 
arguments in addition to putting them to paper. His chronicle may say nothing about the boycott, 
but it generally depicts peace in the 1787-1792 war as an opportunity, “the lesser of two evils,” 
and “an unmitigated blessing.”419 As Vâsıf’s part in negotiating a truce and drafting the mahzar 
furthermore attests, he gave active support to peacemaking.   
 The linchpin of the mahzar’s defense is again the idea of peace as the “lesser of two 
evils.” The council framed their refusal to fight in terms of the realm’s integrity and security. 
Their lives were immaterial, they said, but the army’s weakened state presented too great a risk 
and defeat might bring deeper peril and heavier Russian demands. They thus advocated peace as 
a reprieve; the empire could try its luck again after another round of reforms. Peace in the 
mahzar, then, is a conservative one: a temporary measure dictated by necessity and undergirded 
by all the pertinent legal reasoning discussed above.  
 Another central point of argument in this debate is the nature of an “honorable peace.” 
Such a concern was not new. Preserving the empire’s honor and avoiding dictation had been 
                                                 
418 “Dîn ü Devlet-i ‘Aliyye’ye bu maslahatı bizler hayırlû add eyledik…Biz Devlet-i ‘Aliyye’nin 
şânını vikâye ve dînimize hayırlû olanı ihtiyâr eyledik.” Çınar, “Mehmed Emin Edîb,” 246; 
UT nr. 5203, 120a-121a.  
419 MEHÂSİN 2, 38a, 62a, 89b, 102a-103a, 110a-110b. 
147 
 
issues previously at Karlowitz and Passarowitz.
420
 According to Abou-El-Haj, the honor and 
dignity of the empire required tangible concessions because the Ottoman view of war and peace, 
based on force majeure, made anything less unacceptable.
421
 Selim III’s orders to fight were 
therefore based on a belief that submitting to negotiation damaged the empire’s honor. To save 
face, he wanted first to gain some sort of victory – an honorable peace to him was a “victorious 
peace.”  
The council, on the other hand, argued that in the circumstances a “voluntary peace” was 
sufficient. They had already done the realm credit by confronting the Russians, and to risk battle 
was to risk that honor. The empire might then be forced to make peace “under the shame of 
defeat.” Of course, the idea that the army willingly made peace is at odds with the total rout at 
Maçin and everything the council claimed about the army’s debility, an incredible imposture in 
view of their dire situation. The issue must certainly have been important, that they would go to 
such lengths.  
Vâsıf’s treatment of peace in the 1790s – in the Maçin mahzar and elsewhere – shows a 
debate among Ottoman elites still within traditional limits. It was not possible to publicly depict 
peace as anything more than an interlude; not possible to justify it on any but the most 
constrained terms. Selim III’s conflation of honor and victory shows, moreover, that the link 
between the empire’s military fortune and “honor” in peace persisted to the end of the century. In 
this view peace was neither permanent nor based on “commonweal,” but prescriptive and 
wedded to a militant ethos. This would only begin to change at the turn of the century.  
                                                 
420 Naîmâ writes that some jurists hoped for “victorious peace through a brave attack [bir hamle-i 
dilîrâne ile sulh-ı gâlibâne],” Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 1: 45-46. Also Murphey, “The Politics of 
Peacemaking,” 80-81, 90 n. 11. 
421 Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Attitudes Toward Peacemaking,” 134-135; idem, “Ottoman 
Diplomacy at Karlowitz,” 511. 
148 
 
Küçük Kaynarca: “War is Unpredictable” 
Inklings of change and a more pensive outlook first appear in Vâsıf’s later volumes. Reference to 
peace as the “lesser of two evils” ceases. A more ambiguous and uncertain turn takes place: 
“War is unpredictable,” says Vâsıf. This may seem minor, a slight rhetorical gambit, but the 
result is that Vâsıf loosens his earlier prescriptive, legalistic justifications of peace, based on the 
notion of an immutable enmity with the dâr al-ḥarb. Stressing man’s need and ability to control 
warfare and its outcome, his later work places war and peace within the purview of human 
agency and takes a more philosophical, humane position. 
The 1787-1792 war marked a noticeable shift in Vâsıf’s views of war and peace. After 
1793 he abandoned the phrase “lesser of two evils” in his chronicle in favor of those which 
expressed warfare’s uncertainty, its variability. Most often this was the Arabic adage “War is 
unpredictable in its outcome (al-ḥarbu sijâl)” or paraphrases thereof.422 There seems to be a 
connection between this new approach and the historian’s dawning awareness of his world’s 
volatility. His experience in two wars had robbed him of certainties. His historical vision from 
the mid-1790s onward was therefore tinged with anxieties and doubt, as he came to see the 
empire’s plight and the chaos of Napoleonic Europe as part of a universal breakdown in order.  
Vâsıf’s new-found skepticism was also closely related to aspects of his metaphysics and 
historical philosophy which, not surprisingly, he was developing at the same time. As discussed 
in Chapter Two, the “world of generation and corruption” is inherently unstable. God ordains 
periods of war and peace rather than a perpetual state of hostility and no one, believer or 
unbeliever, is immune to fluctuations in fortune. Vâsıf thus held in his later work that the 
                                                 
422 This axiom is apparently quite ancient. Freytag, 1: 384: “Bellum est situla.” See also Lane, An 
Arabic-English Lexicon, s.v. “S-J-L.” The phrases harb mechûlü’l-netîce and harb mechûlü’l-
‘âkibet appear as variants or paraphrases. Vâsıf’s examples are in works written after 1792. 
For instance, MEHÂSİN 3, 215b; MEHÂSİN 4, 35b, 290b; MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 114.  
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Ottomans had enjoyed three hundred years of perpetual victory, but after 1592 the empire’s arms 
faltered according to the sense of “war is unpredictable” and its power waned. The realm’s 
present malaise, moreover, was to him part of the French sedition spreading itself over all 
regions of the habitable world.
423
  
 An uncertain world naturally poses challenges to rulers and puts a premium on 
deliberation. Vâsıf recognized this clearly, arguing in the early nineteenth century that the 
application of reason and policy is preferable to violence: 
It is a precept of philosophy from the beginning of the universe till now that chaos and 
disorder periodically appear on the face of the earth, each through a secondary cause. We 
know through experience that worldly disorders are removed now using bloodshed and 
now using the policies of military men and scribes; and it is recorded in books of ancient 
philosophers that settling a matter through judgment is, where possible, better than 
wasting lives and that one must guard against danger, for proper discernment in the vital 
affairs of government is to all appearances difficult.
424
  
In a later work dedicated to Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Paşa, one of the victors of the Egypt 
campaign, Vâsıf praises cautious military command. Hüseyin Paşa was aware of the precept that 
“war is of unknown outcome (harb mechûlü’l-netîce),” he says, and so exercised prudence. Even 
though the Ottomans were bested in certain skirmishes, according to the sense of “war is 
                                                 
423 MEHÂSİN 3, 213a-217b; MEHÂSİN (EGYPT), 1a-4b; TOP nr. 1625, 2a-2b. 
424 “Mebde-i ‘âlemden bu âna gelince basît-i gabrâda ba‘zen birer sebeb ile şûr u fiten zuhûrı 
emr-i hikemî olub kâh ihrâk-ı dem ve kâh tedbîr-i erbâb-ı seyf ü kalem ile izâle-i fesâd-ı 
‘âlem hâsıl olageldiği mücerreb olub ma‘a vücûdi’l-imkân rey ile itmâm-ı kâr itlâf-ı nüfûsdan 
evlâ ve hasbe’z-zâhir vâcibât-ı mülkiyyeden olan umûr-ı siyâsiyyede fark u bâtıl müşkil 
olduğundan verta-ı vebâle-i vukû‘dan ittikâ lâzım olduğunı hükemâ-yı mütekaddimîn 
kitâblarında sebt ü imlâ…” MEHÂSİN 4, 274b. 
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unpredictable,” the admiral’s vigilance and circumspection contributed to a final Ottoman 
victory.
425
  
 This new perspective is more cogently set forth in Vâsıf’s volume on the 1768-1774 war 
and Küçük Kaynarca. As said in Chapter Two, this work was composed around 1802 within a 
philosophical framework governing all manner of causal relations including war and peace. In 
place of permanent enmity, God ordains periods of war and strife over which man has some 
control. War, peace, and peacemaking, though ordained by God, fall within the ambit of human 
agency. The work is also unique in the extent to which the author inserts himself, as an active 
supporter of peace, directly into the narrative.  
On a mundane level the chronicle recounts bitter division in the Ottoman ranks over war 
and peace. Vâsıf makes this one of the text’s key themes. Indeed, the dispute between supporters 
and opponents of peace assumes nearly as much importance as actual hostilities, with opponents 
often appearing more foe than friend. One of the key issues of debate was, again, how best to 
secure an “honorable peace.” When formal negotiations began in 1772, Vâsıf notes that the 
empire moved to secure an agreement “befitting its welfare and abiding honor [Devlet-i 
‘Aliyye’nin bekâ-yı şânıyla maslahatına muvâfık].”426 What this meant in practice was 
contentious, though. Many statesmen on the front were convinced that it was necessary to 
“sheath the sword of enmity” and were ready to make to large concessions to salvage the 
empire’s honor.427 But they faced recalcitrant opposition. 
Vâsıf directs revealing sidelights onto the latter. In his account Yenişehirli Osman 
Efendi’s refusal to admit Tatar independence, for example, which led to the collapse of 
                                                 
425 ÖN, nr. H.O. 205, 8b-10a. On Hüseyin Paşa, who may have patronized Vâsıf, Nejat Göyünç, 
“Kapudan-ı Deryâ Küçük Hüseyin Paşa,” Tarih Dergisi 2 (1952): 35-50. 
426 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 196-197. Also ibid, 2: 207. 
427 Ibid, 2: 203-205, 207.  
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negotiations at Foksani in August of 1772, was caused by fear of reprisals from militant 
ulema.
428
 Osman Efendi then became an extravagant critic of the entire process, tried to deter 
Vâsıf from discharging truce duties, and agitated for a return to war. He also publically and 
violently insulted his fellow negotiator Yâsîncizâde Efendi.
429
 The chronicle’s depiction of 
Mustafa III as pusillanimous, dithering, and dominated by councillors is another interesting case. 
At least privately the sultan appears to have felt that peace was a blessing and in the realm’s best 
interest. Yet fear bested him and he made plans to banish the Bucharest delegation in the event of 
popular discontent, in order to relieve pressure on himself.
430
  
It must be said that the opposition’s aims are never openly shared. Ahmed Resmî blames 
the failure of the Bucharest negotiations on Osman Efendi and on high ulema at court who, he 
says, espoused a rigid, literalist interpretation of Tatar independence (lafzî ezberden ma‘âzallah 
pek biyük günâh) and threw the sultan into doubt.
431
 Vâsıf says scarcely more. Nevertheless, the 
chronicle hints that many in the hierarchy, and especially at court in Istanbul, saw the proposed 
peace as dictated and in violation of the law, especially for the Crimea. It was therefore 
unacceptable and the sultan, under his councillors' influence, ordered the army back to war with 
the hope of defeating the Russians and winning a victorious peace.
432
   
 Vâsıf’s own stance naturally differs and presents the war as irresponsible. A section 
preceding the volume, for instance, quoting extensively from Muhsinzâde Mehmed Paşa, 
contrasts this Grand Vezir’s caution towards war with his peers’ recklessness, who disregarded 
                                                 
428 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 223-225. Cf. A Summary of Admonitions, 31a. On Yenişehirli Osman 
Efendi’s life and career, Sefînet, 106-108. 
429 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 225-233. 
430 Ibid, 2: 245-247. 
431 A Summary of Admonitions, 33a.  
432 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 249-250. Also A Summary of Admonitions, 40a: “Düşmanı ürküderek sulha 
böyle gâlibâne nizâm verile deyü İstanbul'da ve orduda karâr verilüb...” 
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its uncertain outcome and latent danger (mechûlü’l-‘âkibet ve hatarı muhtemel fitne-i nâime-i 
harb).
433
 In his preface Vâsıf meanwhile repeats that the war was indeed “a grave affair of 
unknown outcome [mechûlü’l-‘âkibet bir emr-i hatîr].”434 His meaning is twofold. For one, the 
empire was simply unprepared for war and would better have avoided the situation. But as war is 
an inherently risky enterprise, policy must be the best recourse. Given war’s uncertainty, Vâsıf 
argues that it is best to secure peace whenever possible. Importantly, here for the first time one 
can begin to glimpse the influence of Ahmed Resmî.  
Three examples will show how Vâsıf develops these ideas in the work. The first comes 
immediately after the Ottomans rejected peace overtures following the 1770 Battle of Kartal. The 
historian scoffs at the notion that some in Istanbul could impute such advances to Russian 
weakness, lamenting that their refusal was a lost opportunity. Quite to the contrary, he declares, 
and drawing directly from Resmî’s Hulâsat, it is established practice for states to be peaceable in 
wartime and warlike in peacetime: “The outcome of war is unknown. Wise men seize the 
opportunity when victory has presented itself, hence the Europeans always follow this course.”435  
To reiterate his point the historian adds a didactic lesson on the value of peacemaking. 
This section tells the tale of Maslama b. Abdülmalik's siege of Constantinople in 717/18, a 
powerful historical example meant to evoke the triumphal early days of Islam. Even so, 
Maslama’s censure by the caliph Umar demonstrates that past wars were not waged 
indiscriminately. Prudence should be used and rulers must take war’s uncertainty and 
                                                 
433 MEHÂSİN 5, 1: 314-315. Vâsıf writes that on one occasion, while the army wintered in 
Şumnu, Muhsinzâde explained to him the reasons for his dismissal from the vezirate. He adds 
this narrative in the first-person.   
434 Ibid, 2: 5.  
435 “Cenk vaktinde tavr-ı sulh ve vakt-i sulhda tavr-ı cenk irâesi fi‘l-i kudemâ ve cengin netîcesi 
ma‘lûm olmayub galebe el vermişiken fırsatı fevt etmemek kâr-ı ‘ukelâ olduğundan Frenk 
tâifesi dahî dâîm bu mesleğe iktidâ eylediklerinden…” MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 114. Cf. A Summary 
of Admonitions, 35b. 
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destructiveness into account. More directly to the point, says Vâsıf, “if the infidel defeats 
Muslims and repelling them is not possible, then making peace in order to protect other 
Muslims’ life, territory, and property can be considered a sort of victory.”436 Peacemaking, in 
other words, is a desirable and even honorable path.  
 The second example follows the failed negotiations at Bucharest, to which Vâsıf was a 
party. In an extended digression the historian delves into the minutiae of negotiations between 
the chief delegate Abdürrezzâk Efendi and the Russian legate Obreskov.
437
 When talks reached 
an impasse, he writes, Obreskov, exasperated, declared that Russian demands were the fruits of 
victory. What would the Ottomans do in their place? No doubt they would make impossible 
claims.
438
 Abdürrezzâk Efendi deftly replied with the story of Peter I’s 1711 defeat on the Pruth 
at the hands of Baltacı Mehmed Paşa. Though Peter was in dire straits, Abdürrezzâk said, the 
empire did not press its claims but avoided bloodshed and was content with the cession of Azov. 
For that Obreskov admitted Baltacı Mehmed was a wise vezir. He feared that desperate soldiers 
would win in close quarters battle, “and so he did not lose his chance for victory: he chose peace 
[yedinde bulunan serrişte-i galebe ü nusreti zâyi‘ etmeyüb sulhı ihtiyâr eyledi].”439 Whether 
Vâsıf faithfully recounts this conversation matters less than the message therein. The passage 
strengthens his general defense of peace and shows that peacemaking, used judiciously, can be 
                                                 
436 “Ehl-i İslâm’a â‘dâ-ı dînin galebesi vâki‘ ve müdâfa‘a müte‘azzir ü mümteni‘ olursa sâîr 
müslimînin vekâye-i ârâzî ve sıyânet-i nefs ü mâlleri garazıyla in‘ikâd-ı sulh feth ü nusret 
kabîlinden ma‘dûd…” MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 114. 
437 Ibid, 2: 246-247.  
438 Ibid, 2: 247. 
439 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 247. On Baltacı Mehmed Paşa and the Pruth Campagian, see DİA, s.v. “Prut 
Antlaşması.”  
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wiser than force; nor is peace incompatible with victory.
440
 As the historical example asserts, 
moreover, this lesson was not new to the Ottomans.  
Vâsıf inserts the third and final illustration into his narrative at the signing of the Treaty 
of Kaynarca. In an addendum, he first calls attention to how unfavorable the treaty was 
compared to the terms negotiated at Bucharest.
441
 “It is obvious on the slightest consideration 
how much the Russians profited” in the final text, he says. But Vâsıf then proceeds to a 
staggering pronouncement on war and peace:  
There is no question in war that money is squandered on raising levies and that rebellion 
arises in the land through requisite, heavy imposts. Indeed, in warfare victory and 
triumph are but an illusion while the comfort and ease in peace are very real. And it is 
detailed in the books of philosophers who once graced this world that preferring the real 
to the fanciful, and the known to the unknown, were among their own practices.
442
  
This statement, which clearly echoes at least one earlier source,
443
 epitomizes Vâsıf's defense of 
peacemaking in the 1768-1774 chronicle: that war is unclear, unpredictable, unprofitable, to be 
avoided in favor of peace. It is also the closest he comes in the full span of his writing to a 
rejection of war and a radical, Resmian view of peace.  
                                                 
440 Menchinger, “Gems for Royal Profit,” 143-144. Resmî records a discussion with Frederick 
the Great on the same event in MEHÂSİN 5, 1: 255; Virginia Aksan, “An Ottoman Portrait of 
Frederick the Great,” in Ottomans and Europeans, 75.  
441 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 306-307. 
442 “Cenkde aksâr-ı vezâîf-i cünûd ile itlâf-ı emvâl ve tekâlîf-i şakka-ı zarûriyye ile memâlikde 
tevellüd-ü ihtilâl vâreste-i kayd-ı istidlâl olub bâ-husûs cenkde zafer ü nusret mevhûm ve 
sulhda rahat ü asâyiş meczûm olub meczûmı mevhûma ve ma‘lûmı mechûla tercîh 
nakşbendân-ı kârhane-i umûr olan hükemâ-yı eslâfın şiyem ü ‘âdetlerinden olduğı 
kitâblarında tasrîh olunmuşdur.” Ibid, 2: 307. 
443 Cf. Faik Reşit Unat, “Ahmet III. Devrine Ait Bir Islahat Takriri: Muhayyel Bir Mülâkatın 
Zabıtları,” Tarih Vesikaları 1 (1941): 109. There is little doubt Vâsıf read this work.  
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 The above examples and the volume as a whole therefore show a striking change of 
rhetoric. The older formula of peace as a necessary, temporary expedient is gone. Vâsıf instead 
contends that war can and should be subjected to deliberation, and that it is neither a political nor 
a moral imperative but can be evaluated and used, like any other tool, on the merits of reason. In 
doing so, he extends human agency into matters of peace and war.  
 It is possible to discern Vâsıf's new tone more clearly in the way his treatment of a 
particular event changed over time: Austria’s 1774 annexation of parts of Moldavia. On 6 July 
1771 Austria entered into a secret compact with the empire with promises of diplomatic and 
military aid, an agreement it soon disavowed.
444
 However, after Kaynarca Austria did not scruple 
to exploit Ottoman weakness and summarily annexed territory in Moldavia for their “trouble” as 
an erstwhile ally. Vâsıf first mentions this event in a chronicle entry for the year 1783/84. It is 
never licit (câiz) to trust Christian countries, says the author, and it is especially absurd that they 
would aid Islam during war:  
Yet during Mustafa III's reign the Austrians duped the empire and promised, in return for 
certain considerations, to quiet the Russians through peaceable or forcible means. They 
even sent soldiers into Poland and made as though ready for war. In the end, however, 
they were not content with the territory they gained in the clandestine partition of Poland 
and pressed for other advantages, claiming great expenses and demanding the agreed 
portion of Moldavia from the empire…And no matter how the late Grand Vezir İzzet 
Mehmed Paşa, the reis İsmail Paşa, and other statesmen tried to deflect their desires, it 
                                                 
444 Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman, 155-157; Köse, 56-57. 
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was in vain. Since peace had just been made with Russia and refusal would surely have 
meant war, they complied according to the axiom “choose the lesser of two evils.”445 
This same event takes on a slightly different character in the war chronicle. Vâsıf begins 
his account of “Austria's perfidy” by stating that the balance of powers (beyne’d-düvel 
muvâzene) is a respected notion in politics and that it is customary for states to unite against an 
aggressor and take action. Yet this practice has lapsed, for the new states
446
 of Europe are 
“opportunists [rassad-bîn-i mekr u hiyel]”:  
It is fit to reason that human nature, which is prone to evil and vice, feigns goodwill and 
incessantly seeks for advantages. And as man naturally subjugates the feeble and looks 
for indications of weakness, statesmen know as a matter of course that if (by God’s 
ordination) a state is defeated by its enemy and fears excess harm, neighboring states will 
perceive they desire peace and seize a piece of adjacent territory or contemn them so that 
certain untenable peace terms are concluded, which act as a sort of insidious poison. In 
this campaign, therefore, the Austrians secretly agreed to enter the war at a propitious 
time, aiding the empire against their Russian enemy. They had acted as if they would 
honor this provision by sending men to the frontier. Yet there was no trace of their 
promised aid or a declaration of war, and they indemnified the empire for their expenses 
and annexed perforce nine districts of territory from Moldavia. Those privy to the secrets 
of the age understand that the empire was exhausted by its six-year war with Russia and 
bore this injury of necessity.
447
 
                                                 
445 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 166-167. 
446 “Nev-hudûs olan devletler.” This likely refers to the French Republic, Prussia, and Russia. 
Vâsıf’s opinion of Frederick the Great, for example, was tainted by his opportunism. Mehâsin 
(İlgürel), 366; MEHÂSİN 1, 287a-287b; MEHÂSİN 4, 199a.  
447 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 307-308. 
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Whereas Vâsıf earlier explained the empire’s acquiescence using legal language and in the 
context of enmity between the dâr al-ḥarb and dâr al-İslâm, he here stresses political calculation 
and a balance of powers that includes both Christians and Ottomans. The Austrians presumed, 
correctly, that fellow states “would look the other way at their opportunism” and took full 
advantage.
448 
Had the Ottomans not gone to war and exhausted themselves, or had they acted 
with more savvy, the situation could have been avoided altogether. Indeed, Vâsıf implies that the 
loss was largely self-inflicted.  
 This is not to argue that Vâsıf rejected war outright in his late career. Although he seems 
to have been influenced by Ahmed Resmî, he never indulged in quite the same brand of 
radicalism. The key change in the 1768-1774 volume is one of premises. Metaphysically and 
morally, war no longer had to be perpetual and peace, by the same token, was a virtue instead of 
a necessary, temporary evil. To Vâsıf in his latter years the outcome of war could no longer be 
assumed, and so it required all due diligence and care as a political tool. 
 
Conclusions 
War, peace, and peacemaking obviously loomed large in Ottoman minds as the eighteenth 
century drew to a close. In this way, and as in Chapter Two, it is best to evaluate Vâsıf’s position 
as part of a broad, and to all appearances contentious, intellectual debate among the Ottoman 
elite. What might we say about his views and how they fit into such a discussion? 
 We have seen that militant rhetoric in the empire was slow to change but that, from an 
early date, Ottoman intellectuals tried to find ways to contain warfare. We have also seen how 
very tortured and constrained these attempts could be. Essentially prescriptive and legalistic, they 
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used technicalities like the concept of “necessity” and the “lesser of two evils” to justify peace as 
an extraordinary state of affairs, a suspension of normal rules that could be nothing other than 
temporary breathing-space; rare was the individual who said otherwise, at least publicly. Vâsıf’s 
early defenses of peacemaking were of a similar sort. Like Naîmâ, Dürrî Mehmed, and others, he 
preserved the façade of the empire’s exceptionalism by drawing on terminology and lessons 
from the law and the literature of war, a trend that persisted into the nineteenth century.
449
  
The historian’s treatment of peace shifted markedly in the 1790s and thereafter, however, 
evincing a philosophical bent that appears to have paralleled his growing interest in human 
agency and responsibility. Although he never disavowed warfare and its place in the imperial 
mythos, Vâsıf ultimately came to argue that war and peace were like other human endeavors 
open to rational control. War, inherently unpredictable, required restraint and care, while peace, 
no longer the exception, offered advantages that statesmen could ignore only at their own peril. 
This change is not minor. Rather, like the work of Ahmed Resmî Efendi a generation before, it 
points to a widening realm of human agency in the Ottoman conduct of war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
449 Mehmed Münib Efendi’s 1799 translation of Muhammad al-Shaybânî’s Siyer-i Kebîr, which 
was printed at the Imperial Press a generation later in 1825, is a relevant illustration. Münib 
also submitted an essay to Selim III on the legality of various military reforms. Kemal 
Beydilli, Türk Bilim ve Matbaacılık Tarihinde Mühendishâne, Mühendishâne Matbaası ve 
Kütüphânesi (1776-1826) (İstanbul, 1995), 223-225, 328, n. 7. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Moral Order of the Universe 
 
By the late eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire stood in dire need. The crises of the period 
forced Ottomans of all stripes to grapple, above all, with outmoded, outperformed military forces 
and a foundering political system. How they did so – the nature and content of reform – has 
formed a major focus of scholarship in past decades. However, for Ahmed Vâsıf and his peers 
reform was no mere technical matter nor without controversy. Ottoman thinkers and statesmen 
posited a direct link between ethics and the realm's prosperity and elided the distinction between 
its physical and metaphysical wellbeing. Vâsıf and his colleagues saw the empire's problems as 
symptomatic of deeper ills in the body politic, manifestations of a disorder that was foremost of a 
moral or ethical nature. Any discussion of late eighteenth century Ottoman reform must first 
address how Vâsıf and his peers saw the empire within a larger ethico-political order. 
 This chapter examines Vâsıf's views, again, in a wider intellectual discussion. It situates 
his understanding of human nature, the polity, and justice in the Persianate tradition of practical 
philosophy or hikmet-i ‘ameliyye, highlighting the close relationship he drew between individual 
and political virtue, and between governance of the self and polity. Like his peers, Vâsıf sensed a 
malaise in the empire – one grounded in a failure to uphold the universe’s basic moral order.  
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Human Nature and Social Order in Ottoman Thought 
Traditional Ottoman wisdom has it that religion and kingship are indissolubly linked. Faith and 
sovereignty (dîn ü devlet) are twins, “two rings on one finger or two gems from the same mine,” 
divinely ordained and inseparable.
450
 The way Ottomans saw social order was influenced by both 
Islamic scripturalism and the peripatetic philosophical tradition as filtered through al-Fârâbî, Ibn 
Sînâ, al-Ṭûsî, Ibn Khaldûn, and others. In this view political governance was not, and could not 
be, a self-contained process. Rather it was more a department of theology and stood in relation to 
ethics “as theory to practice.”451  
 Any discussion of social order in the empire must begin with some necessary background 
in Islamic philosophy. Ottoman political thought emerged from a peculiar classical synthesis, 
when jurists and philosophers attempted to square the ideal Islamic community guided and ruled 
by Muhammad’s worldly successor, the caliph, with a fragmented political reality. Some, jurists 
like al-Mâwardî (d. 1058), continued to assert the caliph’s sole authority as upholder of holy law 
(sharî‘a) and head of the community. Medieval philosophers, on the other hand, eventually 
yielded the caliph’s temporal supremacy to lesser rulers – sultans. Borrowing from Greek and 
Persian thought, they tried to house the caliphate within the more hospitable confines of 
Aristotle’s theoretical and Plato’s practical philosophies, “to harmonize revelation, in the form of 
                                                 
450 Neşrî, Ğihannümâ: Die Altosmanische Chronik des Mevlânâ Mehemmed Neschrî (Leipzig, 
1951), 1: 2. See also Kınâlızâde, 26. This saying came originally from Sasanid Persia.    
451 E. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam: an Introductory Outline (Cambridge, 
1962), 118. On the empire’s intellectual heritage, see Mardin, Young Ottoman Thought, esp. 
81-106. Muhammad Naquib al-Attas provides a helpful theoretical framework in “The 
Islamic Worldview: an Outline,” in İslâm, Gelenek ve Yenileşme (İstanbul, 1996), 215-241. 
See also Thomas Naff, “The Linkage of History and Reform in Islam: an Ottoman Model,” in 
In Quest of an Islamic Humanism (Cairo), 123-138; Anne Lambton, “Justice in the Medieval 
Persian Theory of Kingship,” Studia Islamica 17 (1962): 91-119; idem, “Changing Concepts 
of Justice and Injustice from the 5
th
/11
th
 Century to the 8
th
/14
th
 Century in Persia: the Saljuq 
Empire and the Ilkhanate,” Studia Islamica 68 (1988): 27-60.  
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prophetic law, with reason, in the form of the Nomos of the Greek city-state.”452 While these 
thinkers took different approaches to the problem, it is important to recognize that they shared 
the same presuppositions about Islamic revelation. For the Ottomans, meanwhile, due perhaps to 
the Abbasid caliphate’s extinction, philosophical political thought proved more influential in the 
long-run than the juristic theory.
453
   
 Islamic political philosophy’s ultimate concern was with happiness (sa‘âda), which, in 
this context, meant a twofold felicity. As said in Chapter One, true happiness was thought to 
occur through the theoretical (naẓarî) and practical (‘amalî) perfection of the soul, a knowledge 
of “existing things” and self-governance that led to worldly felicity and otherworldly salvation 
(sa‘âdet-i neşeteyn).454 But practical perfection required political governance. What is more, it 
needed a polity that could not only guarantee the life and property of subjects but also their 
spiritual welfare. The state’s constitution, and especially its relationship to the law, was therefore 
an overriding concern to philosophers.
455
  
 One of the classic problems of political philosophy, but also of Islamic thought at large, 
was the relationship between revelation and reason. Philosophers deemed humans “political 
beings,” or in Aristotle’s terms zoon politikon, capable of reason and political organization but 
also creatures. Human reason, they thought, being limited and inferior to the divine wisdom, 
needed guidance in the form of revealed prophetic law. This fact did not necessarily preclude 
human legislation or even rational inquiry. Revelation and reason could and did aspire to a 
                                                 
452 Rosenthal, Political Thought, 1-5. See also Crone, Medieval Islamic Political Thought, 145-
196, 219-255; Lambton, “Justice in the Medieval Persian Theory of Kingship.” 
453 A notable exception is Ebu’s-su‘ud Efendi’s attempt to synthesize the caliphate and dynasty, 
Imber, Ebu’s-su‘ud, 98-111. 
454 See again Kashf al-ẓunûn, s.v. “‘Ilm al-ḥikma”; Kınâlızâde, esp. 41-53. 
455 Rosenthal, Political Thought, 13-15. 
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similar aim: happiness.
456
 The question, then, had to do with the respective spheres of divine and 
man-made law in the polity.  
 Islamic thinkers distinguished early on between governments based on revealed law 
(sharî‘a) and human law. Their verdict on the latter was not nearly as negative as we might 
expect, only that it was imperfect. In philosophical terms, a state based on human reason and law 
could secure its subjects only worldly happiness. Human law might ensure order, prevent 
injustice, and arrange the polity’s affairs so that subjects had material welfare, but it could not 
grant salvation. Divine law, to the contrary, served “the welfare of the soul and the welfare of the 
body.” To be perfect the soul needed right belief through sharî‘a in addition to reason; 
theoretical and practical perfection were as a result only possible in the ideal state, ruled 
according to revealed law.
457
 Ibn Khaldûn in the fourteenth century identified three types of 
polities, for example: religious nomocracy (siyâsa dîniyya), the state based on reason (siyâsa 
‘aqliyya), and the “Virtuous City,” Plato’s republic (siyâsa madaniyya). Ibn Khaldûn dismissed 
the Virtuous City as fantasy, because it posited a community so sublimated by philosophy that it 
needed no ruler at all. He also felt that pure nomocracy, though ideal, had ended with the so-
called “Rightly Guided (râshidûn)” caliphs and transformed into a polity based on reason, with 
                                                 
456 Ibid, 15-20. 
457 Rosenthal, Political Thought, 19-20, 113-121; Crone, 266-272. Especially Rosenthal on 
philosophers: “Revelation is for them not simply a direct communication between God and 
man…it is also and above all a valid and binding code for man, who must live in society and 
be politically organized in a state in order to fulfil his destiny. In short, it is the law of the 
ideal state…It provides for man’s welfare in this world and prepares him for the hereafter, and 
thus alone guarantees his perfection and happiness as a religious being. In so doing it goes 
beyond the nomos, the man-made law of Greek philosophy, which knew no two-fold 
happiness, though it was equally designed to enable man to reach his goal, intellectual 
perfection,” 116.  
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sharî‘a as its main source of law. Still, for him the Islamic polity was better than other human 
states, as it was still notionally guided by revelation.
458
  
 Ottoman intellectuals profited from this philosophical legacy in the way they understood 
social order and the polity. If their concern with revelation, reason, and the soul sometimes took 
different forms, they too, for example, acknowledged from the empire’s early days a basic 
division between divine (siyâset-i ilâhiyye/dîniyye/şer‘iyye) and human political authority 
(siyâset-i sultâniyye/‘akliyye). According to the fifteenth century author Tursun Bey, government 
realized the perfection of human nature, secured mankind’s twofold happiness, and could be of 
either type: rule according to wisdom and holy law in the first instance, or, in the second, 
according to human reason. Moreover, although Ottomans believed revealed law provided a 
more infallible guide than reason, they also affirmed rule by custom, which they called örf or 
kânûn.
459
  
 The phrase nizâm-ı ‘âlem, a pithy formula that translates as “universal/world order” and 
articulates, indeed, the whole of the moral universe, is the key to Ottoman political views. While 
it appears often in sources, nizâm-ı ‘âlem has remained enigmatic and subject to debate. This is 
because Ottoman authorities rarely bothered to define it as a concept, as if they shared a tacit 
understanding over the phrase’s meaning. Scholars have hence tried to relate “world order” to 
various political dispensations. Osman Turan, for instance, sought in it Turkic ideals of world 
                                                 
458 Rosenthal, Political Thought, 84-109. A nomocracy is a government based upon a legal code. 
For its application to the Islamic community, and how it differs from a theocracy, see 
Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, 14-18. 
459 See Uriel Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law (Oxford, 1973), 167-207; Imber, 
Ebu’s-su‘ud, esp. 24-51; Halil İnalcık, “Şerî‘at ve Kanun, Din ve Devlet,” in Osmanlı’da 
Devlet, Hukuk, Adâlet (İstanbul, 2000), 43-44; Mardin, Young Ottoman Thought, 102-106; 
Mehmet Öz, “Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Siyasi Düşüncesi: Tarihi Temeller ve Ana İlkeler,” 
İslâmî Araştırmalar Dergisi 12 (1999): 28-29; Coşkun Yılmaz, “Osmanlılarda Siyaset 
Düşüncesi (XVI-XVIII. Asırlar),” Akademik Araştırmalar 4-5 (2000): 61-62; idem, “Osmanlı 
Siyaset Düşüncesinde Kavramlar,” Türkler 11 (2002): 35. 
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domination; others have proposed that “world order” meant nothing more than the physical 
integrity of the realm, or attempted to equate it with a Pax Ottomanica.
460
  
 Recent scholarship, however, argues that nizâm-ı ‘âlem more likely presupposed a 
universal order that was not merely physical but embraced all human social relations. The origins 
of this order lay in a primeval, Hobbesian “state of nature” derived from al-Fârâbî, Ibn Sînâ, and 
ultimately Aristotle. The idea, as Ottoman thinkers held, was that humans are by nature social 
beings and incline to settled life. Yet humans are also susceptible to carnal passions. If left to 
their own devices they will covet their neighbors’ goods, threatening to disrupt society with 
violence, and only government (siyâset) and a ruler’s administration of justice (‘adâla, Trk. 
‘adâlet) can restrain the passions, keep individuals in their proper social station, and make 
society function properly.
461
 As Gottfried Hagen notes, nizâm-ı ‘âlem had universal validity in 
that it was not confined to any given historical period, dynasty, or region, and so was to be 
distinguished from similar but purely political notions like nizâm-ı devlet (“order of the 
dynasty”) and nizâm-ı mülk (“order of the realm”). It also implies that kingship is necessary and 
ordained by God, “a divine remedy for a problem caused by weakness intrinsic to human 
nature.”462 
                                                 
460 Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 56, n. 7; Tahsin Görgün, “Osmanlı’da Nizâm-ı Âlem 
Fikri ve Kaynakları Üzerine Bazı Notlar,” İslâmî Araştırmalar Dergisi 13 (2000): 180-181; 
Öz, “Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Siyasi Düşüncesi,” 29-30; Turan, Türk Cihân Hâkimiyet 
Mefkûresi Tarihi, 2: 1-3, 10-36. 
461 Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 61-71; Crone, 259-268; Kınâlızâde, 405-412; 
Lambton, “Justice in the Medieval Persian Theory of Kingship,” 109-110. See also Yılmaz, 
“Osmanlılarda Siyaset,” 61-62.  
462 Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 58, 61; Görgün for textual examples and analysis, 
181-184. Also Berkes, 11-13; Hagen and Menchinger, 98; and Yılmaz, “Kavramlar,” 35-36. 
Görgün traces the term to Arabic theological works studied in Ottoman medreses and the 
concept of causal “acquisition” or kasb. In these works niẓâm al-‘âlam represented an order 
made and sustained through individual human effort and responsibility, 184-187.  
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 The ideal “world order” was rigidly compartmentalized. In the Ottoman period most 
sources cite four different groups or estates (and some three or five) under the title erkân-ı erba‘a 
or “four pillars,” a distinction going back to al-Ṭûsî and earlier which usually consisted of 
soldiers, scribes, artisans, and farmers. According to the theory, these groups filled specific roles 
in a human society that was naturally hierarchical and unchanging. Soldiers and scribes ensured 
stability and public welfare, while artisans produced staple goods and farmers food. Furthermore, 
it followed that these groups had to cooperate and remain fixed in place. Movement could not be 
countenanced lest it disturb the order of the world and the whole system fall into chaos. The 
Ottomans therefore expressed aversion to social mobility in a concept of rigid social boundaries 
or hadd – “a carefully defined hierarchical station in life for all, the observation of which caused 
society to function harmoniously” – as well as to any change in the structure’s legal and 
institutional underpinnings, or what they called “ancient practice (kânûn-ı kadîm).463 They also 
frequently likened the pillars to the four elements or four bodily humors, the so-called 
“biological metaphor,” discussed in detail in Chapter Five, to emphasize that society was an 
organic whole whose equilibrium must be carefully tended.
464
  
                                                 
463 Rhoads Murphey, “The Veliyuddin Telhis: Notes on the Sources and Interrelations between 
Koçi Beg and Contemporary Writers of Advice to Kings,” in Essays, 127-128. One definition 
of kânûn-ı kadîm was “that practice whose establishment none can recall.” See Cemal 
Kafadar, “The Myth of the Golden Age: Ottoman Historical Consciousness in the Post 
Süleymânic Era,” in Süleyman the Second and His Time, ed. Halil İnalcık and Cemal Kafadar 
(Istanbul, 1993), 38; Mehmet Öz, “Kânûn-ı Kadîm: Osmanlı Gelenekçi Söyleminin Dayanağı 
mı, Islahat Girişimlerinin Meşrulaştırma Aracı Mı?” in Nizâm-ı Kadîm'den Nizâm-ı Cedîd'e: 
III. Selim ve Dönemi, ed. Seyfi Kenan (İstanbul, 2010), 59-77; idem, “Klasik Dönem Osmanlı 
Siyasi Düşüncesi,” 31-32; Yılmaz, “Osmanlılarda Siyaset,” 48-52; idem, “Kavramlar,” 37-38. 
464 On the “four pillars,” Hagen, “Afterword,” 238-240; idem, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 
63-64; Mardin, Young Ottoman Thought, 94-102; Kınâlızâde, 478-484; Murphey, 
“Veliyuddin Telhis,” 127-128; Öz, “Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Siyasi Düşüncesi,” 31;  
Rosenthal, Political Thought, 218-223, 224-230; Yılmaz, “Osmanlılarda Siyaset,” 54-56; 
idem, “Kavramlar,” 38-39. 
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 What ensured this equilibrium was the ruler's justice (‘adâlet). It is important to first note 
that Ottomans did not recognize justice in the modern sense of equality or impartial treatment 
before the law. To them social inequality was a fact of nature, ordained by God. Rather, Ottoman 
thinkers, guided by Aristotelian ethics, thought of justice in terms of balance. In this tradition 
there were four cardinal virtues – wisdom (hikmet), courage (şecâ‘at), and temperance (‘iffet) – 
each means between two vices. The fourth, justice or ‘adâlet, emerged in individuals who 
possessed the other three and was thus the embodiment of all virtue and equity in individual 
behavior. Injustice (ẓulm, Trk. zulüm), alternately, was regarded as justice’s diametric opposite. 
While some held that injustice was its own vice, an extreme the mean of which was justice, 
others thought it was really a negation of justice – that just as justice was the sum of all virtue, so 
injustice was not a vice itself but vice in its entirety.
465
  
 A direct link between individual ethics and political governance meant that in Ottoman 
thought ‘adâlet was a social principle, too. The ethical dimension becomes clearer if one recalls 
that “world order” rested on the human predisposition to vices like greed, envy, and 
covetousness. The ruler’s duty was to restrain these passions to allow society to function. The 
notable Ottoman moralist Kınâlızâde proposed three conditions for justice in a polity: keeping 
the realm’s social groups in equilibrium, determining each group’s merits and capacity, and 
                                                 
465 The literature on ‘adâlet is extensive. Etymologically, the term comes from the Arabic root ‘-
D-L and signifies a putting to rights or putting something in the correct place. See Lewis, The 
Political Language of Islam, 143 n. 60, 155 n. 30; Roy Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership 
in an Early Islamic Society (New York, 2001), 179. The best article on justice in the Ottoman 
context is Ergene’s “On Ottoman Justice.” See furthermore DİA, s.v. “‘Adâlet” and “Ahlâk”; 
Fakhry, 64, 111-115; Necdet Gök, “Türk-İslam Kültüründe Adalet Anlayışı ve Osmanlı 
Uygulamalarından Örnekler,” Türkler 11 (2002): 61-70; Hagen, “Legitimacy and World 
Order,” 66-67, 71-73; Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice (Baltimore, 1984), 
esp. 119-125; Kınâlızâde, 93-107; Lambton, “Changing Concepts of Justice and Injustice”; 
idem, “Justice in the Medieval Persian Theory of Kingship”; Öz, “Klasik Dönem Osmanlı 
Siyasi Düşüncesi: 30; Yılmaz, “Osmanlılarda Siyaset,” 56-58. 
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distributing posts and other benefactions accordingly.
466
 To be just in government, then, was to 
apportion each subject his or her due according to their proper function and station and to 
preserve harmony between the “four pillars.” Injustice was a deviation from these conditions, 
especially the principle of hadd. Moreover, since politics were essentially a domain of personal 
ethics the just ruler needed to be individually just.
467
 As such, justice in the last resort was rooted 
in personal moral qualities and the ruler’s ability (success or failure) to govern himself and 
others.
468
 
 In the Ottoman mind justice and injustice directly influenced the realm’s prosperity. Its 
instrumental role was most often voiced through the famous “Circle of Equity,” or dâire-i 
‘adliyye, a formula generally written around the inside of a circle that describes how justice 
should circulate through the whole social order. The realm, it posited, can only prosper through 
justice, which must be upheld by observing holy law. Only a king with an army can uphold the 
law, which, in turn, requires wealth from subjects. Only through justice can subjects produce 
wealth.
469
  
 The “Circle of Equity,” an ancient device going back to pre-Islamic Persia, summarized 
the interdependence of kingship, justice, and prosperity. However, this prosperity did not stop 
with subjects’ material wellbeing. We find in close parallel a notion that a ruler’s actions affected 
                                                 
466 Kınâlızâde, 478-488; Ergene, 85. 
467 Berkes, 11-13; Gök, 62-63; Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice, 122-123; Lambton, 
“Justice in the Medieval Persian Theory of Kingship,” 119; Tezcan, “Ethics,” 117; Yılmaz, 
“Osmanlılarda Siyaset,” 56-58.  
468 Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 66-67. Crone writes that “moral perfection was a key 
desideratum in a ruler in that virtue was required for justice. Besides, the moral outlook of 
kings was generally assumed to affect that of their subjects,” 161. 
469 Kınâlızâde attributes the circle to Aristotle, 532. Also Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 
64-66; Linda Darling, A History of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East: the 
Circle of Justice from Mesopotamia to Globalization (New York, 2013), esp. 127-156; 
Yılmaz, “Osmanlılarda Siyaset,” 52-54. 
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not just the social order but the underlying order of nature itself. If Ottomans believed that justice 
created prosperity, they also believed that it created natural fecundity. Likewise, injustice might 
beget famine, drought, and physical ruin, the classic symbol of which was rain and a hadith that 
declared, “When rulers act wrongly, the heavens dry up.” The idea behind this, as Crone states, 
is that “the regularities of nature depended on a moral order which it was the duty of the king to 
maintain,” and that his failure to do so provoked divine warnings or wrath.470 A ruler studied in 
virtue was in this way the linchpin of a moral order encompassing all creation, man and nature.  
 It would nevertheless be mistaken to think that justice was the ultimate goal of the 
Ottoman polity, or even what legitimated it. Boğaç Ergene astutely observes that Ottoman justice 
served a larger end – sustaining the primeval social order – and that “justice was generally 
conceptualized more as a personal quality of an ideal ruler than as a definitive characteristic of a 
legitimate social order.” The order’s legitimacy was based on its primeval quality rather than on 
justice as such.
471
 Hagen adds that justice was a sort of universal “lubricant” for a preexisting 
ideal order, the “realities” of which had to be taken into account.472 The ultimate end of the 
polity was not justice in itself, but upholding that order which best allowed humans to flourish 
and attain felicity in this world and the next. 
 We might then think of the ideal Ottoman social order as a building. The structure itself, 
the whole of it, is the “order of the world” or nizâm-ı ‘âlem. Yet there are also essential elements 
inside that form and prop up the structure. Hierarchical social groups, the “four pillars (erkân-ı 
erba‘a),” provide support, encircling and sheltering which are walls and framework equating to 
the “Circle of Equity (dâire-i ‘adliyye)” and “ancient practice (kânûn-ı kadîm).” Holding up the 
                                                 
470 Crone, 158-160, 163-164. See also Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 74-75. 
471 Ergene, 57-58.  
472 Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 67. 
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entire edifice is the central keystone – justice (‘adâlet), whose administration (siyâset) is 
dispensed by the virtuous ruler. This keystone sits above the structure but is crucial to its 
integrity. It holds the pillars in their proper place – in proper equilibrium – preventing them from 
toppling into each other or perforating the walls. Without justice, indeed without any of these 
elements, the whole structure collapses.  
 This of course is an idealized, simplified schema. We need only briefly consider how 
Ottomans construed the relationship between revealed and customary law to see that “world 
order” and its parts could be reinterpreted again and again in different ways. While Tursun Bey 
thought that revealed law was the superior basis for government, upheld both “worldly and 
spiritual order (nizâm-ı ‘âlem-i zâhir ü batın),” and provided for twofold felicity, he admitted the 
possibility of government based purely on customary law and reason (siyâset-i sultânî), which, 
as under the Mongols, might ensure worldly order (nizâm-ı ‘âlem-i zâhir). Kınâlızâde and 
Şehzâde Korkud meanwhile deemed rule based on reason as illegitimate, rejecting the “two-
tiered foundation of rule,” while Kâtib Çelebi, İbrahim Müteferrika, and others argued 
strenuously for its validity.
473
 Our authors’ differences say nothing, necessarily, against their 
sincerity or the ideal as such. Indeed, it is as an ideal that these ideas exerted most of their 
influence, in shaping the way Ottomans thought about society, the realm, proper rule, and even 
political reform. 
 
 
                                                 
473 Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 67-71; Heyd, Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, 
169-171. Hagen and Görgün admirably illustrate the fluidity of nizâm-ı ‘âlem. For ‘adâlet, 
Ergene and Heather Ferguson’s ambitious “Genres of Power: Constructing a Discourse of 
Decline in Ottoman Nasihatname,” Journal of Ottoman Studies 35 (2010): 81-116. Marinos 
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Ahmed Vâsıf and World Order 
Intellectual discussion in Vâsıf's day was filled with allusions to world order. As Savaş observes, 
eighteenth century Ottoman reformers remained concerned with the “biological view” of society, 
the “four pillars,” and the prevention of luxury, venality, and moral turpitude,474 making fair if 
fleeting reference into the 1780s and 1790s to traditional Ottoman concepts of human nature and 
order. Vâsıf and his peers viewed reform primarily as the restoration of balance in the realm. 
Their work, his chronicle above all, offers ample evidence that virtue, moral renewal, and proper 
rule were topics of intense debate even as the Ottomans began to forge the “New Order.”  
 Of course, none of these debates were really new. In the early eighteenth century Naîmâ 
had prefaced his history with a discussion of “world order” and an extended biological metaphor, 
much of which he borrowed wholesale from Kâtib Çelebi.
475
 İbrahim Müteferrika also grounded 
his work on reform in the traditional moral order. The preface to his printed edition of Naîmâ’s 
chronicle begins, as does so much Ottoman historical writing, with a description of human social 
organization and the need for kings, whose just rule, he says, forms the “order of the world 
(nizâm-ı ‘âlem)” that ensures mankind’s affairs.476 The same author’s Usûlü’l-hikem fî nizâmi’l-
ümem repeats these arguments. In this tract Müteferrika’s reform proposals are strikingly novel 
and seem forced into the traditional moral order like a sort of bed of Procrustes, eschewing 
“ancient practice.” Hagen speculates that by this time world order was devoid of “meaningful 
content,”477 but the fact is that we cannot tell whether Müteferrika invested nizâm-ı ‘âlem with 
                                                 
474 Ali Savaş, “Lâyiha Geleneği İçinde XVIII. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Islahat Projelerindeki Tespit ve 
Teklifler,” Bilig 9 (1999): 109-110. 
475 Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 1: 21-31. Cf. Kâtib Çelebi, Düstûrü’l-‘Amel li-Islâhi’l-Halel, in Ayn-i Ali 
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sincere meaning, only that his arguments still resided in an overall framework of “world order” 
linking the realm’s prosperity to a natural, immemorial balance between the “four pillars.”478  
  The 1768-1774 Russian-Ottoman war furnished more discussion that, at the very least, 
demonstrates that the concept of an immutable world order still resonated among Ottoman 
thinkers. In the 1774 tract Nuhbetü'l-Emel, for example, Dürrî Mehmed Efendi blames the 
realm’s late troubles on disruption in the “four elements of the state (‘anâsır-ı erba‘a),” an 
alternate reference to the pillars of Ottoman social order described as statesmen, soldiers, 
subjects, and the treasury. These, he says, are “final causes (‘illet-i gâiyye)” of the realm’s 
continued existence and must be kept in good order, purged of outsiders.
479
 At the same time, 
Dürrî, who was apparently influenced by Naîmâ, employs the biological metaphor and an Ibn 
Khaldûnian understanding of dynastic rise and fall. He argues that it is possible to treat the 
empire and avert its decline with careful ministrations, like eliminating venality and corruption, 
ridding the military of outsiders, and above all restoring the “ancient practice” of Süleyman I.480  
 Canikli Ali Paşa’s Tedbîr-i Cedîd-i Nâdir is a point of contrast, for it takes a more 
conservative line and has been compared justly to advice tracts from the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Canikli Ali claims to have written this essay in 1776 wondering “whether 
or not the order of this world [bu ‘âlemin nizâmı] is possible,”481 and, while conceding that 
military strategy and technology change, he too obviously saw reform as the restoration of the 
traditional nizâm and ancient practice. He shares, for instance, Dürrî Efendi’s concern with the 
                                                 
478 Usûlü'l-Hikem, esp. 128-144, 152-154. 
479 TOP nr. 1438, 282a-283a. See also Savaş, 92. In Aristotelian terms “final cause” signifies a 
telos or ultimate end.  
480 For example: “Bu sûretde kânûn-ı kadîm ile olunub ocaklarda yol ve erkâna ri‘ayet ve 
içlerinden hidmet ederek Sultân Süleymân ‘aleyhi’r-rahmet ve’l-gufrân kânûnı üzere yolı 
gelüb...” TOP nr. 1438, 86a-91b; Savaş, 92-96. 
481 ÖN nr. H.O. 104b, 71a; Özkaya, 172-173. Savaş summarizes the tract, 96-102. 
172 
 
infiltration of “outsiders (nâ-ehil)” into activities not properly their own. To him this caused 
much disruption.
482
 Yet Ali diverges idiosyncratically from the classic formulation of the “four 
pillars” to join four individuals (dört direk) – the sultan, Grand Vezir, defterdâr, and commissary 
officer – to the “edifice (yapı)” of subjects.483 Hadd for him is therefore ambiguous: not 
necessarily a transgression of social estate but any infringement on the prerogative or even 
opinion of another. He complains that in his day the elite stray from their respective spheres. 
Whereas statesmen should only offer counsel on political matters, soldiers on strategy, and 
ulema on whether this advice is legal, he maintains, now the ulema give opinions on war and 
every ignoramus on holy law. He repeatedly urges the sultan to distribute his favor according to 
merit and to the qualified – notably, one of Kınâlızâde’s conditions of sovereign justice. Finally, 
and intriguingly, Canikli Ali advocates a much stronger sultanic role. Although no Ottoman ruler 
had led an army in decades, he encourages Abdülhamid I to take up command. Sultans won great 
conquests in the past; the army under Grand Vezirs had proven less fortunate.
484
  
 Dürrî’s and Ali’s focus on proper order can be considered a leitmotiv for the era, when 
time and again authors gravitated to nizâm-ı ‘âlem as a frame of reference for the realm’s 
troubles. So Ahmed Resmî began his Hulâsat by averring that human antagonism is the “basis of 
world order.” In another instance, Süleyman Penâh Efendi quoted Naîmâ approvingly in his tract 
on the Morean uprising to suggest that it was possible to prolong a dynasty indefinitely, the 
biological metaphor notwithstanding. Vâsıf himself recorded the desire of statesmen as late as 
                                                 
482 ÖN nr. H.O. 104b, 29b-30b, 37a-37b, 47a-54b; Özkaya, 152, 156, 161-164. 
483 ÖN nr. H.O. 104b, 22a. Özkaya, 147; Savaş, 98. 
484 ÖN nr. H.O. 104b, 12b-13a, 42b-54b; Özkaya, 142-143, 158-162. 
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1777 for “a long-lost Köprülü vezir [sâkıt ‘an nazar görilen Köprüli vezîr gibi],” a reference to 
the line of traditionally-minded seventeenth century reformers.
485
 
 What these authors suggest is that nizâm-ı ‘âlem was not so much at issue itself. “World 
order” seems to have remained an idée fixe in the Ottoman mentality, even if, as Hagen contends, 
it no longer had any “meaningful content.” Eighteenth century Ottomans were instead engrossed 
in peripheral issues – moral renewal, reform as a restoration of balance, and the relevance and 
nature of “ancient custom” – hence some like Canikli Ali Paşa focused on bringing back the old 
ways; others like Müteferrika abandoned kânûn-ı kadîm entirely for new methods; and still 
others disagreed on what exactly the old ways were. One sees this tendency in Vâsıf's 
commentary on Canikli Ali’s work. Although the historian agreed, in principle, that reform was 
needed to restore the realm, he found the essay's aggressive tone distasteful and felt it arrogated 
far too much importance to military commanders. To him Canikli Ali's specific 
recommendations were old fashioned, relics “out of step with the times.”486 
 Throughout his life, Vâsıf displayed a similar implicit belief in the natural order of the 
world, and his written work reveals a conviction that the destiny of the realm was tied 
inextricably to the ruler's administration of justice and personal virtue. Yet it is clear that Vâsıf 
spoke in universal terms. For him political life proceeded from the nature of humanity itself. It 
went without saying that humans were by nature given to carnal desires and passions, which 
must be restrained, it followed, sometimes by force, in order to allow society to function.  
 Vâsıf outlines this belief most fully in his fifth volume from the turn of the nineteenth 
century, in “a preface on the nature of civilization, society, and the need for political authority.” 
The historian states that humans are by nature political (medenî bi’l-tab‘) and, as a result, require 
                                                 
485 Respectively, A Summary of Admonitions, 1b; Savaş, 103; TOP nr. 1406, 49b. 
486 MEHÂSİN 1, 214a. 
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the society of others. God created man to cooperate in order to procure food and needs and to 
defend himself, “but mere civilization [ictimâ‘ u temeddün] can by no means efface his depravity 
or compass his probity,” he writes, inasmuch as injustice and enmity are rooted in human nature, 
which is guided by carnal passions and breeds conflict. Left to their own devices humans will 
quarrel, brutalize each other, and threaten the stability of society.
487
  
 Humans therefore require outside restraint. “An ordered regime and regular law ought to 
be established to educe sensual desires and inherent wants for every man,” Vâsıf declares, “that 
none may hinder another in his wants through force or dominance, but should be content in the 
desires and pleasures to which he is entitled.” This is “comprehensive government (siyâset-i 
‘uzmâ ve saltanat-ı kubrâ)” and can occur in two ways: either through a prophetic law (şerî‘at-ı 
ilâhiyye) or an absolute ruler (hâkim-i mâni‘), a sultan or padişâh who wields what philosophers 
call “kingship or sovereign authority (sınâ‘at-ı mülk ü saltanat).” Vâsıf elaborates that the 
foundation of kingly rule is “pure justice (‘adl-ı mahz).” The ruler, who is indispensable, must 
hold sway over all others:  
He must be able to govern justly [hakkâniyyet üzere] and command so that all may fear 
him, but not tyrannize any by iniquity or spite. Society should be stable because of his 
rule, and men's affairs, livelihood, and offspring ordained according to the natural order 
[nizâm-ı tabî‘î].488  
 These ideas are all quite familiar, even hackneyed. They were at the basis of the empire’s 
sociopolitical order and part of the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic tradition Ottomans inherited 
from medieval Islamic philosophy, so ubiquitous that the source from author to author is 
impossible to establish. Ibn Khaldûn spoke in nearly the same terms; indeed, Vâsıf may be 
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paraphrasing the great North African. But the moralist Kınâlızâde had an identical view of social 
order and likely no exposure in his lifetime to Khaldûn.
489
 Rather than the source, what is 
important is that Vâsıf could still credibly uphold this complex of ideas on the cusp of the 
modern period, at the turn of the nineteenth century.  
 Judged by Vâsıf's written corpus, his particular vision of society also continued to rest 
upon compartmentalized social groups or the so-called “four pillars,” and he made passing 
reference throughout his career to these as bastions of the ideal order. The army, for example, 
was “one of the four pillars that outwardly maintains the edifice of state.”490 All people must 
furthermore belong to one of the pillars and none should infringe on the prerogatives of the 
others: 
According to Islamic philosophers, rational individuals are divided into four estates: they 
are either soldiers [‘askerî], craftsmen and merchants [sûkî], scribes [ehl-i kalem], or 
farmers [hars u zirâ‘at erbâbı]. To leave outsiders as they are is improper and they 
should be forced into one of the estates. Some philosophers say that anyone who refuses 
to join one of the said groups must be killed, lest they trouble the people. Likewise, 
according to the sense of “Keeping each group to its own occupation orders the realm and 
                                                 
489 Cf. Ibn Khaldun text and translation; Kınâlızâde, 405-412. Fleischer argues convincingly that 
Khaldûn’s entry into Ottoman intellectual circles must have occurred after figures like 
Mustafa Âli and Kınâlızâde, “Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and 'Ibn Khaldûnism' in 
Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Letters,” in Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Ideology (Leiden, 1984), 
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vice versa,” no class must be compelled into the occupation of another class, as when 
merchants or producers are sent to war, for this causes chaos.
491
  
 For Vâsıf one of the signal functions of the ruler's justice was to keep these groups in 
their proper spheres, as any attempt by commoners to infiltrate higher stations – to exceed their 
bounds (hadd) – could unravel the very fabric of society. He avers in his fourth volume that 
though humans may be equal in terms of creation or as Muslims, society requires them to be 
unequal. In obtaining a livelihood to sustain the species, the lowly and the slave require a master:  
If all men were equal at all times in wealth, status, and leisure, they would, following the 
wisdom, “Were men equal they would all be destroyed,” have no need for each other, a 
livelihood, or industry. This would clearly throw the world into chaos and spoil man’s 
livelihood.
492
  
Vâsıf concludes, then, that it is part of the kingly administration of justice (siyâset-i mülkiyye) to 
reduce people to their station and keep them in their particular sphere.
493
  
 Conversely, a deficient justice on the part of the ruler or failure to accord each his due 
courted disaster. For one, it could affect the realm's material prosperity. So, for example, Vâsıf 
dwells from time to time on the need to keep agriculturalists from migrating to cities and to 
enforce sartorial laws. The one protects the realm's income, as farmers are producers of wealth, 
                                                 
491 MEHÂSİN 2, 169a-169b. The groups were therefore fixed and impermeable. Cf. Kınâlızâde, 
who lists five estates (scholars, orators, administrators, warriors, and merchants) and five 
types of “outsiders,” 451-453. 
492 MEHÂSİN  4, 183a. 
493 MEHÂSİN 4, 183a-183b. Also: “Fark-ı ifrâd-ı beşer içün ‘anasıl vaz‘ u ta‘yîn olunan hudûd u 
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while the other inhibits those of lower station and more dubious moral character from being 
driven to greed, envy, and perhaps serious crimes.
494
  
 Yet for Vâsıf sovereign justice seems to have ensured not merely the order of the realm 
but nature itself, for injustice could trigger natural calamities and divine wrath. His biography of 
the late Osman III, who died in 1757, reveals how this is so. In spite of his generosity and 
compassion for the poor, we are told, Osman had a mercurial character as a result of spending his 
adult life sequestered in the palace. He was rash, compulsive, and prone to unpredictable mood 
swings. The sultan was moreover venal. His corruption brought the conduct of the court to a very 
base level and he once reportedly executed a Grand Vezir for a bribe. Vâsıf lists a number of 
omens that occurred during Osman's reign in token of God's anger, reckoning, among other 
things, two great fires in Istanbul, plague, the freezing of the Bosphorus in 1755, the pillage of 
the Mecca caravan, and other “trials and afflictions.”495  
 The preface to Vâsıf’s second, 1789-1794 volume encapsulates his understanding of the 
natural social and moral order and how it must be maintained. Bringing the whole critical 
apparatus together, he writes:  
Let it be known that for mankind the ordering of faith, justice, and righteousness are 
possible through diversity in occupation and temperament and the procreation of the 
species through necessary mutual aid. For were not some men base and others noble, and 
if the lowly had no need of the noble, there must be general equality and, owing to 
conflicting desires, two opinions on a single matter. And thus there would everywhere be 
chaos and certain conflict; the common people would rush to destroy each other and the 
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order of the world [nizâm-ı ‘âlem] and creation would come utterly undone – “Were men 
equal they would all be destroyed.” It is therefore needful that in every era there be a 
perfect being [bir vücûd-ı kâmil] to adeptly administer the law [nâmûs-ı siyâseti tekmîl], 
ruling such disparate people according to their merits and “keeping them in their proper 
station” through the scales of justice that order all creation.496  
 Vâsıf’s understanding of “world order” closely follows that of earlier Ottomans. He 
assumed that it was universal, moral, essentially unchangeable to the point of being natural law, 
and required the oversight of a virtuous and just ruler. What is more, nizâm-ı ‘âlem directly 
affected how he saw personal morality and politics. Vâsıf’s devotion to the idea reflects the 
influence of practical philosophy, which fused the two, and allows us to explore more closely 
how eighteenth century Ottoman intellectuals conceptualized governance and reform, moral as 
well as political.  
 
Practical Philosophy as Governance 
If world order depended on justice, then justice required the cultivation of personal and political 
virtue through philosophy (hikmet). As said in Chapter One, for Vâsıf philosophy formed a guide 
to moral education (edeb) and a necessary link between knowledge, virtue, politics, and the 
ultimate Good: the perfection of the soul and individual and communal salvation. In 
philosophical discourse, this meant perfection in both mind and deed, or more technically in the 
speculative (hikmet-i nazariyye) and practical (hikmet-i ‘ameliyye) spheres of philosophy.  
 Premodern Islamic philosophy began with the human soul or nefs. Following Hellenic 
tradition, this soul was deemed tripartite and each part assigned a different ken of responsibility. 
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Thinkers identified the vegetative or concupiscent soul (nefs-i nebâtî/behîmî) with growth, 
sustenance, reproduction, and appetite. The animal or irascible soul (nefs-i hayvânî/sebû‘î) was 
responsible for sense, locomotion, voluntary movement, and defense, while the rational soul 
(nefs-i nâtıka) governed understanding and action, hence things like speech and higher reflection. 
Each soul harbored different moral tendencies. Whereas the concupiscent soul continually urged 
evil and the irascible soul vacillated between carnal appetites and remorse, the rational soul was 
free from sensual appetites.
497
  
 The human soul was also the seat of moral action and had speculative and practical 
faculties, mirroring a basic division within philosophy. Ottoman thinkers categorized hikmet in 
terms of knowledge that lies inside or outside the bounds of human volition. “Speculative 
philosophy” included what we might call “pure science,” or subjects that exist independently like 
metaphysics, mathematics, and all branches of natural science, while “practical philosophy” dealt 
with voluntary human action and governance, whether of the self (ethics), family (economics) or 
polity (politics).
498
 Particularly in its lower natures, so it was thought, the soul is inclined to 
carnal appetites and must be suborned by willpower to the nefs-i nâtıka. This came about first 
through the cultivation of knowledge in the speculative faculty, by rising through levels of 
intellect (‘akl) until the soul joined the active intellect, and, second, of virtue in the practical. 
Virtue as an activity, then, was a conscious subordination of the carnal to the rational soul in 
                                                 
497 The terminological confusion arises from differences between Plato and Aristotle, which Ibn 
Sînâ later attempted to reconcile. A three-fold Quranic division of the soul also roughly 
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498 Kınâlızâde, 41-53; Kashf al-ẓunûn, s.v. “‘Ilm al-ḥikma”; Tûsî, The Nasirean Ethics, 26-29; 
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accordance with wisdom, for “if the practical faculty accords with the rules of the speculative 
faculty, it produces virtue; if the animal powers, vice.”499  
 To Ottomans like Vâsıf, then, and notably to the canonical authorities Taşköprüzâde, 
Kınâlızâde, and Kâtib Çelebi, “practical philosophy” represented a passage from potential to 
action. The aim of moral education (edeb) was to develop self-discipline in the “practical 
faculty” based on speculative knowledge. Taşköprüzâde, for example, said that ethics as a 
science concerned the carnal dispositions (al-malakât al-nafsâniyya) and how to regulate 
them.
500
 Kınâlızâde later observed that ethics studies human action, and that practical philosophy 
allows men to perceive what actions are virtuous and vicious and how to purify their rational 
souls by acquiring the one and abjuring the other – a perfection of action.501 Kâtib Çelebi for his 
part said that ethics, as it compassed practical philosophy, was “a science for the virtues and how 
to grace the carnal soul with them; and for the vices and how to get the soul to renounce them.” 
Its subject was the description of moral behavior, traits of character, and the nefs-i nâtıka 
itself.
502
 He added elsewhere that philosophy as a whole was “the perfection of the speculative 
faculty…and the perfection of the practical faculty through the acquisition of a consummate 
inclination for virtuous, moderate actions between excess and dearth.”503  
 As ethics was a “science for the virtues,” we must try to define these virtues more 
precisely. Taşköprüzâde quite aptly called them “the moderation of a faculty.”504 As said earlier, 
Ottomans posited that the cardinal virtues attached to the soul's three faculties, hence temperance 
(‘iffet) belonged to the concupiscent soul, bravery (şecâ‘at) to the irascible soul, and wisdom 
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(hikmet) to the rational soul. As well, each of these virtues held a balance between two vices, one 
an extreme of dearth and the other of excess. For example, temperance was the mean between 
the excess of debauch (fücûr) and the dearth of self-denial (humûd), while bravery balanced 
foolhardiness (tehevvür) and cowardice (cübn). There also existed a number of virtues subsidiary 
to each cardinal virtue, such as perspicacity (zekâ), clemency (hilm), patience (sabr), 
contentedness (kanâ‘at), and others.505  
 How then do virtues occur? In Ahlâk-ı Alâî Kınâlızâde begins from the moral trait or 
hulk. The soul, he holds, has faculties of action and intellection – practical and speculative 
faculties – and the carnal and irascible impulses from which moral traits emanate can either be 
virtuous, vicious, or neutral. Virtue occurs when an action derived from these accords with sound 
reason and in moderation; vices when it is immoderate, either in excess or dearth. Lastly, justice 
in personal conduct comes only when there is equilibrium in the soul’s three levels – when one 
develops the other three cardinal virtues.
506
  
 As said before, Islamic and Ottoman thought elided personal morality and good 
governance and held ethics to be the singular variant of economics and politics, naturally at the 
heart of the latter two.
507
 Justice had a very personal cast, through the cultivation of the cardinal 
and so-called “kingly virtues” like ambition (ulüvv-i himmet), patience (sabr), and sound 
judgment (isâbet-i rey). Moral education was therefore a requisite moderating tool. However, 
there was some amount of debate among intellectuals over the possibility of ethical reform – of 
changing a person’s moral character. Kınâlızâde raised three views on this subject. Some 
authorities, he offered, said that ethical reform is impossible because moral traits are innate, 
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whereas others contended that reform can occur insofar as moral character is either innate or 
habitual. A third view held that all moral behavior can be changed, as character stems entirely 
from external causes.
508
  
 This issue of ethical reform was related in turn to another controversy: the soul’s natural 
composition. According to Kınâlızâde some claimed the soul was naturally good and only later 
became corrupt. Others insisted that the soul was created from an impure nature and hence could 
reform itself gradually, with God’s aid, while the majority thought it neither essentially good nor 
evil but capable of both. Galen supplied a fourth opinion that there were three types of souls: a 
very few were naturally good, more were naturally evil, and most were equally inclined to good 
or ill. Likewise could the human soul be categorized in terms of its speculative and practical 
capacities. There were those, “mature (kâmil)” and “pure (münezzeh),” that had perfection in 
both. Some were “mature” but “impure,” being proficient in the speculative but not the practical, 
while others were “immature” but “pure,” or proficient in the practical but not the speculative. 
Still others failed in both faculties.
509
  
 Ottoman intellectuals disagreed on certain details when it came to the soul and moral 
reform. Kınâlızâde seems to have believed that all moral behavior could be changed, citing it as 
scholarly consensus.
510
 He therefore would have objected to the middle position expressed by 
Kâtib Çelebi, that moral character (hulk) is a deeply rooted disposition which proceeds from the 
carnal soul, acts readily and spontaneously, and has two parts: the innate and the habitual. The 
first cannot be altered, he claimed. The second, which initially acts through volition, becomes 
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ingrained practice, and the benefit of ethics is to expose the carnal soul’s innate dispositions and 
teach virtuous habits.
511
  
 Whatever their views, these thinkers did largely agree on the value of practical 
philosophy. Kınâlızâde pointedly disavowed the view that moral education is ineffective, as, if 
taken to an extreme, it would enslave many to their passions. Whichever view is correct, he said, 
it is clear that there is a need for practical philosophy because at least some humans are capable 
of changing their moral behavior.
512
 What is more, the central importance of sovereign justice 
and virtue to Ottoman intellectuals meant that moral education, justice, and philosophy served as 
linchpins in the whole scheme of universal order. The moralist not inadvertently made this point 
when he urged kings to cultivate wisdom (hikmet) and justice:  
For as the body reaches its ideal [kıvâm] through nature, nature through the soul, and the 
soul through the intellect, so the realm reaches its ideal through the king, the king through 
the administration of justice [siyâset], and the administration of justice through wisdom 
[hikmet]. When wisdom is known in the realm and holy law in the king, there is order and 
subjects gain all possible perfection. But holy law shall be forsaken if wisdom is 
abandoned; and when the law is forsaken the king’s majesty shall disappear, disorders 
arise, and blessings be obliterated.
513
  
 
Governance of the Self: Virtue and Vice 
Vâsıf's use of “practical philosophy” indicates that he took the moralists’ lessons to heart and, at 
least in part, saw ethical instruction and virtue as major components of his history. It will be 
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recalled that for Ottomans ethics stood in relation to politics as theory to practice. The just ruler 
was supposed to be a virtuous “perfect man” – one who had acquired perfection in mind and 
deed – and had a duty to guide his subjects accordingly. Kınâlızâde in this way likened the ruler 
to a doctor: in order to govern, he had to know what was the health of the realm, in what its 
equilibrium consisted, what formed its possible maladies, and how to cure them.
514
 Vâsıf too 
voiced this thought in history when he expressed the need for a “perfect being” to rule and 
uphold order.
515
 For him self-rule was an inherent part of the art of statecraft as well as one of 
history’s manifold benefits.   
 It comes as no surprise, then, that the historian spiced his work liberally with passages on 
simple virtues or vices from hikmet-i ‘ameliyye. For example, in a section from his sixth volume 
Vâsıf records how the şeyhülislâm İvazpaşazâde İbrahim Beyefendi (1774-1775) was dismissed 
because of colleagues’ backbiting, and then digresses on intrigue and court rivalry with “a 
lesson” on envy (hased). Envy, he says, arises from a combination of two other vices, greed 
(tama‘) and ignorance (cehl), since the envious have an unwarranted sense of entitlement. It is 
also of two sorts. One is a lesser, “honorable envy,” which does not begrudge comfort to others 
but merely hopes to attain it. This envy is laudable if it aspires to spiritual matters; if to worldly 
matters, it is blameworthy. The other type is malicious. Those who are envious in this way are 
filled with self-love and ambition, smitten with a desire for power, and seek to destroy others. 
Envy among vezirs, ulema, and other ministers is of this sort.
516
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 Greed (tama‘) is another common vice, one which Vâsıf treats in his fourth volume. Here 
the historian comments on the behavior of a statesman, one Mehmed Efendi, who was dismissed 
as anadolu muhâsebecisi due to his incessant complaints about the position’s salary. Mehmed 
had independent means, says Vâsıf, and could well manage his affairs without a post, but he 
disdained his good fortune out of avarice and ignorance and treated his benefactor, the dynasty, 
ungraciously. Continuing, the historian counsels that while men are naturally attracted to 
vanities, wise men content themselves with their appointed lot and earn tranquility in both 
worlds. Greed leads its victims to pride and folly, to reject divine blessings appointed them from 
pre-eternity, and in the end to despair and frustration.
517
  
 A further apposite passage from the fourth volume tells readers about clemency (hilm), 
with an exemplary tale told on the authority of Abdürrezzâk Efendi. It seems that one day 
Abdürrezzâk was visiting the şeyhülislâm Mirzâzâde Mehmed Efendi, who was known for being 
particularly clement. As they conversed, Vâsıf records that a “disgruntled Arab” suddenly burst 
in, threw down his turban, berated Mirzâzâde for treating him unjustly, and stormed off in high 
spleen. Mirzâzâde then turned, smiling, and said, “My lord, what say you about the frightful din 
this fellow caused by throwing down his turban?” and astounded Abdürrezzâk with what, to him, 
was an admirable display of indulgence. Yet here Vâsıf disagrees. He adds in gloss:  
In my humble opinion such a degree of clemency is nonsensical. It is far from virtuous if 
someone is provoked but fails to become angry, insofar as courage, indignation, righteous 
anger, revenge, and ardor are considered personal virtues the lack of which must be 
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despised. In the words of the philosophers, “Respectable men spurn overindulgence, for 
such comes from fools.”518  
The jurist's clemency was to Vâsıf’s mind not a virtue at all, but overindulgence – and hence, a 
failure to mete out proper justice.  
 Single virtues and vices in Vâsıf’s work are also integrated into larger moral themes, 
most notably practical philosophy’s major concern, restraining carnal desire. Carnal desire lies at 
the heart of vice and particularly worldliness and vanity. Ottomans believed that humans were 
inherently given to such urges by the lower souls. Incited to evil, men desire trifles and luxuries 
and automatically incline to passions, misled by good fortune and oblivious to divine anger.
519
  
 Two examples will suffice to show how carnal desire is presented in the history. The first 
comes from Vâsıf’s fifth volume in an entry on a mid-eighteenth century defterdâr, Hilmî 
Mustafa Efendi. Though skilled, this scribe abandoned himself to sensual pleasures and inclined 
one day to wine and the next to business. The historian claims that eventually his life caught up 
with him and he was left plagued by debts and creditors, deserted by friends, dispossessed by the 
sultan, and exiled. The final blow came upon inquiry into his accounts, which showed a pattern 
of misappropriation. Mustafa Efendi was executed. Vâsıf reflects that this servitor was actually 
an expert accountant and a kind-natured man of effort and generosity. Yet he chastens those who 
waste their God-given gifts in pleasure and vanity, declaring that most become bankrupt, 
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MEHÂSİN 2, 149a. 
187 
 
impoverished, or are struck down by the sword of justice. Such has happened countless times in 
history.
520
  
 In another case Vâsıf offers a personal perspective on worldly conceit. On 5 February 
1802, two days after the end of Ramadan, the statesmen gathered at the imperial palace for 
general appointments, each anxious for a position. That very day, however, kaymakam Abdullah 
Paşa suddenly took ill and died. The Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Paşa stood in his place and 
hastily ordered the appointments, invested candidates in office, and sent everyone home, 
astonished. No one could recall such an event ever taking place – a “bizarre misfortune” and 
“cause for admonition,” Vâsıf calls it, insofar as God demonstrated His great power to the 
statesmen on the one day of the year in which they all gathered together. Yet he admits most of 
his peers were indifferent and thought only of their own vanity. He saw firsthand (reyü'l-‘ayn 
meşhûd), he says, how such men were consumed by their avarice for posts and prestige, 
gossiping to each other about how little there was and how many there were who wanted it.
521
  
 A second theme, closely related to carnal desire, is that of fickle fortune. The passions 
blind us to the fact that material prosperity is fragile, and Vâsıf’s work is filled with reminders of 
men, deceived in good fortune, who forsook justice, foresight, and God in pursuit of their desires 
only to meet a sudden reverse, a crashing fall. Sırrı Selim Efendi, one of Vâsıf's colleagues, 
exemplifies this pattern in his 1777 dismissal to Baghdad. It seems that Selim once humiliated an 
unknown kapıcıbaşı named Darendeli Mehmed, haughtily refusing him an audience. In time the 
same Mehmed Efendi rose through the ranks and became Grand Vezir, all the while 
remembering the slight, and upon his appointment made Sırrı Selim the governor of Baghdad, 
ostensibly as an honor but in actuality to punish him, knowing the appointment would be 
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ruinous. Vâsıf reflects: it is utter ignorance to be haughty to one’s equals, however unknown, on 
the strength of a tenuous fortune. Wise men see material things for what they are worth (‘an ‘ilm-
i hakâîiki üzere) and people according to their deserts (be-hasb-ı takâtihim). Many times an 
unknown is raised up by fortune and causes one to regret thoughtless slights, sometimes on the 
pain of financial or personal ruin.
522
  
 The moral peril of office forms a third theme. Ottomans in general had ambivalent views 
on worldly power as enticing and dangerous.
523
 Human nature makes it so, for power puts one 
into a position to gratify pride, avarice, and other lusts; it therefore corrupts. Ottoman officials 
faced bribery, venality, factional pressures, and customarily had to give superiors “gifts,” which 
Vâsıf and his colleagues accepted as necessary corruption that came with office. Grand Vezir 
Koca Ragıb Paşa once even advised an official who was disturbed by venality to dissociate 
himself from court and obtained for him a provincial governorship.
524
  
 At the same time, Vâsıf reminds us that holding authority can pose mortal dangers to the 
soul. One of the best illustrations of this is his extended, if hypocritical, sermonizing on his 
former patron Halil Hamid Paşa. Halil Paşa began his career in the chancery with integrity, but 
over time, and especially as Grand Vezir, was apparently seduced by power and became 
imperious, unjust, and avaricious. Vâsıf blames Halil Paşa’s downfall largely on his vanity and 
weakness for pleasure, which led him to peculate and defraud the treasury. He was also deceived 
by fortune.
525
 But be that as it may, a statesman must be aware that problems can occur equally 
in the dereliction of power as in its abuse, for those in authority are apt to avoid decisions that 
could damage their position or reputation. As Vâsıf observes,  
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Willpower can unleash hidden lusts which, once unleashed, cause a decrease in effort, 
and carnal desires are in this way a sort of satanic suggestion…It is tried and true that the 
fruit of irresolution is hardship and sometimes death.
526
  
 The point of these lessons is that carnal desires do not bring happiness. Quite the 
contrary, man’s uncontrolled passions lead to wholesale self-destruction, a danger against which 
Vâsıf frequently warns readers. The world of generation and corruption, he says, “the world of 
conceit,” is ever trying to ensnare the heedless:  
The sensible avoid artifice’s grasp but others are seized. Climbing high on fortune’s 
wheel, they purge their hearts of fear of God, amass wealth, confound illicit for licit, 
devote themselves to gain and advantage, and fall headlong into perdition [istidrâc]. They 
thus give themselves entirely over to worldly and sensual pleasures and…as wise men 
have seen countless times, are reprobated unto divine justice.
527
  
 Restraint (sabr) and contentment (kanâ‘at) – subsidiary virtues of temperance528 – are by 
contrast surer guides to happiness in this world and the next. “Honoring the carnal soul with a 
slight effort is better than making a great effort to debase it,” he advises, “for, verging on 
trumpery, the latter takes needless labor for things that will not bring contentment.”529 A person 
who seeks such desires lives in constant anxiety. Accepting one’s lot and learning contentment is 
the more virtuous behavior:  
It is well-established that temperance comes from accepting one’s lot and that any desire 
beyond this is a useless burden…If the world and its spoils belonged to one man, his 
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share would be daily bread, shelter, and enough clothes to cover himself. The rest is 
clearly luxury…Plato was asked “What is the world’s chief joy?” He replied: 
“Contentment with one’s lot.” “And what is the world’s chief care?” He said: “Worldly 
desire and greed.”  
Vâsıf concludes that these vices owe to ignorance (cehl), for if the ills of reason are many, the 
greatest and most severe in terms of its wickedness is ignorance. But while humans are naturally 
ignorant, they can also be led to salvation by moral improvement.
530
  
 The solution to vice is for individuals, rulers above all, to cultivate restraint, self-
governance, and personal reform – moral education, in other words – through the precepts of 
practical philosophy. In the early 1790s Vâsıf chronicled the dismissal of şeyhüislâm Hamidzâde 
Efendi, who was worthy and intelligent. Had Hamidzâde tried to reform himself, he remarks, to 
restrain his severity and act with care and deliberation, his term would have been a moral boon. 
Yet he acted poorly, precipitately,
531
 and the moral is that rulers must have time and 
independence if they are to be experienced and impartial, for according to philosophers the 
corruptive qualities of sovereignty (‘avârız-ı mefâsid-i mülkiyye) become progressively ingrained 
in people's souls. Swift reform is impossible and requires care. Those who are rash are 
disappointed and endanger the dynasty to which they owe their affluence.
532
  
 How rulers might apply such lessons is illustrated in Vâsıf’s curious ethical tract 
Râhibnâme, which again shows practical philosophy’s links to knowledge, virtue, and politics. 
Râhibnâme tells of a wise ascetic or monk (râhib) in pre-Ottoman Byzantium who harbors an 
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impossible love for the emperor’s daughter and eventually wins political power. However, it is 
above all a discourse on judgment, restraint, and the kingly virtue of patience (sabr). Vâsıf 
introduces this work by discussing patience’s source and usefulness. He writes:  
Some philosophers claim that all things have an essence and that patience is the essence 
of reason [‘akl], while others say patience is a faculty or part of reason. Kingly patience, 
meanwhile, consists of firmness in all the faculties of the heart. The first faculty is 
clemency [hilm], whose fruit is pardon; the second is deliberation [te’enî] and cautious, 
mild words, whose fruit is the realm’s prosperity; and the third is bravery [şecâ‘at], 
which begets firmness. Patience means enduring bitter adversity. Its object is swallow 
one’s cares and await better opportunity.533  
Vâsıf argues that seemingly impossible things can be gained through the virtue of patience. In 
more detail, he says that experiential reasoning (i.e. ‘akl-ı tecârübî) and the ability to understand 
sensibilia through past adversity give humans certain premises (mukaddemât) by which they can 
see the benefit or harm of an action. Some of these premises are universal, some particular, and 
by applying them it is possible to learn self-control and attain the things one wants.
534
  
 We see in countless examples throughout Vâsıf’s work that the stakes of self-reform were 
quite high – death in this world, damnation in the next. The onetime Silistre governor Osman 
Paşa is a case in point. As discussed in Chapter One, Osman was an energetic, intelligent 
commander, but also prideful and harsh. After the 1774 Treaty of Kaynarca the sultan appointed 
him to Bender, but Osman defied the order and fled to Rumelia, where he let his clients pillage 
the inhabitants. The sultan’s agent finally surprised him at Lepanto, incognito, and took him back 
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to Istanbul for execution.
535
 According to Vâsıf Osman Paşa knew the wages of justice and 
injustice but failed to reform or exercise control. “When men are heedless,” he writes, 
When they cease to serve God; when they flout lawful orders from the sultan, God’s 
caliph; when they harm subjects by extorting money in the cities they govern, to spend it 
on lusts of the flesh; when they obstinately abandon the boons that arise through justice – 
though they may try to escape justice [seyf-i siyâset] in this world, Aristotle writes on the 
divisions of justice that in the hereafter they will suffer the most violent of torments.  
Osman let worldly gain cloud his judgment. He gave license to those Vâsıf calls “vagabonds” 
and “a plague on the poor” and was therefore killed.536  
 Of all the chronicle’s exempla, Halil Hamid Paşa most visibly symbolizes hubris and the 
danger of unregulated passions. As said earlier, Vâsıf’s critique of his erstwhile patron must be 
taken with a hefty grain of salt, in that Halil Paşa’s fall placed him in a grave situation. Others 
close to the Grand Vezir were dismissed or executed, and even though Vâsıf speaks in the virtue 
tradition we must realize that he condemns the Grand Vezir at least in part to exculpate himself.  
 Halil Paşa, he begins, was not initially devoid of integrity or devotion, and was admired 
by the elite for his long chancery service. His knowledge of state affairs was unparalleled, and he 
gained the sultan’s favor and began to rise in rank, as amedci, büyük tezkireci, and finally 
reisülküttâb. However, his first inklings of power boded ill. Vâsıf alleges that Halil alienated 
peers with his “conceit” and, once in power, unjustly exiled rivals and bullied the court into 
submission. As Grand Vezir he also took full advantage of his position for self-aggrandizement. 
Having the sultan’s solemn promise of independence, and though he had reproached earlier 
Grand Vezirs for augmenting their income, he hoarded wealth and expropriated wealthy 
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statesmen. Vâsıf charges that Halil Paşa’s avarice and greed were major causes of his downfall, 
and that, among other things, he alienated crown lands as tax farms to his followers for a little 
cash up front and embezzled from the treasury.
537
 
 At last, writes the historian, the Grand Vezir’s brutal behavior provoked God’s wrath: 
anyone familiar with fickle fortune knows that divine vengeance (intikâm-ı ilâhî/siyâset-i 
ilâhiyye) strikes down those who satisfy their own concupiscence and are fooled by the world’s 
fleeting fortune. Such dispensations are a warning. What is more, anyone who would dare to 
amass canonically ambiguous wealth for sensual pleasures or abuse justice must end up as an 
outcast from the courts of this world and heaven (gayr-i mahmûd ve dergâh-ı kurb-ı sûrî ve 
m‘anevî’den matrûd). Vâsıf says that Halil Paşa’s improper behavior therefore reached the sultan 
and he was dismissed and exiled to Gallipoli. Under pressure from the Grand Vezir’s enemies, 
Abdülhamid I then decided to make an example of the vezir to ensure the realm’s stability. An 
agent delivered his severed head to Istanbul, as a warning.
538
 
 While Vâsıf admits that Halil Hamid Paşa was perceptive, intelligent, and a skilled 
bureaucrat, he alleges he was absorbed with vanities and avarice. He was also imperious. Since 
he had the sultan’s full discretion, he so thoroughly browbeat the statesmen that they equally 
feared to advise or praise him. Had he preserved his integrity and followed God’s and the 
sultan’s will; had he dutifully overseen state affairs; had he preserved unity in the bureaucracy, 
treated all with courtesy, and avoided avarice – outwardly, he probably would have escaped this 
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event. Linking injustice to the order of nature itself, Vâsıf further claims that omens and strange 
dreams attended Halil’s death, which astrologers had predicted years before.539  
 
Governance of the Polity: Ottoman Political Thought 
To understand ethics is to grasp the basic premises of eighteenth century Ottoman views of 
politics, for the latter were an extrapolation of ethics onto the larger community. “Politics,” or 
siyâset-i müdün, formed the third and final branch of practical philosophy. Its Ottoman iteration 
can be traced to the Aristotelian concept of politikê and the Neoplatonic “Virtuous City (al-
madîna al-fâḍila),” distilled by al-Fârâbî, Ibn Sînâ, and later moralists like al-Ṭûsî, Davvânî, and 
the widely popular Kınâlızâde. Ottomans made ethics the lodestone of politics, whose stated aim 
was to ensure justice in the body politic and, hence, the most propitious conditions for the 
community to achieve material and spiritual felicity.
540
 
 How did Ottoman thinkers define politics? Of course, there was no single conception or 
less still a coherent theory, and we are confronted with a concept that is diffuse, vague, but 
invariably joined to the ethical tradition. For example, Kâtib Çelebi classified politics (siyâsat al-
madîna; lit. “the governance of the city”) as a branch of practical philosophy which discusses 
“the knowledge of communal affairs in a city.”541 To Kınâlızâde it concerned “the actions 
dealing with social intercourse in the inhabitants of cities and realms.” “Ethics is naturally at the 
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basis of politics,” he added.542 Taşköprüzâde’s article on the subject (‘ilm al-siyâsa) meanwhile 
offers one of the most extensive definitions: 
[Politics] is a science that treats rulership, government, polities, and positions like sultans, 
kings, commanders, scribes, judges, scholars, and treasurers…Its subject is the city’s 
estates and their governance; its benefit is knowledge of the social groups of the Virtuous 
City [ijtimâ‘ât al-madîna al-fâḍila]; and its aim is to restrain each from the other and to 
preserve them. 
Taşköprüzâde continues that “this science requires rulers first of all and then other people, 
because men are political by nature [madanî bi'l-ṭab‘], and enjoins living in the Virtuous City, 
abandoning vice, and knowing how to serve the people of the city and profit by them.” Politics 
therefore involve the proper function of power and authority in themselves, the condition of 
officials, and subjects and their welfare.
543
 
 One idea Ottomans accepted implicitly from the medieval tradition was the need for an 
absolute, and absolutely just, ruler. Political governance along with ethics were thought to 
originate in the primeval order of the world and the dictum that humans are “political by nature,” 
an idea attributable to Plato and Aristotle.
544
 Men must live and work together to survive. 
However, they also need outside restraint and guidance to contain passions which ever threaten 
to tear society apart. As said before, this argument formed a sort of “natural law” at the center of 
ideas of order, society, and sovereignty. As also treated earlier, Ottoman thinkers recognized that 
restraint and order might occur through revelation or reason, through prophets or kings, and the 
justice they laid down in accordance with either holy law or rational precepts. The tension 
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between shar‘ and ‘akl was well-established, as attested in the ubiquitous influence of Ibn 
Khaldûn and works like that of Tursun Bey.  
 Another parallel strand of thought derived more or less directly from the Neoplatonic 
tradition of the Virtuous City, taken from Arab and ultimately Hellenic philosophers. Kınâlızâde 
divided political associations into two basic types: the “Virtuous City (medîne-i fâzıla)” and the 
“Vicious City (medîne-i gayr-i fâzıla)” In his description virtuous cities are governed 
benevolently (siyâset-i fâzıla) by rulers who seek moral perfection and happiness, are just, 
cherish subjects, fill the city with good works, and master their appetites. Vicious cities, as 
would be expected, are governed wickedly (siyâset-i nâkısa). Such rulers are unjust, consider 
their subjects slaves, and want only to satisfy their carnal souls through tyranny (tagallüb).
545 
Kınâlızâde further subdivides these cities according to the characteristic vice – there can be, he 
says, “ignorant cities (medîne-i câhile),” “vicious cities (medîne-i fâsıka),” and “erring cities 
(medîne-i dâlle).” Each of these categories has an assortment of types.546  
 Naturally, not all Ottomans accepted the philosophical tradition and its approach to 
government. Scripturalist countercurrents found a ready audience and are perhaps best known 
from the work of Birgivî Mehmed Efendi, whence sprung the seventeenth century’s puritanical 
Kâdızâdeli movement. This sort of revivalism was quite different from the “Virtuous City” and 
looked back to the idyll of the early community for a model of governance. Although he was no 
Kâdızâdeli, for example, Fazlızâde Ali took a scripturalist tack when he called for religious 
purification and demanded that the community return to the ethical mores and practices of 
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Prophet and his companions.
547
 The chronicler Câbî Efendi (d. 1814?) also recorded an anecdote 
in which one eighteenth century dignitary was unceremoniously grabbed by the ears and nose by 
three men and given the “advice” that the realm was neither Sublime nor Ottoman but an 
“Islamic state (devlet-i muhammediyye).” “Anyone who betrays this state has betrayed the 
Prophet and faith and needs swift punishment,” they said. “You may be below the sultan and 
above other vezirs, but you should show more loyalty to the Islamic state and fear no one; keep 
this well in mind.”548  
 The grist of philosophical ideas was nevertheless highly popular in the Ottoman Empire 
throughout the eighteenth century, though this point is not without controversy. Marinos 
Sariyannis has proposed that the “moral interpretation” of politics, focusing on individual virtue, 
largely dissolved in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. “As for the eighteenth century 
writers,” he adds, “they seem to have ignored moral issues [entirely].”549 In close parallel is 
Heather Ferguson’s hypothesis that Ottoman conceptions of justice underwent a similar 
demoralization in the same period, a shift away from justice as an extension of the ruler’s 
personal virtue to one of abstracted rulership.
550
 On the other hand, Kemal Beydilli convincingly 
argues the very opposite: that eighteenth century Ottoman statesmen and thinkers increasingly 
conflated personal and political morality. He attributes this development to the empire’s 
weakened state and its urgent need to keep engagements, a “making a virtue of necessity” that 
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seventeenth century “dissolution of the moral discourse over legitimacy.”  
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clashed jarringly with European raison d’état.551 Indeed, although our grasp of the period’s 
intellectual history is still quite limited, it supports Beydilli’s position that the “moral” view of 
politics was by no means in retreat. Ottomans appear to have fully accepted the metaphysical 
connections between politics and morality. 
 When the historian Naîmâ prefaced his work with a defense of Amcâzâde Hüseyin’s 
reformist policy, for example, he spoke of political rule based on human reason and holy law. 
Borrowing from Kâtib Çelebi’s reform tract Düstûrü’l-‘Amel, he equated the first with royal 
policy, part of practical philosophy, and the second with divine commands based on scripture. To 
him this binary separated the Ottomans from Christian Europe. Naîmâ felt that divine law is 
different from law derived from reason and a guiding principle to all Islamic rulers, while 
Christian kings rule by reason alone. This favored the Ottomans, since whoever obeys holy law 
gains happiness in here and the hereafter, but those who disregard it suffer God’s wrath.552  
 Müteferrika also placed politics within the larger moral order of the world. In his preface 
to Naîmâ’s history, beginning with the argument from natural law, he writes that kings and rulers 
ensure worldly prosperity, punish evildoers, and must exercise justice to restrain their subjects 
and keep them in their proper places. Such is the order of the world (nizâm-ı ‘âlem). As Naîmâ 
observed, he further states, a dynasty is composed from human society and requires a vigorous 
ruler to execute the demands of religion and governance: politics, derived either from reason 
(‘aklî) and practical philosophy or from holy law and scripture (şer‘î), are necessary for the rise 
and subsistence of every dynasty.
553
  
                                                 
551 Kemal Beydilli, “Dış Politika ve Ahlâk,” İlmî Araştırmalar 7 (1999): 47-56. Sariyannis does 
not seem to have consulted this article.  
552 Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 1: 21, 25. Parallels in Thomas, 73-76.  
553 Müteferrika in Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 4: 1894-1895. 
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 Müteferrika was well aware of specific forms government could take – monarchy, 
democracy, and aristocracy – but argued that the combination of rule by revelation and reason 
served the Ottomans. Holy law is peculiar to Islamic rulers, he clarifies. All who utilize it are 
victorious and win felicity in both worlds, while God punishes those that disregard the law. 
Politics derived from reason, meanwhile, called royal politics, are “those laws formed by 
philosophers in accordance with the needs of the time and as a guiding principle for all, for the 
ordering of state affairs and of the realm.” Though distinct, the two are not mutually exclusive 
and may even ultimately coincide in their outcome. Christian monarchs have no divine law and 
must base the order of their realms entirely on reason, but not so the Ottomans.
554
 Müteferrika, 
who argued for thorough reform from the top down, indicates that the dynasty must therefore 
access the universal benefits of reason alongside revelation, saying that philosophers warn 
against negligence in either holy law or reasoned politics. Any measure of indifference will ruin 
the realm and inevitably lead to its dissolution and decline (zevâl).
555
  
 These examples suggest that Ottomans in the eighteenth century shared a belief in 
exceptionalism and the conviction that something had gone quite wrong. Whatever their position 
– for a strong reformist hand, a return to “true religion,” or aggressive application of reason – all 
advocated some variety of reform and a common understanding of order. However, Naîmâ and 
Müteferrika both contain an undercurrent justifying reason or at least making it palatable to a 
moral view of the dynasty. There seems to have been an association in the popular mind with 
                                                 
554 In Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 4: 1895; Usûlü’l-hikem, 164-165. In the tract Usûlü’l-hikem, he repeats 
that the empire has an advantage over its rivals precisely because they, Christian kings, must 
rely on reason alone to order their kingdoms, Usûlü’l-hikem, 170-172, 191. Gottfried Hagen 
points out that rational and revealed governance are not necessarily opposed in point of law, 
but rather in the authority that enforces them. Hence the famous saying that “the world is not 
destroyed by unbelief, but by injustice.” “Legitimacy and World Order,” 70-71. 
555 In Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 4: 1895. 
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reason – cold, calculating, Machiavellian – in contrast to the Ottomans’ more ingenuous self-
perceptions. This opposition emerged boldly in the century’s final decades, when European 
concepts of politics challenged the moral view. In Sevânihü’l-Levâyih (ca. 1803), Behiç Efendi 
calls “politics” or politika “a European term that in our time means to act through trickery and 
deceit, but whose original meaning is umûr-ı siyâsiyye or tedbîr-i müdün.” His definition 
presents a stark contrast between the politics of the philosophers and the crass politicking of 
Europeans, in the sense of “spinning lies.”556  
 
Vâsıf on the Ideal Ruler, Politics, and Proper Rule 
Ahmed Vâsıf too employed this philosophical paraphernalia in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Although he never presents a schematic political theory, we can make 
accurate observations about how he saw such things as the ideal ruler, governance, and, 
importantly, the moral order of the universe.  
 It is well to note first that Vâsıf shared his peers’ anxieties and the belief that something 
has gone terribly wrong for the Ottomans. His history’s earliest volume, dedicated to Halil 
Hamid Paşa, expresses a hope that this Grand Vezir would be the long-awaited “renewer of the 
age.” Later in his career he likewise praised Selim III effusively as the Platonic philosopher king, 
the “perfect being.”557 
 Philosophy was without doubt the leaven of Vâsıf’s ideal ruler. His earliest explicit 
statements on this subject appear in the preface to his second volume from 1794, where he draws 
                                                 
556 Beydilli, “Dış Politika ve Ahlâk,” 50-51. Râtib Efendi, who appears to have heavily imbibed 
contemporary European political theory, used the term in this pejorative sense but also wrote 
that “every state must bend [politics] to its his own affairs and advantage, and order it, justly, 
according to the country’s temper, nature, custom, and faith.” Ebubekir Râtib Efendi, 221-
224.  
557 Respectively, MEHÂSİN 1, 8b; MEHÂSİN 2, 2b. 
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on the concept of the Virtuous City and especially the Ahlâk-ı Alâî of Kınâlızâde. It is proven in 
practical philosophy, he writes, that the kingly administration of justice (siyâset-i mülkiyye) is of 
two sorts: virtuous (siyâset-i fâzıla) and vicious (siyâset-i nâkısa). Virtuous rule imposes justice, 
strengthens the faith, promotes integrity and firm belief, and governs and nurtures the realm and 
subjects. A virtuous ruler is called “Commander of the Faithful.” Vicious government, however, 
seeks sensual pleasures and natural lusts, wields injustice, wrongfully seizes goods, and enslaves 
subjects. This sort of rule is also known as “tyranny (tagallüb).” Virtuous rulers, he adds, cleave 
to religion, faith, reason, and wisdom:  
Mastering their passions and nature, they treat subjects kindly, order the realm through 
justice, integrity, and benevolence, have as their basic aim felicity and the perfection of 
morals, and are thus fit to be called “Shadow of God” and “Master [ulû’l-emr].” Yet 
vicious rulers incline to iniquity, forsake integrity and moderation. Through force, the 
tyrant considers his subjects as so much chattel and so many slaves while he himself is 
enslaved to concupiscence [nefs-i emmâre], and fills his realm with fear, suffering, 
contention, discord, enmity, and ruin.
558
 
 Beyond political virtue, the historian uses this discussion of rulership to assert the 
dynasty’s exceptionalism. “Religion and kingship are twins,” he declares; “one cannot be 
achieved without the other.” Religion is thus like the foundation and kingship the support – for a 
foundation is destroyed without support and a baseless support is toppled – and for this reason 
just rulers like the Prophet spread the benefits of justice into the non-Islamic world. The Ottoman 
sultans particularly strengthened the faith in this way, he avows, and were endowed with God's 
aid and known for great wisdom and reason. They fostered their realm with beneficent rule, 
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enforced the law, and overwhelmed their subjects with kindness. Vâsıf then lavishly praises 
Selim III, who, he says, from his accession ruled virtuously to alleviate injustice, gird the 
frontiers, and other duties. He voices the hope that Selim’s fortune will grow ever stronger and 
that he will acquire the means (esbâb) of taking revenge on the enemies of the faith and realm. 
God willing, they will be crushed, the realm prosperous, and all people made joyous.
559
  
 We can gain more insight into Vâsıf’s political ideal by his words on two other posts and 
how they served the ruler: the Grand Vezir and şeyhülislâm. His first volume notes that the 
vezirate is “the noblest position in the empire, the utmost governmental rank.” Here we read that 
the Grand Vezir personally administers the men of the four pillars, which form the order of all 
realms, and he must arbitrate between them.
560
 A distinguished individual ought therefore to hold 
this post and should, assuming the realm’s honor, know the public’s needs and act as a barrier 
between the ruler and people to prevent either side from altering the proper balance (inhirâf-ı 
mizân ile tarafeyn tuğyân etmemek maslâhatı içün miyânede berzah-ı hâil olub). He must 
ultimately be responsible for all affairs and the welfare of faith and country, equitable to all, and 
an independent overseer. Because of all this, Vâsıf maintains there is no more arduous service 
than to be Grand Vezir.
561
  
 In this way the Grand Vezir represents an extension of the ruler’s worldly authority, 
devlet. He depends on approval from God, the sultan, the people, and himself – that is, on four 
competing claims, and his course in governance must lie on the straight path with loyalty to God 
and the law. Vâsıf asserts that the vezir can only hold his position, and obtain prosperity in both 
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560 MEHÂSİN 1, 172a. 
561 Ibid, 172a-172b. 
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worlds, if he acts disinterestedly, keeps everyone in their station, takes council with experienced, 
wise men, and abjures vice and impropriety that might form a pretext to his enemies.
562
  
 The şeyhülislâm represents on the other hand devlet’s twin, dîn, the divine law and faith. 
It is his duty to act independently, and he must uphold the law and exhort the Grand Vezir 
toward justice. Vâsıf counsels that those in this position are charged with delivering divine 
commandments, speaking truth to power, and advocating the general welfare of dîn ü devlet to 
authorities.
563
 To execute the law, guard the state’s honor, obstruct venality, increase the 
treasury, strengthen defenses, and prosecute injustice – these are the şeyhülislâm’s guiding 
principles and, he adds, the foundations of state order (usûl-ı nizâm-ı mülk ü devlet ve esâs-ı 
bünyân-ı saltanat). None can be neglected and it is his duty to address concerns to the sultan.564 
Furthermore, the şeyhülislâm must work with the Grand Vezir, the representative of the ruler’s 
worldly authority, “to right the state’s affairs together and endeavor for the state’s greater 
honor.” Neither should he plot and intrigue against the other nor remain silent in the face of 
injustice, as this injures the realm and is an abdication of responsibility.
565
  
 A still broader sense of the ideal political order comes to us from the preface to Vâsıf’s 
fifth volume, written in the early years of the nineteenth century. Like so many Ottomans before 
him, Vâsıf here presents an argument from nature and distinguishes between governments based 
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on divine and human law. He likewise has it that the temporal ruler must be just, a philosopher 
king having both intellectual and moral perfection: 
Philosophers call this individual the absolute ruler [hâkim ‘ale’l-ıtlâk], his rule kingship 
and sovereign power; modern men call him Caliph, his function the caliphate; Plato calls 
him the Philosopher King; Sufis call him the Axis of the Universe or Perfect Man; and in 
the parlance of state, they call him padişah, şahanşah, and his function sovereign power 
[saltanat] or sovereign law [kânûn-ı hükûmet]…In fine, both religious and sovereign 
power involve defending the faith and serving the Lawgiver as his deputy on earth…In 
the idiom of philosophy this concept is called “kingship” or “sovereign authority.” The 
one responsible for its practice is called sultan or padişah.566 
According to Vâsıf the Ottoman dynasty has fulfilled this role more perfectly and more justly 
than any before them except the Rightly-Guided caliphs.
567
 The passage validates Selim III as a 
“philosopher king” like his namesake Selim I, and is yet another assertion of Ottoman 
exceptionalism. 
 We can safely presume that the historian believed in the dynasty’s moral underpinnings 
as well as the bond between justice, material prosperity, and victory over enemies. Vâsıf referred 
frequently to this relationship in his work. To provide a clear illustration, he records in his 
second volume sedition in Rumelia, where petty magnates were extorting subjects. The weak are 
a divine trust, he warns. Not only is their protection incumbent on just sultans, but the removal of 
oppression and injustice begets material prosperity (‘imar-i bilâd) and God's approbation.568 In 
another instance he baldly declares that “willful injury for trifling advantage is completely 
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unsuited to the rules of proper governance (kânûn-ı zabt-ı şevârid-i mülkiyye).” It provokes 
God’s wrath and can redound on the treasury.569  
 Still, the administration of justice required a firm hand. Vâsıf’s ideal was an absolute 
ruler governing in accordance with law and reason and commanding the obedience of his 
subjects (itâ‘at ulû’l-emr). Shared rule, like some sort of “commonwealth,” was out of the 
question. The sovereign had to conform all his affairs to holy law to ensure his subjects’ moral 
and physical welfare,
570
 and this included, when appropriate, resort to force. Indeed, a ruler’s 
duties demanded the promotion of reform in subjects, nurturing their moral qualities and pruning 
wickedness like a regal gardener. The figure is apt. “Philosophers liken the world to a garden,” 
he explains, “and urge virtuous rulers to be informed of blossoms and plants and compare their 
subjects to branches.”  
When a branch grows crooked one must straighten it through horticulture, otherwise it 
loses its original nature and comes to resemble wild brambles. People are exactly like 
this. The philosophers have shown that letting subjects go uncorrected causes them to 
exceed their natural disposition and become most intractable.
571
  
In such circumstances force was justified. In Vâsıf’s opinion prudent states wisely liquidate these 
types, whether high or low.
572
  
 There is no doubt that Vâsıf merged personal and public virtue, the ethical and the 
political, and in this way reflects what Beydilli considers the characteristic quality of eighteenth 
century Ottoman political morality. Whether this approach was in fact “nothing more than 
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making a virtue of necessity” by a weakened empire is less certain.573 Ottomans were of course 
no strangers to expediency. But the framework of political thought in the empire, the tradition of 
Aristotelian and Platonic practical philosophy itself, inescapably merges the two. 
 Up to now we have surveyed Vâsıf`s thoughts on his own dynasty. Yet the Ottomans’ 
distinction between revealed and human law raises some intriguing questions. What of justice? Is 
it possible for non-believers to be just? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is yes – it is possible for 
non-Mulism rulers to be just, at least in the imperfect sense mentioned above; for rational rule, if 
properly understood, will implement the same measures as revealed law, the problem being 
rather the authority that enforces them. In his second volume, for example, Vâsıf chronicles the 
recapture of Oran in Algeria by Barbary corsairs and writes that, during his Spanish embassy, he 
met inhabitants of this city in Barcelona and Madrid and upbraided them for accepting infidel 
rule. They retorted that they had done so of necessity, due to iniquity and heavy exactions – so, 
he quips, it is clear to what end injustice and oppression led!
574
  
 Vâsıf comments in the same way on Rumelia, critiquing its disorders with praise, of all 
people, of the Chinese. “Although it is not possible to govern as justly as the Rightly-Guided 
caliphs and imams,” he says, with quotations from scripture, “to completely abandon justice 
leads to disorder and ruin, following the sense of ‘Something should not be fully abandoned just 
because it cannot be fully realized.’”   
For although the Chinese profess false religions and are a diverse people, histories attest 
that their realms have been stable for 3,000 years because they obey their long-
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574 MEHÂSİN  2, 132a-132b. 
207 
 
established laws and desire justice above all else. Highwaymen and other rabble do not 
exist in their lands and their subjects are ever healthy and prosperous.
575
  
He then relates that the Grand Vezir, knowing that “justice is the essential cause of subjects’ 
tranquility and of the realm’s prosperity,” urged justice on the new governor of Rumelia, who in 
turn acted “with the most trifling justice” and calmed the rebellion. “Thus those who are privy to 
the secrets of fortune know, on the least reflection, to what extent the superiority and virtue of 
pure justice would reach.”576  
 Ottoman political morality can be brought into greater relief if we consider how the 
historian classified European states. To Vâsıf the empire’s political morality differed in very 
basic ways from that of its non-Muslim rivals. To him Europeans pursued amoral, changeable 
politics; they were opportunists who could not be trusted. For example, in an entry on the 1790 
appointment of Azmî Efendi as Prussian ambassador, he says that European leaders are guided 
by “satanic insight” (‘ukûl-ı şeytâniyye), a sort of Mephistophelian reason which allows them to 
organize affairs and, by gathering advantages of a perhaps dubious nature, to expand their 
territories, increase revenues and population, and make their realms prosper. Not only that, but 
Europeans eagerly sacrifice treasure, family, and kin for trifling gains and are fragmented from 
putting political matters before religious ones.
577
 His description recalls Behiç Efendi’s 
understanding of politics (politika) not in the traditional sense of siyâset-i müdün, but as trickery 
and ruse.  
 Frederick the Great of Prussia embodied this brand of mercenary politics for the 
historian, who was likely familiar with him through sources like Ahmed Resmî’s embassy report, 
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written after a 1763/64 visit to Berlin and which speaks at length about Frederick’s personality, 
style of rule, and foreign policy.
578
 Vâsıf regarded Frederick’s achievements with something like 
awe, noting he won glory and territory, was an expert in mathematics and warfare, and was 
largely successful in his wars against Austria and Russia. He disapproved of his duplicitous 
means, however. We are told that Frederick considered only how to defeat his enemies, and even 
claimed he could not be faulted if he broke a treaty because of the advantages gained; treaties 
were only to be respected in commercial dealings, where war was a danger to commerce. Vâsıf 
therefore counsels prudence: it never permissible to trust Christian states, who will continue to 
undermine the terms they have signed with the empire as long as they are able.
579
  
 The Russian empress Catherine the Great, the Ottomans’ chief nemesis of the late 
eighteenth century, affords another tableau. Vâsıf was well-informed about her, most notably 
that she was a German princess who overthrew her husband, Peter III, with the help of officers 
and the brothers Orlov, and seized power for herself over her son Paul. He also gives a sound 
account of the Pugachev rebellion. Not surprisingly, however, his depiction is entirely 
unfavorable and contains nothing like his veiled awe for Frederick: Catherine was immoral, 
enslaved by carnal passions, and took lovers; she was depraved and corrupted her own son, the 
crown prince, to divert him from rule; and she was unnatural, a female usurper who killed her 
husband. In short, Catherine was a paragon of iniquity.
580
 Vâsıf consequently presents Pugachev 
not as a pretender to the throne, as he was in fact, but a rebel seeking to protect the Russians 
from wanton injustice and restore the rightful heir. Catherine’s success was, to his mind, based 
on divine trial or istidrâc rather than on justice or even human reason. She was thus able to 
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overcome Pugachev, “and, according to the sense of ‘Verily are wounds long-lived,’ reigned a 
long while and continued to terrorize her neighbors.” After she died, Vâsıf specifies that she 
went straight to hell and Russia’s power was broken.581  
 In the ethical tradition these Christian rulers and their regimes were imperfect. Being 
non-Muslim, they could not access holy law and so could not ensure their subjects twofold 
felicity. However, Christian kings could and at times did utilize human reason, thereby providing 
their subjects stability, material prosperity, and perhaps even justice. As Vâsıf suggests, though, 
reason without the underpinning of revealed religion and morality was hollow, little more than 
cheap trickery. In the tradition of the Virtuous City such realms might be “ignorant” or “erring.” 
Catherinean Russia probably qualified as a “vicious” regime.582 
 The great upheaval of the day – the French Revolution and its concept of political liberty 
– confronted Vâsıf and his peers with a different order of regime entirely, a species of tyranny 
worse than the most malicious Christian kingdom. Like Edmund Burke, the historian reviled the 
new French government. To him absolute rule was imperative and political “freedom,” such as it 
was under the Republic, a complete perversion of the natural order.  
 Ottoman elites generally were suspicious of the revolution. If at first some welcomed it as 
a possible counterbalance to their enemies, like Ahmed Fâiz Efendi, who prayed it might “spread 
like syphilis” in Europe, statesmen were quick to realize that the revolutionary ideology struck at 
the empire’s faith and sovereignty root and branch. In the early 1790s Ebubekir Râtib Efendi 
worried about the spread of Jacobin propaganda, the outbreak of general war, and that freedom 
would “metastasize like cancer.” In 1798, reisülküttâb Ahmed Âtıf Efendi wrote a report that 
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took note of the revolution’s irreligion and the dangers posed thereby, blaming the lot on 
materialists and atheists – for him, law without religion was clearly not enough to guarantee 
public order and tranquility.
583
 After the surprise invasion of Egypt that same year, the Ottoman 
declaration of war charged the revolutionary government with spreading sedition to the other 
states of Europe, devastating them, seizing people's property, and loosing basic human bonds 
with their “freedom.”584 
 Vâsıf’s earliest references to the revolution appear in his third volume in a section 
entitled “Revolution in France.” This entry reappears in his unfinished chronicle of the Egypt 
campaign and in a printed copy in his drafts, which may suggest he was preparing it for wider 
dissemination, perhaps as a pamphlet. Interestingly, Vâsıf was less concerned with possible 
threats to the empire’s faith than to its social order. Lewis claims that contemporary Ottomans 
were most shocked by the revolution’s secularism,585 but the historian, at least, was well-able to 
envision regimes based on revealed law, human law, or some combination of the two. The new 
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French regime posed a danger because, to him, it had neither ruler nor law. It was quite literally 
lawless.
586
   
 Vâsıf introduces the revolution, through which the French “brought the world into 
chaos,” by saying it was inspired by the English colonies in the New World. This situation 
excited the French rabble and they “all unscrupulously discussed the advantages of independence 
(serbestlik) and being without a ruler (tahte’l-hüküm olmamak),” thinking that freedom and 
equality would bring prosperity. They did not consider the benefits of being under sovereign 
rule, he says, but preferred to be plunged into tyranny (istibdâd) and anarchy (teferrüd).
587
 Such 
as they were, these “perverse” designs were nonetheless concealed by certain “universal causes 
(esbâb-ı kevniyye).” The kingdom, bankrupt, took on loans and economies which the inhabitants 
felt unjust. They therefore invoked a custom one hundred years in abeyance and convened the 
various estates in a parliament (meclis). Vâsıf writes that the king was unable to suppress or 
placate this rising and that the rebels, confident in their new powers, tried to remedy the realm’s 
ills and form a new government that would prevent tyranny. The king capitulated. However, “the 
disdain of absolute government and the demands of the state’s honor would not bear the burden 
of shared power,” and Louis tried to escape to Vienna but was captured and killed. The rebels 
then grew powerful through istidrâc and forced most other states into obedience to “the hellfire 
of rebellion which forms this new regime.”588  
 To emphasize the revolution’s complete perversity and immorality in terms an Ottoman 
reader would grasp, Vâsıf added a marginal note that compares the republicans to the ancient 
Persian cult of Mazdak. “The false sect (mezheb) that the French created is like that of the 
                                                 
586 This also explains why Vâsıf was less repelled by Napoleon, who, he felt, had restored 
stability and monarchical authority to France. MEHÂSİN 4, 269a-270b. 
587 MEHÂSİN 3, 196a-196b; MEHÂSİN (EGYPT), 4b-5a; BOA.Y.EE 90/33.  
588 MEHÂSİN 3, 196b-197b; MEHÂSİN (EGYPT), 5a-6a.  
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perverted philosopher Mazdak, which arose in the reign of Kaykubad b. Firuz b. Yazdegird,” he 
explains. Mazdak subscribed to a radical belief in the equality of high and low, and as the rabble 
are vulnerable to evil, many converted, indeed even Kaykubad was led astray and drove his 
subjects into error, putting objectors to cruel torture. It was Kaykubad’s son that broke the spell. 
When Kaykubad ordered the crown prince to conform, the son explained to his father that 
common ownership of goods and women confused lineages and made inheritance claims invalid. 
It would make rulership and the administration of justice (riyâset ü siyâset) impossible, which 
restrain subjects and secure obedience to the divine law. He then laid proofs against Mazdak. 
Kaykubad recognized the truth of his words and executed the prophet.
589
 Any of Vâsıf’s peers 
would have agreed that this was a wise course of action.  
  
Conclusions 
Ahmed Vâsıf’s work reveals a deeply philosophical view of government, one which resonated 
still among Ottoman elites in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. This view begins 
with the Persianate tradition of practical philosophy. For the historian political problems were 
essentially moral problems, in that, in practical philosophy, politics was an extension of 
individual ethics and all depended on the stabilizing presence of an all-moral, all-just, absolute 
sovereign and his representatives. This discourse had a long and storied history as well as an 
established vocabulary; “world order,” the crucial operative phrase, tied together human nature, 
the polity, justice, and realm’s physical and metaphysical welfare such that any disorder, any 
disruption therein, was inevitably couched in moral terms.  
                                                 
589 MEHÂSİN 3, 197b; MEHÂSİN (EGYPT), 6b. In the Shahname a Zoroastrian priest presents 
these arguments rather than the crown-prince. Shahnameh: the Persian Book of Kings, trans. 
Dick Davis (New York, 2006), 679-683. 
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 As I have attempted to demonstrate, Vâsıf’s stance was also part of a larger discourse in 
late eighteenth century Ottoman intellectual life over the law, justice, ethical probity, political 
morality, and order. Contrary to what some have argued, these subjects attracted much attention 
and were far from settled as the empire stood on the cusp of the modern period. Just as Vâsıf and 
his colleagues conflated the ethical and political, they saw the empire’s malaise as a basic rupture 
in the divinely ordained order, an order any attempt at reform had to restore. In this way, the 
moral order of the Ottoman universe gives us an adequate framework for Chapter Five, where we 
will more closely assess eighteenth century political reform.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Eighteenth Century Ottoman Reform 
 
Traditionally, scholars have viewed eighteenth century Ottoman reform as hopelessly ad hoc, 
obstructed by cultural blinkering and a collective failure of will. The Ottomans were too 
insouciant, too complacent, too self-satisfied and blinded by bigotry to adopt anything that 
Christendom could offer. This may be partly true in its way. Certainly, at least, the dynasty’s 
supposed exceptionalism convinced many that a return to victory required only a return to proper 
ways and true belief. It is also true that the eighteenth century elite was riven by faction. Yet we 
must take into account that reform and Ottoman discussions thereof, even during Selim III’s so-
called “New Order,” were thoroughly enmeshed in the traditional concepts of world order and 
balance. It is crucial to look more closely at some of these discussions, and especially what was 
meant by “New Order.” 
 This chapter examines how Vâsıf and his cohort conceptualized political and military 
reform up to the turn of the nineteenth century. As argued above, one sees an essential continuity 
in the idea of order or nizâm. There was no Ottoman crise de conscience, as Kafadar has said.
590
 
Reformist or not, Ottomans shared similar metaphysical assumptions and saw reform primarily 
as a restoration of balance, with debate focused on issues within the greater concept of world 
order like the nature and relevance of kânûn-ı kadîm and the use and legitimate application of 
reason. Vâsıf’s own position evolved with the discourse over his career, and notably expanded 
                                                 
590 Cemal Kafadar, “The Question of Ottoman Decline,” Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic 
Review 4 (1998): 43. Cf. Edhem Eldem, “18. Yüzyıl ve Değişim,” Cogito 19 (1999): 189-199. 
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the amount of agency he was willing to grant reformers. He could bend, but not yet break, the 
fundamental concept of an immutable world order.  
 
“World Order” and the Problem of Reform 
The ideal of “world order” permeated Ottoman thought in the early modern period but exerted 
perhaps its most powerful influence in conditioning the way statesmen and intellectuals thought 
about political reform. As Hagen observes, nizâm-ı ‘âlem described a primordial order that had 
the force of a natural law, endowed with a “sacral aura.” In theory, it could be observed but not 
altered. “The order,” he says, “can be disrupted but not changed. The alternative is not a different 
order, but chaos.”591 Reform, then, by definition, was a restoration of the status quo.  
 What Ottomans could debate were the reasons behind and possible solutions to the 
empire’s apparent weakness. They sought answers from inside the system, because, in their 
opinion, they already had a successful template – the institutions and practices that supported the 
universal moral order, nizâm-ı ‘âlem, which in turn girded the empire and ensured its survival. 
Ottoman elites for the same reason largely supposed that problems were internal rather than 
proof of European superiority in power or institutions.
592
 Indeed, the governing ideology of the 
empire could not envision Europe’s superiority in any real sense, or any alteration in the 
primordial universal order.  
                                                 
591 Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 62. See also Öz, “Klasik Dönem Osmanlı Siyasi 
Düşüncesi,” 29-30. 
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“Osmanlı’da 18. Yüzyıl Düşünce Dünyasına Dair Notlar,” in Osmanlı Düşünce Dünyası ve 
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 The first discussions of reform began in the sixteenth century with inklings of a “decline” 
in the empire, when elites tried to identify sources of political disorder in advice treatises called, 
variously, nasihatnâme, siyâsetnâme, or ıslahatnâme. These writings became a distinct literary 
genre by the seventeenth century and have attracted much attention. In fact, they form one of the 
few well-lit crannies in Ottoman intellectual history.  
 Initially, scholars interpreted advice literature as ruminations on actual political disorder. 
In this view, Ottoman statesmen were describing “symptoms” of a very real disease, imperial 
decline, and prescribing remedies to restore the empire’s institutions to a classical form reached 
during the “Golden Age” of Süleyman I.593 Such is no longer the case. No longer do we assume 
the literature reflects a real state of decline, for instance. Rather, as Douglas Howard, Cemal 
Kafadar, and others have argued, the tracts represent on one hand intense intellectual debate 
within the elite over questions of reform, in response to the empire’s changing political, social, 
and moral fabric.
594
 Mustafa Âli’s scathing indictment of the bureaucracy or Kâtib Çelebi’s 
prosaic discussion of the empire’s military-fiscal complex must therefore be understood as part 
of distinct political and intellectual milieux; or, in Howard’s words, “a crucial dialogue among 
                                                 
593 For example, Bernard Lewis, “Ottoman Observers of Ottoman Decline,” Studia Islamica 1 
(1962): 71-87; Pál Fodor, “State and Society, Crisis and Reform, in 15th - 17th Century 
Ottoman Mirror for Princes,” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 40 (1986): 
217-240; A.C. Barbier de Meynard, “Considérations sur l’histoire ottomane d’après un 
document turc,” in Nouveaux mélanges orientaux (Paris, 1886), 52-81. 
594 There is a sizeable literature on this topic, notably Rifaat Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman 
Nasihatname as a Discourse Over Morality,” in Mélanges professeur Robert Mantran: études 
réunieset présentées par Abdeljelil Temimi (Tunisia, 1988), 17-30; Doug Howard, “Ottoman 
Historiography and the Literature of 'Decline' of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” 
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Kings Literature,” in The Early Modern Ottomans, 137-166; Kafadar, “Myth of the Golden 
Age”; and Ferguson, 81-116. Fleischer’s Bureaucrat and Intellectual was the first monograph 
to examine this problem in the work of an individual, Mustafa Âli. 
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Ottoman intellectuals of the post-Suleymanic age concerning the bases of Ottoman sovereignty 
and legitimacy.”595 
 On the other hand, reform treatises suggest that the notion of decline grew largely out of 
Ottoman historical consciousness itself. The literature reveals, for one, an awareness of social 
malaise, an anxiety that something had gone badly wrong, which was then transmitted to 
Western intellectual discourse as “decline.”596 As Kafadar has it, this consciousness of decline 
was also accompanied by nostalgia for “a past which was believed to have been the locus 
classicus of Ottoman ‘universal order,’ nizâm-ı ‘âlem,” upheld by the empire’s institutions and 
kânûn. Indeed, in his opinion the contrast between a better past and a corrupt present formed the 
“major axis” of Ottoman historical thought from the sixteenth century onward.597 Reform 
unsurprisingly focused on restoring institutions in accord with kânûn-ı kadîm, an approach 
typified by the efforts of Murad IV, Mehmed IV, and the Köprülü vezirs, a “dynasty” of 
seventeenth century military strongmen. 
 From the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, Ottomans thinkers often illustrated 
this perception of reform by invoking the “biological metaphor,” likening the social order to an 
organic entity and its different groups to the four elements, the four humors, or to human 
faculties. Kınâlızâde, for example, compared the “four pillars” to the elements of nature – earth, 
air, fire, and water – and claimed the body politic should be maintained through a balance of 
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these groups just as the human body is maintained through a balance of elements. The 
administration of justice (siyâset), to him, like medicine, is how harmony is achieved.
598
  
 In later centuries Kâtib Çelebi and Naîmâ too used the biological metaphor. In the tract 
Düstûrü'l-‘Amel, Kâtib Çelebi added the humoral theory to the elements, to which he then 
integrated the human faculties and an Ibn Khaldûnian notion of dynastic life cycles. Like 
Kınâlızâde, he agreed that the proper functioning of society depended on a proper balance among 
groups in the body politic, and that the reestablishment of harmony could be enacted by the 
administration of justice. Naîmâ for his part adopted these ideas from Kâtib Çelebi, echoes of 
which are perceptible well into the nineteenth century.
599
  
 The biological metaphor communicates two things about how Ottoman intellectuals saw 
social order and political reform. First, it implies that disorders in the body politic were 
reversible – that, given proper ministrations, there was always a possibility of treating and 
extending the life of the dynasty. Second, the metaphor makes it clear that the function of politics 
and the administration of justice was foremost to uphold or restore the ordained order. As Berkes 
has observed, Ottomans invariably couched reform in terms of upholding nizâm or order, even if 
they might have disagreed on the correct solution. Most discussions from the sixteenth through 
the eighteenth century in this way enjoined the restoration of “ancient practices” or kânûn-ı 
kadîm as the necessary course of action.
600
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 Yet Ottoman attitudes were not so facile as lamenting the “Golden Age” or dogmatically 
insisting on a return to ancient practice, at least as fixed concepts. Praise for Süleyman was at 
times tinged with criticism, and likewise did intellectuals single out Mehmed II, Bayezid II, and 
Selim I to praise or censure contemporary policy and rulers. In a similar manner, “ancient 
practice” could mean very different things to different authors. Indeed, Kafadar maintains that 
the sheer size and diversity of Ottoman reform literature speaks to the empire’s vigor rather than 
its decline, a conclusion still to be tested for the eighteenth century.
601
 If the past formed the 
template for action, it was a highly flexible one. 
 The traditional view of eighteenth century reform has also been challenged in past 
decades. As noted, this older view supposes the elite’s efforts were stymied by cultural 
blinkering and a naive longing for the “Golden Age.” It follows that their failure to meet the 
challenge of Europe’s military ascendency resulted from a lack of consensus but also 
conservative reaction, which mobilized opposition against reformers in revolts in 1702, 1730, 
1740, and most latterly against Selim III in 1807.
602
  
 More recently, scholars have tried to understand reform in terms of the empire’s internal 
dynamics and a highly conflicted response to military defeat. It is correct to say that the main 
impetus for reform was defeat and loss of territory and that it was initially limited to the military. 
It is also correct, in general, that opposition came from lower-ranking ulema and Janissaries, who 
objected in religiously charged language. However, as Beydilli and Şakul have shown in two 
                                                 
601 Kafadar, “Myth of the Golden Age,” 39-48; idem, “The Question of Ottoman Decline,” 43, 
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important articles, the scope of reform expanded in the last quarter of the eighteenth century to 
include many aspects of economic and social life. Indeed, Şakul claims to see in Selim’s reforms 
the empire’s first attempt at social engineering, and in his reformers the first ideologues.603 
Likewise, Levy observes that this was not necessarily a battle between “conservatives” and 
“reformers,” or between “reactionaries” and “progressives.” Reform threatened vested interests 
in the Ottoman elite. Those interests voiced their opposition in cultural and religious terms, in 
what became a deadly ideological contest with a shared, symbolic vocabulary.
604
  
 While certainly to be preferred, this interpretation wants further elaboration. For one, it 
does not tell us how Ottomans envisioned reform or how, as Kafadar points out for an earlier era, 
their positions could be and were quite diverse. There was surely as much “intense intellectual 
debate” over reform in the eighteenth century as in the sixteenth and seventeenth, for example, if 
not more, which scholars are only now beginning to explore. Similarly, the interpretation 
undervalues Ottoman thinkers’ cultural conditioning and continuity in concepts like order and 
balance. It is unlikely that we can so neatly separate the ulema’s and Janissaries’ defense of 
material interests and their use religious rhetoric. Nor can one simply discount the Ottomans' 
belief in a universal order or the innate superiority of their institutions – in the exceptionalism 
that pervades our sources – in shaping general approaches to reform.  
 How much influence these ideas carried during Ahmed Vâsıf's day – particularly the 
meaning of nizâm in the empire’s European-style reforms – remains an open question. Is there 
for example a direct connection, as some have claimed, between the traditional Ottoman world 
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order and the “New Order (Nizâm-ı Cedîd)” of Selim III?605 If so, what was this relationship? 
Did Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals conceive of these reforms as new in the fullest sense – 
as a new universal dispensation to replace the old? 
 As we have already seen, some scholars point in this direction. For example, Gottfried 
Hagen argues that nizâm-ı ‘âlem had lost its relevance by the early eighteenth century. If 
seventeenth century authors used “world order” to invoke a threat of chaos, the redress of which 
was to be sought in restoring social harmony and “ancient practice,” eighteenth century reform 
looked outside the traditional order to the purely political order mentioned in Chapter Four, 
nizâm-ı devlet / mülk. Thus, he says, İbrahim Müteferrika could “[parade] the entire arsenal of 
traditional concepts before the reader, only to argue his reform agenda which is either unrelated 
or outright opposed to the Ottoman state tradition.” World order, in his opinion, was devoid of 
meaning by the early eighteenth century, and little more than a rhetorical ploy.
606
  
 Others scholars suggest in an interesting parallel that morality in Ottoman political 
thought yielded diminishing returns by the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Ferguson, 
for example, posits that the concept of justice became abstracted in the late sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, while for Sariyannis the “moral interpretation” of politics, focused on the 
ruler’s personal virtue, gave way in the seventeenth century to more pragmatic outlooks. 
Although he grants that the Ottoman ethical tradition never died out, and perhaps revived in the 
nineteenth century, eighteenth century writers ignored moral issues.
607
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 Such conclusions are premature. For one, the impression that the ethical tradition receded 
in the eighteenth century only to revive in the nineteenth is problematic, if not outright unlikely, 
and challenged by Chapter Four's conclusions. More probably, these authors' findings reflect the 
fact that none surveys the eighteenth century. We can, for example, easily read Ahmed Vâsıf’s 
words on a rumored drought and famine in 1791, mentioned in Chapter Two, within the 
traditional discourse on the ruler’s morality: as a rebuttal of accusations that the sultan’s iniquity 
had caused the heavens to dry up.
608
 More important, though, is the plain fact that Ottomans 
continued to draw on concepts like “world order,” the “four pillars,” and “ancient practice” in 
their discussions of reform, either explicitly or tacitly, into the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. Even if “world order” was reduced to rhetoric, it retained its power as an 
ideal and influenced how Ottomans thought and spoke of reform.  
 In its conceptualization eighteenth century Ottoman reform is best described as a form of 
restoration. Christopher Tuck notes that reform can encompass such widely different activities as 
innovation, adaptation, restoration, or imitation and is shaped by certain ways of thinking about 
the world.
609 
Ottoman elites shared assumptions about the empire and its place in a larger divine 
order, which constrained the scope of their thinking. Although they may have agreed something 
was wrong, and even that change was needed, there is no reason why they should have preferred 
imitation or innovation over other methods. “It may be clear that one has lost,” writes Tuck. “It is 
often far from clear why one has lost, or what an individual defeat might say about one’s longer 
                                                                                                                                                             
and Süleyman Penah Efendi in the late eighteenth century. Ebubekir Râtib Efendi, 163 and 
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term military potential.”610 Whether ulema, scribe, or military man, eighteenth century Ottomans 
had yet to question the validity of the traditional moral universe but recognized the need for 
reform – at least in the sense of restoring balance and returning the realm to its dominant 
position.  
 
Reform as Restoration: the 1770s and 1780s 
Political reform in the early part of Ahmed Vâsıf’s career remained cloaked in a traditional garb. 
This is not to imply any lack of debate, for the issues were heated to the point of danger. Reform 
was no “polite exercise,” as Beydilli says, but posed a mortal peril to its advocates even before it 
could be put into application.
611
 Instead, elites focused on how to repair what they saw as a 
disordered realm and restore the empire’s supposed exceptionalism. In these discussions the 
most pressing questions were two: the precise nature and value of kânûn-ı kadîm and, closely 
related, the extent to which human reason might be applied to solve political problems. 
 The 1768-1774 Russian-Ottoman war is as always a good place to begin, for it supplied 
the necessary psychological shock to force elites to reflect seriously. The empire’s abysmal 
military showing and, perhaps more importantly, the loss of the Crimean peninsula spurred them 
to consider major changes, leading to a fevered burst of debate.  
 Dürrî Mehmed Efendi’s 1774 Nuhbetü'l-Emel offers a cautious opinion on “ancient 
practice” and what must be done to right the empire. At his work’s core is a sense of disorder, 
particularly among the military forces, subjects, treasury, and servitors, which for him were the 
realm’s foundations.612 Any solution had to restore these pillars. For example, Dürrî was 
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concerned about the infiltration of unqualified outsiders into the army, which corrupted its 
effectiveness and raises expenses. He also urged that taxes be strictly canonical and not exacted 
from the indigent. Treasury officials should in turn spend this money properly and avoid 
venality, overseen by the sultan himself.
613
 His solutions hence focused in large part on the 
restoration of justice, in the sense of balance.  
 Nuhbetü'l-Emel shows a high level of what Cornell Fleischer once called “kanun-
consciousness.”614 The term kânûn appears frequently throughout the work and makes it clear 
that to Dürrî the past was the proper template for action. “The way is to follow ancient practice,” 
he says in one passage, “and, for the military corps, to serve sincerely and respect career paths 
and experts according to the model (kânûn) of the late Sultan Süleyman.”615 But Dürrî displayed 
flexibility in that he was willing to accept a modicum of historical change. Using an Ibn 
Khaldûnian framework, he recognized that the empire must adapt to the “nature of the age” and 
enact reforms during peacetime to preserve the realm, to restore its health by, as it were, “letting 
the bad blood.”616  
 Canikli Ali Paşa’s Tedbîr-i Cedîd-i Nâdir evinces perhaps even more of a conservative 
air in urging a return to kânûn-ı kadîm. “Today cannot be compared with yesteryear,” he fretted. 
“Before there were honorable commanders, effective officers, and other leaders; now there is a 
dearth of able men.”617 Likewise, Ali felt that neither bravery nor adherence to kânûn prevailed. 
He idealized the past, notably the reigns of Süleyman and Mehmed II, arguing that the empire 
was more successful when rulers took an active role in war and as paragons of virtue and 
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learning. He was particularly disturbed by what he saw in his own day as a breakdown in 
competence and the blurring of professional lines. The sultan should only appoint those who are 
qualified and must keep all in their proper station, he insisted. He therefore proposed purging 
“outsiders,” even those on the Janissary muster rolls.618  
 Canikli Ali wanted to restore proper order, nizâm, and singled out the neglect of kânûn as 
the main cause of Ottoman defeat: 
During the war, the statesmen neither acted wisely nor achieved victory over the enemy; 
they did not respect earlier practice in policy or battle nor did they meet the enemy like-
for-like. Indeed, their neglect of proper practice was the entire reason for our failure.
619
  
Like Dürrî Efendi, however, Ali granted that the Ottomans might take certain changes into 
account. Warfare, for one, had changed since Süleyman’s day. The empire’s enemies fought with 
cannons and muskets rather than swords and lances and, this being the case, he cited weaponry 
as a major reason for Ottoman defeat and advised new tactics and technology: 
Those who are ignorant of war may claim that earlier battles were not like this. Yet the 
enemy does not fight as he once did but slowly adopts tactics, fighting not with lance or 
sword but cannon and mortar. This has occurred many times in warfare up to now, and 
many times have we matched the enemy. So I maintain that in this era we must use wiles 
against the enemy’s wiles, cannon against his cannon, and mortar against his mortar. Our 
recent trouble in battle has occurred because we have failed to act thus.
620
 
 Ali here outlines a principle known as mukâbele bi’l-misl, a “meeting like-for-like” or 
“reciprocation,” which became progressively important to Ottoman intellectual life in the 
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Meaning to imitate and use an enemy’s tactics and 
technology against them, reciprocation must be understood within the context of wider legal 
discussions of tradition (sunna, Trk. sünnet), innovation (bid‘a, Trk. bid‘at), and what 
constituted acceptable change where deviation from norms might pose a threat to God’s 
intentions for the Muslim community. According to jurists, bid‘a was the opposite of sunna, 
practices for which there was no precedent in the Prophet’s time. However, not all change was 
condemned and most upheld a basic distinction between “welcome” and “illicit” change. 
Reciprocation figured into this discussion because it raised key theoretical questions about 
reform: how can human reason be applied to political problems? Also, to what extent is 
innovation justified? Where does one draw the line between legitimate change and illicit, sinful 
innovation (bid‘a)?621 Many elites claimed there was leeway for military reform. Canikli Ali, for 
example, associated “reciprocation” with kânûn-ı kadîm, because for him the use of reason was 
valid and a constant element of the empire’s past success. This opinion was not uncommon 
during the period, which sources often reinforce with scripture and the hadith, “War is a trickery 
(al-ḥarbu khud‘a).”622  
 But not all agreed. To others, military reform verged on sinful innovation and unbelief. 
Fazlızâde Ali provides a clear (if extreme) example of this logic in his flat rejection of human 
reason (‘akl) and the practically unlimited scope he gave to sinful innovation, bid‘a, which were 
                                                 
621 On reciprocation see Uriel Heyd, “Ottoman ‘Ulemâ,” 74-77; Ahmet Özel, “İslam Hukuku ve 
Modern Devletler Hukukunda Mukabele Bilmisl / Misilleme / Karşılıklılık,” İslam Hukuku 
Araştırmaları Dergisi 5 (2005): 49-66; Şakul, 118-121. On innovations, EI², s.v. “Bid‘a”; 
Ferguson, 98-101; İnalcık, “‘Adâletnâmeler,” in Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk, Adâlet, 80-81; 
and Öz, “Kânûn-ı Kadîm,” 66. 
622 As Heyd says, “to learn from the infidel enemy would not constitute a religiously illicit 
innovation (bid‘at) but would be an application of the legitimate maxim of muḳâbele bi’l-misl 
or reciprocation, that is fighting the enemy with his own weapons.” “Ottoman ‘Ulemâ,” 74-
75. But see also Hagen, “Legitimacy and World Order,” 67, n. 49, which, invoking Weberian 
“traditional law,” describes new laws as the reinstatement of kânûn-ı kadîm. 
227 
 
thought to arise from the carnal soul, a vain trust in reason, and man’s own conceit. Fazlızâde 
argued that Muslims should model their behavior on the Prophet and his Companions alone. 
Moreover, using reason for anything other than affirming God’s omnipotence – including a 
belief in worldly causes – was a grave sin. People who “meddled” with creation wrongly 
assumed that they could manipulate God, which to him was blasphemy and unbelief.
623
 For 
Fazlızâde and his ilk, the proper answer to the empire’s ills was not “reciprocation” but a return 
to the unadulterated example of the early community.
624
  
 Still other eighteenth century Ottomans moved in the opposite direction, toward a broader 
application of reason in political reform. İbrahim Müteferrika, for example, seems to have 
dispensed with the concept of kânûn-ı kadîm. To him the art of war had changed completely. Old 
ways and institutions were obsolete and the only way to restore the empire was to emulate 
Christian powers and meet them like-for-like. As Muslims, he claimed that the Ottomans had a 
superior bravery and natural advantage. Christians being cowards with no recourse but reason, 
and lacking a valid religious law, he called on his peers to inform themselves of the enemy’s 
                                                 
623 Kurz, 98-100, 183-196. 
624 Naff, “Linkage of History and Reform,” 127-129; Kurz, 98-99, quoting Fazlızâde: “Not to act 
according to the Sunna of the Messenger and in the way of the chosen Companions, and also 
to perform things that are not permissible according to Sharia – that is, to perform actions 
which have neither emerged from the noble Messenger nor from the Companions and the 
followers nor from the authoritative founders and expounder of the Islamic law, thinking, 
‘[These are] ritual duties,’ in particular, to perform innovations that have been brought forth 
by the erring groups – all this is a tremendous transgression and a great shamefulness. 
Therefore it is necessary not to do that which the Lord of the Sharia – upon him be prayer and 
peace! – did not do, whatever it may be, be it related to the ritual duties or to the transactions 
between men or to the traditions or to the clothing or to eating or to drinking, be it in relation 
to oneself or to another, be it with regard to the affairs of the world or to the affairs of the 
hereafter. And it is necessary to do everything he did. And in no way must one turn away 
from the Companions of the Messenger.” 
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“new military order” and methods, for if they studied the new warfare, adding their innate 
bravery to reason, the enemy would be overcome.
625
 
 These sentiments – a widened scope for reason and muted emphasis on the past and 
kânûn in favor of mukâbele bi’l-misl – reappeared in some later works, including an anonymous 
tract, perhaps written by Müteferrika, and after the 1768-1774 war in Ahmed Resmî’s 
iconoclastic Hulâsatü’l-İtibâr.626 Still, the prevailing discourse was one of restoration. The elite 
generally looked to a nebulous Golden Age for models, so that, Vâsıf tells us, in 1777 Darendeli 
Mehmed Paşa was groomed for the grand vezirate in the hope he would prove a “long-lost 
Köprülü” – a leader who would reestablish order, perpetuate kânûn, and put the empire to rights. 
Abdülhamid agreed to the plan and promoted him.
627
  
 How did Vâsıf conceptualize reform at this period? The historian’s account of Halil 
Hamid Paşa offers no small insight into his early career, as he spent much ink in praise of the 
vezir’s reforms. “It is clear to those who study history,” he opens his first volume, again 
championing Ottoman exceptionalism,  
that while [our sovereigns] are subject to some of the sovereign afflictions that are among 
the greatest particular qualities of Islamic dynasties, they have always immediately after 
been successful in putting the situation to rights [nizâm-ı esbâb-ı hâle muvaffak] and, 
indeed, have become even more powerful and mighty than before [belki sâbıkından evfer 
ü akvâ kudret ü miknete mâlik olageldikleri...]
628
  
                                                 
625 Usulü'l-Hikem, 146-148, 151-152, 164-165; in Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 4: 1894-1899. 
626 Unat, “Bir Islahat Takriri,” 107-121. Unat suggests the authorial connection, 107, n. 3. A 
Summary of Admonitions, 24b, 35a-35b. 
627 MEHÂSİN 6, 49b. 
628 MEHÂSİN 1, 5b. 
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The disorder caused by the 1768-1774 war required the attention of the empire’s leaders, he says, 
but, through their stupidity and neglect, nothing was done. The sultan thus appointed Halil 
Hamid Paşa “for the sake of the order of the realm [hıfzen li-nizâmi devletihi]” and the latter set 
to work.
629
  
 Vâsıf’s preface extols the Grand Vezir at length and especially his reorganization of the 
military. Halil Paşa sought to recover lapsed land grants, we are informed. He raised salaries 
through rational economies without burdening the treasury, brought market prices under control, 
extirpated venality, “closing the door of bribery” so that ministers did not even accept gifts from 
fear of punishment, and reimposed sartorial laws the neglect of which had caused a great many 
“abominations.” He also introduced a 2,000-man light artillery corps and new cannons to “meet 
the enemy like-for-like, as it is among the secondary causes of victory for every state to acquire 
weapons to match those of its enemy.”630 Finally, Vâsıf lauds Halil Paşa for reestablishing the 
empire’s martial vigor, which had fallen into desuetude. “The empire is ever accustomed to gaza 
and jihad,” he writes, “and if ever there is a momentary halt in them, as may be, it is among our 
excellent practices to prepare for action, abandon inactivity, and train in the military sciences.” 
The Grand Vezir hence issued orders to cultivate these sciences, to drill, and to prepare for a 
possible campaign. In light of these efforts, the historian calls his patron the “sâhib-i mia” of 
prophetic wisdom and quotes a famous hadith, “The Lord God will send to this community at the 
turn of each century someone who will restore religion.”631 
 The title “sâhib-i mia” deserves closer comment, for it evokes a very old discourse on 
reform. According to Landau-Tasseron, the tradition of a centennial reformer, “one who 
                                                 
629 Ibid, 5b-6b. 
630 “Her devlet hasmının edevâtına mukâbil edevât tedârük etmek esbâb-ı zâhiriyye-i zafer ve 
galebeden olduğuna binâen mukâbeleten li’l-hasm...” Ibid, 7a-7b. 
631 Ibid, 8a-8b. 
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restores” or more commonly mujaddid (Trk. müceddid), dates to the early centuries of the 
Islamic community as an honorific title and may have had eschatological dimensions.
632
 What is 
more important here is that it expresses a certain understanding of reform. Etymologically, 
mujaddid derives from the Arabic root J-D-D and can encompass both innovation and 
renovation, which are “diametrically opposed concepts in Islamic terms.” Landau-Tasseron 
demonstrates that over time the term acquired the sole meaning of renovation or revival. The 
mujaddid was supposed to stop religious decay – to eliminate sinful innovations or bid‘a and 
restore “those ideas and practices which had been held by the Prophet and which were 
abandoned after his death.”633 As the sâhib-i mia, then, Halil Paşa was supposed to be a very 
particular type of reformer. 
 Vâsıf’s utilization of this discourse should not surprise us. There are indications that 
many Ottomans of the time shared eschatological expectations of a restorer or even savior 
(mahdi) who would renew the empire and repair its dominance. Halil Paşa proved a logical 
choice, if only because his term as Grand Vezir coincided with the turn of the thirteenth hijri 
century (1197-1199), and Ottoman thinkers and poets of the next decades would proclaim Selim 
III and Mahmud II müceddid and mahdi, as well.
634
 The historian’s association of Halil Paşa 
with the müceddid indicates, at least rhetorically, a claim that the vezir was poised to restore the 
empire to its proper practices and pure religion (dîn ü devlet). 
                                                 
632 Ella Landau-Tasseron, “The Cyclical Reform: a Study of the Mujaddid Tradition,” Studia 
Islamica 70 (1989): 79-117. 
633 Landau-Tasseron, 79-84, 107-113. See also Seyfettin Erşahin, “Westernization, Mahmud II, 
and the Islamic Virtue Tradition,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (n.d.) 23: 
46-47; Heyd, 76. 
634 Çelik, “Nizâm-ı Cedîd’in Niteliği,” 569; Cem Dilçin, “Şeyh Galip’in Şiirlerinde III. Selim ve 
Nizam-ı Cedit,” Türkoloji Dergisi 11 (1993): 209-219; Erşahin, 46-47; Gawrych, 107-108; 
Heyd, “Ottoman ‘Ulemâ,” 76. Ali Yaycıoğlu, “The Provincial Challenge: Regionalism, 
Crisis, and Integration in the Late Ottoman Empire (1792-1812) (Ph.D. diss., Harvard 
University, 2008), 310-311.  
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 While not discounting the rational reorganization of the military, then, Vâsıf clearly 
presumed a universal order and the need to reenforce social boundaries and kânûn-ı kadîm. We 
see this further in his support of sartorial laws, intended to distinguish the realm's estates, and his 
belief that a breakdown in these laws caused “abominations.” Just so, Vâsıf held that infiltration 
of “outsiders (nâ-ehil / bîgâne)” had corrupted the military corps and provincial timar cavalry. In 
its sacred duty of jihad, he said, the empire required cavalry and supported them with crown 
land. Yet outsiders, subjects of non-military background, had usurped many of these grants and 
were unable to serve – the timars had to be returned to their functions according to kânûn-ı 
kadîm, he insisted.
635
 
 The moral dimension of these views emerges more clearly when Vâsıf places piety, 
rational reform, and worldly success side-by-side. He endorsed the public reading of religious 
texts, for example, or what he calls “spiritual provisions (rûhânî tedârükât),” because, as he has 
it, “secondary causes (esbâb-ı zâhiriyye)” are realized through God’s aid alone. These were 
“moral causes” to complement the latter: since the empire’s large scale military reforms 
depended on divine favor, moral causes will secure God’s approbation and victory.636 Another 
illustration of the combination of the worldly and spiritual, of rational and moral reform, comes 
in the historian’s comments on a transfer of men into the Grand Vezir’s new light artillery corps. 
We read that inwardly these soldiers were pious and “measured the time of purgatory till the last 
judgment.” Outwardly, however, they were like Ḥayy ibn Yaqzân, Ibn Ṭufayl’s autodidact who, 
                                                 
635 MEHÂSİN 6, 67b-68b. Also Mehâsin (İlgürel), 177, 191-193.  
636 MEHÂSİN 1, 42b-44a. This would tend to corroborate a shifting emphasis to the morality of 
society as a whole. See note 608 above. 
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as an allegory for the human intellect, ascended through higher and higher levels of 
contemplation to discover ultimate truth.
637
 Piety and reason worked in tandem.  
 Another important source for Vâsıf's early views on political reform is his 1784 risâle, 
treated in Chapter Two. Although the concerns are familiar, his conclusions here are 
perplexingly different, as he appears to reject the mechanism behind Halil Paşa’s reforms, 
mukâbele bi'l-misl. Vâsıf starts this tract by contrasting European and Ottoman soldiers. He 
denies that European means are appropriate to the Ottomans, and categorically rejects the 
conscription of peasants or orphans, insofar, he says, as Muslim soldiers cannot be compelled to 
fight but depend for success on unity and devotion.
638
 This sort of conscription, incidentally, 
violated the social principle of hadd, allowing in much-feared “outsiders.” Yet Vâsıf also denies 
that circumstances had materially changed since the empire's Golden Age. “When Ottoman 
armies were winning,” he muses, “the enemy's weapons were no different. If the weapons they 
use today are known, their organization follows the rules of war. When our soldiers attack them, 
all their organization, strategy, and means of intimidation should come to naught.” Rather than 
tactics or technology, he blames the empire's failures on leadership and divine trial.
639
 The essay 
is thus quite different from the rest of his first volume, more reminiscent of Fazlızâde Ali’s 
repudiation of innovation and reason.  
 One must be cautious in reading too much into the 1784 risâle's static vision of warfare, 
as it contradicts the historian's other statements. As seen, Vâsıf elsewhere advocates 
                                                 
637 Mehâsin (İlgürel), 173-174. Sajoo writes that “intuition and reason are reconciled with 
Revelation” in Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓân. A Companion to Muslim Ethics, 22. Also Davidson, 146-
149.  
638 MEHÂSİN 1, 130a-130b. 
639 Ibid, 131a-131b. 
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“reciprocation,” and to him the enemy's arms and tactics were a key consideration.640 He was 
likewise willing to admit changes in historical conditions at this period, most notably mocking 
Canikli Ali for giving too much credit to soldiers and commanders, or, as he says, “arrogating to 
the military a station and bounds at variance with the temper of the age [efrâd-ı ‘askeriyyeye 
mizâc-ı vakte mugâyîr merâtib ve hudûd ta‘yîn].”641 Most striking, though, is that Vâsıf ends the 
essay by wholly brushing off these reservations and extolling Halil Paşa's reform program.642 
Although it is possible he is for some reason interpreting kânûn in a very strict way but still 
giving limited scope to mukâbele bi'l-misl, it is also possible he is foisting on readers an 
argument less representative of his own attitudes than of those held at court. In this way the essay 
may intimate opposition to Halil Paşa’s faction from vested interests, a danger which led in the 
following year to the vezir’s dismissal, murder, and denunciation as “a traitor to faith and 
country.”643 
 
Nizâm-ı Cedîd: Reform under Selim III 
Up to this point we have spoken of reform almost wholly in terms of military tactics and 
technology. This changed with the reign of Selim III, who directed a period of intense 
restructuring known to posterity as the “New Order” or Nizâm-ı Cedîd, and which differed from 
earlier efforts in an important way – namely, an expansion of reform into the economy, 
administration, financial bureaucracy, and, some suggest, social engineering. With the “New 
Order” one also sees a shift in the tone of debate, at once more unyielding and combative, as its 
                                                 
640 For example, MEHÂSİN 1, 7b; MEHÂSİN 4, 131a.  
641 MEHÂSİN 1, 214a.  
642 Ibid, 131b-132b. 
643 Berkes, 67, drawing on Uzunçarşılı, Sadrazam Halil Hamid Paşa,” 244: “hâin-i dîn ü devlet 
ve azlem-i ‘ibâd.” One of Abdülhamid’s rescripts uses the same phrase, MEHÂSİN 1, 189a. 
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partisans tried to make reform the only legitimate discourse and brand their opponents as idiots, 
boors, miscreants, and other manner of low-level scum.
644
  
 While most scholars date the beginning of the Nizâm-ı Cedîd to 1792, when the reforms 
began, the die was already firmly cast by 1791. Shortly after his accession, Selim convened a 
general council at the imperial palace’s Revan pavilion and solicited some 22 or 23 proposals 
from attendees, which subsequent events allowed him to enact with impunity. At Maçin, Beydilli 
observes, army and Janissary officers had publically sworn that their forces were ineffective and 
bound themselves, perforce, to the coming program. The boycott gave the sultan and his allies 
incontrovertible evidence for the military’s collapse and the need of reform, which they fully 
exploited as leverage against their opponents.
645
  
 The rest of the story is well-known. Over the ensuing decade, with the aid of a small 
camarilla of reformers, the so-called atabegân-ı saltanat, Selim introduced new regulations and 
regular drill, opened western-style military academies, established embassies in major European 
capitals, and founded a “New Order” corps to counterbalance the Janissaries funded by a 
separate exchequer. However, Selim failed to build consensus. Opposition increased particularly 
from the Janissaries and lower-ranking ulema, who were threatened by his military and financial 
initiatives, so that by 1805 the reforms faced heavy criticism veiled in religious rhetoric as 
                                                 
644 Akyıldız, 131-133; Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri,” 25-30; Çelik, “Nizâm-ı Cedîd’in Niteliği,” 
565-568; DİA, s.v. “Nizâm-ı Cedîd”; Fatih Yeşil, “Nizâm-ı Cedîd,” in III. Selim: İki Asrın 
Dönemecinde İstanbul, ed. Coşkun Yılmaz (İstanbul, 2010), 103-121. Şakul claims reformers 
tried to turn the nizâm-ı cedîd into a “social movement.” See 118-124, 149-150.  
645 Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri,” 30; Çelik, “Nizâm-ı Cedîd’in Niteliği,” 573-574; DİA, s.v. 
“Nizâm-ı Cedîd.” 
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innovation, infidel, and unjust. Selim was deposed in 1807 during the Kabakçı Mustafa rebellion 
and later murdered along with many collaborators.
646
  
 What is of concern here, however, is not why the Nizâm-ı Cedîd failed but what it meant 
to eighteenth century Ottomans, both supporters and opponents. The “New Order” indeed 
represented much that was new. Contemporary elites increasingly recognized the novelty of 
modern warfare and expanded “reciprocation” to new lengths to match their enemies. In the 
same vein, many placed less stock in kânûn-ı kadîm. There are even hints of a willingness to 
experiment with the “four pillars,” the constituent parts of world order itself. But the Nizâm-ı 
Cedîd was not new in the fullest sense. Ottomans had yet to question the validity of the 
metaphysical order and reform remained wedded to the idea of restoration; this was not a new 
universal nizâm supplanting the old. 
 
The Meaning of Nizâm-ı Cedîd 
As an intellectual concept the Ottoman “New Order” has never been rigorously analyzed. This is 
unfortunate, because in certain ways our interpretation of the period’s attitudes toward reform 
depends on how we understand it.
647
 The main obstacle in evaluating the Nizâm-ı Cedîd is the 
term’s ambiguity. In Ottoman Turkish nizâm has any number of meanings; although its primary 
sense is “order,” it can refer more concretely to a system or method, hence a regime, military 
corps, or legal regulations. As said in Chapter Four, it is even problematic in the sense of “order” 
and can take on, alternately, metaphysical (nizâm-ı ‘âlem) or strictly worldly and political 
                                                 
646 The most accessible study of this period is Stanford Shaw’s Between Old and New. See 
further DİA, s.v. “Nizâm-ı Cedîd”; Üstün, 108-145; Yaycıoğlu, 294-427; A. Yıldız, “Vaka-yı 
Selimiyye.” The term atabegân-ı saltanat is from Târih-i Cevdet, 8: 147.  
647 Görgün argues that the intellectual baggage of nizâm is crucial to understanding why the 
reformers of Selim’s era applied the term “new order” to the program, 187-188. Üstün does 
not explore the conceptual framework behind the reforms.  
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connotations (nizâm-ı devlet / nizâm-ı mülk).648 Current scholarship mostly begs the question of 
its significance, though.   
 According to Beydilli, the phrase “new order” is attested in sources as early as the 
seventeenth century vezirate of Köprülü Fâzıl Mustafa Paşa (1689-1691), where it referred to 
standardization of the poll tax on non-Muslims. By Selim’s reign, the phrase had acquired the 
more specific sense of a set of comprehensive reforms which would address the modern needs of 
the bureaucracy and the army, establishing a “new order” to supplant the old. To Beydilli, the 
concept thus expresses an opposition to the established and traditional regime, nizâm-ı kadîm, 
though he does not venture what sort of order this was.
649
 
 Other scholars have argued more stridently that the “new order” heralded a new mentality 
and rupture with the past. Tezcan, for example, argues that the term nizâm-ı cedîd indicates a 
break with the “ancien régime (nizâm-ı kadîm)” and old ways, and that contemporary Ottomans 
realized as much. Referencing Ömer Fâik Efendi’s 1804 treatise Nizâmü’l-Atîk fî Bahri’l-Amîk 
(The Old Order in the Abyss), which he describes as a “eulogy” for the old order, he states that 
“Ottoman learned men of the early nineteenth century were themselves very aware of the novelty 
of the New Order.”650 Çelik claims nizâm-ı cedîd can be read similarly. Not only was it a 
“making anew,” in his opinion, but a withdrawal from the universal claims of nizâm-ı ‘âlem and 
                                                 
648 One might well start with a thorough etymological study. For example, older Arabic seems to 
lack the concreteness found in some Persian, Turkish, and modern Arabic definitions, 
focusing on an abstracted concept of order. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, 8: 3034. Cf. 
Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (Urbana, IL, 1994) 1147; F. Steingass, A 
Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary (Springfield, VA, 2010), 1409-1410. If Meninski 
and Sâmî are representative of seventeenth and nineteenth century Ottoman usage, 
respectively, one sees a similar contrast between the abstract and the concrete, Thesaurus 
Linguarum Orientalium Turcicae-Arabicae-Persicae (İstanbul, 2000), 3: 5203; Sâmî, Kâmûs-
ı Türkî, 1463. 
649 DİA, s.v. “Nizâm-ı Cedîd.” See also Enveri Ziya Karal, Selim III’ün Hatt-ı Hümayunları: 
Nizam-ı Cedit, 1789-1807 (Ankara, 1946), 29-30. 
650 Tezcan, The Second Empire, 193-194. 
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a new order at odds with the old and “ancient practice” (kânûn-ı kadîm; nizâm-ı kadîm). In 
Çelik’s case, at least, it is clear that the new order was supposed to be a metaphysical one.651 
 It is well to discount one possibility out of hand – that nizâm refers strictly to a regular 
military corps, namely Selim’s new-style army. It is true, and cause for some confusion, that the 
new-style army was known popularly as nizâm-ı cedîd during Selim’s lifetime and thereafter.652 
To all appearances this was a neologism; nizâm in this sense was probably either a metonym for 
the reforms as a whole or the truncated version of a larger verbal phrase. In some cases the corps 
is called “the regular soldiery (mu‘allem ‘asker),” which accords with Redhouse’s explanation 
that nizâm as military corps stands for the phrase “military formation (nizâm-ı ‘askerî).”653 In 
any event, usage in sources makes it clear that nizâm-ı cedîd was, as Beydilli specifies, much 
more comprehensive in scope. 
 Nizâm can also signify a set of regulations or a legal code, especially in the form 
nizâmnâme and the plural nizâmât. This sense appears in dynastic chronicles and Vâsıf’s work, 
where it refers explicitly to the new codes promulgated by Selim to implement his reforms and as 
a synonym for kânûn.
654
 For example, discussing the sultan’s new exchequer in his third volume, 
he uses nizâm-ı cedîd and kânûn-ı cedîd to refer specifically to the code (nizâmnâme) regulating 
the reform.
655
 In another passage he mentions “regular soldiers drilling according to the new 
                                                 
651 Çelik, “Nizâm-ı Cedîd’in Niteliği,” 571-572. 
652 For an example, MAC, 33; Wilkinson, 222. This definition appears in nineteenth century 
dictionaries like James Redhouse, A Turkish and English Lexicon (İstanbul, 2001), 2088; and 
Sâmî, Kâmûs-ı Türkî, 1463. 
653 In which case the full phrase might be nizâm-ı cedîd-i ‘askerî. Redhouse, A Turkish and 
English Lexicon, 2088. Cf. MEHÂSİN 3, 51a, 191b, 244b-245a; Barbier de Meynard, 
“Considérations sur l’historie ottomane,” 72. 
654 As per Redhouse and Sâmî. Cf. Steingass, “nizâmât.” In later times, according to Heyd, nizâm 
was increasingly used as a synonym for kânûn. Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, 168.  
655 MEHÂSİN 3, 76a. 
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regulations [mu‘allem ‘asker kânûn-ı cedîd üzere icrâ-yı fünûn-ı darb u harb].”656 This meaning 
– nizâm as a set of legal regulations – obtains elsewhere, as when he describes reforms “in 
accordance with the new regulations heretofore promulgated [mukaddemce verilen nizâm-ı cedîd 
mûcibince]” and “at present, according to the requirements of the new regulations [elhâletühazihi 
muktezâ-yı nizâmât-ı cedîdeye nazaren…].”657 However, for Vâsıf nizâm-ı cedîd definitely had 
other, wider connotations. Hence we see him refer to Selim’s reforms in other situations as the 
“new organization (tertîb-i cedîd)” and “new order” the branches of which extended into 
administrative and other matters.
658
   
 That nizâm stood for order in the strictly worldly sense – the order of the dynasty or 
realm (nizâm-ı devlet / nizâm-ı mülk) – and eventually attached to the reform program itself is an 
idea worth close consideration. Textually this sense is found early on. Müteferrika seems to have 
used it in precisely this fashion, as a rational way of arranging the empire’s political and military 
affairs unrelated to or within the overarching metaphysical order. In Usûlü’l-hikem, he describes 
how Europeans, relying purely on human reason, had developed innovations in tactics, strategy, 
and weaponry that represented a “new military order (nizâm-ı cedîd-i ceyşiyye).” With these 
innovations the art of war had changed. Henceforth, any ruler who heeded this new art, great or 
small, would prevail; any ruler who neglected it would lose.
659
 Vâsıf too referred to reform in 
                                                 
656 Ibid, 29a. 
657 Ibid, 74b, 76a. 
658 Respectively, MEHÂSİN 2, 21b, 154b-156b. Vâsıf describes a reform of provincial 
judgeships as part of the nizâm-ı cedîd: “bu esnâda râbıta-gîr-i karâr olan nizâm-ı cedîd 
feru‘âtından olduğuna binâen...” 
659 Usûlü’l-hikem, 146-148, 151-152. Reichsmuth notes the importance of nizâm in this work, 
and speculates, incorrectly, that Müteferrika was the first to use the term nizâm-ı cedîd. 
“Islamic Reformist Discourse in the Tulip Period (1718-1730): Ibrahim Müteferriqa and His 
Arguments for Printing,” in Learning and Education in the Ottoman World (Istanbul: 
IRCICA, 1999), 157-161.  
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these terms and at least one modern scholar suggests that necessity forced eighteenth century 
reformers to think increasingly of a centralized state rather than in universal terms.
660
   
 The exact meaning of the “New Order” is a problem that exceeds the scope of this study. 
Recognizing novelty as well as continuity, Fatih Yeşil probably comes closest to a satisfactory 
definition of the term as “a state of orderliness or new laws/regulations that would ensure the 
order of civil life, which is subject to reconstruction.”661 Yet it suffices that nizâm-ı cedîd does 
not, to all appearances, signal a rupture between past and present and old and new in the sense of 
a new universal moral order. As argued in Chapter Four, Vâsıf and his colleagues clung fast to 
that concept. They continued to analyze the empire’s troubles within the traditional ethico-
political framework and conceptualized reform above all as an act of restoration. However, in 
Selim’s reign the edifice of world order began to show definite signs of wear. Amid the period’s 
upheavals and quarrels, we can perceive strain and the first fissures.  
 
Reform and its Discontents 
Under Selim III the elite’s metaphysical assumptions remained largely unshaken. The men of the 
“New Order” agreed that the empire had lost its ability to adapt to the age but respected the 
traditional shape of reform, continuing to think defeat due more to a divergence from past 
practices than European innovation. Only gradually did their solutions expand from the military 
into financial, administrative, and social spheres.
662
 The sultan himself symbolized the desired 
revival, furthermore. Named after a world conqueror, his namesake Selim I, we know that at 
                                                 
660 Görgün, 187-188. 
661 Yeşil, “Nizâm-ı Cedîd,” 103. However, he is not clear about whether the new order was a 
rational, political reordering or a new metaphysical order. See for example idem, Ebubekir 
Râtib Efendi, 139, 163.  
662 Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri,” 30; DİA, s.v. “Nizâm-ı Cedîd.” 
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least some saw in Selim a restorer, the sâhib-i mia, or perhaps the mahdi or Muslim savior.
663
 
Still, among elites there was great diversity of opinion. The reality of reform was complex, and it 
is more productive to understand their views along a spectrum rather than simply as “reformer” 
and “conservative,” or even “supporter” and “opponent.”  
 The proposals submitted to Selim after the 1789 Revan council are a good place to begin, 
because even at this stage they reveal uncertainty among Selim’s allies about how to proceed. 
Although the authors repeated much of what İbrahim Müteferrika had advised in creating a new 
European-style corps to counterbalance the Janissaries, who refused to accept modern drill, they 
could not agree to a general approach.
664
  
 Much of their uncertainty surrounded “ancient practice,” kânûn-ı kadîm, and its value as 
a model for political reform. Vâsıf’s friend and colleague Tatarcık Abdullah Mollâ, for example, 
took a cautious tack in his proposals and favored appealing to the old corps through the language 
of “ancient practice.” The Europeans have technical advantage in warfare, he argues, as opposed 
to the Janissaries whose disorder arises from their disregard of old ways. He recommends that 
they be pressed to accept modern drill and encouraged that in doing so they would respect 
proprieties, and regain their old superiority.
665
 The implication appears to be that Abdullah 
reckoned kânûn-ı kadîm a part of reciprocity. To him “ancient practice” was valuable, at least so 
long as it could serve Selim’s policies. 
                                                 
663 See note 635 above.   
664 On the council and its contributors, DİA, s.v. ““Nizâm-ı Cedîd.” Üstün treats these reformers 
too categorically. They do not, on close inspection, seem to have had a “conscious and clearly 
articulated agenda for positive change” (149), but disagreed over minor and major points. Cf. 
Yaycıoğlu, 310-311. 
665 Öz, “Kânûn-ı Kadîm,” 75.  Cf. original text in Enver Ziya Karal, ed., “Nizâm-ı Cedîd’e Dâir 
Lâyihalar,” Tarih Vesikaları 1 (1941-42): 417-420. 
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 Still other proposals argued for ancient practice only when it met the needs of the day. If 
not, it could be partially or entirely replaced. According to Mustafa Râsih Efendi, the former 
rikâb kethüdâsı and later ambassador to Russia, the Janissaries ought to be returned to kânûn-ı 
kadîm through their chain of command. However, he qualifies that “those approaches that are 
ancient practice and still applicable now ought to be strengthened. Other regulations may have 
worked when first instituted, but they must, due to changes over time, be reformed to suit today’s 
needs.”666 Mustafa Reşid Efendi extended Râsih’s argument to its logical conclusion to assert 
that ancient practice was wholly obsolete. He writes that over time the realm’s institutions had 
“decayed (inhilâl-pezîr),” and a new approach was needed to fix them. “In view of the current 
troubles we must reform kânûn anew,” he concludes. “The empire requires a new order [nizâm-ı 
cedîd].”667 Incidentally, this passage corroborates the theory that nizâm-ı cedîd meant not just 
regulations or a specific reform program but the rational rearrangement of the empire’s worldly 
affairs.  
 Reform tracts from the late 1790s and early 1800s reflect a similar diversity of opinion 
among statesmen and thinkers. Beydilli and Şakul divide these into three groups: those that 
publicize, those that defend, and those that criticize the Nizâm-ı Cedîd. As earlier, this literature 
focused on what had gone wrong and how to effect a restoration, above all in terms of ancient 
practice and the legitimate scope given to “reciprocation” and reason. 
 As an example of a work of publicization, Mahmud Râif Efendi’s 1798 Tableau des 
nouveaux règlemens de l’empire Ottoman parroted the government’s official line and presented 
the Nizâm-ı Cedîd in glowing terms. Selim’s circle appears to have intended this work to 
introduce his reforms to European audiences and had it translated into French, illustrated, 
                                                 
666 Öz, “Kânûn-ı Kadîm,” 75.  Cf. Karal, “Nizâm-ı Cedîd,” 2 (1942-43): 107-108. 
667 Öz, “Kânûn-ı Kadîm,” 76.  Cf. Karal, “Nizâm-ı Cedîd,” 2 (1942-43): 104-105. 
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printed, and distributed to foreign envoys. In it, Râif Efendi makes a stark textual and pictorial 
contrast between the old (kadîm) and new (cedîd). Above all, he claims, the reforms remedied a 
decay in Ottoman institutions that was caused by neglect of Süleyman I’s statutes or kânûnnâme. 
He also expresses a belief in the importance of a foreign language, French, and that modern 
sciences could only be acquired outside of the empire.
668
 
 Küçük Seyyid Mustafa Efendi’s Diatribe de l’ingénieur Séid Moustapha provides a 
similar perspective. Like Râif’s Tableau, the sultan’s coterie translated Diatribe into French and 
disseminated it to European envoys as a defense of the reforms. According to Şakul, Seyyid 
Mustafa’s most important contribution to reformist discourse during the period was the 
importance he attached to mukâbele bi’l-misl. While there are question over the tract’s 
authorship, indeed Seyyid Mustafa’s very existence, the author, like Râif, laments popular 
attitudes toward the positive sciences and their use in modern warfare. To be sure, he argues, 
Ottoman weakness and European superiority stem from this attitude. The Ottomans suffer defeat 
because they do not benefit from European know-how and fail to observe reciprocation, which 
has been distorted by “la classe des idiots et superstitieux” and turned from a worldly into a 
religious issue. For Seyyid Mustafa knowledge and reason are universal. What is more, scientific 
dominance can migrate, and he therefore locates the basic dynamism of civilizations in 
reciprocation, which becomes something closer to a historical law than the transfer of 
technology. The empire’s problem was not, then, a matter of recreating old institutions but of 
                                                 
668 Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri,” 34-35; Şakul, 125-127. Cf. text in Kemal Beydilli and İlhan 
Şahin, eds., Mahmud Râif Efendi ve Nizâm-ı Cedîd’e Dâir Eseri (Ankara, 2001), 121-245. 
The original Turkish title was Nümûne-i Menâzım-ı Cedîd-i Selîm Hânî. 
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restoring the precept of mukâbele bi’l-misl, over and above the objections of wrongheaded boors 
who interpreted reform as sinful innovation (bid‘a).669  
 Among publicists of reform, we may also mention the name of Ebubekir Râtib Efendi (d. 
1799). A chancery scribe and ambassador to Vienna, Râtib Efendi was heavily influenced abroad 
by contemporary European political theory, and attempted to convey these ideas in a large 
embassy report (sefâretnâme). The centrality of order – nizâm – in this tract is quite striking. To 
Râtib, “nizâm” and the “new order” of European regimes, which his master Selim III was 
attempting to imitate, meant above all a political or administrative order that might be rationally 
controlled. He too was aware that Christian kings lacked a revealed law and depended on reason, 
and at times refers to nizâm as rational law (kânûn) that will secure order. However, Râtib also 
argues that the Ottoman “new order” was in fact a restoration of the old. Dating the realm’s 
decline to the late sixteenth century, he indicates, in a tacit assertion of reciprocation, that 
European regimes had merely borrowed from originally Ottoman practices.
670
 Fatih Yeşil has 
pointed out that Râtib’s understanding of order is closely related to contemporary debates over 
the boundaries of human agency (irâde-i cüziyye), mentioned in Chapter Two, and which during 
Selim’s reign were being pushed into realms like finance and social organization.671  
                                                 
669 Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri,” 34-35; Şakul, 127-131. See text in Diatribe de l’ingénieur 
Séid Moustapha sur l’état actuel de l’art militaire, du génie et des sciences à Constantinople 
(Paris, 1810); Kemal Beydilli, “İlk Mühendislerimizden Seyyid Mustafa ve Nizâm-ı Cedîd’e 
Dair Risâlesi,” Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi 12 (1987): 387-479. Hammer-Purgstall once claimed 
that Seyyid Mustafa never existed and that the tract was written by the dragoman Yakovaki 
Argyropolous at the behest of the reisülküttâb, Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey, (Oxford, 2002), 60, n. 43.  
670 Yeşil, Ebubekir Râtib Efendi, esp. 229-240.  
671 Ibid, 233-234. Yeşil’s main goal is to trace, through Râtib, the introduction of a modern 
episteme into the empire – an intellectual rather than institutional way of viewing modernity. 
Râtib was not unchanged by his travels, and evinces an interesting blend of continuity and 
novelty, in one telling passage blending traditional Ottoman views of statecraft with European 
cameralism (229-230).   
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 Reformers also published polemical defenses of Selim’s program, propaganda like 
Ubeydullah Kuşmanî’s Zebîre-i Kuşmânî and Vâsıf’s Muhassenât that mocked opponents, 
exploited fears of Russia and earlier defeats, and co-opted the language of scriptural Islam to 
refute arguments that the reforms offended religion. Kuşmânî, for one, had pointed words for the 
Janissaries. Like Seyyid Mustafa, he too viewed reciprocation as a historical process and 
continuous transfer of knowledge. Şakul posits that Kuşmânî was a Nakşbendi-Müceddidî sufi, a 
politically active order that supported religious renewal, and other Sufi contemporaries like Galib 
Dede advocated reciprocation in this way, as a religious principle, by reason that the divine plan 
encompassed all creation – not just Muslims – and so supplied endless sources of knowledge. A 
person might borrow equally from Pharaoh as from Moses. To do otherwise was unbelief, as it 
rejected the divine plan.
672
 In Muhassenât, as we shall see, Vâsıf also belittled his opponents and 
invoked mukâbele bi’l-misl as a universal principle.   
 These treatises and polemics raise an important question. Who were the Nizâm-ı Cedîd’s 
opponents, Seyyid Mustafa’s “idiots” and Vâsıf’s “blockheads”? What were their arguments? 
We should take care not to dismiss them as straw men or to presume out of hand they were a 
“small minority of extremists,” as some scholars do.673 In fact, we can say a certain amount 
about their ostensible reservations and why they resisted reform.  
 Some Ottomans clearly opposed the Nizâm-ı Cedîd viscerally and outright. Tuck 
observes a twofold trend in attitudes toward reform in the late eighteenth century. As we have 
seen, the period’s continuing crises led certain elites to give greater latitude to mukâbele bi’l-
                                                 
672 Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri,” 35-37; Şakul, 135-140; A. Yıldız, 11-21. Yıldız has published 
this work along with another by Ebubekir Efendi as Asiler ve Gaziler: Kabakçı Mustafa 
Risalesi (İstanbul, 2007). 
673 Çelik, “Nizâm-ı Cedî’in Niteliği,” 579-580. While Üstün is right to criticize the view that 
opposition to reform was the result of inherent cultural conservatism (ex. 78-86), there was, at 
the same time, a very real and heated debate over reform’s religious legitimacy.  
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misl, while at the same time, and perhaps in reaction, contemporary ulema hardened their stance 
on innovation. Reform to them undermined the faith, and veered into heresy, unbelief, and 
treason.
674
 Such people not unexpectedly objected to the Nizâm-ı Cedîd in religious rhetoric and, 
as indicated in the reform tracts themselves, charged that Selim’s initiatives were sinful 
innovation, bid‘a. We should note that such served to disqualify Selim as a müceddid, who, it 
was thought, protected tradition against innovation. It is also of interest that after the sultan’s 
1807 deposition, a number of high-profile scholars signed an affidavit (hüccet-i şer‘iyye) 
denouncing the reforms as “unprecedented illegal innovations and reprehensible infidel 
imitations.”675 
 Vâsıf reveals the presence of such arguments, which are mostly absent from the written 
record, when he occasionally refers to opponents who charged Selim with innovation, or who 
tried to dissuade him through “frigid asceticism and perverse fanaticism.”676 A partial copy of his 
Muhassenât also suggests that, if this sort of religious rhetoric initially came from disaffected 
ulema, it was aped by members of the military. In this copy marginalia left by a reader supply 
Janissary rebuttals, which, though crudely, use the same rhetoric of “innovation” and insinuate 
the new-style army and its European drill injured the faith. “Infidels work through trickery,” says 
the imagined soldier. “This is effective, but we are Muslims and trickery does not become a 
                                                 
674 Tuck, 484-487. This argument is expressed in the phrase man tashabbaha bi-qawmin fa-huwa 
minhum: “He who imitates another people becomes one of them.” Heyd, “Ottoman ‘Ulemâ,” 
70-77.  
675 Târih-i Âsım, 2: 46-49; Heyd, “Ottoman ‘Ulemâ,” 69; A. Yıldız, 457-472, with intriguing 
comments on whether this affidavit justified military force in politics in order to oppose 
“innovations.” Another anonymous tract charged that Selim’s intention was not to reform 
Islam but “convert” it, ibid, 181-183.  
676 “Zühd-i bârid ve ta‘assub-ı fâsid ile…” MEHÂSİN 2, 110b, 133b, 154b.  
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Muslim.”677 Another fascinating note not only avows that hand-to-hand combat is the only 
proper way to fight but that newer technology has, in fact, caused Ottoman defeats: “Fooling 
with weapons is infidel business and to a Muslim infidel business is unbelief…They are the 
reason for our defeat, you see.”678 Whether these men really had religious qualms with Selim’s 
reforms we cannot know, but it is significant that Vâsıf and his reader dismiss their concern as 
baseless and insincere. The Nizâm-ı Cedîd threatened their livelihood and they likely feared a 
loss of pay. Or, as the imagined Janissary has it: “the zeal of Islam is good but is powerless 
without a ‘zeal for coin.’”679  
 A very different sort of critic emerges in the “New Order” literature from the center of 
power – reformers, some of them in government. Critics-cum-reformers generally sympathized 
with Selim but questioned the Nizâm-ı Cedîd’s trajectory, especially its focus on worldly goals. 
Ömer Fâik Efendi was one of this number. A lower-level scribe, Fâik tells us that he attended a 
10 June 1804 meeting organized by sırkâtibi Ahmed Fâiz Efendi, another of Vâsıf’s colleagues, 
which appears to have been a “seminar” to push the reform program on the palace bureaucracy. 
In response to his persistent questions, Ahmed Fâiz ordered Fâik to put his thoughts on paper in 
what eventually became the tract Nizâmü’l-Atîk fî Bahri’l-Amîk. Yet Fâik dared not publish the 
tract, feeling it deviated from sanctioned views and might endanger him.
680
 
                                                 
677 “‘Askerimizin bunda cevâbı budur ki küffre tâifesi işini hîle ile görür ki üste çıkar lâkin biz 
Müslümânız, Müslümâna hîle yakışmaz derler.” BOA.HAT 48106-A, ninth note.  
678 “Ve kimi dahi cevâbında cenk alâtıyla oynamak gâvûr işidir, Müslümâna göre gâvûr işi 
küfürdir derler. Yâ tüfenk ve…top ve humbarayı Müslümânlar isti‘mâl edeyorlar dendikde ah 
işte nusret olmadığına sebeb bunlardır…” BOA.HAT 48106-A, eleventh note. 
679 “Bu bâbda cevâbları gayret-i dîniyye güzel lâkin gayret-i akçeviyye olmadıkça gayret-i 
dîniyye kavî olmaz...” BOA.HAT 48106-A, twelfth note. Cf. MAC, 57-65. On resistance to 
the reforms from Janissaries and others, Üstün, 146-192; Yaycıoğlu, 304-317. 
680 Ahmet Sarıkaya, ed., “Ömer Fâ’ik Efendi, Nizâmü’l-Atîk” (senior thesis, İstanbul 
Üniversitesi, 1979), 3-5. On Fâik and the work, Beydilli, Islâhât Düşünceleri, 37-42; Şakul, 
145-148; A. Yıldız, 183-184. 
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 Nizâmü’l-Atîk addresses thirty-two separate issues, twenty-three devoted to outward order 
and nine to moral issues. Fâik believed that the empire needed military as well as all-purpose 
reform. However, he was disturbed by what he saw as wrongheaded foreign and domestic 
policies in addition to the luxury, conspicuous consumption, and caprice of Selim’s camarilla.681 
Above all, he was convinced that the reforms, as they stood, did not sufficiently address causes 
that would secure God’s aid, and his main criticism of the Nizâm-ı Cedîd was that it valued only 
reason and neglected the spirituality of the “old order.” Fâik drew attention to so-called “spiritual 
measures (tedbîrât-ı ma‘neviyye),” including the public reading of religious texts, improving the 
quality of religious education, and governing justly according to holy law, arguing that the realm 
would prosper and defeat its enemies with these reforms. Nizâmü’l-Atîk in this way replicates 
common views of Ottoman exceptionalism and raises a subject that was quite sensitive to the 
program’s opponents.682 Fâik himself, while uneasy, did not reject the Nizâm-ı Cedîd, though. 
The work is not a “eulogy of the Old Order,” as Tezcan alleges, but a guarded critique of the 
new.
683
  
 Mehmed Emîn Behîç Efendi, who wrote the tract Sevânihü’l-Levâyih in 1803, was 
another Nizâm-ı Cedîd discontent. Originally from Rusçuk, Behîç served in various bureaucratic 
posts and was executed in 1809 as a result of his alignment with Âlemdar Mustafa Paşa, the 
author of an 1807 counter-coup and Mahmud II’s first Grand Vezir. Behîç too granted that the 
realm required thorough reform and that the Ottomans were supremely capable of achieving this. 
In this way, he contrasted them with Europeans, who were markedly inferior, and the Russians, 
                                                 
681 Şakul, 146-148.  
682 For contents see Sarıkaya, 40-41; Beydilli, “Islâhât Düşünceleri,” 37-39; A. Yıldız, 183-184. 
Fâik’s “moral reforms” parellel Vâsıf’s rûhânî tedârükât, MEHÂSİN 1, 42b. He also notes 
sûrî ve ma‘nevî tedbîr in MEHÂSİN 4, 202b.  
683 Tezcan, The Second Empire, 194, n. 8. 
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whom he called “stupid brutes incapable of learning the simplest matter in ten years, even should 
they be clobbered on the head.” If they, the Russians, had succeeded, the empire certainly could. 
Behîç also impressed that the basis of the “New Order” and reform was holy law, and therefore 
stood against the Janissaries, who likened the Nizâm-ı Cedîd to becoming infidel. However, he 
was not fully satisfied with the reforms and joined Fâik Efendi in criticizing what he saw as the 
debased state of religious life and education.
684
 
 
Ahmed Vâsıf on the “New Order” 
Vâsıf sided in debates on the “New Order” with men like Tatarcık Abdullah, Reşid, Râif, and 
Fâiz Efendi – with Selim’s circle, of which he was a part – and defended the reforms at length in 
his work. Indeed, he is one of our most extensive sources for the Nizâm-ı Cedîd. But Vâsıf was 
no party hack. His work analyzed Ottoman “decline” and offered solutions that, if not wholly 
original, took tentative steps away from an immutable world-picture. Vâsıf still envisioned 
reform as a moral and material restoration of the empire’s exceptionalism. However, he 
increasingly recognized the novelty of his era, and elevated “reciprocation” to the foundation of 
worldly reform: a universal, rational, historical, and even legal precept that must guide the 
empire to a new political and military order and which, when combined with the dynasty’s innate 
virtues, would reestablish Ottoman dominance.  
 The 1787-1792 Russian-Austrian-Ottoman war was a point of departure in Vâsıf’s views 
on reform. Henceforth, as Selim’s principal mouthpiece he began to concede that a new science 
of war had emerged in Europe, based on mathematical precision, and that the empire’s traditional 
                                                 
684 Ali Osman Çınar, ed., “Es-Seyyid Mehmed Emîn Behîc’in Sevânihü’l-Levâyih’i ve 
Değerlendirmesi” (master’s thesis, Marmara Üniversitesi, 1992). Also Beydilli, “Islâhât 
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methods were obsolete. An extended digression in his second volume introduces these changes. 
After the Ottoman rout at Remnik, Vâsıf says the empire’s soldiers were no match for Austria’s 
and Russia’s new-style levies, who were trained, obedient, and versed in the “science of warfare, 
which is to say, the new organization (tertîb-i cedîd) that is part of the mathematical sciences.”685 
Vâsıf reminds readers that warfare is “the attempt of various armies to dominate each other, to 
inflict injury, and to invent various means to achieve this end,” with the goal of victory. War may 
be aggressive or defensive, and its modes vary due to differences between the combatants, time 
and place, topography, and arms.
686
 The point was that warfare had changed; the dynasty needed 
to change with it. 
 Vâsıf’s position is striking when compared to his earlier work. Now, unlike in his 1784 
essay, he conceded that war was changeable and that Europeans had developed a better 
approach. Contemporary warfare is not what it was in the past, he argues, and it is outwardly 
impossible to defeat an enemy without equal or superior organization, which varies from era to 
era. The Prophet, for example, fought in his time with a sword, and though he might have 
crushed his opponents with a prayer, he instead used patience and even strategy according to the 
phrase, “War is a trickery (al-ḥarbu khud‘a).” Vâsıf urges the Ottomans to act like the Prophet. 
How had they not seen the Russians coming? The Russians scouted the imperial army’s 
movements from forty hours away. The rout could have been avoided if they had acted similarly 
– through the worldly causes described in Chapter Two – “and it is fit to reason that if one group 
can make predictions, so can another.” The enemy was meanwhile so well-disciplined in battle 
that the Ottoman force stood no chance. “May God the Primary Cause grant good foreordination 
to the strategy that the Sublime State is making to reorganize,” Vâsıf prays. “May He ordain its 
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686 Ibid, 27b-29b. 
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completion while the opportunity is in hand, grant us the ability to take revenge on the enemy, 
and fill the hearts of all believers with the joy of illimitable victory.”687 
 The underlying mechanisms in this passage are human reason and reciprocation. In the 
1790s, Vâsıf expressed the empire’s plight, its supposed “decline,” in terms of mukâbele bi’l-
misl, which he felt the dynasty had failed to apply to warfare. While the states of Christian 
Europe moved ahead, the Ottomans had to their peril neglected mathematics, geography, and 
other sciences. However, reciprocation was universally valid. The empire only needed to look to 
its enemies for models.
688
  
 Vâsıf’s third volume contains several passages on the “new science of warfare,” which 
taken together explain how the infidel gained their military advantage and interpret Ottoman 
“decline” as a failure to keep current through mukâbele bi’l-misl.689 The first passage falls early 
in his third volume, on the new-style army. The Europeans, writes Vâsıf, were long powerless 
against Muslim arms and worked tirelessly to invent a new style of warfare (bir tavr-ı nev-icâd). 
With satanic inspiration and ancient Greek and Byzantine principles, they adapted their battle 
order, siege warfare, and tactics to the rules of geometry and learned how to attack and defend in 
tight but adaptable formations. Following these principles the Christians were unbeatable. Vâsıf 
                                                 
687 Ibid, 26b-27b. 
688 For example, Vâsıf lamented the neglect of these sciences in the preface to Atlas-ı Cedîd 
Tercümesi (İstanbul, 1803/04), 1, a work based on “modern” principles of European 
geography.  
689 On the whole this argument was not unique. See Heyd: “Learning from the infidels should not 
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progress of Christian Europe in military science was but the reaction of the frightened West to 
the superiority of Ottoman arms and Muslim heroism over many centuries…The Muslims 
would only take back what originally had been borrowed from them. “Ottoman ‘Ulemâ,” 75. 
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says that, thoroughly fostering the derivative sciences, they began to defeat untrained and 
disordered armies.
690
 
 One important innovation the Europeans borrowed from the Greeks in Vâsıf’s account is 
gunpowder. Humans use reason to produce tools to obtain food, clothing, and weapons, he 
writes. As Galen details in his work on the human limbs,
691
 they create weapons in lieu of natural 
limbs, like spears for claws or daggers and swords for teeth. Gunpowder, invented by a “perverse 
philosopher” in Alexandria in the year 660/61 and transferred to the Byzantines, offered 
possibilities for arms that effectively neutralized natural human bravery (nüfûs-ı beşeriyyede 
merkûz cevher-i merdânegî ve şecâ‘atın ednâ sebeb ile izmihlâlına ‘illet oldılar) and 
disadvantaged dynasties without them. The Europeans researched these to achieve victory at a 
distance (bilâ-takarrüb bir nev‘ galebe esbâbını fikr ü tahayyül), because they are natural 
cowards and could not withstand the Muslims, who are known for firmness and bravery. They 
then developed related crafts and learned to mitigate personal courage through the shock and awe 
and range of their weapons. Gunpowder spread to every dynasty and the empire; for a time the 
Ottomans were able to repel them, but they did not perfect the art.
692
 
 The empire, then, faced a daunting foe. Its military could not match their new methods – 
neither the power of their firearms nor tactics – and scattered at the first volley. Moreover, the 
historian claims that sultans up to Selim III had not tried to solve this problem. Weakness 
infected the soldiery, the greatest of the four pillars, and they could no longer protect the realm. 
Vâsıf therefore lavishes praises on Selim for adopting the new warfare, for reorganizing the 
cannoneer corps, rebuilding the arsenal, acquiring foreign experts, and founding the new-style 
                                                 
690 MEHÂSİN 3, 5a-5b. 
691 He cites the Arabic translation of De usu partium corporis humani. 
692 Ibid, 38a-40b.  
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force. He also contends that the new methods complement Muslims’ innate bravery, the “zeal of 
Islam,” and produced such recent victories as the one over the French at Acre. He prays that the 
enemy’s new methods of warfare may be successfully used against them, and that Selim’s efforts 
to renew the foundations of the faith and law continue.
693
  
 A second, similar passage in the third volume repeats and elaborates these views. 
Introducing the Ottoman campaign in Egypt, Vâsıf proposes that the empire’s present malaise is 
not limited to Muslim dominions but that the French revolution has spread near and far in the 
habitable world and affected all nations.
694
 Moreover, if Ottoman soldiers were drilled and 
obedient, their natural bravery and zeal for Islam would overwhelm the enemy, who has an 
invalid religion and is naturally cowardly. Until the year 1591, he argues, the hijri millennium, 
Muslims had defeated the infidel absolutely. But afterward the empire’s forces became 
accustomed to indolence and battle accorded with the phrase, “War is unpredictable.” The 
empire’s dread power weakened while the Christians developed a new order (bir tarz-ı cedîd) 
and organization (tertîb) that led them to total victory, derived from the mathematical sciences 
and ratiocination. They produced firearms, became proficient in defense, and began to best the 
empire's forces in field battles and sieges.
695
  
 Vâsıf insists that the Ottomans should have tried to match the enemy on equal terms 
(müsâvât ile tekâbül), if they could not surpass their organization. However, no one gave this 
matter any attention, and the Ottomans were by forced by sophistry into a battle order that had 
long since become obsolete (takâdüm-i ‘ahd ile tarzdan çıkmış sûret-i muhârebe). Their forces 
                                                 
693 Ibid, 5b-6a.. 
694 MEHÂSİN 3, 213a-215b; MEHÂSİN (EGYPT), 1a-3a. Cf. MAC, 35. 
695 MEHÂSİN 3, 215b-216a; MEHÂSİN (EGYPT), 3a-3b. 
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could not withstand the enemy's more disciplined levies and serious defeats ensued.
696
 Yet the 
historian reiterates that the empire will endure until Judgment Day. To restore the empire God 
granted Selim III the throne absolutely, and he has since his accession spent his time with 
rational economies and sovereign strategies (tasarrufât-ı ‘akliyye, tedbîrât-i mülkiyye). For 
twenty or thirty years, Vâsıf writes, the state was diseased and the order of the world (nizâm-ı 
‘âlem) unhinged by growing chaos. Yet since the sultan’s accession, he has unflaggingly 
endeavored to reorganize the realm’s resources and repulse its enemies. This, Vâsıf says, is a 
“perfect power caused by divine support.”697  
 These views deserve closer scrutiny. For one, there is nothing especially innovative about 
them. Ottomans ranging from Naîmâ and Dürrî Efendi to Fazlızâde Ali and Mehmed Saçaklızâde 
projected the empire’s “decline” back to approximately the thousandth hijri year, for instance, 
albeit for different reasons. Whereas the former held the millennium to mark a transition into Ibn 
Khaldûn’s “age of stasis,” Fazlızâde associated the date with the infiltration of Persian texts into 
the empire – heretical philosophical texts, to be precise. He and Saçaklızâde argued that Ottoman 
weakness was the result of sheer impiety.
698
 
 If we can say anything about Vâsıf’s views on military reform during this period, it is that 
they are heavily indebted to İbrahim Müteferrika. In Usûlü’l-hikem, Müteferrika built an 
argument for reform around the concept of reciprocation, his aim being, he said, to investigate 
Ottoman weakness and explain Christian rulers’ new weapons and military principles. For him 
these rulers’ power stemmed from their development of a new warfare based on reason, 
mathematics, and geography. Müteferrika argued that war had changed, that old methods were 
                                                 
696 MEHÂSİN 3, 216a; MEHÂSİN (EGYPT), 3b. 
697 MEHÂSİN 3, 216a-217a; MEHÂSİN (EGYPT), 3b-4b. 
698 See Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 1: 21-30, 44; Thomas, 77-78; TOP nr. 1438, 284b-285b; Atik, 71. Cf. 
Kurz, 51-54, 199-200; el-Rouayheb, 203-205.  
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obsolete, indeed dangerous, and that the dynasty ought to inform itself of the enemy’s “new 
military order” as well as cultivate sciences and work through worldly causes. For ultimately, he 
claimed, Christians lack Muslims’ innate bravery and must rely on reason alone. This works to 
Ottoman advantage, and if they combine the new military arts with natural courage the enemy 
will be brought to his knees.
699
 Mukâbele bi’l-misl; the importance of worldly causes; Ottoman 
neglect of geography and mathematics; and the combination of innate Muslim bravery with 
rational reform – all elements of Vâsıf’s views were present decades earlier in Müteferrika’s 
work.  
 No passage better illustrates the connection between these two intellectuals than the 
“Frankish king” from Vâsıf’s fifth volume. In this section, a didactic addendum, we read that 
books on the mathematical science of war advise against dismissing a commander because of 
one or two defeats. Vâsıf relates that in times of old the Franks fought the Goths and that their 
commander was routed on seven occasions in seven years, losing many men and supplies. The 
king’s men discussed his ill fortune and each year called for his dismissal. However, the king 
was foresighted, a prudent and philosophical man; he ignored them and reconfirmed the 
commander, who in the eighth year crushed the enemy, broke their power with a total victory, 
and forced them to make peace. The king then addressed his people. He declared that each year 
his commander had learned the enemy's strategies and acquired the means (esbâb) of 
overcoming them in the future. Now, with victory, they had triumphed. The historian concludes 
that the Frankish king’s behavior was politic, and ends with an axiom: “The believer’s 
persevering quest is wisdom, which he seizeth wherever he findeth.”700 The passage, which 
                                                 
699 Usûlü’l-hikem, 128-148, 151-152, 160-162, 170-172, 191. 
700 MEHÂSİN 5, 2: 187. See Lane for this axiom, s.v. “Ḍ-L-L,” and meaning “that the believer 
ceases not to seek wisdom like as a man seeks his stray.” 
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comes almost ad verbum from Müteferrika,
701
 is unabashed in its activism and promotion of 
reciprocation. 
 Vâsıf’s activism, however, was not restricted to the military. It extended to such other 
fields of endeavor as economics and commerce, whose workings he considered “worthy of 
attention.”702 Vâsıf was a mercantilist who espoused state intervention and showed great interest 
in manipulating the empire’s currency and balance of trade with foreign powers. For example, 
apart from supporting “traditional” revenue tools like debasement and prosecuting coin-cutters, 
the historian, who had worked extensively in the financial bureaucracy, advised using foreign 
bullion to mint currency. This, he said, would bring two main benefits: income to the treasury 
and the discomfiture of other powers.
703
 But as a mercantilist Vâsıf focused above all on the 
empire’s bullion. He recognized that European commercial dominance would siphon off specie 
and wished to compete with them, both by developing industry to keep metals in domestic 
circulation and by enlarging the Ottoman merchant marine, forcing wealthy statesmen to 
purchase ships and trading concerns. The latter, we should point out, involving the ruling class in 
commercial activity, violated basic rules of Ottoman political theory.
704
    
 The “new science of warfare” and rational reform continued to preoccupy the historian in 
the years leading to his death, and figure prominently in 1804’s Muhassenât. This work must be 
classified as propaganda. Evidently commissioned by Selim III, it attempts to silence and 
disparage opponents of the Nizâm-ı Cedîd, while Vâsıf, the consummate rhetorician, dresses up 
                                                 
701 Usûlü’l-hikem, 177-178. 
702 “Esbâb-ı mu‘âmelât umûr-ı i‘tibâriyyeden olmağla…” MEHÂSİN 2, 160b. 
703 Ibid, 161a-162b. 
704 MEHÂSİN 2, 162a-162b, 165a-166a; MEHÂSİN 4, 276b-279a. Also Metin Kunt, “Derviş 
Mehmed Paşa, Vezir and Entrepreneur: a Study in Ottoman Political-Economic Theory and 
Practice,” Turcica 9 (1977): 197-214. 
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his abusive arguments in the familiar garb of a world order sustained through the principle of 
reciprocation.   
 Muhassenât’s preface gives readers all the essential information. Vâsıf declares that God 
creates sovereigns as the “mundane cause (sebeb-i ‘adî)” of worldly tranquility and order. This 
tranquility must be vigilantly preserved by “repelling hostile violence,” for God ordained that the 
earth should be ruled by many monarchs instead of one. Since humans are naturally avaricious 
and opportunistic, then, states that care more than their neighbors to uphold order (nizâm) 
flourish and “those States which from carelessness did not take proper precautions to guard 
against the violence of strangers, have remained without either honour or reputation, and 
dependent upon others.”705 The essay’s purpose is essentially to vindicate this argument. For 
some while, Vâsıf complains, a mutinous rabble has taken to abusing the government. These 
types, who undermine both the realm and order of the world, he wishes to silence.
706
  
 Vâsıf quickly establishes reciprocation as the basis for the Nizâm-ı Cedîd, and in 
particular Selim’s new-style army. In response to Russian threats against Istanbul, he says, the 
sultan’s ministers urged defensive measures and the establishment of a new corps of trained 
soldiers. They met immediate opposition from the Janissaries, but according to the historian it 
was a necessary step, because the Janissaries, engaged in all manner of trade, refused regular 
discipline: 
Whatever confidence we may place in our own strength, yet, God forbid that so cunning 
an enemy should find us in an unguarded posture; particularly since we are instructed by 
the example of so many States, that owed their loss of reputation and ruin to the want of 
care in observing the machinations of their enemies, and in neglecting to provide in 
                                                 
705 MAC, 29-30; Wilkinson, 216-217. 
706 MAC, 32; Wilkinson, 220-221. 
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proper time efficient troops and military stores. From this source their calamities have 
arisen…707 
The new-style army was to provide the realm the necessary protection from grasping enemies. 
Vâsıf hopes that, after the nizâm soldiers’ recent successes in Egypt, and when the forces become 
numerous enough, the empire’s enemies will cease their demands and that the trained troops will 
restore dîn ü devlet and cause the empire to subsist till judgment day, bringing victory over all 
their enemies.
708
  
 Like his chronicle, Vâsıf’s Mehassenât also depicts reciprocation as a key mechanism in 
the empire’s history – but with a twist. As earlier, he claims that the empire’s decline began late 
in the sixteenth century, when Christian states reacted to Ottoman dominance by inventing new 
gunpowder weapons and a system of warfare with professional soldiers, regular drill, and 
formations. The new warfare negated the Ottomans’ innate bravery and made the infidels 
formidable. “Since the invention of this new system of tactics,” he writes, “the Ottomans have 
been most frequently worsted, because they found it impossible to make use of their sabres 
among the infidels as they wished to do...”709  
 The twist lies in the fact that Mehassenât depicts the new warfare as a reaction to earlier 
Ottoman innovations. Süleyman, Vâsıf alleges, had faced defeats of his own against the 
Christians, and to match them he created a successful force of regular infantry, the Janissaries, of 
which the era’s rabble bitterly complained. But with the new warfare the Janissaries ceased to be 
                                                 
707 MAC, 39-40; Wilkinson, 232. 
708 MAC, 37-44; Wilkinson, 227-238. 
709 MAC, 47-49; Wilkinson, 242-244. 
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an elite unit. Mahmud I tried to understand the infidel’s success and commissioned Müteferrika’s 
Usûlü’l-hikem, but the work went unread and reform unfulfilled until Selim’s accession.710 
 Of course, Vâsıf must have known very well that his account was wrong and that the 
Janissaries were an earlier foundation. However, it is a cunning rhetorical stroke.
711
 He does two 
things by making Süleyman the founder of the Janissaries. Firstly, he links one of the most 
potent symbols of the Ottoman “Golden Age” and its storied ruler to the principle of 
reciprocation. Mukâbele bi’l-misl, he is saying, was a main ingredient in the dynasty’s past 
success and trouble followed only when they ceased to observe it. Vâsıf secondly makes the 
opposition appear absurd. If they, the Janissaries, were an innovation, a trained body of troops 
once submitted to drill, how can they now object to the Nizâm-ı Cedîd and refuse discipline?  
 In the remainder of the essay, Vâsıf presumes that victory in battle goes to the best 
trained and prepared. The new army’s “advantages” over the old depend on its ability to match 
the Christians like-for-like, something the old corps’ disorder, indiscipline, and obstinacy make 
impossible: “Should it happen that the enemy is as skilful and well-trained as themselves, and 
employs against them the same discipline,” he explains, 
Then of the two parties, that will be victorious whose chiefs are enabled, by the favour of 
Divine Providence, to put in practice with superior address, the new science and 
stratagems of war which they have learned, because the apostle of the Most High, our 
great prophet (on whom be the blessings and peace of God!) himself condescended to use 
military stratagems [al-ḥarbu khud‘a] – which is to say, “war is a trickery.”712  
                                                 
710 MAC, 45-46, 49-50; Wilkinson, 240-242, 244-246. 
711 On this and other historical inconsistencies, Aksan, “Ottoman Political Writing,” 39-40; 
Erdem, “Wise Old Man,” 166-168; Şakul, 134-135; Üstün, 152-153.  
712 MAC, 66-74; Wilkinson, 266-274. I have emended Wilkinson’s translation.  
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 Vâsıf charges that his opponents had brought the empire to ruin, refusing to cooperate 
and effectively causing defeats to Russia and the loss of the Crimea. According to his logic, 
reciprocation is how the dynasty wards off external enemies, sustains itself, and upholds the 
universal order. Indeed, the historian argues that to act against reform, and so reciprocation, is a 
betrayal of the empire and faith (dîn ü devlet):  
As the superiority which the practice of military exercise gives to the infidels in war is 
clearly evident, as well as the deficiency of the people of Islam in several points 
connected with military science, is not the obstinacy with which you oppose the 
introduction of this exercise, purely a treason against our religion and empire?
713
  
For Selim’s circle, then, opposition to the Nizâm-ı Cedîd was not just perverse; it was heretical 
and criminal. 
 Two final aspects of Ahmed Vâsıf’s thought on reform in this period warrant attention, 
since as they are novel to the 1790s and early 1800s. This does not mean he was unique in any 
special way. Very likely others shared his opinions. Instead, it suggests that intellectuals allied to 
Selim III increasingly pushed their arguments in favor of rational reform into untrodden territory. 
If the “new warfare” had gone beyond the pale,714 so too must solutions. 
 As seen above, in Selim’s reign Vâsıf began to depict mukâbele bi’l-misl as something 
more than a rational precept: reciprocation, he contended, is obligatory, a duty to faith and 
country. His terminology in this regard was quite specific. In his fourth volume, the historian 
records the sultan’s reform of the imperial fleet, saying that the infidel had developed dangerous 
new naval technologies and that “it is a duty obligatory on each individual (farz-ı ‘ayn) for the 
                                                 
713 MAC, 50-54; Wilkinson, 246-251.  
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dynasty to respond in kind to the naval affairs which the infidels have arranged in this era, and to 
organize the causes of contention by meeting them.” He made similar claims in Muhassenât.715 
Reciprocation was therefore, for him, an individual religious obligation (farz-ı ‘ayn). This is a 
legal term signifying an act incumbent on all believers rather than one incumbent on only a part 
of the community (farz-ı kifâye). Jihad, for example, was deemed a collective obligation except 
in dire emergencies, as in an invasion, when all individuals became liable. Vâsıf’s claim likewise 
implies a set of truly exceptional circumstances – namely, that the danger posed by not acting 
reciprocally endangered the empire’s very existence.716  
 The second aspect is perhaps more striking. Vâsıf’s thought during this period displays an 
increasing willingness to experiment, to alter elements of the traditional order for the sake of 
rational reform. The “four pillars” remained central to the Ottoman world-picture through the 
early nineteenth century and Ottomans, the historian and his contemporaries alike, continued to 
refer to them and their importance in the primordial order. Vâsıf personally defended their 
integrity on a number of occasions.
717
 By Selim’s reign, however, he was prepared to tinker. 
 In a digression from his second volume, Vâsıf pauses to comment on European social 
systems. From a young age, he says, Europeans occupy children with a trade according to their 
ability. No one in their countries is unemployed but rather beggars are nonexistent, obliged to 
support themselves. Indeed, he adds that this approach conforms with Islamic thought on the 
“four pillars” and that some philosophers reckon it is impermissible to leave any outside these 
                                                 
715 “Müşrikînin bu asırda nizâm verdikleri umûr-ı bahriyyelerine mukâbele ve bi’l-muvâzene 
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groups, else they must be killed according to the sense of “Keeping each group to its own 
occupation orders the realm and vice versa.”718  
 Moreover, continues the historian, when European men reach adolescence they are sent 
to schools called “academies (akademyâ),” where they study mathematics and geography and 
can survey the whole earth without leaving their country. But it does not suffice to know merely 
the names of the seas and rivers, roads and realms, and fortresses and lands. In order to have 
firsthand experience, Europeans also travel and campaign, and having gained this knowledge in 
theory and practice muster troops, build fortresses, and increase their state's income of their own 
accord. In this manner, infidels, known for their innate stupidity, acquire useful trades through 
compulsion and training. Vâsıf writes that it is cause for regret that Muslims have no care or 
desire to acquire like crafts, so beneficial to dîn ü devlet: 
God willing, henceforth through this means mathematical sciences and industrial methods 
will be spread throughout our realm and according to the sense of “The believer’s 
persevering quest is wisdom, which he seizeth wherever he findeth.” Thus we expect 
dexterous and trained Muslims will take cognizance of all European crafts and produce a 
great many choice matters.
719
 
 While Vâsıf’s 1784 essay excoriated conscription and “outsiders” in other groups, what 
he proposes in this passage is quite the opposite. It is, in fact, nothing short of social engineering. 
In Mardin’s words, Vâsıf is advising the “dragooning” of subjects – orphans, beggars, and 
whomever else – into military academies for compulsory training.720 The scheme’s ostensible 
intellectual guise stretches our credulity. The source of these subjects is immaterial, as is any 
                                                 
718 MEHÂSİN 2, 169a-169b. Cf. with Râtib Efendi’s similar observations on the Viennese. 
Ebubekir Râtib Efendi, 142-144.  
719 Ibid, 169b-170a.  
720 Mardin, “Mind of the Turkish Reformer,” 32. 
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danger of undesirable mixing in social estates. Vâsıf is pushing the notion of an immutable 
universal order supported by rigid social hierarchies to the breaking point, and intimates the 
Ottomans might freely diverge from it, like the Europeans, in order to produce trained experts. In 
this passage the edifice of nizâm-ı ‘âlem seems on the brink of collapse; the strain is nearly 
audible.  
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EPILOGUE 
Vâsıf and Ottoman Intellectual History 
 
The Ottoman elite’s debates over reform, pursued here largely through Vâsıf’s manuscript folia, 
leave us in a commanding position to look back and survey the empire’s intellectual trends at the 
turn of the nineteenth century. It has been my contention throughout this study that the late 
eighteenth century was a period of considerable intellectual and moral crisis. Far from apathy, 
however, this crisis stimulated ferment within the Ottoman ranks over issues ranging from 
theodicy, predestination, and human agency to the limitations of warfare and moral and political 
reform. 
 First we must say a word about continuity. If I have focused on continuity in eighteenth 
century intellectual life at the expense of the new, the novel, it has been with the assumption that 
Ottomans did not, as it were, throw out the baby with the bath water to meet the century’s 
challenges. The late eighteenth century was not a period of radical reexamination of old 
institutions and beliefs. Quite the contrary, the realm’s statesmen and thinkers, while pragmatic, 
brought tested conceptual frameworks to bear on their problems, and many of these, like the 
belief in an immutable world order and dynastic exceptionalism, appear to have been deeply 
ingrained and slow to change. Still, it is precisely by maintaining a cognizance of these persistent 
trends that we can highlight elements of change. The conservatism of Ottoman reactions allows 
us to better perceive innovations when they did indeed occur.  
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 Early nineteenth century Ottomans clung fast to the pretense that their empire was 
unique, immune to the inexorable march of history and its patterns, and in these pages we have 
seen countless examples to this effect. However, the tenor of these assertions was increasingly 
strained. Ottomans like Vâsıf sensed that reality did not match their expectations and, as though 
they could not withstand the psychological blow, they tried valiantly but vainly to save 
exceptionalism from collapse by depicting the empire’s ills in terms of divine trial (istidrâc) and 
as essays in theodicy. At the same time, Vâsıf and like minds insisted that subjects could not 
remain idle. They reaffirmed the dynasty’s unique character, but tempered it with the caveat that 
continued success was part of a divine grand bargain: exceptionalism, they claimed, demanded 
action as well as moral responsibility.  
 This concern with causality, human agency, and initiative is an important and heretofore 
unwritten chapter in Ottoman intellectual history, with wide implications. As mentioned in 
Chapter Two, it created potent arguments for political reform and even hinted at a secularized, 
humanized concept of history. Vâsıf and his peers were responding in their arguments, or 
preempting, discordant voices, fatalists who for various reasons rejected human agency. Some of 
these may well have had legitimate religious scruples. Others more likely exploited the rhetoric 
of fatalism to rebut threats to their material interests, particularly those posed by reformers of 
Vâsıf’s ilk. The presence of this discourse is not in question, but rather why and how. It 
permeates the sources and deserves much fuller study.  
 We can clearly see how agency influenced other facets of Ottoman intellectual life in the 
contemporary debate over peace and peacemaking, treated at length in Chapter Three. The 
gradual abandonment of prescriptive, legalistic defenses of peace not only represented a 
departure from the empire’s martial ideology but also an expanded role for human agency in the 
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conduct of war. If warfare were “unpredictable in its outcome,” as Vâsıf came to argue in the 
1790s and after, it meant that Ottomans could not simply rely on victory as a predetermined, 
preordained result. Rather, they had to exert prudence, care, and reason, and as often as not forgo 
force. While such an approach had always been part of Ottoman praxis, and was, besides, firmly 
in their interest, it was not until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, after much lag, 
that ideology finally caught up with action. For the first time Ottomans began to assert the 
virtues of peace – or, put slightly differently, of containing warfare – rather than treating it as a 
necessary evil. 
 The early nineteenth century likewise saw the first major fissures in that hoary bastion of 
Ottoman sociopolitical stability, “world order (nizâm-ı ‘âlem).” As said in Chapters Four and 
Five, “world order” remained without fail the primary framework that thinkers and statesmen 
used to describe society and discuss political thought. Reform, meanwhile, was understood as 
nothing more or less than the restoration of this order’s internal balance. Ottoman reformers of 
the period did not envision a radical revolution or even more modest structural change, for, 
indeed, to them the primary characteristic of world order was that it was, in theory, unchanging 
and unchangeable. Selim III and his camarilla therefore presented the “New Order” reforms not 
as a new universal order but as a restoration of the old – a renovation, through human reason, of 
a purely political order functioning within nizâm-ı ‘âlem.  
  Perhaps the greatest debate involving reform, one which was still ongoing at the turn of 
the century, was the extent to which human reason could be taken. As we have seen, Selim’s 
supporters asserted the legitimacy of rational reform by pressing concepts like “reciprocation 
(mukâbele bi’l-misl),” “ancient practice (kânûn-ı kadîm),” “individual obligation (farz-ı ‘ayn),” 
and others to new ends and to new limits, even to the point of contravening rules of Ottoman 
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political thought. They were, perhaps without fully appreciating it, undermining the basic 
supports of “world order.” Yet reformers like Vâsıf did not carry the argument, at least not 
totally. We have it on good grounds that many rejected the “New Order” as sinful innovation 
(bid‘a), a religiously charged term that, along with fatalism, could be and was usefully 
manipulated by vulnerable interest groups. This is not to say the contest was wholly cynical, 
though. Clearly many Ottomans, including reformist sympathizers, were skeptical about the 
rationalist direction of Selim’s “New Order” and felt that it neglected spiritual, nonmaterial 
concerns. The presence of such a policy disagreement among the reformers themselves must be 
seen as important, an indication that Selim had, in the end, failed to build necessary consensus 
even within his own government.  
 These are some of the major intellectual trends outlined in this dissertation, but what 
larger observations do they raise? What, if anything, can they tell us more generally about late 
eighteenth century Ottoman society? For one, they point to a surprisingly dynamic milieu. Vâsıf 
and his peers responded to the direst challenges of the period mostly on the strength of their own 
resources – that is, by adapting, reinterpreting, and reshaping the accumulated capital of some 
thousand years of Islamic culture. We have seen in all chapters how concepts – legal, 
philosophical, ethical, and otherwise – were progressively reconsidered, altered, and redeployed 
to make room, just to cite two examples, for widened human agency and increased control over 
war. We have also observed how Ottomans were willing to tinker in certain circumstances, to 
bend and sometimes even break seemingly fundamental precepts.  
 This was certainly not dogmatism. Indeed, the weight that Vâsıf and his partisans laid on 
human action and reason, or what Mardin once called “activism,” was eminently pragmatic and 
needs further careful study. It would be all too easy to read into their arguments an incipient 
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humanism, secularization, or modernity. The late eighteenth century is no doubt promising as a 
terminus post quem for the development of Ottoman modernity, doubly so in that, as we have 
seen, it was during this period that certain storied conceptual frameworks began to fracture and 
crumble. However, without an adequate intellectual history of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, for which this dissertation can hopefully serve as partial groundwork, we can hardly 
hope to make sweeping pronouncements. At most we might say that Vâsıf and his peers were 
neither here nor there, unwittingly on the brink of a seismic shift but not over it, both the last of 
the ancients and first of the moderns. Anything more must be left for future research.  
 Likewise should we avoid overrating the flexibility of eighteenth century Ottoman elites. 
If they were resourceful and dynamic, they were also badly divided. Throughout the eighteenth 
century Ottoman rulers governed by consensus, and past sultans had enacted limited reforms 
because they could not afford to alienate entrenched interests. Late eighteenth century reformers, 
particularly Selim III, understood this fact but failed to overcome the divisions and build 
agreement for their programs. Exactly why this was so is another question for the future. Clearly 
the debate was a bitter one, so bitter, in fact, that we are well able to trace the period’s rich 
intellectual history. Our sources exist for the reason that opposition needed to be countered in 
writing, else why make the argument? Yet we almost completely lack the story of the opposition, 
and it is unclear whether it can ever be recovered apart from what we are told, probably in 
distorted fashion, by hostile interlocutors. Do these opponents have a rival intellectual history to 
be told? What prevented them from forming a viable coalition with Vâsıf and his colleagues? 
Given what the sources suggest about breakdown in traditional frameworks and other devices of 
legitimation, and the absence of ready replacements, is it possible that the Ottoman polity had at 
this date and in this guise simply become unworkable?  
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 Ahmed Vâsıf serves an intellectual history of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries because he was so personally invested in these and other events he recorded. The youth 
from Baghdad grew into mature adulthood on the war front, in Istanbul and abroad, and 
witnessed the empire’s failures from an often dangerous firsthand vantage; he survived 
successive governments and sultans, reformers and reactionaries, and reached old age as the 
chief voice of the most ambitious reform program yet attempted in the empire’s history. It should 
not come as a surprise that his work conveys the outlines of all these changes, nor that we must 
only take the trouble to learn his language, read his signposts, and become sensitive to the 
nuances of his discourse to see the stakes and positions involved, on his side and on the others. 
Vâsıf’s history in this way offers a panorama of Ottoman intellectual life during his lifetime, a 
microcosm of his world.  
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